Tax Treaty Override

What exactly is tax treaty override ? When is it realized ? This thesis, which is the result of a co-directed PhD between the University of Bologna and Tilburg University, gives a deep insight into a topic that has not yet been analyzed in a systematic way. On the contrary, the analysis about tax treaty override is still at a preliminary stage. For this reason the origin and nature of tax treaty override are first of all analyzed in their ‘natural’ context, i.e. within general international law. In order to characterize tax treaty override and deeply understand its peculiarities the evaluation of the effects of general international law on tax treaties based on the OECD Model Convention is a necessary pre-condition. Therefore, the binding effects of an international agreement on state sovereignty are specifically investigated. Afterwards, the interpretation of the OECD Model Convention occupies the main part of the thesis in order to develop an ‘interpretative model’ which can be applied every time a case of tax treaty override needs to be detected. Fictitious income, exit taxes and CFC regimes are analyzed in order to verify their compliance with tax treaties based on the OECD Model Convention and establish when the relevant legislation realizes cases of tax treaty override.

Legal presumptions in national tax systems (Italy and Belgium) and in EU law

The thesis deals with the concept of presumptions, and in particular of legal presumptions, in the context of national tax systems (Italy and Belgium) and EU law. The purpose was to investigate the concept of legal presumption under a twofold comparative perspective. After having provided a general overview of the common core concept of presumption in the European context, an insight in the national approach to legal presumptions was given by examining two different national experiences, namely the Italian and Belgian tax systems. At this stage, the Constitutional framework and some of the most interesting and relevant at EU level presumptive measures were explored, with a view to underlining possible divergences and common grounds. The concept of (national) legal presumption was then investigated in the context of EU law, with the attempt to systematize under a uniform perspective a matter which has been traditionally dealt with either from the merely national point of view or, at EU level, through a fragmented form. In this instance, the EU law relevant framework and the most significant EUCJ case-law, in particular in the field of customs duties, VAT, on the issue of the repayment of taxes levied in breach of EU law and in the area of direct taxation, were examined so as to construe the overall EU approach to national legal presumptions. This was done with the finality of determining if and to what extent a common analytical framework may be identified, from which were extracted certain criteria governing the compatibility of national legal presumptions with EU law.

Public Attitudes Toward Social Spending in the United States: The Differences Between Direct Spending and Tax Expenditures

This paper uses a survey experiment to examine differences in public attitudes toward 'direct' and 'indirect' government spending. Federal social welfare spending in the USA has two components: the federal government spends money to directly provide social benefits to citizens, and also indirectly subsidizes the private provision of social benefits through tax expenditures. Though benefits provided through tax expenditures are considered spending for budgetary purposes, they differ from direct spending in several ways: in the mechanisms through which benefits are delivered to citizens, in how they distribute wealth across the income spectrum, and in the visibility of their policy consequences to the mass public. We develop and test a model explaining how these differences will affect public attitudes toward spending conducted through direct and indirect means. We find that support for otherwise identical social programs is generally higher when such programs are portrayed as being delivered through tax expenditures than when they are portrayed as being delivered by direct spending. In addition, support for tax expenditure programs which redistribute wealth upward drops when citizens are provided information about the redistributive effects. Both of these results are conditioned by partisanship, with the opinions of Republicans more sensitive to the mechanism through which benefits are delivered, and the opinions of Democrats more sensitive to information about their redistributive effects.