Strategic Behavior and Collusion: An Application to the Spanish Electricity Market

The paper has two major contributions to the theory of repeated games. First, we build a supergame oligopoly model where firms compete in supply functions, we show how collusion sustainability is affected by the presence of a convex cost function, the magnitude of both the slope of demand market, and the number of rivals. Then, we compare the results with those of the traditional Cournot reversion under the same structural characteristics. We find how depending on the number of firms and the slope of the linear demand, collusion sustainability is easier under supply function than under Cournot competition. The conclusions of the models are simulated with data from the Spanish wholesale electricity market to predict lower bounds of the discount factors.

The Evaluation of Fisheries Management: A Dynamic Stochastic Approach

In this article, we analyze how to evaluate fishery resource management under “ecological uncertainty”. In this context, an efficient policy consists of applying a different exploitation rule depending on the state of the resource and we could say that the stock is always in transition, jumping from one steady state to another. First, we propose a method for calibrating the growth path of the resource such that observed dynamics of resource and captures are matched. Second, we apply the calibration procedure proposed in two different fishing grounds: the European Anchovy (Division VIII) and the Southern Stock of Hake. Our results show that the role played by uncertainty is essential for the conclusions. For European Anchovy fishery (Division VIII) we find, in contrast with Del Valle et al. (2001), that this is not an overexploited fishing ground. However, we show that the Southern Stock of Hake is in a dangerous situation. In both cases our results are in accordance with ICES advice.

Pension system's reform in Spain: a dynamic analysis of the effects in Welfare

100 p. : graf.