799 resultados para ECONOMIC CRISIS
Resumo:
Apos uma década de rápido crescimento econômico na primeira década do século 21, Brasil e Turquia foram considerados duas das economias emergentes mais dinâmicas e promissoras. No entanto, vários sinais de dificuldades econômicas e tensões políticas reapareceram recentemente e simultaneamente nos dois países. Acreditamos que esses sinais e a sua simultaneidade podem ser entendidos melhor com um olhar retrospectivo sobre a história econômica dos dois países, que revela ser surpreendentemente paralela. Numa primeira parte, empreendemos uma comparação abrangente da história econômica brasileira e turca para mostrar as numerosas similaridades entre os desafios de política econômica que os dois países enfrentaram, assim como entre as respostas que eles lhes deram desde a virada da Grande Depressão até a primeira década do século 21. Essas escolhas de política econômica comuns dão forma a uma trajetória de desenvolvimento notavelmente análoga, caracterizada primeiro pela adoção do modelo de industrialização por substituição das importações (ISI) no contexto da recessão mundial dos anos 1930; depois pela intensificação e crise final desse modelo nos anos 1980; e finalmente por duas décadas de estabilização e transição para um modelo econômico mais liberal. Numa segunda parte, o desenvolvimento das instituições econômicas e políticas, assim como da economia política subjacente nos dois países, são analisados comparativamente a fim de prover alguns elementos de explicação do paralelo observado na primeira parte. Sustentamos que o marco institucional estabelecido nos dois países durante esse período também têm varias características fundamentais em comum e contribui a explicar as escolhas de política econômica e as performances econômicas comparáveis, detalhadas na primeira parte. Este estudo aborda elementos do contexto histórico úteis para compreender a situação econômica e política atual nos dois países. Potencialmente também constitui uma tentativa de considerar as economias emergentes numa perspectiva histórica e comparativa mais ampla para entender melhor as suas fraquezas institucionais e adotar um olhar mais equilibrado sobre seu potencial econômico.
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The recent emerging market experiences have posed a challenge to the conventional wisdom that unsustainable fiscal deficits are the key to understanding financial crises in these countries. The health of the domestic banking system has emerged as the main driving force behind the perverse dynamics of partial reforms. The current paper shares this view and uses a model of contractual inefliciencies in the banking sector to understand the dynamics of these reforms. We find that the threat of a large exchange rate devaluation depends on the stock of international reserves relative to the stock of domestic credit that must be extended by the Central Bank in response to a large capital outflow. Moreover, if a country has a weak banking sector but high net reserve ratios, the capital flow reversal might only increase the vulnerability to a currency crisis without necessarily causing it. The results are in accordance with much of the empiricalliterature on the determinants of financiaI crises in emerging markets. Some aspectsof the recent policy debate on the introduction of capital controls are also analysed.
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The private equity industry was experiencing a phenomenal boom at the turn of the century but collapsed abruptly in 2008 with the onset of the financial crisis. Considered one of the worst crises since the Great Depression of the 1930s, it had sent ripples around the world threatening the collapse of financial institutions and provoking a liquidity crunch followed by a huge downturn in economic activity and recession. Furthermore, the physiognomy of the financial landscape had considerably altered with banks retracting from the lending space, accompanied by a hardening of financial regulation that sought to better contain systemic risk. Given the new set of changes and challenges that had arisen from this period of financial turmoil, private equity found itself having to question current practices and methods of operation in order to adjust to the harsh realities of a new post-apocalyptic world. Consequently, this paper goes on to explore how the private equity business, management and operation model has evolved since the credit crunch with a specific focus on mature markets such as the United States and Europe. More specifically, this paper will aim to gather insights on the development of the industry since the crisis in Western Europe through a case study approach using as a base interviews with professionals working in the industry and those external to the sector but who have/have had considerable interaction with PE players from 2007 to the present.
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The main goal of this article is to identify the dynamic effects of fiscal policy on output in Brazil from 1997 to 2014, and, more specifically, to estimate those effects when the output falls below its potential level. To do so, we estimate VAR (vector autoregressive) models to generate impulse-response functions and causality/endogeneity tests. Our most remarkable results indicate the following channel of economic policy in Brazil: to foster output, government spending increases causing increases in both tax rates and revenue and the short-term interest rate. A fiscal stimulus via spending seems efficient for economic performance as well as monetary policy; however, the latter operates pro-cyclically in the way we defined here, while the former is predominantly countercyclical. As the monetary shock had a negative effect on GDP growth and GDP growth responded positively to the fiscal shock, it seems that the economic policy has given poise to growth with one hand and taken it with the other one. The monetary policy is only reacting to the fiscal stimuli. We were not able to find any statistically significant response of the output to tax changes, but vice versa seems work in the Brazilian case.
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The Brazilian economy was severely hit by the 2008 crisis. In the beginning of the crisis, the vast majorities of the economic agents and authorities thought that Brazil could face some sort of decoupling since some macroeconomic fundamentals were very good. What we saw, however, was that the Brazilian economy was not decoupled, and expectations faced a huge deterioration soon after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 15th. Two aspects regarding the impact of crisis in Brazil, however, deserve a great deal of attention: (a) although deep, the impact did not last for a long time. Actually, the GDP growth experienced a good recovery in the second quarter of 2009, showing that the health of the Brazilian economy was good; (b) the Brazilian banking system performed very well during the crisis, although we cannot say the system was not in danger in the worst time of the crisis. In spite of the confidence crisis faced by the banking system 1, it showed a great deal of resilience. In this aspect, we argue that the restructure faced by the banking system in the aftermath of the Real Plan, as well as the development of a solid supervision regulation helped a lot the system to avoid the systemic crisis that was an open possibility to the Brazilian banking system in the end of 2008. These notes, thus, discusse why the Brazilian banking system performed pretty well in the 2008 financial crisis and how the Brazilian banking (and prudential) regulation can be taken as responsible for this good performance. More specifically, the paper back to the middle of the 1990s, when the Real Plan was implemented, in order to understand the role played by the restructuring of the Brazilian financial system in helping to pave the way to the great resilience experienced by the Brazilian banking system during the 2008 crisis. More specifically, the prudential regulation that was implemented in Brazil in the aftermath of the Real Plan seems to play a decisive role in the resilience of the system nowadays.
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This paper argues the euro zone requires a government banker that manages the bond market and helps finance country budget deficits. The euro solved Europe’s problem of exchange rate speculation by creating a unified currency managed by a single central bank, but in doing so it replaced the exchange rate speculation problem with bond market speculation. Remedying this requires a central bank that acts as government banker and maintains bond interest rates at sustainable levels. Because the euro is a monetary union, this must be done in a way that both avoids favoring individual countries and avoids creating incentives for irresponsible country fiscal policy that leads to “bail-outs”. The paper argues this can be accomplished via a European Public Finance Authority (EPFA) that issues public debt which the European Central Bank (ECB) is allowed to trade. The debate over the euro’s financial architecture has significant political implications. The current neoliberal inspired architecture, which imposes a complete separation between the central bank and public finances, puts governments under continuous financial pressures. That will make it difficult to maintain the European social democratic welfare state. This gives a political reason for reforming the euro and creating an EPFA that supplements the economic case for reform.
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Brazil was frequently criticized for its interventionist and heavy financial regulation up until the 2008‐09 world financial crisis. According to the neo‐liberal or pro‐market view that predominated in academic and financial circles during the early 2000s, economic development came together with financial deepening, which in its turn could only be achieved through financial liberalization and deregulation. The currency crises of the 1990s notwithstanding, by the mid‐2000s Brazil’s segmented financial market and its restrictive reserve and capital requirements were seen as a symbol of inefficiency and backwardness by most financial specialists. To the luck of the Brazilian population, most of the advices of such specialists were ignored by the Brazilian authorities, so that, when the 2008 financial crisis hit the world economy, Brazil still had powerful and efficient instruments to deal with the problem. The objective of this note is to present the mains aspects of the Brazilian financial regulation and how they helped the economy to deal with the consequences of 2008‐09 financial meltdown.
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The 1980s' debt crisis is a landmark in developing economies' growth and stabilization. According to the most quoted empirical articles, external shocks and vicissitudes gave rise to crisis just because of delays in stabilization policies, engendered by internal conflicts and institutional immaturity. I review some of these papers, and find out some problems - in the measurement of shocks and foreign indebtedness, namely - whose corrections lead to opposite results: external shocks and foreign indebtedness explain that crisis regardless of domestic policies. At the same time, the strong correlation of income distribution to terms of trade changes and foreign indebtedness suggest that inequality may have contributed differently to that crisis: either through an economic channel, or through a political channel based on delays in reforms.
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