Malta Transformed by Multi-level Governance: More Than Just an Outcome of Europeanisation. Occasional Paper 03/2014

Malta has been transformed in many ways with and by EU Membership. This paper goes beyond the more obvious impacts of ‘Europeanisation’ and instead reviews the implications of an explosion of multi-level governance on doing politics in Malta. While for most of its recent political history, there has been a clawing back of power by the central government – as when the Gozo Civic Council (1960-1973), an early foray into regional government, was “unceremoniously dissolved” in 1973 – this trend was reversed with the setting up of local councils as from 1994, an advisory Malta Council for Economic and Social Development (MCESD) in 2001, and then EU membership in 2004. These events have created a profligacy of decision-making tiers and multiplied the tensions that exist between different levels of governance in this small archipelago state. Malta has never experienced such pluralism before. In fact, since 1966, only two political parties have been represented in the national legislature and, therefore, there has been no division of powers between the executive and the national parliament. This paper reviews the implications of these developments on two hot political issues in 2014: the International Investor Programme (IIP) proposed by the Labour Government in its 2014 Budget; and the location of a Liquid Natural Gas (LNG)-storage vessel inside Marsaxlokk harbour.

A feigned liberalisation: Russia is restricting Gazprom's monopoly on exports. OSW Commentary No. 121, 26.11.2013

An act restricting Gazprom’s monopoly in Russian gas exports came into effect on 1 December 2013. Previously Gazprom had had a legal guarantee to its monopoly position. The changes are an effect of consultations between various ministries that had been conducted for many months and were affected by lobbying from Novatek and Rosneft (Gazprom’s competitors on the domestic gas market); they need not, though, be seen as system changes. The ‘liberalisation’ they appear to bring in is feigned. Proof of this are found for example in both the limited material scope of the new law (it concerns only exports of liquefied natural gas, LNG) and the small number of the beneficiaries of the new regulations (the new solutions will be beneficial for Novatek and Rosneft). Contrary to initial announcements, the right to export LNG has not been restricted to South-Eastern Asian markets, which means that Russian liquefied natural gas is also likely to be sold to Europe in the coming years. Although these changes have been motivated above all by the individual interests of Gazprom’s competitors, they are also to a certain extent a response to the processes taking place on regional gas markets. They may, therefore, turn out to be beneficial for the state (increasing Russia’s share on the global LNG market and attracting foreign investors to gas extraction projects being implemented in Russia). The new regulations are probably the first step down the long road to breaking Gazprom’s monopoly in gas exports via the pipeline system.

A bottomless pit: the costs of Crimea’s annexation by Russia. OSW Commentary No. 143, 29.07.2014

The annexation of Crimea has brought the Russian authorities significant dividends, in particular on the domestic stage: it has resulted in an unprecedented social and political consolidation, and strengthened Vladimir Putin’s position after several years of decline in social support for him. It has provided Russia with strategic benefits, giving it broad access to the Black Sea and the military infrastructure on the peninsula, as well as access to natural gas and crude oil reserves. Russia has also taken over numerous assets (including the tourist infrastructure) previously owned by the Ukrainian state. However, the decision itself concerning Moscow’s annexation of Crimea was taken off the cuff, with no calculation of the costs of integrating it with the Russian legal, political and socio-economic space. Russia took over a region that required subsidies from the Ukrainian budget; moreover, the annexation struck at the most important industry of the Crimean economy – tourism. Crimea’s integration with Russia will be a complex process that entails high costs, financial, organisational and social, including multi-billion dollar investments in the modernisation and development of infrastructure, covering the region’s budget deficit, and paying out social benefits. For reasons of prestige and political significance, Moscow is treating Crimea as a showcase region. Russia is determined to prove that the Crimean incorporation will be beneficial for the region’s economy and will raise people’s living standards. However, the expenses triggered by Crimea’s integration will coincide with a deteriorating economic situation in Russia, aggravated by US and EU sanctions, and this may force Russia to postpone or even give up some of its ambitious investments in the peninsula. Some of the integration costs will have to be borne by other Russian regions, even though they already face serious financial problems that have forced them to reduce their own investment programs. Another issue that has come into question is the fulfilment of the Crimean people’s’ expectations concerning the improvement of their living standards, due to the tourist sector’s problems (small-scale tourist services used to be one of the local people’s main sources of income), the rising costs of maintenance, and finally, restrictions of civil rights after the introduction of the more restrictive Russian legislation.

Gazprom's expansion in the EU - co-operation or domination? OSW Report, April 2008

The energy sector, especially with regard to natural gas trade, is one of the key areas of co-operation between the EU and Russia. However, the character of this co-operation has given rise to increasing doubts both in Brussels and among the EU member states. The questions have emerged whether this co-operation does not make the EU excessively dependent on Russian energy supplies, and whether Gazprom's presence in the EU will not allow Moscow to interfere in the proces of devising the EU energy policy. This report is intended to present the factual base and data necessary to provide accurate answers to the foregoing questions. The first part of the report presents the scope and character of Gazprom's economic presence in the EU member states. The second part shows the presence of the EU investors in Russia. The data presented has been provided by the International Energy Agency, European Commission, the Central Bank of Russia and the Russian Federal State Statistics Service. Some of the data is the result of calculations made by the Centre for Eastern Studies' experts who were basing on the data provided by energy companies, the specialist press and news agencies.

Forerunners or scaremongers? Germany to abandon nuclear power. OSW Commentary No. 58, 2011-07-21

The German government’s final decision to abandon nuclear power as of 2022 has been expected for months. However, instead of calming the waters, providing solutions and answering the question ‘What next?’, it has only fanned the flames. Even the adoption of legal amendments enforcing the government’s decision by the German parliament (both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat) in late June and early July has not calmed the situation. It is more than apparent that these decisions have been made under emotional pressure: there was not enough time for accurate calculations to be made and consideration to be given to the consequences of Germany abandoning nuclear power. Chancellor Angela Merkel has so far been unable to fully convince the public that the ‘energy shift is a huge opportunity’ and that this process will be carried out on condition that ‘the supplies remain secure, the climate protected and the whole process economically efficient’1. German economic associations have warned against a politically motivated, ill-judged and irreversible abandonment of nuclear energy. They are anxious about an increase in electricity prices, the instability of supplies and environmental damage. The government believes, however, that green technologies will become a new driving force for the German economy and its main export commodity. Before that happens the industry will have to increase its use of electricity produced from fossil fuels, mainly natural gas imported from Russia. This may be exploited by Gazprom which will try to strengthen its position on the German market, and thus in the entire EU.

Ukrainian economy on the verge of recession. OSW Commentary No. 96, 2012-11-21

In the third quarter of 2012, Ukraine’s economy recorded negative growth (-1.3%) for the first time since its 2009 economic crisis. Q4 GDP is projected to suffer a further decline, bringing Ukraine into formal recession. In addition to the worsening macroeconomic indicators, Ukraine is also facing a series of concomitant economic problems: a growing trade deficit, industrial decline, shrinking foreign exchange reserves, and the weakening of the hryvnia. Poor economic growth is expected to result in lower than projected budget revenues, which in turn could lead to the sequestration of the budget in December. The decline evident across the key economic indicators in the second half of 2012 brings to a close a period of relative economic stability and two years of economic growth, which had been seen as a significant personal achievement of President Viktor Yanukovych and the ruling Party of Regions. The health of the Ukrainian economy largely depends on the state of the country’s export- -oriented industries. The current economic forecasts for foreign markets are not very optimistic. It is impossible to determine whether the current economic downturn is likely to be merely temporary or whether it heralds the onset of a prolonged economic crisis. The limited capacity to deal with the growing economic problems may mean that Kiev will need to seek financial support from abroad. This is particularly significant with regard to external debt servicing, since in 2013 Ukraine will need to pay back around 9 billion USD, including over 5.5 billion USD to the International Monetary Fund. In order to overcome the recession and stabilise public finances, the government may be forced to take a series of unpopular measures, including raising the price of natural gas and utilities. These measures have been stipulated by the IMF as a condition of further financial assistance and the disbursement of the 12 billion USD stabilisation loan granted to Ukraine in July 2010. The only alternative for Western loans and economic reforms appears to be financial support from Russia. The price for Moscow’s help might however turn out to be very high, and precipitate a turn in Kiev’s foreign policy towards a gradual re-integration of former Soviet republics under Moscow-led geopolitical projects.

Iranian-Saudi tensions: the energy dimension. EPC Policy Brief, 9 February 2016

Following the execution of Saudi Shiite cleric Nimr Baqer al-Nimr, the deep rooted rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia entered a new phase in January 2016. While the main objective for both countries still is regional hegemony, the Iranian-Saudi competition takes many different forms and shapes, and also extends into the field of energy. In this Policy Brief, David Ramin Jalilvand gives a detailed analysis of the energy-related aspects of the Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry and its possible consequences for Europe’s energy market; both countries hold giant hydrocarbon reserves, so European energy will probably be affected by their competition in several regards; increased oil supplies will be available for the European market, while the cycle of low oil prices will be prolonged. According to Jalilvand, this is a mixed blessing; Europe’s energy import bill will be reduced, but its indigenous production will suffer, while Russia’s role in European natural gas will only continue to grow.

Validation of the Swiss methane emission inventory by atmospheric observations and inverse modelling

Atmospheric inverse modelling has the potential to provide observation-based estimates of greenhouse gas emissions at the country scale, thereby allowing for an independent validation of national emission inventories. Here, we present a regional-scale inverse modelling study to quantify the emissions of methane (CH₄) from Switzerland, making use of the newly established CarboCount-CH measurement network and a high-resolution Lagrangian transport model. In our reference inversion, prior emissions were taken from the "bottom-up" Swiss Greenhouse Gas Inventory (SGHGI) as published by the Swiss Federal Office for the Environment in 2014 for the year 2012. Overall we estimate national CH₄ emissions to be 196 ± 18 Gg yr⁻¹ for the year 2013 (1σ uncertainty). This result is in close agreement with the recently revised SGHGI estimate of 206 ± 33 Gg yr⁻¹ as reported in 2015 for the year 2012. Results from sensitivity inversions using alternative prior emissions, uncertainty covariance settings, large-scale background mole fractions, two different inverse algorithms (Bayesian and extended Kalman filter), and two different transport models confirm the robustness and independent character of our estimate. According to the latest SGHGI estimate the main CH₄ source categories in Switzerland are agriculture (78 %), waste handling (15 %) and natural gas distribution and combustion (6 %). The spatial distribution and seasonal variability of our posterior emissions suggest an overestimation of agricultural CH₄ emissions by 10 to 20 % in the most recent SGHGI, which is likely due to an overestimation of emissions from manure handling. Urban areas do not appear as emission hotspots in our posterior results, suggesting that leakages from natural gas distribution are only a minor source of CH₄ in Switzerland. This is consistent with rather low emissions of 8.4 Gg yr⁻¹ reported by the SGHGI but inconsistent with the much higher value of 32 Gg yr⁻¹ implied by the EDGARv4.2 inventory for this sector. Increased CH₄ emissions (up to 30 % compared to the prior) were deduced for the north-eastern parts of Switzerland. This feature was common to most sensitivity inversions, which is a strong indicator that it is a real feature and not an artefact of the transport model and the inversion system. However, it was not possible to assign an unambiguous source process to the region. The observations of the CarboCount-CH network provided invaluable and independent information for the validation of the national bottom-up inventory. Similar systems need to be sustained to provide independent monitoring of future climate agreements.

(Table 2) Methane to ethane ratio, and d13C-methane at DSDP Hole 76-533

Natural gas hydrates are clathrates in which water molecules form a crystalline framework that includes and is stabilized by natural gas (mainly methane) at appropriate conditions of high pressures and low temperatures. The conditions for the formation of gas hydrates are met within continental margin sediments below water depths greater than about 500 m where the supply of methane is sufficient to stabilize the gas hydrate. Observations on DSDP Leg 11 suggested the presence of gas hydrates in sediments of the Blake Outer Ridge. Leg 76 coring and sampling confirms that, indeed, gas hydrates are present there. Geochemical evidence for gas hydrates in sediment of the Blake Outer Ridge includes (1) high concentrations of methane, (2) a sediment sample with thin, matlike layers of white crystals that released a volume of gas twenty times greater than its volume of pore fluid, (3) a molecular distribution of hydrocarbon gases that excluded hydrocarbons larger than isobutane, (4) results from pressure core barrel experiments, and (5) pore-fluid chemistry. The molecular composition of the hydrocarbons in these gas hydrates and the isotopic composition of the methane indicate that the gas is derived mainly from microbiological processes operating on the organic matter within the sediment. Although gas hydrates apparently are widespread on the Blake Outer Ridge, they probably are not of great economic significance as a potential, unconventional, energy resource or as an impermeable cap for trapping upwardly migrating gas at Site 533.

(Table 1) Crystal sizes of measured samples

Due to experimental difficulties grain size distributions of gas hydrate crystallites are largely unknown in natural samples. For the first time, we were able to determine grain size distributions of six natural gas hydrates for samples retrieved from the Gulf of Mexico and from Hydrate Ridge offshore Oregon from varying depths. High-energy synchrotron radiation provides high photon fluxes as well as high penetration depth and thus allows for investigation of bulk sediment samples. The gas hydrate crystallites appear to be (log-) normally distributed in the natural samples and to be of roughly globular shape. The mean grain sizes are in the range from 300-600 µm with a tendency for bigger grains to occur in greater depth, possibly indicating a difference in the formation age. Laboratory produced methane hydrate, starting from ice and aged for 3 weeks, shows half a log-normal curve with a mean value of ~40 µm. This one order-of-magnitude smaller grain sizes suggests that care must be taken when transposing grain-size sensitive (petro-)physical data from laboratory-made gas hydrates to natural settings.

(Table 1) Crystal sizes of measured samples from the Bush Hill region in the Gulf of Mexico and from ODP Leg 204 at the Hydrate Ridge offshore Oregon

The grain sizes of gas hydrate crystallites are largely unknown in natural samples. Single grains are hardly detectable with electron or optical microscopy. For the first time, we have used high-energy synchrotron diffraction to determine grain sizes of six natural gas hydrates retrieved from the Bush Hill region in the Gulf of Mexico and from ODP Leg 204 at the Hydrate Ridge offshore Oregon from varying depth between 1 and 101 metres below seafloor. High-energy synchrotron radiation provides high photon fluxes as well as high penetration depth and thus allows for investigation of bulk sediment samples. Gas hydrate grain sizes were measured at the Beam Line BW 5 at the HASYLAB/Hamburg. A 'moving area detector method', originally developed for material science applications, was used to obtain both spatial and orientation information about gas hydrate grains within the sample. The gas hydrate crystal sizes appeared to be (log-)normally distributed in the natural samples. All mean grain sizes lay in the range from 300 to 600 µm with a tendency for bigger grains to occur in greater depth. Laboratory-produced methane hydrate, aged for 3 weeks, showed half a log-normal curve with a mean grain size value of c. 40 µm. The grains appeared to be globular shaped.

(Table 1) Gravity and pressure within the Sleipner area relative to ones at the reference station in 2002 and 2005

At Sleipner, CO2 is being separated from natural gas and injected into an underground saline aquifer for environmental purposes. Uncertainty in the aquifer temperature leads to uncertainty in the in situ density of CO2. In this study, gravity measurements were made over the injection site in 2002 and 2005 on top of 30 concrete benchmarks on the seafloor in order to constrain the in situ CO2 density. The gravity measurements have a repeatability of 4.3 µGal for 2003 and 3.5 µGal for 2005. The resulting time-lapse uncertainty is 5.3 µGal. Unexpected benchmark motions due to local sediment scouring contribute to the uncertainty. Forward gravity models are calculated based on both 3D seismic data and reservoir simulation models. The time-lapse gravity observations best fit a high temperature forward model based on the time-lapse 3D seismics, suggesting that the average in situ CO2 density is about to 530kg/m**3. Uncertainty in determining the average density is estimated to be ±65 kg/m**3 (95% confidence), however, this does not include uncertainties in the modeling. Additional seismic surveys and future gravity measurements will put better constraints on the CO2 density and continue to map out the CO2 flow.

(Table 1) Carbon, hydrocarbons and observations at DSDP Holes 67-497 and 67-498A

Gas hydrates are icelike materials that form when specific conditions of temperature, pressure, and gas composition are simultaneously satisfied. Among the first descriptions of gas hydrates under natural conditions was that of Hammerschmidt (1940), who found them in pipelines used to transport natural gas. Milton (1976) indicates that conditions are suitable for the presence of gas hydrates in areas affected by permafrost and cites studies suggesting that large quantities of gas exist in hydrate form.

Final report of a 1991 Plymouth Acclaim rear impact CNG fuel tank integrity.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Washington, D.C.

A 1992 Dodge Ram B250 van rear impact CNG fuel tank integrity. Final report.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Washington, D.C.