Corporate capital structure revisited: incomplete markets and default

After Modigliani and Miller (1958) presented their capital structure irrelevance proposition, analysis of corporate Önancing choices involving debt and equity instruments have generally followed two trends in the literature, where models either incorporate informational asymmetries or introduce tax beneÖts in order to explain optimal capital structure determination (Myers, 2002). None of these features is present in this paper, which develops an asset pricing model with the purpose of providing a positive theory of corporate capital structure by replicating main aspects of standard contractual practice observed in real markets. Alternatively, the imperfect market structure of the economy is tailored to match what is most common in corporate reality. Allowance for default on corporate debt with an associated penalty of seizure of Örmís future cash áows by creditors is introduced, for instance. In this context, a qualitative assessment of Önancial managersídecisions is carried out through numerical procedures.

Privatização aspectos fiscais e dívida pública

Este trabalho analisa os efeitos do programa de desestatização brasileiro sobre acumulação da dívida pública no período 1995-1999. objetivo central avaliar se utilização de receitas auferidas com alienação de ativos estatais concessões de serviços públicos no abatimento de dívidas de curto prazo tem efeito significativo sobre redução ou contenção do crescimento da dívida pública alteração do seu perfil, com reflexos sobre as necessidades de financiamento do setor público. Como possível contribuição adicional, esta dissertação apresenta um conjunto de dados, em geral pouco conhecidos, relativos às empresas estatais, ao programa de desestatização dívida pública, considerados de interesse geral. Dentre os principais aspectos discutidos no trabalho destacam-se os seguintes, referentes ao período 1995-1999. economia de juros obtida por meio do uso de recursos da privatização no resgate da dívida mobiliária interna de emissão do Tesouro Nacional atingiu R$ 8,8 bilhões, contra R$ 0,5 bilhão que Tesouro deixou de arrecadar na forma de dividendos das empresas privatizadas. No que tange aos efeitos da privatização sobre os estoques de dívidas, calcularam-se reduções de R$ 27,6 bilhões R$ 30,8 bilhões no saldo nas emissões de títulos competitivos dessa dívida, respectivamente. redução da dívida líquida do setor público alcançou 8,4% do PIB, tendo as privatizações estaduais contribuído com 3,6% do PIB. Adicionalmente, as necessidades de financiamento do setor público foram reduzidas em 5,4% do PIB. Esses são alguns resultados obtidos, por meio de metodologia de cálculo descrita no trabalho utilizando-se dados efetivamente observados, com os valores em moeda corrente preços de dezembro de 1999. Acrescenta-se esses resultados melhoria do desempenho das estatais remanescentes de alguns indicadores fiscais, com impactos positivos sobre dívida e déficit públicos. análise dos resultados indica que contribuição da privatização para redução da dívida do setor público esforço de ajuste fiscal pode ser significativa, mesmo no curto prazo. utilização de receitas de privatização para abater diversas dívidas governamentais as dívidas transferidas para setor privado reduziram carga de juros incidentes sobre dívida, seu estoque déficit público no período sob análise. privatização possibilitou, ainda, melhoria do perfil da dívida reestruturação de passivos do setor público.

Tratamento das contas das empresas estatais produtivas no orçamento do setor público: o exemplo da Petrobrás

Nos últimos anos, a contabilização do resultado das empresas estatais nos números que medem a necessidade de financiamento do setor público e o estoque da dívida líquida do setor público tem garantido o cumprimento das metas fixadas para o superávit primário mas tem limitado a quantidade de recursos que as empresas do governo podem tomar na forma de empréstimo para fins de investimento. Ao examinarmos o tratamento dado às contas das Empresas Estatais nos acordos do Brasil com o FMI em relação ao estabelecido nos manuais do Fundo, na União Européia e em diplomas legais brasileiros, encontramos discrepância de tratamento, o que nos faz supor que há condições tanto para a inclusão como para a exclusão das contas das Empresas Estatais, não apenas na apuração dos resultados em termos de déficit ou superávit fiscal, mas também no cálculo dos valores da dívida pública. Ao considerarmos os manuais e a legislação brasileira, verificamos a possibilidade de se adotar um tratamento similar ao empregado na União Européia, excluindo essas sociedades das contas de déficit e dívida. Essa dissertação se propõe a discutir o tratamento das contas das empresas estatais produtivas no orçamento do setor público, utilizando como exemplo a Petrobras, e analisar duas possibilidades: a primeira é a exclusão das contas dessas estatais não apenas na apuração dos resultados em termos de déficit ou superávit fiscal, mas também no cálculo dos valores da dívida pública. A segunda possibilidade é que as contas dessas empresas pelo menos sejam retiradas do cálculo do superávit primário. A Petrobras, por exemplo, possui todos os seus investimentos custeados por recursos próprios oriundos da comercialização de seus produtos ou por captação no mercado. Além disso, a Petrobras não recebe qualquer recurso do governo. Pelo contrário, ela contribui significativamente para a receita pública da União, dos estados e dos municípios, por meio do pagamento de impostos, taxas, contribuições, dividendos e royalties pela extração de petróleo e gás natural, sendo a maior contribuinte individual do Brasil, além da economia de divisas proporcionada ao longo de sua história. Pelos motivos acima expostos, sugerimos a exclusão das contas das empresas estatais produtivas das contas de déficit e de dívida do setor público. Caso esta proposta não seja adotada, sugerimos que pelo menos essas empresas sejam excluídas do cálculo do superávit primário do setor público. Neste documento, analisamos o caso da Petrobras, a empresa estatal federal que apresenta as melhores condições para essas propostas.

Dinâmica não-linear e sustentabilidade da dívida pública brasileira

This paper contributes to the debate on whether the Brazilian public debt is sustainable or not in the long run by considering threshold effects on the Brazilian Budget Deficit. Using data from 1947 to 1999 and a threshold autoregressive model, we find evidence of delays in fiscal stabilization. As suggested in Alesina (1991), delayed stabilizations reflect the existence of political constraints blocking deficit cuts, which are relaxed only when the budget deficit reaches a sufficiently high level, deemed to be unsustainable. In particular, our results suggest that, in the absence of seignorage, only when the increase in the budget deficit reaches 1.74% of the GDP will fiscal authorities intervene to reduce the deficit. If seignorage is allowed, the threshold increases to 2.2%, suggesting that seignorage makes government more tolerant to fiscal imbalances.

Collateral, default penalties and almost finite-time solvency

We argue that it is possible to adapt the approach of imposing restrictions on available plans through finitely effective debt constraints, introduced by Levine and Zame (1996), to encompass models with default and collateral. Along this line, we introduce in the setting of Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) and Páscoa and Seghir (2008) the concept of almost finite-time solvency. We show that the conditions imposed in these two papers to rule out Ponzi schemes implicitly restrict actions to be almost finite-time solvent. We define the notion of equilibrium with almost finite-time solvency and look on sufficient conditions for its existence. Assuming a mild assumption on default penalties, namely that agents are myopic with respect to default penalties, we prove that existence is guaranteed (and Ponzi schemes are ruled out) when actions are restricted to be almost finite-time solvent. The proof is very simple and intuitive. In particular, the main existence results in Araujo et al. (2002) and Páscoa and Seghir (2008) are simple corollaries of our existence result.

On the economic and fiscal effects of infrastructure investment in Brazil

This article studies the productive impact of infrastructure investment in Brazil. Public-capital expenditures in the country have decreased continuously over the last two decades, and this paper shows the significant impact this has had on infrastructure stocks. Cointegration analysis is used to investigate the long-run association between output and infrastructure, the results being then used to study the short-run dynamic of these variables. Whether in the short or long run, the productive impact of infrastructure was found to be relevant. Other group of simulations studies the impact of expanding capital expenditures through debt finance on debt to GDP ratio as well as on public cash áow and net worth.

Monetary arrangements for emerging economies

In this paper we look at various alternatives for monetary regimes: dollarization, monetary union and local currency. We use an extension of the debt crisis model of Cole and Kehoe ([3], [4] and [5]), although we do not necessarily follow their sunspot interpretation. Our focus is to appraise the welfare of a country which is heavily dependent on international capital due to low savings, for example, and might suffer a speculative attack on its external public debt. We study the conditions under which countries will be better off adopting each one of the regimes described above. If it belongs to a monetary union or to a local currency regime, a default may be avoided by an ination tax on debt denominated in common or local currency, respectively. Under the former regime, the decision to inate depends on each member country's political inuence over the union's central bank, while, in the latter one, the country has full autonomy to decide about its monetary policy. The possibility that the government inuences the central bank to create ination tax for political reasons adversely affects the expected welfare of both regimes. Under dollarization, ination is ruled out and the country that is subject to an external debt crisis has no other option than to default. Accordingly, one of our main results is that shared ination control strengthens currencies and a common-currency regime is superior in terms of expected welfare to the local-currency one and to dollarization if external shocks that member countries suffer are strongly correlated to each other. On the other hand, dollarization is dominant if the room for political ination under the alternative regime is high. Finally, local currency is dominant if external shocks are uncorrelated and the room for political pressure is mild. We nish by comparing Brazil's and Argentina's recent experiences which resemble the dollarization and the local currency regimes, and appraising the incentives that member countries would have to unify their currencies in the following common markets: Southern Common Market, Andean Community of Nations and Central American Common Market.

Speculative attacks on debts and optimum currency area: a welfare analysis

Traditionally the issue of an optimum currency area is based on the theoretical underpinnings developed in the 1960s by McKinnon [13], Kenen [12] and mainly Mundell [14], who is concerned with the benefits of lowering transaction costs vis-à- vis adjustments to asymmetrical shocks. Recently, this theme has been reappraised with new aspects included in the analysis, such as: incomplete markets, credibility of monetary policy and seigniorage, among others. For instance, Neumeyer [15] develops a general equilibrium model with incomplete asset markets and shows that a monetary union is desirable when the welfare gains of eliminating the exchange rate volatility are greater than the cost of reducing the number of currencies to hedge against risks. In this paper, we also resort to a general equilibrium model to evaluate financial aspects of an optimum currency area. Our focus is to appraise the welfare of a country heavily dependent on foreign capital that may suffer a speculative attack on its public debt. The welfare analysis uses as reference the self-fulfilling debt crisis model of Cole and Kehoe ([6], [7] and [8]), which is employed here to represent dollarization. Under this regime, the national government has no control over its monetary policy, the total public debt is denominated in dollars and it is in the hands of international bankers. To describe a country that is a member of a currency union, we modify the original Cole-Kehoe model by including public debt denominated in common currency, only purchased by national consumers. According to this rule, the member countries regain some influence over the monetary policy decision, which is, however, dependent on majority voting. We show that for specific levels of dollar debt, to create inflation tax on common-currency debt in order to avoid an external default is more desirable than to suspend its payment, which is the only choice available for a dollarized economy when foreign creditors decide not to renew their loans.

Speculative attacks, openness and crises

In this paper we propose a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to evaluate financial adjustments that some emerging market economies went through to overcome external crises during the latest decades, such as default and local currency devaluation. We assume that real devaluation can be used to avoid external debt default, to improve trade balance and to reduce the real public debt level denominated in local currency. Such effects increase the government ability to deal with external crisis, but also have costs in terms of welfare, related to expected inflation, reductions in private investments and higher interest to be paid over the public debt. We conclude that openness improves expected welfare as it allows for a better devaluation-response technology against crises. We also present results for 32 middle-income countries, verifying that the proposed model can indicate, in a stylized way, the preferences for default-devaluation options and the magnitude of the currency depreciation required to overcome 48 external crises occurred as from 1971. Finally, as we construct our model based on the Cole-Kehoe self-fulfilling debt crisis model ([7]), adding local debt and trade, it is important to say that their policy alternatives to leave the crisis zone remains in our extended model, namely, to reduce the external debt level and to lengthen its maturity.

Ataques especulativos sobre dívidas e regimes monetários

A tese pretende conhecer de forma profunda a metodologia de ataques especulativos sobre dívidas, desenvolvida por Cole e Kehoe (1996), e tem três objetivos principais: (i) aplicá-la a outros países, além do México, que é feito na versão original; (ii) entender a opção de um país dolarizar, em relação à alternativa de manter sua moeda local, quando a economia depende da entrada de capitais financeiros internacionais; e (iii) estudar a união monetária como uma terceira alternativa de regime monetário, em comparação com a dolarização e o regime de moeda local. O modelo de crises da dívida de Cole-Kehoe é aplicado às economias da Coréia, da Rússia e do Brasil. Modifica-se este modelo para incluir dívida denominada em moeda local, que é totalmente adquirida pelos consumidores nacionais e que dá ao governo a possibilidade de obter receitas por meio da cobrança de um imposto inflacionário sobre estes ativos. As receitas obtidas desta forma podem ser utilizadas para pagar os banqueiros internacionais e evitar uma crise da dívida externa, que ocorreria, em caso contrário. Considera-se também, neste caso, que o banco central possa estar sujeito a pressões de seu governo para gerar estas receitas. Analogamente, para representar um país pertencente a uma união monetária, inclui-se dívida denominada em moeda comum e um governo central no modelo original. A política monetária da união está subordinada à decisão conjunta de todos os países membros. Supõe-se também que o banco central da união possa sofrer pressões políticas de alguns governos nacionais sem disciplina fiscal e dispostos a obter receitas de imposto inflacionário sobre a dívida. Na dolarização, a política monetária está submetida a do banco central do país âncora e, portanto, não há possibilidade de o governo gerar receitas extraordinárias sobre a dívida, a menos que haja forte simetria dos choques que atingem a economia dolarizada e o país âncora. Considerando estas peculiaridades dos três regimes monetários, os níveis de bem-estar são caracterizados e avaliados numericamente para o Brasil. Além disso, obtém-se a política ótima do governo para a dívida em dólar, segundo os três regimes.

Essays on international finance, default and inflation

This thesis is composed by three papers, each one of them corresponding to one chapter. The first and the second chapters are essays on international finance appraising default and inflation as equilibrium outcomes for crisis time, in particular, for confidence crisis time that leads to speculative attack on the external public debt issued by emerging economies. With this background in mind, welfare effects from adopting common currency (chapter 1) and welfare effects from increasing the degree of economic openness (chapter 2) are analyzed in numerical exercises, based on DSGE framework. Cross-countries results obtained are then presented to be compared with empirical evidence and to help on understanding past policy decisions. Some policy prescriptions are also suggested. In the third chapter we look to the inflation targeting regime applied to emerging economies that are subject to adverse shocks, like the external debt crisis presented in the previous chapters. Based on a more theoretical approach, we appraise how pre commitment framework should be used to coordinate expectations when policymaker announcement has no full credibility and self fulfilling inflation may be possible.

Economic growth with foreign saving?

Highly indebted countries, particularly the Latin American ones, presented dismal economic outcomes in the 1990s, which are the consequence of the ‘growth cum foreign savings strategy’, or the Second Washington Consensus. Coupled with liberalization of international financial flows, such strategy, which did not make part of the first consensus, led the countries, in the wave of a new world wide capital flow cycle, to high current account deficits and increase in foreign debt, ignoring the solvency constraint and the debt threshold. In practical terms it involved overvalued currencies (low exchange rates) and high interest rates; in policy terms, the attempt to control de budget deficit while the current account deficit was ignored. The paradoxical consequence was the adoption by highly indebted countries of ‘exchange rate populism’, a less obvious but more dangerous form of economic populism.

Financiamento para o subdesenvolvimento, o Brasil e o segundo consenso de Washington

While in the social and in the ethical realms the Cardoso administration was successful, its economic outcomes were frustrating. In this administration’s eight years the investment rate did not increase and income per capita growth lagged, while the public debt and the foreign debt increased substantially. This poor economic performance may be explained by three chained causes: a mistake in agenda setting, the adoption of the Second Washington Consensus, and the alienation of elites. The decision of setting high inflation as the major problem to be tackled instead of achieving equilibrium in foreign accounts represented a major macroeconomic mistake, which can be explained by the Second Washington Consensus. This consensus proposed in the 1990s that highly indebted countries should grow counting on foreign savings, although this is not the experience among OECD countries. The outcome was to evaluate the real, to increase artificially wages and consumption, so that instead of growth what we have been increased indebtedness. Why this flopped strategy was adopted? Rich countries’ interests are not difficult to guess. On the part of Brazil, the only explanation is Brazilian elites’ alienation in relation to the country’s national interest. As a final outcome, the Cardoso administration ends with another balance of payments crisis, which was empowered by the coming presidential elections. Yet, the solvency situation of the Brazilian economy have been improving since the 1999 successful floatation of the real, so that I believe that, adopted a policy that deepens fiscal adjustment, while lowers the interest rate, and avoids new evaluation of the real, the country will eventually be able to avoid default.

Incompatibilidade distributiva e desenvolvimento auto-sustentado

Effective macroeconomic stability and sustained economic growth will only be achieved in Brazil when the country settles the distributive inconsistency that arose in the 1970s. Since then the state and the nation started to incur respectively in high domestic and foreign debt. Wages grew at much slower rate than productivity, and income concentrated in the hands of business entrepreneurs and particularly of rentiers. Sheer populist practices, or disguised combination of neo-liberal and neopopulist policies were unable to address the problem. Budget deficits and high inflation, or exchange rate overvaluation and financial crises were the typical outcome. To settle distributive inconsistency by compensating in the short term workers for their income losses is not realistic. Only a consistent growth strategy and a credible commitment to share future growth benefits, combined with active social policies oriented to the poor, will do the job.