889 resultados para Limited partnership
Resumo:
The seventh round of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations between the European Union and the United States will take place in Washington on 29 September. If concluded successfully, the TTIP would become the world’s largest free trade pact. The EU and the US account for nearly half of the world’s GDP and 30% of world trade with exchanges of goods and services worth around €723 billion a year and €1.8 billion a day. The Partnership, unprecedented in its scope and ambition, has generated great expectations which will be hard to meet in reality. It could however have a beneficial effect on trade multilateralism, provided that it is the result of an open negotiating process.
Resumo:
Introduction. In the speech given to both Houses of Parliament on 11 October 2013 during the first parliamentary session, King Mohammed VI said that the “Moroccan democratic model” was “a precursor in the region as well as on the continental level.”1 Similarly, with the purpose of stressing the “democratic exceptionalism”2 of the country, the new government, led by Abdeilah Benkirane, emphasised that Morocco represents a “third way” compared to countries such as Tunisia, Libya or Egypt since it “…has not embarked on a limited process of reform from the top, driven and controlled by the King. Nor has it experienced a revolution brought a angry citizens rising up against the regime. Rather, it has chosen an alternate path based on a genuine partnership between the King and the PJD (Parti de la justice et du développement) that promises to bring about more far-reaching reform than palace alone would grant, without the disruption caused by uncontrolled popular upheaval.”4 It should not be at all surprising that the regime and the new Government consider Morocco a “democratic model” or a “third way.” After all, they are refe country. What is harder to understand is that when discussing the Arab uprisings, even prominent Western political leaders, representatives of the European Union institutions and the mainstream media (when they do not forget about Morocc to praise the process of democratic reform carried out by Mohammed VI. For example, on 12 September 2012, Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State, said, “in many ways, the United States looks to Morocco to be a leader and a model […] On political reform, we have all seen remarkable changes taking place across North Africa and the Middle East. I commend Morocco and your government for your efforts to stay ahead of these changes by holding free and fair elections, empowering the elected parliament, taking other steps to ensure that the government reflects the will of the people.”5 Similarly, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy sang the praises of the process that led to the adoption of the new 2011 Constitution: “King Mohammed VI has shown the path towards a profound, peaceful and modern transformation of Moroccan institutions and society […] France fully supports this exemplary process.” Interestingly enough, even at the European Union level the constitutional reform that took more far-reaching reform than palace alone would grant, without the disruption caused by uncontrolled popular upheaval.”4 It should not be at all surprising that the regime and the new Government consider Morocco a “democratic model” or a “third way.” After all, they are refe country. What is harder to understand is that when discussing the Arab uprisings, even prominent Western political leaders, representatives of the European Union institutions and the mainstream media (when they do not forget about Morocc to praise the process of democratic reform carried out by Mohammed VI. For example, on 12 September 2012, Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State, said, “in many ways, the United States looks to Morocco to be a leader and a model […] On political reform, we have all seen remarkable changes taking place across North Africa and the Middle East. I commend Morocco and your government for your efforts to stay ahead of these changes by holding free and fair elections, empowering the elected parliament, taking other steps to ensure that the government reflects the will of the people.”5 Similarly, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy sang the praises of the process that led to the adoption of the new 2011 Constitution: “King Mohammed VI has shown the path towards a profound, peaceful and modern transformation of Moroccan institutions and society […] France fully supports this exemplary process.” Interestingly enough, even at the European Union level the constitutional reform that took place in Morocco was considered an extremely positive step taken by the country, as well as a means to strengthen the cooperation between the EU and Morocco. Indeed, according to the High Representative Catherine Ashton, this reform “constitute[s] a significant response to the legitimate aspirations of the Moroccan people and [is] consistent with Morocco’s Advanced Status with the EU.”7 When it comes to the media, it is worth noting that following the ratification of the 2011 Constitution, The New York Times headlined: “All Hail the (Democratic) King.” Even sections of the academic literature have commended the constitutional reform carried out by the Moroccan Sovereign.9 In this paper I argue against the aforementioned idea, according to which Morocco should be considered a model in the region, and in particular I show that the constitution-making process, the 2011 Constitution and its subsequent implementation have more flaws than merits. Accordingly, this paper proceeds in five steps. First of all, I examine the reaction of the regime to the upheavals that broke out in the country after 20 February 2011. Secondly, I analyse the process of constitution showing its main strengths and weaknesses, and comparing it with other constituent processes that took place in the region following the Arab uprisings. In the third section, I highlight the most significant elements of continuity and discontinuity with the previous 1996 Constitution. The fourth section deals with the process of implementation: specifically process is proceeding quite slowly and that in some cases ordinary legislation is in contrast with the new Constitution and international human rights treaties. Moreover, I discuss the role that the judiciary and the Constitutional Court can play in the implementation and interpretation of the Constitution. Finally, I draw some concluding remarks.
Resumo:
In recent weeks, Russia has stepped up its efforts to prevent a group of former Soviet republics from tightening their relations with the European Union. The intensification of these efforts comes ahead of the upcoming Eastern Partnership summit, scheduled to take place in Vilnius on 28-29 November. It is expected that during the summit Kiev will sign the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (AA) initialled in March 2012, including an agreement for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). Meanwhile, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia are expected to initial similar documents, effectively accepting their terms and conditions, and paving the way for their official signing in the near future. Moscow has always viewed the relations between the EU and the post-Soviet states as a threat to its own influence in the region. Consequently, any attempts to tighten these relations have been actively opposed by Russia. The EU’s Eastern Partnership programme, launched in 2009, has posed a particular challenge to Moscow’s policies in the region.. Russia responded by rolling out a Eurasian integration project, which began in 2010 with the establishment of the Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, and is expected to culminate in the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union by 2015. Moscow’s overarching objective has been to persuade the countries in the region, especially Ukraine, to adopt an unambiguously pro-Russian geopolitical stance and to join the integration project proposed by the Kremlin. The Russian government hopes that this would permanently place these states in Moscow’s sphere of influence and at the same time prevent them from developing closer relations with Brussels. Russia has regularly taken actions aimed at showcasing the benefits of integration with the Customs Union (particularly, by promising preferential pricing of Russian energy resources) and at the same time it has adopted measures highlighting the pitfalls of retaining a pro-European orientation (mainly by imposing occasional trade sanctions). The upcoming summit in Vilnius, during which Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia could lock themselves on to a pro-European course, has spurred Moscow to intensify its efforts to torpedo a successful outcome of the Vilnius meeting, with a view to slowing down or even blocking the possibility of closer cooperation between the EU and the former Soviet republics.
Resumo:
Over the four years since its launch, the Eastern Partnership initiative has created frameworks and mechanisms for the integration of Eastern Partnership countries with the European Union. Despite this, the partner countries have so far made little meaningful progress in modernisation, implementation of reforms or integration with the EU.Since the European Neighbourhood Policy was launched in 2004, the situation in areas of key importance for the EU, such as democratisation, free-market transformations, European integration, political stability and regional security, has not improved significantly. In this context, it is legitimate to ask questions about the extent to which the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership have brought the Union closer to achieving its declared objectives in the relations with eastern neighbours. What is the underlying cause of the dwindling involvement and declining interest in achieving real progress in integration? How may the events that have been dominating the political agenda – i.e. the EU’s financial crisis, the debate on the future of the Union, but also the political processes taking place within the partner countries – affect the future of mutual relations?
Resumo:
Contrary to both parties' declarations on the development of their "strategic partnership", relations between Russia and the European Union have over recent years been in a state which could be called one of crisis. However, this does not mean that there have been no achievements in EU-Russian relations. The key problem is that Russia and the European Union have essentially different perceptions, aspirations and interests, which causes mistrust and disillusionment. This crisis is manifested in mutual criticism by the two sides, regularly recurring tensions and cooling of relations ("minicrises"), and especially by the "virtualisation of co-operation", i.e. concealing a lack of substantive content in many key areas under increasingly rich layers of dialogue and co-operation.
