Sandcastles of hope? Civil society organizations and the working conditions of migrant farmworkers in North America

This research explores whether civil society organizations (CSOs) can contribute to more effectively regulating the working conditions of temporary migrant farmworkers in North America. This dissertation unfolds in five parts. The first part of the dissertation sets out the background context. The context includes the political economy of agriculture and temporary migrant labour more broadly. It also includes the political economy of the legal regulations that govern immigration and work relations. The second part of the research builds an analytical model for studying the operation of CSOs active in working with the migrant farmworker population. The purpose of the analytical framework is to make sense of real-world examples by providing categories for analysis and a means to get at the channels of influence that CSOs utilize to achieve their aims. To this end, the model incorporates the insights from three significant bodies of literature—regulatory studies, labour studies, and economic sociology. The third part of the dissertation suggests some key strategic issues that CSOs should consider when intervening to assist migrant farmworkers, and also proposes a series of hypotheses about how CSOs can participate in the regulatory process. The fourth part probes and extends these hypotheses by empirically investigating the operation of three CSOs that are currently active in assisting migrant farm workers in North America: the Agricultural Workers Alliance (Canada), Global Workers’ Justice Alliance (USA), and the Coalition of Immokalee Workers (USA). The fifth and final part draws together lessons from the empirical work and concluded that CSOs can fill gaps left by the waning power of actors, such as trade unions and labour inspectorates, as well as act in ways that these traditional actors can not.

The distribution of debt across euro area countries : The role of individual characteristics, institutions and credit conditions. National Bank of Belgium Working Paper No. 252, December 2013

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we present an up-to-date assessment of the differences across euro area countries in the distributions of various measures of debt conditional on household characteristics. We consider three different outcomes: the probability of holding debt, the amount of debt held and, in the case of secured debt, the interest rate paid on the main mortgage. Second, we examine the role of legal and economic institutions in accounting for these differences. We use data from the first wave of a new survey of household finances, the Household Finance and Consumption Survey, to achieve these aims. We find that the patterns of secured and unsecured debt outcomes vary markedly across countries. Among all the institutions considered, the length of asset repossession periods best accounts for the features of the distribution of secured debt. In countries with longer repossession periods, the fraction of people who borrow is smaller, the youngest group of households borrow lower amounts (conditional on borrowing), and the mortgage interest rates paid by low-income households are higher. Regulatory loan-to-value ratios, the taxation of mortgages and the prevalence of interest-only or fixed-rate mortgages deliver less robust results.

Big business in Belarus - its genesis, conditions and prospects. OSW Commentary No. 113, 2013-09-09

Over the past ten to twenty years, Belarus has seen a steep rise in the number of local dollar millionaires. This has somewhat undermined the myth of an egalitarian model of society promoted through the Belarusian state propaganda. There is a small group of businessmen among the top earners who, in exchange for their political loyalty and their consent to share profits with those in power, have enjoyed a number of privileges that allow them to safely conduct business in an environment typically hostile to private enterprise. The favourable conditions under which they are operating have enabled them not only to accumulate substantial capital, but also to invest it abroad. However, since such businesses are seen as providing a financial safety net for the regime, in 2011 and 2012 some of their directors received an EU travel ban, while their companies were subjected to economic sanctions by Brussels. At the same time, fearing that Belarus’s big business could become powerful enough to influence the country’s political scene (as has been the case in Russia and Ukraine), Alexander Lukashenka has actively prevented such players from becoming too independent. Consequently, Belarus has so far not developed its own elite class of oligarchs who would be able to actively influence government policy. The current informal agreement between the government in Minsk and big business has proved stable and is unlikely to change in the near future. Nonetheless, a reordering of state power giving Belarus’s big business significant political influence would be possible should Mr Lukashenka lose power in the next presidential election.

Ukraine and Russia: mutual relations and the conditions that determine them; The Republic of Belarus or the Belarussian Republic? OSW Study 3/2001

Ukraine and Russia: Among all of the countries that border Ukraine, the Russian Federation is its most important partner. Ukraine's relations with Moscow are the key issue of its foreign policy to such an extent that each option of the Ukrainian foreign policy is first and foremost a choice as to the shape of its relations with Russia. This is mainly a consequence of Ukraine's geographic and geopolitical situation, the legacy of many centuries of political, economic and cultural bonds between these two countries, as well as Russia's inevitably dominant position in their mutual relations. Belarus: Belarus has not broken off its bonds with Moscow after the break-up of the Soviet Union. Throughout the whole period of the Belarussian independence we can observe the country's strong political, economic and military dependence on Russia. This dependence allows Russia to control, and even shape, the processes that take place in Belarus in all the areas mentioned.

Big business in the Russian economy and politics under Putin's rule; The Russian power industry shortly before reforms; Ukrainian metallurgy: the economic link in the oligarchical system. OSW Study 5/2002

Big business in Russia: The pace of ownership transfer in the Russian economy has speeded up considerably over the last year. There has been a significant rise in the number of acquisitions of whole enterprises, and large blocks of shares in individual firms and plants. Similarly the number of mergers, bankruptcies and take-overs of failing firms by their strongest competitors has grown. The Russian power industry: This study is an overview of the current condition and principles on which the Russian power sector has been functioning so far. This analysis has been carried out against the background of the changes that have been taking place in the sector since the beginning of the 1990s. This text also contains a description of guidelines and progress made so far in implementing the reform of the Russian power industry, the draft of which was adopted by the government of the Russian Federation in summer 2001. However, the purpose of this study is not an economic analysis of the draft, but an attempt to present the political conditions and possible consequences of the transformations carried out in the Russian power sector. The final part attempts to evaluate the possibilities and threats related to the implementation of the reform in its present shape. Ukrainian metallurgy: The metallurgic sector, like the east-west transit of energy raw materials, is a strategic source of revenue for Ukraine. Over the last ten years, this sector has become Kiev's most important source of foreign currency inflows, accounting for over 40 per cent of its total export revenues. The growth of metallurgic production, which has continued almost without interruption since the mid-1990s, has contributed considerably to the increase in GDP which Ukraine showed in 2000, for the first time in its independent history.

Financial Engineering Instruments and their Assessment Under EU State Aid Rules. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 26/2013

Financial engineering instruments such as guarantees, loans and equity are increasingly used in public funding of enterprises. These instruments have three attractive features: they are repayable, they “leverage” private involvement, and they have a multiplier effect because they generate new income. At the same time, however, they are technically complex and they are subject to state aid rules. Their assessment under EU state aid rules creates two additional problems. First, under certain conditions financial instruments may not contain state aid. This is when public authorities act as “private investors”. This means that state aid cannot be presumed to exist in all financial instruments. It must first be established through market analysis. Second, when state aid is found to be present it is not always possible to quantify it. For this reason the state aid rules that apply to financial instruments differ significantly from other rules. This paper reviews how financial instruments have been assessed by the European Commission and under which conditions the state aid they may contain can be considered to be compatible with the internal market. The paper finds that by and large Member States have succeeded to design measures that have all been approved by the Commission.

Has the European ICT sector a chance to be competitive? Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 14/2006

In this paper we try to present the main trends of evolution of the ICT sector. Its dynamics, supported by a constant technical progress in ICs, compounded with “non convexities” such as network effects and high sunk costs, may either lead to a Schumpeter Mark I or Schumpeter Mark II competition regime. This means that in some segments, the market will be more competitive (Mark I), while in other it will be more monopolistic (Mark II). But a key trend is also the so called “convergence”. But digitization makes it cost effective to integrate different communications, information processing and entertainment systems and devices. Hence, Schumpeter Mark II grows at the core where software production dominates, while Schumpeter Mark I is established at the periphery. In this context, the European ICT industry is potentially smashed between two forces: the cost advantages of Asian countries on one hand, the inventiveness and dynamism of the US industry on the other hand. The way out of this very difficult situation is to create in Europe the conditions of restoring knowledge accumulation in a key sub-sector of ICT, that is software production. To do this, Europe can rely on its tradition of cooperation and knowledge sharing and on a set of institutions that have shown their ability to stimulate inter-regional cooperation. By concentrating on an ambitious project of open source software production in embarked systems and domestic networks, Europe could reach several objectives: to make freely accessible an essential facility, to stimulate competition, to help reaching the Lisbon objectives and to restore the European competitiveness in ICT.