power network concept : a theoretical and empirical approach to strategy in the global network economy

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Wirtschaftswiss., Diss., 2014

Entwicklungsprojekt MCUI13 : Machbarkeitsstudie/ Konzept zum Bau und Betrieb einer „Power to Methanol“-Anlage

[s.c.]

Forward rates : predictive power and trading strategies

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Wirtschaftswiss., Diss., 2014

Impact of a power plant cooling system on copepod and meroplankton survival (Bahía Blanca estuary, Argentina)

The impact of a power plant cooling system in the Bahía Blanca estuary (Argentina) on the survival of target zooplanktonic organisms (copepods and crustacean larvae) and on overall mesozooplankton abundance was evaluated over time. Mortality rates were calculated for juveniles and adults of four key species in the estuary: Acartia tonsa Dana, 1849 and Eurytemora americana Williams, 1906 (native and invading copepods), and larvae of the crab Chasmagnathus granulata Dana, 1851 and the invading cirriped Balanus glandula Darwin, 1854. Mean total mortality values were up to four times higher at the water discharge site than at intake, though for all four species, significant differences were only registered in post-capture mortality. The findings show no evidence of greater larval sensitivity. As expected, the sharpest decrease in overall mesozooplankton abundance was found in areas close to heated water discharge.

Estudos sôbre o pneumococo: 4a. nota - Influência do pH do meio sôbre a formação da cápsula pelo pneumococo

One of the features of pneumococcus which has deserved the attention of investigators is the capsule. Since Pasteur, Chamberland and Roux (1881) several functions have been ascribed to it as well as peculiar properties. In the present paper, we take into consideration one only aspect of this problem; it is the relationship which there possibly may be between acidity of the culture medium and the power of capsule formation by pneumococcus. As it is known, this germ requires for its development 7.8 as an optimum pH, but maintains its biological activities down to 5.6. These variations do not take place without large alterations, particularly of the capsule, not only from the morphological but also from the chemical viewpoint. The diameter of the mucous envelopment of the pneumococcus decreases in proportion to the increase of acidity down to its complete extinction. This fact has been regarded by investigators as a biological feature inhe¬ring to the germ itself and as proceeding of self-defense. In an acid medium the existing capsule is destroyed and the germ does not produce it again; consequently, acidity inhibits the formation of the capsule. We tried to check how this phenomenon comes to pass and to elucidated it. As we know, the fundamental compound of the pneumococcus capsule is mucin. In the first place, we experimented the action of acidity on same in the following manner: Mucin extracted from bovine submaxillary gland is precipitated by HC1 at a determined concentration degree; the mucin dissolves again and precipi¬tates in function of this concentration. This property of mucin (solubility in acid medium) modifies a little the interpretation of the mechanism of disappearance of the capsule from the said germ in the culture medium. Indeed: The acidification of the medium consecutive to the growth of pneumococcus reduces the dimensions of the capsule until causing its com¬plete disappearance; but on transferring this strain to new optimum cultiva¬ting conditions the capsule appears again exhuberantly, at times as anteriorly, although with biased virulence. Linking these two facts we draw the following conclusions: Pneumo¬coccus does not lose its capacity of capsule formation in an acid medium; but mucin, whilst being produced, is entirely dissolved in this medium by the aid of acidity; we venture to state that, in spite of medium acidity, the capacity of capsule production is a constant feature of pneumococcus and that the disappearance of the capsule does not depend on the pneumococcus in itself when it produces smooth colonies, but on the chemical properties of mucin, mainly on its solubility in acid medium.

Tacit collusion and capacity withholding in repeated uniform price auctions

This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when each firm sets a price-quantity pair specifying the firm's minimum acceptable price and the maximum quantity the firm is willing to sell at this price, there exists a range of discount factors for which the monopoly outcome with equal sharing is sustainable in the uniform price auction, but not in the corresponding discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this out-come. We extend these results to the case where firms may set bids that are arbitrary step functions of price-quantity pairs with any finite number of price steps. Surprisingly, under the Maximum Accepted Price rule, firms need employ no more than two price steps to minimize the value of the discount factor

Forward induction and the excess capacity puzzle: An experimental investigation.

While the theoretical industrial organization literature has long argued that excess capacity can be used to deter entry into markets, there is little empirical evidence that incumbent firms effectively behave in this way. Bagwell and Ramey (1996) propose a game with a specific sequence of moves and partially-recoverable capacity costs in which forward induction provides a theoretical rationalization for firm behavior in the field. We conduct an experiment with a game inspired by their work. In our data the incumbent tends to keep the market, in contrast to what the forward induction argument of Bagwell and Ramey would suggest. The results indicate that players perceive that the first mover has an advantage without having to pre-commit capacity. In our game, evolution and learning do not drive out this perception. We back these claims with data analysis, a theoretical framework for dynamics, and simulation results.

Countervailing power? Collusion in markets with decentralized trade

We consider the collective incentives of buyers and sellers to form cartels in markets where trade is realized through decentralized pairwise bargaining. Cartels are coalitions of buyers or sellers that limit market participation and compensate inactive members for abstaining from trade. In a stable market outcome, cartels set Nash equilibrium quantities and cartel memberships are immune to defections. We prove that the set of stable market outcomes is non-empty and we provide its full characterization. Stable market outcomes are of two types: (i) at least one cartel actively restrains trade and the levels of market participation are balanced, or (ii) only one cartel, eventually the cartel that forms on the long side of the market, is active and it reduces trade slightly below the opponent's.

I want you! An experiment studying the selection effect when assigning distributive power.

We study whether selection affects motivation. In our experiment subjects first answer a personality questionnaire. They then play a 3-person game. One of the three players decides between an outside option assigning him a positive amount, but leaving the two others empty-handed and allowing one of the other two players to distribute a pie. Treatments differ in the procedure by which distributive power is assigned: to a randomly determined or to a knowingly selected partner. Before making her decision the selecting player could consult the personality questionnaire of the other two players. Results show that knowingly selected players keep less for themselves than randomly selected ones and reward the selecting player more generously.

Endogenous capacity utilization and the asymmetric effects of monetary policy

This paper investigates the role of variable capacity utilization as a source of asymmetries in the relationship between monetary policy and economic activity within a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework. The source of the asymmetry is directly linked to the bottlenecks and stock-outs that emerge from the existence of capacity constraints in the real side of the economy. Money has real effects due to the presence of rigidities in households' portfolio decisions in the form of a Luces-Fuerst 'limited participation' constraint. The model features variable capacity utilization rates across firms due to demand uncertainty. A monopolistic competitive structure provides additional effects through optimal mark-up changes. The overall message of this paper for monetary policy is that the same actions may have different effects depending on the capacity utilization rate of the economy.

Demand elasticity and market power in the spanish electricity market

In this paper we check whether generator's bid behavior at the Spanish whosale electricity market is consistent with the hypothesis of profit maximization on their residual demands. Using OMEL data, we find the arc-elacticity of the residual demand around the system marginal price. The results suggest thet the larger firms are not actually profit-msximization. We argue how the regulatory environment may drive these results. Finally, we repeat the analysis for the first session of the intra-day market where presumably firms may not have the same incentives as in the day-ahead market.