Ramzanistan. Russia's Chechen Problem. OSW POINT OF VIEW Number 54, 2015-08-25

The political activity and growing independence of Chechnya’s leader Ramzan Kadyrov raises questions about his loyalty and the possibility of his openly renouncing his servitude to Moscow. Such a scenario seems unlikely because of the dependence of Kadyrov’s regime on Russia. He is burdened by his republic’s financial dependence, the stain of collaboration and the crimes committed on his own people, and so his regime cannot exist without Moscow’s support. However, Kadyrov’s dependence on Moscow and the apparent stability of the situation in Chechnya do not mean that a lasting peace has been established there. The current plan for governing the republic and the relationship between Moscow and Grozny is a temporary solution, based not on durable solutions, but on the situational convergence of the Kremlin and Kadyrov’s interests. A change of government in the Kremlin, or to an even greater degree a domestic crisis in Russia which weakens its position in the Caucasus, would mean the fall of Kadyrov’s regime, and the reactivation of pro-independence rhetoric in Chechnya.

Strangers among us. Non-governmental organisations in Russia. OSW COMMENTARY 2015-09-29

The situation of the third sector in Russia, i.e. the civil society structures independent from the state, is worsening on a regular basis. The Kremlin’s actions aimed at paralysing and destroying the independent non-governmental sector seen over the past four years have been presented as part of a struggle for the country’s sovereignty. This is above all a consequence of the Russian government’s efforts to take full control of the socio-political situation in the country while it also needs to deal with the geopolitical confrontation with the West and the worsening economic crisis. The policy aimed against non-governmental organisations is depriving the public of structures for self-organisation, protection of civil rights and the means of controlling the ever more authoritarian government. At the same time, the Kremlin has been depriving itself of channels of co-operation and communication with the public and antagonising the most active citizens. The restrictive measures the Kremlin has taken over the past few years with regard to NGOs prove that Russian decision-makers believe that any social initiative independent of the government may give rise to unrest, which is dangerous for the regime, and – given the economic slump – any unrest brings unnecessary political risk.

Russia in the Balkans: How should the EU respond? EPC Policy Brief, 12 October 2015

On 3 September 2015, Russia's 7th Guards Airborne-Assault (Mountain) Division kicked off an exercise near the Black Sea city of Novorossiysk, some 150 km southeast of the annexed Crimean peninsula. The timing was chosen carefully. 'Swift Response', a large-scale drill run by NATO alongside the coastline of Romania and Bulgaria, along with other European locations, had concluded several days earlier. Codenamed 'Slavic Brotherhood', the war games at Novorossiysk involved Belarusian Special Forces and, strikingly, paratroopers from Serbia. Here was a country negotiating its accession to the EU and a recent signatory of a cooperation deal with NATO that was siding with the self-declared competitor of the West.

The Economic Impact of Sanctions against Russia: Much ado about very little. CEPS Commentary, November 2015

The decision process leading to the imposition of sanctions against Russia in response to its annexation of Crimea and its subsequent military intervention in Eastern Ukraine has been very difficult for the EU, with some member states claiming that they have been particularly hard hit because exports to Russia are important to their economies. This commentary shows, however, that the economic cost in terms of lost exports, and thus potentially jobs, has in reality been negligible.

The Southern Gas Corridor. The Azerbaijani-Turkish project becomes part of the game between Russia and the EU. OSW POINT OF VIEW 53, 2015-08-20

The Southern Gas Corridor is a system of three complementary gas pipeline projects controlled by Azerbaijan and Turkey, each at a different stage of implementation. The crisis in EU-Russia relations over Ukraine has made the two players interested in the Southern Gas Corridor once again. Brussels views it as an opportunity for a genuine diversification of gas supplies and a way to reinforce its position against Russia. In turn, Moscow’s proposal for Turkey and Greece to join the Turkish Stream gas pipeline project changes the energy map of the regional projects, which indirectly affects the Southern Gas Corridor. This has raised concern in Azerbaijan, which has been making efforts to manoeuvre between the interests of Moscow and Brussels.

End of an energy honeymoon: what’s next for Russia-Turkey energy relations? EPC Commentary, 7 December 2015

Back in the autumn of 2014, the deal between Russia and Turkey on the Turkish Stream pipeline was expected to start a period of close energy cooperation between the two countries, potentially able to change the energy game in the region and consolidate political relations in a long-term perspective. One year later, after announcing the project’s size would be reduced by half, Moscow suspended the negotiations in retaliation to the downing of a Russian fighter jet by the Turkish Air Force at the border between Turkey and Syria. This seems to complement growing doubts about Turkish Stream, which already started as a result of Russia���s military involvement in Syria. From an EU perspective, recent developments raise doubts about Turkey’s role in the Union’s energy strategy.

The altar and the throne alliance. The Russian Orthodox Church vs. the government in Russia. OSW STUDIES 54, 2016-01-04

The Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC), the largest religious community in Russia, plays an essential role in the process of the cultural and national self-identification of the Russian people. Being a socio-political institution with a centuries-long history, it possesses great symbolic capital and enjoys public respect, which has been used for political purposes. Since Vladimir Putin regained the presidency in 2012, in order to strengthen the political regime in Russia the Kremlin has begun to extensively draw upon conservative ideology and promote the traditional moral and social values which the Church is viewed as the guardian of. This has resulted in establishing closer relations between the secular government and the ROC, as well as in a greater engagement of ROC hierarchs and organisations in domestic and foreign policy issues. This situation exposes the ROC to criticism for being excessively involved in politics, and in the longer term, to the risks linked to potential destabilisation of the governmental system in Russia.

EU-Russia relations in the context of the eastern neighbourhood. Bertelsmann Policy Brief, May 2015

The EU’s approach towards the eastern neighbourhood has evolved to become an inclusive EU-centred regional policy.

Information Guide: Russia. March 2016

A guide to information sources on the Russian Federation, with hyperlinks to information within European Sources Online and on external websites (For other language versions of this record click on the original url)

Ukraine, Russia and the EU. Breaking the deadlock in the Minsk process. CEPS Working Document No. 423 / June 2016

Although the Minsk process brought about a de-escalation of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, not all of its 13 points have been implemented, including a ceasefire and withdrawal of heavy weaponry. In the absence of a military option, economic sanctions have become the core instrument of the EU and the US, to respond to Russia���s aggression. At the end of June 2016, when EU Heads of State and Government meet to discuss the extension of sanctions against Russia, they should bear in mind that Russia did not implement the commitments it took upon itself in the framework of the Minsk agreements. Given the persistent deadlock in the Ukraine crisis, the leaders of the EU ought to agree to prolong the sanctions against Russia, push for the renegotiation of the Minsk II agreement and widen the ‘Normandy format’ to include the US and bolster reforms in Ukraine.

Business under supervision – pathologies serving the system of power in Russia. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 212 | 31.05.2016

The relations between Russia���s authorities and business circles are subordinated not so much to rational economic calculations as to the interests of political elites. The key interest in this case is maintaining the current model of government. The formal and informal supervision of business by law enforcement agencies is an important element of Russia���s economic reality. Despite the rhetoric of high-ranking officials, intended to suggest that the state is taking care of businesspeople’s interests, it is evident that there is no will to devise a systemic solution to the most urgent problems, including the state institutions’ disrespect for the rights of ownership.

The China-Russia trade relationship and its impact on Europe. Breugel Working Paper Issue 4, 2016

This paper analyses empirically how increasingly close trade relations between China and Russia might affect the European Union (EU). We show that EU countries are complementary to Russia on the Chinese market. However, Chinese exports are increasingly relevant substitutes for EU exports on the Russian market. This means that an increase in China-Russia economic cooperation should have a negative impact on European exports. We simulate a scenario in which trade tariffs between Russia and China are eliminated, which is found to reduce EU exports to Russia. Finally, a more granular approach to the question analyses which sectors in Europe will be more affected by the increasing economic links between China and Russia, and finds that electronic machinery, equipment and machinery, and nuclear reactors will be particularly affected. Such findings obviously show quickly China is moving up the ladder in terms of export structure and how strategically important it is for Europe to continue upgrading its industry to compete at the highest level of that ladder.

Traduzione tra documentazione e terminologia Gli additivi alimentari in Russia e Unione Europea Il caso traduttologico degli standard “GOST R”

L’obiettivo di questo lavoro di tesi è rappresentato dalla definizione di un metodo di ricerca terminologica e documentazione, nonché di traduzione assistita, supportato dalle moderne tecnologie disponibili in questo campo (Antconc, Bootcat, Trados ecc.), valido per la traduzione di questo tipo di documenti, gli standard, ma sfruttabile anche in altri ambiti della traduzione tecnico-scientifica, permettendo al traduttore e, di conseguenza, al committente, di ottenere un documento “accettabile” e qualitativamente idoneo in lingua di arrivo. Il percorso tracciato in questo elaborato parte dalla presentazione del quadro storico generale, per poi passare alla classificazione degli additivi alimentari in base alla tipologia e agli impieghi in campo alimentare. Verranno illustrati in modo generale i metodi di analisi degli additivi e i criteri di validazione dei metodi impiegati, in funzione degli standard internazionali relativi alla materia, rivolgendo particolare attenzione al quadro normativo e alle agli organi coinvolti nella regolamentazione e nel controllo di queste sostanze, sia in Italia che in Russia e nel resto del mondo. Tutto ciò in funzione degli avvenimenti sul piano geopolitico e su quello culturale: da un lato le sanzioni economiche tra UE e Russia, dall’altro EXPO 2015, opportunità per numerosi traduttori e terminologi di approfondire e arricchire le proprie conoscenze in un ambito tanto importante: alimentazione e sicurezza alimentare, in relazione al progetto di gestione terminologica VOCA9. La parte finale della tesi è dedicata alla presentazione degli standard russi GOST R e alla loro traduzione in italiano, in funzione della documentazione e alla ricerca terminologica necessarie per la traduzione tramite CAT tools ed indispensabili per la creazione di glossari.

Radiocarbon ages from Novaya Zemlya, Russia

Recent observations on postglacial emergence and past glacier extent for one of the least accessible areas in the Arctic, northern Novaya Zemlya are here united. The postglacial marine limit formed 5 to 6 ka is registered on the east and west coasts of the north island at 10 ± 1 and 18 ± 2 m aht, respectively. This modest and late isostatic response along with deglacial ages of >9.2 ka on adjacent marine cores from the northern Barents Sea indicate either early (>13 ka) deglaciation or modest ice sheet loading (<1500 m thick ice sheet) of Novaya Zemlya. Older and higher (up to 50 m aht) raised beaches were identified beneath a discontinuous glacial drift. Shells from the drift and underlying sublittoral sediments yield minimum limiting 14C ages of 26 to 30 ka on an earlier deglacial event(s). The only moraines identified are within 4 km of present glacier margins and reflect at least three neoglacial advances in the past 2.4 ka.