999 resultados para Department coordination


Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Quarterly publication of the Governor's Traffic Safety Bureau, Iowa Department of Public Safety containing traffic safety and related information and news articles

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

We report an experiment on the effect of intergroup competition on group coordination in the minimal-effort game (Van Huyck et al., 1990). The competition was between two 7-person groups. Each player in each group independently chose an integer from 1 to 7. The group with the higher minimum won the competition and each of its members was paid according to the game s original payoff matrix. Members of the losing group were paid nothing. In case of a tie, each player was paid half the payoff in the original matrix. This treatment was contrasted with two control treatments where each of the two groups played an independent coordination game, either with or without information about the minimum chosen by the outgroup. Although the intergroup competition does not change the set of strict equilibria, we found that it improved collective rationality by moving group members in the direction of higher-payoff equilibria. Merely providing group members with information about the minimal-effort level in the other group was not sufficient to generate this effect.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Addendum to Annual Report of the Iowa Department of Revenue FY2007. Comparison to prior years. Local option tax distributions.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Audit report on the Iowa Water Pollution Control Works Financing Program and the Iowa Drinking Water Facilities Financing Program, joint programs of the Iowa Finance Authority and the Iowa Department of Natural Resources for the year ended June 30, 2007

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

This report outlines the strategic plan for Department of Administrative Services, including, motto, goals and mission.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Audit report on Wave 2 of the Phase II Strategic Sourcing Initiative implemented by the Department of Administrative Services

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

We lay out a model of wage bargaining with two leading features:bargaining is ex post to relevant investments and there isindividual bargaining in firms without a Union. We compareindividual ex post bargaining to coordinated ex post bargainingand we analyze the effects on wage formation. As opposed to exante bargaining models, the costs of destroying the employmentrelationship play a crucial role in determining wages. Highfiring costs in particular yield a rent for employees. Ourtheory points to a employer size-wage effect that is independentof the production function and market power. We derive a simpleleast squares specification from the theoretical model thatallow us to estimate components of the wage premium fromcoordination. We reject the hypothesis that labor coordinationdoes not alter the extensive form of the bargaining game. Laborcoordination substantially increases bargaining power butdecreases labor's ability to pose costly threats to the firm.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

We analyze the role of commitment in pre-play communication for ensuringefficient evolutionarily stable outcomes in coordination games. All players are a priori identical as they are drawn from the same population. In games where efficient outcomes can be reached by players coordinating on the same action we find commitment to be necessary to enforce efficiency. In games where efficienct outcomes only result from play of different actions, communication without commitment is most effective although efficiency can no longer be guaranteed. Only when there are many messages then inefficient outcomes are negligible as their basins of attraction become very small.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertaintyabout the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models that have beenused in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problemsof equilibrium indeterminacy. In our experiment each subject receives anoisy signal about the true payoffs. This game has a unique strategyprofile that survives the iterative deletion of strictly dominatedstrategies (thus a unique Nash equilibrium). The equilibrium outcomecoincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome ofthe underlying coordination game. The behavior of the subjects convergesto the theoretical prediction after enough experience has been gained. The data (and the comments) suggest that subjects do not apply through"a priori" reasoning the iterated deletion of dominated strategies.Instead, they adapt to the responses of other players. Thus, the lengthof the learning phase clearly varies for the different signals. We alsotest behavior in a game without uncertainty as a benchmark case. The gamewith uncertainty is inspired by the "global" games of Carlsson and VanDamme (1993).

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Audit report on the Wireless E911 Emergency Communication Fund of the Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division of the Iowa Department of Public Defense for the year ended June 30, 2007

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Audit report on the Iowa Department of Human Services – Case Management Unit for the year ended June 30, 2007

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Report on the Iowa Department of Natural Resources for the year ended June 30, 2007

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Report on the Iowa Department for the Blind for the year ended June 30, 2007

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Report on the Iowa Department of Public Defense for the year ended June 30, 2007

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Report on the Iowa Department of Education, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation Services for the year ended June 30, 2007