Praxisleitfaden zur Etablierung und Aufwertung von Säumen und Feldrainen

Der vorliegende Praxisleitfaden soll die Anlage von Säumen und Feldrainen in produktiven Agrarlandschaften und im urbanen Bereich erleichtern. Es werden wertvolle Hinweise zur Planung von Ansaatmischungen mit Wildpflanzen, zur Bodenvorbereitung, zur Umsetzung der Maßnahme (Ansaatzeitpunkt, Ansaatmethode, Ansaatstärke) und zur Entwicklungs- und Folgepflege gegeben. Darüber hinaus werden Fördermöglichkeiten und vergaberechtliche Aspekte erörtert. Mit 10 Praxisbeispielen werden bereits erfolgreich umgesetzte Maßnahmen aus Niedersachsen und Sachsen-Anhalt vorgestellt. Das Kapitel "Aus Fehlern lernen" zeigt kurz und prägnant, wie Misserfolge vermieden werden können. Insgesamt dokumentiert der Leitfaden, wie monotone Grasstreifen nach einer intensiven Bodenstörung, einer Ansaat mit zertifizierten, gebietseigenen Wildpflanzen und einer angepassten Entwicklungs- und Folgepflege erfolgreich in ausdauernde, blütenreiche Bestände umgewandelt werden können, die vielfältige Ökosystemdienstleistungen erfüllen und die Biodiversität erhöhen. Der Praxisleitfaden entstand im Rahmen des Projektes "ProSaum", das vom Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung gefördert wurde.

Diet of Procyon cancrivorus (Carnivora, Procyonidae) in restinga and estuarine environments of southern Brazil

Despite its wide range and abundance on certain habitats, the crab-eating raccoon Procyon cancrivorus (G. Cuvier, 1798) is considered one of the less known Neotropical carnivore species. In the present study we analyzed the diet of P. cancrivorus in a peat forest and in an estuarine island in southernmost Brazil. Fruits of the gerivá palm tree Syagrus romanzoffiana were the most consumed item in the peat forest, followed by insects and mollusks. Small mammals, followed by Bromelia antiacantha (Bromeliaceae) fruits and brachyuran crustaceans were the most frequent items in the estuarine island. Other items found in lower frequencies were Solanum sp., Psidium sp., Smilax sp. and Dyospiros sp. fruits, diplopods, scorpions, fishes, anuran amphibians, reptiles (black tegu lizard and snakes), birds and medium-sized mammals (white-eared opossum, armadillo and coypu). Levin’s index values (peat forest: 0.38; estuarine island: 0.45) indicate an approximation to a median position between a specialist and a well distributed diet. Pianka’s index (0.80) showed a considerable diet similarity between the two systems. Procyon cancrivorus presented a varied diet in the studied areas and may play an important role as seed disperser on coastal environments in southernmost Brazil.

An ordinal shapley value for economic environments (Revised version)

We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and call it the Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). We characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone and anonymous. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapely value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.

An ordinal shapley value for economic environments

We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The sharing problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined in a recursive manner incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and refer to it as an Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). The OSV associates with each problem an allocation as well as a matrix of concessions ``measuring'' the gains each agent foregoes in favor of the other agents. We analyze the structure of the concessions, and show they are unique and symmetric. Next we characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone in an agent's initial endowments and satisfies anonymity. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapley value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.

Bidding at sequential first-price auctions with(out) supply uncertainty: a laboratory analysis

We report on a series of experiments that test the effects of an uncertain supply on the formation of bids and prices in sequential first-price auctions with private-independent values and unit-demands. Supply is assumed uncertain when buyers do not know the exact number of units to be sold (i.e., the length of the sequence). Although we observe a non-monotone behavior when supply is certain and an important overbidding, the data qualitatively support our price trend predictions and the risk neutral Nash equilibrium model of bidding for the last stage of a sequence, whether supply is certain or not. Our study shows that behavior in these markets changes significantly with the presence of an uncertain supply, and that it can be explained by assuming that bidders formulate pessimistic beliefs about the occurrence of another stage.

Stable coalition structures with fixed decision scheme

This paper studies the stability of a finite local public goods economy in horizontal differentiation, where a jurisdiction's choice of the public good is given by an exogenous decision scheme. In this paper, we characterize the class of decision schemes that ensure the existence of an equilibrium with free mobility (that we call Tiebout equilibrium) for monotone distribution of players. This class contains all the decision schemes whose choice lies between the Rawlsian decision scheme and the median voter with mid-distance of the two median voters when there are ties. We show that for non-monotone distribution, there is no decision scheme that can ensure the stability of coalitions. In the last part of the paper, we prove the non-emptiness of the core of this coalition formation game

Approximating subtree distances between Phylogenies

We give a 5-approximation algorithm to the rooted Subtree-Prune-and-Regraft (rSPR) distance between two phylogenies, which was recently shown to be NP-complete by Bordewich and Semple [5]. This paper presents the first approximation result for this important tree distance. The algorithm follows a standard format for tree distances such as Rodrigues et al. [24] and Hein et al. [13]. The novel ideas are in the analysis. In the analysis, the cost of the algorithm uses a \cascading" scheme that accounts for possible wrong moves. This accounting is missing from previous analysis of tree distance approximation algorithms. Further, we show how all algorithms of this type can be implemented in linear time and give experimental results.

Convergence of the mass-transport steepest descent scheme for the sub-critical Patlak-Keller-Segel model

Variational steepest descent approximation schemes for the modified Patlak-Keller-Segel equation with a logarithmic interaction kernel in any dimension are considered. We prove the convergence of the suitably interpolated in time implicit Euler scheme, defined in terms of the Euclidean Wasserstein distance, associated to this equation for sub-critical masses. As a consequence, we recover the recent result about the global in time existence of weak-solutions to the modified Patlak-Keller-Segel equation for the logarithmic interaction kernel in any dimension in the sub-critical case. Moreover, we show how this method performs numerically in one dimension. In this particular case, this numerical scheme corresponds to a standard implicit Euler method for the pseudo-inverse of the cumulative distribution function. We demonstrate its capabilities to reproduce easily without the need of mesh-refinement the blow-up of solutions for super-critical masses.

Diseño de filtros con topología apilada mediante resonadores FBAR

Els continguts de la memòria es divideixen en dues parts fonamentals, precedides d’una breu explicació on s’introdueix al lector en el tema; primer s’exposen les bases d’un ressonador simple FBAR, d’on s’obtenen equacions de control vitals, i seguidament es plantegen les bases per a un ressonador apilat SCR, derivades de l’estudi previ d’un ressonador simple. La primera part fonamental del treball es centra en l’anàlisi d’un ressonador SCR. Aquest anàlisi es recolza sobre el punt de vista teòric dels paràmetres imatge, el nostre punt de sortida. Aquesta primera part és la més teòrica: obtenció i aplicació dels paràmetres imatge i obtenció dels elements discrets que conformen el circuit equivalent SCR, una xarxa de dos ports. Posteriorment, s’analitza què succeeix modificant els valors dels elements discrets sense variar determinats paràmetres imatge i finalment, es proposa una aproximació per a controlar determinades especificacions de disseny, com són l’ample de banda de transmissió de la xarxa i el factor de qualitat, en funció de les modificacions dels elements discrets. En la segona part s’analitzen, de forma qualitativa, xarxes compostes per diferents ressonadors apilats connectats en cascada. Aquest segon estudi es divideix en dues subparts. En la primera connectem N ressonadors idèntics, plantegem algunes equacions de control i analitzem les respostes. En la segona, es planteja la connexió de dos (N=2) ressonadors diferents amb freqüències de ressonància properes. Aquest segon anàlisi es també totalment qualitatiu, però ens aporta informació que amb la unió de N ressonadors iguals no aconseguíem. Finalitzant aquesta segona part, es planteja l’optimització dels resultats obtinguts per a N=2, mitjançant estructures N=3 ressonadors.

Exclusive Nightclubs and Lonely Hearts Columns: Nonmonotone Participation in Optional Intermediation

In many decentralised markets, the traders who benefit most from an exchange do not employ intermediaries even though they could easily afford them. At the same time, employing intermediaries is not worthwhile for traders who benefit little from trade. Together, these decisions amount to non-monotone participation choices in intermediation: only traders of middle “type” employ intermediaries, while the rest, the high and the low types, prefer to search for a trading partner directly. We provide a theoretical foundation for this, hitherto unexplained, phenomenon. We build a dynamic matching model, where a trader’s equilibrium bargaining share is a convex increasing function of her type. We also show that this is indeed a necessary condition for the existence of non-monotone equilibria.

Ordering Policy Rules with an Unconditional Welfare Measure

The unconditional expectation of social welfare is often used to assess alternative macroeconomic policy rules in applied quantitative research. It is shown that it is generally possible to derive a linear - quadratic problem that approximates the exact non-linear problem where the unconditional expectation of the objective is maximised and the steady-state is distorted. Thus, the measure of pol icy performance is a linear combinat ion of second moments of economic variables which is relatively easy to compute numerically, and can be used to rank alternative policy rules. The approach is applied to a simple Calvo-type model under various monetary policy rules.

Tractable Consumer Choice

We derive a rational model of separable consumer choice which can also serve as a behavioral model. The central construct is [lambda] , the marginal utility of money, derived from the consumer's rest-of-life problem. We present a robust approximation of [lambda], and show how to incorporate liquidity constraints, indivisibilities and adaptation to a changing environment. We fi nd connections with numerous historical and recent constructs, both behavioral and neoclassical, and draw contrasts with standard partial equilibrium analysis. The result is a better grounded, more flexible and more intuitive description of consumer choice.

The Inflation Bias under Calvo and Rotemberg Pricing.

New Keynesian models rely heavily on two workhorse models of nominal inertia - price contracts of random duration (Calvo, 1983) and price adjustment costs (Rotemberg, 1982) - to generate a meaningful role for monetary policy. These alternative descriptions of price stickiness are often used interchangeably since, to a first order of approximation they imply an isomorphic Phillips curve and, if the steady-state is efficient, identical objectives for the policy maker and as a result in an LQ framework, the same policy conclusions. In this paper we compute time-consistent optimal monetary policy in bench-mark New Keynesian models containing each form of price stickiness. Using global solution techniques we find that the inflation bias problem under Calvo contracts is significantly greater than under Rotemberg pricing, despite the fact that the former typically significant exhibits far greater welfare costs of inflation. The rates of inflation observed under this policy are non-trivial and suggest that the model can comfortably generate the rates of inflation at which the problematic issues highlighted in the trend inflation literature emerge, as well as the movements in trend inflation emphasized in empirical studies of the evolution of inflation. Finally, we consider the response to cost push shocks across both models and find these can also be significantly different. The choice of which form of nominal inertia to adopt is not innocuous.

Bilateral oligopoly and quantity competition

Bilateral oligopoly is a strategic market game with two commodities, allowing strategic behavior on both sides of the market. When the number of buyers is large, such a game approximates a game of quantity competition played by sellers. We present examples which show that this is not typically a Cournot game. Rather, we introduce an alternative game of quantity competition (the market share game) and, appealing to results in the literature on contests, show that this yields the same equilibria as the many-buyer limit of bilateral oligopoly, under standard assumptions on costs and preferences. We also show that the market share and Cournot games have the same equilibria if and only if the price elasticity of the latter is one. These results lead to necessary and sufficient conditions for the Cournot game to be a good approximation to bilateral oligopoly with many buyers and to an ordering of total output when they are not satisfied.

The non-linear Dirichlet problem in Hadamard manifolds

We prove existence theorems for the Dirichlet problem for hypersurfaces of constant special Lagrangian curvature in Hadamard manifolds. The first results are obtained using the continuity method and approximation and then refined using two iterations of the Perron method. The a-priori estimates used in the continuity method are valid in any ambient manifold.