Asymmetric Smiles, Leverage Effects and Structural Parameters.

In this paper, we characterize the asymmetries of the smile through multiple leverage effects in a stochastic dynamic asset pricing framework. The dependence between price movements and future volatility is introduced through a set of latent state variables. These latent variables can capture not only the volatility risk and the interest rate risk which potentially affect option prices, but also any kind of correlation risk and jump risk. The standard financial leverage effect is produced by a cross-correlation effect between the state variables which enter into the stochastic volatility process of the stock price and the stock price process itself. However, we provide a more general framework where asymmetric implied volatility curves result from any source of instantaneous correlation between the state variables and either the return on the stock or the stochastic discount factor. In order to draw the shapes of the implied volatility curves generated by a model with latent variables, we specify an equilibrium-based stochastic discount factor with time non-separable preferences. When we calibrate this model to empirically reasonable values of the parameters, we are able to reproduce the various types of implied volatility curves inferred from option market data.

Empirical Assessment of an Intertemporal Option Pricing Model with Latent variables

This paper assesses the empirical performance of an intertemporal option pricing model with latent variables which generalizes the Hull-White stochastic volatility formula. Using this generalized formula in an ad-hoc fashion to extract two implicit parameters and forecast next day S&P 500 option prices, we obtain similar pricing errors than with implied volatility alone as in the Hull-White case. When we specialize this model to an equilibrium recursive utility model, we show through simulations that option prices are more informative than stock prices about the structural parameters of the model. We also show that a simple method of moments with a panel of option prices provides good estimates of the parameters of the model. This lays the ground for an empirical assessment of this equilibrium model with S&P 500 option prices in terms of pricing errors.

Organizational Design of R&D Activities

This paper addresses the question of whether R&D should be carried out by an independent research unit or be produced in-house by the firm marketing the innovation. We define two organizational structures. In an integrated structure, the firm that markets the innovation also carries out and finances research leading to the innovation. In an independent structure, the firm that markets the innovation buys it from an independent research unit which is financed externally. We compare the two structures under the assumption that the research unit has some private information about the real cost of developing the new product. When development costs are negatively correlated with revenues from the innovation, the integrated structure dominates. The independent structure dominates in the opposite case.

Rationalizability of Choice Functions on General Domains without Full Transitivity

The rationalizability of a choice function by means of a transitive relation has been analyzed thoroughly in the literature. However, not much seems to be known when transitivity is weakened to quasi-transitivity or acyclicity. We describe the logical relationships between the different notions of rationalizability involving, for example, the transitivity, quasi-transitivity, or acyclicity of the rationalizing relation. Furthermore, we discuss sufficient conditions and necessary conditions for rational choice on arbitrary domains. Transitive, quasi-transitive, and acyclical rationalizability are fully characterized for domains that contain all singletons and all two-element subsets of the universal set.

Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games

A contingent contract in a transferable utility game under uncertainty specifies an outcome for each possible state. It is assumed that coalitions evaluate these contracts by considering the minimal possible excesses. A main question of the paper concerns the existence and characterization of efficient contracts. It is shown that they exist if and only if the set of possible coalitions contains a balanced subset. Moreover, a characterization of values that result in efficient contracts in the case of minimally balanced collections is provided.

Logique et tests d'hypotheses: reflexions sur les problemes mal poses en econometrie

Dans ce texte, nous analysons les développements récents de l’économétrie à la lumière de la théorie des tests statistiques. Nous revoyons d’abord quelques principes fondamentaux de philosophie des sciences et de théorie statistique, en mettant l’accent sur la parcimonie et la falsifiabilité comme critères d’évaluation des modèles, sur le rôle de la théorie des tests comme formalisation du principe de falsification de modèles probabilistes, ainsi que sur la justification logique des notions de base de la théorie des tests (tel le niveau d’un test). Nous montrons ensuite que certaines des méthodes statistiques et économétriques les plus utilisées sont fondamentalement inappropriées pour les problèmes et modèles considérés, tandis que de nombreuses hypothèses, pour lesquelles des procédures de test sont communément proposées, ne sont en fait pas du tout testables. De telles situations conduisent à des problèmes statistiques mal posés. Nous analysons quelques cas particuliers de tels problèmes : (1) la construction d’intervalles de confiance dans le cadre de modèles structurels qui posent des problèmes d’identification; (2) la construction de tests pour des hypothèses non paramétriques, incluant la construction de procédures robustes à l’hétéroscédasticité, à la non-normalité ou à la spécification dynamique. Nous indiquons que ces difficultés proviennent souvent de l’ambition d’affaiblir les conditions de régularité nécessaires à toute analyse statistique ainsi que d’une utilisation inappropriée de résultats de théorie distributionnelle asymptotique. Enfin, nous soulignons l’importance de formuler des hypothèses et modèles testables, et de proposer des techniques économétriques dont les propriétés sont démontrables dans les échantillons finis.

A Representation Theorem for Domains with Discrete and Continuous Variables.

This paper proves a new representation theorem for domains with both discrete and continuous variables. The result generalizes Debreu's well-known representation theorem on connected domains. A strengthening of the standard continuity axiom is used in order to guarantee the existence of a representation. A generalization of the main theorem and an application of the more general result are also presented.

The Measurement of Diversity

The notion of diversity is an issue that is of relevance in several contexts. For example, the biodiversity of a given ecological environment and the diversity of the options available to a decision maker have attracted some attention in recent research. This paper provides an axiomatic approach to the measurement of diversity. We characterize two nested classes of ordinal measures of diversity and an important member of these classes. We prove that the latter special case is equivalent to a diversity ordering proposed by Weitzman.

Wage Policy of Firms: an Empirical Investigation.

This paper analyzes the dynamics of wages and workers' mobility within firms with a hierarchical structure of job levels. The theoretical model proposed by Gibbons and Waldman (1999), that combines the notions of human capital accumulation, job rank assignments based on comparative advantage and learning about workers' abilities, is implemented empirically to measure the importance of these elements in explaining the wage policy of firms. Survey data from the GSOEP (German Socio-Economic Panel) are used to draw conclusions on the common features characterizing the wage policy of firms from a large sample of firms. The GSOEP survey also provides information on the worker's rank within his firm which is usually not available in other surveys. The results are consistent with non-random selection of workers onto the rungs of a job ladder. There is no direct evidence of learning about workers' unobserved abilities but the analysis reveals that unmeasured ability is an important factor driving wage dynamics. Finally, job rank effects remain significant even after controlling for measured and unmeasured characteristics.

The Bootstrap of Mean for Dependent Heterogeneous Arrays.

Presently, conditions ensuring the validity of bootstrap methods for the sample mean of (possibly heterogeneous) near epoch dependent (NED) functions of mixing processes are unknown. Here we establish the validity of the bootstrap in this context, extending the applicability of bootstrap methods to a class of processes broadly relevant for applications in economics and finance. Our results apply to two block bootstrap methods: the moving blocks bootstrap of Künsch ( 989) and Liu and Singh ( 992), and the stationary bootstrap of Politis and Romano ( 994). In particular, the consistency of the bootstrap variance estimator for the sample mean is shown to be robust against heteroskedasticity and dependence of unknown form. The first order asymptotic validity of the bootstrap approximation to the actual distribution of the sample mean is also established in this heterogeneous NED context.

La finance islamique: fondements, theorie et realite.

L’Islam interdit le riba , mot arabe signifiant à la fois usure et intérêt. L’interdiction du rib figure dans la loi islamique, née dans l’Arabie du Moyen Âge. Elle est à la base de la finance islamique qui connut une expansion remarquable durant la deuxième moitié du XX e siècle. Nous nous interrogeons sur les origines de cette interdiction, sur les problèmes que connaît actuellement la finance islamique et sur ses perspectives d’avenir.

On the Political Economy of Sequential Reforms

This paper proposes an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers have the power to block their implementation, even though compensating them is feasible. We construct a signaling model with two-sided incomplete information in which a government faces the task of sequentially implementing two reforms by bargaining with interest groups. The organization of interest groups is endogenous. Compensations are distortionary and government types differ in the concern about distortions. We show that, when compensations are allowed to be informative about the government’s type, there is a bias against the payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms. This is because paying high compensations today provides incentives for some interest groups to organize and oppose subsequent reforms with the only purpose of receiving a transfer. By paying lower compensations, governments attempt to prevent such interest groups from organizing. However, this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses.

Exact Nonparametric Two-Sample Homogeneity Tests for Possibly Discrete Distributions.

In this paper, we study several tests for the equality of two unknown distributions. Two are based on empirical distribution functions, three others on nonparametric probability density estimates, and the last ones on differences between sample moments. We suggest controlling the size of such tests (under nonparametric assumptions) by using permutational versions of the tests jointly with the method of Monte Carlo tests properly adjusted to deal with discrete distributions. We also propose a combined test procedure, whose level is again perfectly controlled through the Monte Carlo test technique and has better power properties than the individual tests that are combined. Finally, in a simulation experiment, we show that the technique suggested provides perfect control of test size and that the new tests proposed can yield sizeable power improvements.

On Fixed-Path Rationing Methods.

Moulin (1999) characterizes the fixed-path rationing methods by efficiency, strategy-proofness, consistency, and resource-monotonicity. In this note, we give a straightforward proof of his result.

Multiple Public Goods and Lexicographic Preferences Replacement Principle.

We study the problem of locating two public goods for a group of agents with single-peaked preferences over an interval. An alternative specifies a location for each public good. In Miyagawa (1998), each agent consumes only his most preferred public good without rivalry. We extend preferences lexicographically and characterize the class of single-peaked preference rules by Pareto-optimality and replacement-domination. This result is considerably different from the corresponding characterization by Miyagawa (2001a).