Androgen deprivation results in time-dependent hypoxia in LNCaP prostate tumours; informed scheduling of the bioreductive drug AQ4N improves treatment response

Androgen withdrawal induces hypoxia in androgen-sensitive tissue; this is important as in the tumour microenvironment hypoxia is known to drive malignant progression. This study examined the time-dependent effect of androgen deprivation therapy (ADT) on tumour oxygenation and investigated the role of ADT-induced hypoxia on malignant progression in prostate tumours. LNCaP xenografted tumours were treated with anti-androgens and tumour oxygenation measured. Dorsal skin fold chambers (DSF) were used to image tumour vasculature in vivo. Quantitative PCR (QPCR) identified differential gene expression following treatment with bicalutamide. Bicalutamide and vehicle-only treated tumours were re-established in vitro and invasion and sensitivity to docetaxel were measured. Tumour growth delay was calculated following treatment with bicalutamide combined with the bioreductive drug AQ4N. Tumour oxygenation measurements showed a precipitate decrease following initiation of ADT. A clinically relevant dose of bicalutamide (2mg/kg/day) decreased tumour oxygenation by 45% within 24h, reaching a nadir of 0.09% oxygen (0.67±0.06 mmHg) by day 7; this persisted until day 14 when it increased up to day 28. Using DSF chambers, LNCaP tumours treated with bicalutamide showed loss of small vessels at days 7 and 14 with revascularization occurring by day 21. QPCR showed changes in gene expression consistent with the vascular changes and malignant progression. Cells from bicalutamide-treated tumours were more malignant than vehicle-treated controls. Combining bicalutamide with AQ4N (50mg/kg; single dose) caused greater tumour growth delay than bicalutamide alone. This study shows that bicalutamide-induced hypoxia selects for cells that show malignant progression; targeting hypoxic cells may provide greater clinical benefit.

Informed Consent: Autonomy and Self-Ownership

Using the example of an unconsented mouth swab I criticise the view that an action of this kind taken in itself is wrongful in respect of its being a violation of autonomy. This is so much inasmuch as autonomy merits respect only with regard to ‘critical life choices’. I consider the view that such an action is nevertheless harmful or risks serious harm. I also respond to two possible suggestions: that the action is of a kind that violates autonomy; and, that the class of such actions violates autonomy. I suggest that the action is wrongful in as much as it is a bodily trespass. I consider, and criticise, two ways of understanding how morally I stand to my own body: as owner and as sovereign. In respect of the latter I consider Arthur Ripstein’s recent defence of a sovereignty principle. Finally I criticise an attempt by Joel Feinberg to explain bodily trespass in terms of personal autonomy.

Multicentre randomised control trial comparing real time teledermatology with conventional outpatient dermatological care:societal cost-benefit analysis

Comparison of real time teledermatology with outpatient dermatology in terms of clinical outcomes, cost-benefits, and patient reattendance.

A comparison of real-time and store-and-forward teledermatology:a cost-benefit study

Increasing use of teledermatology should be based on demonstration of favourable accuracy and cost-benefit analysis for the different methods of use of this technique. Objectives To evaluate the clinical efficacy and cost-effectiveness of real-time and store-and-forward teledermatology.

Informed consent and the requirement to ensure understanding

It is generally held that doctors and researchers have an obligation to obtain informed consent. Over time there has been a move in relation to this obligation from a requirement to disclose information to a requirement to ensure that that information is understood.Whilst this change has been resisted, in this article I argue that both sides on this matter are mistaken.When investigating what information is needed for consent to be informed we might be trying to determine what information a person would need in order to consent at all, or we might be trying to determine what information a person needs in order to make an informed choice about whether or not to consent. I argue that the obligation to ensure understanding only applies to information generated by the ?rst type of enquiry; but that much of the information generally thought necessary in order for consent to be informed is only required if our concern is with the second type of enquiry. For this reason it is neither the case that doctors and researchers should ensure all the information they provide is understood, nor is it the case that their only obligation is to disclose it.

Risk-informed decision-making in the presence of epistemic uncertainty

An important issue in risk analysis is the distinction between epistemic and aleatory uncertainties. In this paper, the use of distinct representation formats for aleatory and epistemic uncertainties is advocated, the latter being modelled by sets of possible values. Modern uncertainty theories based on convex sets of probabilities are known to be instrumental for hybrid representations where aleatory and epistemic components of uncertainty remain distinct. Simple uncertainty representation techniques based on fuzzy intervals and p-boxes are used in practice. This paper outlines a risk analysis methodology from elicitation of knowledge about parameters to decision. It proposes an elicitation methodology where the chosen representation format depends on the nature and the amount of available information. Uncertainty propagation methods then blend Monte Carlo simulation and interval analysis techniques. Nevertheless, results provided by these techniques, often in terms of probability intervals, may be too complex to interpret for a decision-maker and we, therefore, propose to compute a unique indicator of the likelihood of risk, called confidence index. It explicitly accounts for the decisionmaker’s attitude in the face of ambiguity. This step takes place at the end of the risk analysis process, when no further collection of evidence is possible that might reduce the ambiguity due to epistemic uncertainty. This last feature stands in contrast with the Bayesian methodology, where epistemic uncertainties on input parameters are modelled by single subjective probabilities at the beginning of the risk analysis process.