Policy Coordination in an Oligopolistic Housing Market

This paper analyzes the consequences of the interaction between two different levels of government (regulators) in the development of housing policy when their decisions determine the level of competition in the housing market. The analysis discusses the implications derived from a lack of coordination between a local regulator who controls the supply of land for housing development and a central regulator who decides on housing subsidies. The results suggest that lack of coordination has significant effects on prices and supply of houses, housing developers’ profits, and buyers’ surplus.

Labor Market Assimilation of Recent Immigrants in Spain

Revised: 2006-11.-- Published as an article in: British Journal of Industrial Relations, June 2007, vol. 45, issue 2, pp. 257-284.

Computing abuse related damages in the case of new entry: An illustration for the Directory Enquiry Services market

A number of European countries, among which the UK and Spain, have opened up their Directory Enquiry Services (DQs, or 118AB) market to competition. We analyse the Spanish case, where both local and foreign firms challenged the incumbent as of April 2003. We argue that the incumbent had the ability to abuse its dominant position, and that it was a perfectly rational strategy. In short,the incumbent raised its rivals' costs directly by providing an inferior quality version of the (essential) input, namely the incumbent's subscribers' database. We illustrate how it is possible to quantify the effect of abuse in situation were the entrant has no previous history in the market. To do this, we use the UK experience to construct the relevant counterfactual, that is the "but for abuse" scenario. After controlling for relative prices and advertising intensity, we find that one of the foreign entrants achieved a Spanish market share of only half of what it would have been in the absence of abuse.

The Weekend-Dividend Effect in the Spanish Market

Revised: 2006-05

A Supply Function Competition Model for the Spanish Wholesale Electricity Market

We model the Spanish wholesale market as a multiplant linear supply function competition model. According to the theory, the larger generators should have supply curves for each plant which are to the left of the supply curves of plants owned by smaller generators. We test this prediction for fuel plants using data from the Spanish Market Operator (OMEL) from May 2001 to December 2003. Our results indicate that the prediction of the model holds.

Immigrants Responsiveness to Labor Market Conditions

Using data from the Spanish Labor Force Survey (Encuesta de Población Activa) from 1999 through 2004, we explore the role of regional employment opportunities in explaining the increasing immigrant flows of recent years despite the limited internal mobility on the part of natives. Subsequently, we investigate the policy question of whether immigration has helped reduced unemployment rate disparities across Spanish regions by attracting immigrant flows to regions offering better employment opportunities. Our results indicate that immigrants choose to reside in regions with larger employment rates and where their probability of finding a job is higher. In particular, and despite some differences depending on their origin, immigrants appear generally more responsive than their native counterparts to a higher likelihood of informal, self, or indefinite employment. More importantly, insofar the vast majority of immigrants locate in regions characterized by higher employment rates, immigration contributes to greasing the wheels of the Spanish labor market by narrowing regional unemployment rate disparities.

Union Formation and Bargaining Rules in the Labor Market

This paper analyzes union formation in a model of bargaining between a firm and several unions. We address two questions: first, the optimal configuration of unions (their number and size) and, second, the impact of the bargaining pattern (simultaneous or sequential). For workers, grouping into several unions works as a price discrimination device which, at the same time, decreases their market power. The analysis shows that optimal union configuration depends on the rules that regulate the bargaining process (monopoly union, Nash bargaining or right to manage).

Market Power in the Spanish Electricity Auction

Published as an article in: Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2010, vol. 37, issue 1, pages 42-69.

Strategic Behavior and Collusion: An Application to the Spanish Electricity Market

The paper has two major contributions to the theory of repeated games. First, we build a supergame oligopoly model where firms compete in supply functions, we show how collusion sustainability is affected by the presence of a convex cost function, the magnitude of both the slope of demand market, and the number of rivals. Then, we compare the results with those of the traditional Cournot reversion under the same structural characteristics. We find how depending on the number of firms and the slope of the linear demand, collusion sustainability is easier under supply function than under Cournot competition. The conclusions of the models are simulated with data from the Spanish wholesale electricity market to predict lower bounds of the discount factors.

Asset pricing and systematic liquidity risk: an empirical investigation of the Spanish stock market

Systematic liquidity shocks should affect the optimal behavior of agents in financial markets. Indeed, fluctuations in various measures of liquidity are significantly correlated across common stocks. Accordingly, this paper empirically analyzes whether Spanish average returns vary cross-sectionally with betas estimated relative to two competing liquidity risk factors. The first one, proposed by Pastor and Stambaugh (2002), is associated with the strength of volume-related return reversals. Our marketwide liquidity factor is defined as the difference between returns highly sensitive to changes in the relative bid-ask spread and returns with low sensitivities to those changes. Our empirical results show that neither of these proxies for systematic liquidity risk seems to be priced in the Spanish stock market. Further international evidence is deserved.

Optimal Fiscal Policy with Rationing in the Labor Market

Published as an article in: Topics in Macroeconomics, 2005, vol. 5, issue 1, article 17.

[A_Laguardia_SanJuan] Levantamiento fotogramétrico de la portada Sur o “de los abuelos” de la iglesia de San Juan de Laguardia (Álava)

[ES] La documentación contenida en este registro ha servido de base para los siguientes documentos:

The Vietnamese shrimp trade: livelihoods analysis of stakeholders and market chain analysis

Aquaculture and capture fisheries in Vietnam have been increasing fast in the last decade, especially aquaculture growth rate is 12% for the 1999 – 2003 period, contributing a significant part into the hunger eradication and poverty reduction1. Vietnam is to be ranked into one of the countries potential to produce the aquatic economic in the world, and the fact is that, after 40 years of establishing, the fisheries sector has made remarkable contributions to the country. By the list, at the moment the aquatic products make up about 4 - 5% of GDP and create job opportunities for over 3 three million employees (VASEP, 2004), in which the largest contribution is from shrimp farming. [PDF contains 124 pages.]

Multi-species and multi-interest management: An ecosystem approach to market squid (Loligo opalescens) harvest in California

Market squid (Loligo opalescens) plays a vital role in the California ecosystem and serves as a major link in the food chain as both a predator and prey species. For over a century, market squid has also been harvested off the California coast from Monterey to San Pedro. Expanding global markets, coupled with a decline in squid product from other parts of the world, in recent years has fueled rapid expansion of the virtually unregulated California fishery. Lack of regulatory management, in combination with dramatic increases in fishing effort and landings, has raised numerous concerns from the scientific, fishing, and regulatory communities. In an effort to address these concerns, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) Channel Islands National Marine Sanctuary (CINMS) hosted a panel discussion at the October 1997 California Cooperative Oceanic and Fisheries Investigations (CalCOFI) Conference; it focused on ecosystem management implications for the burgeoning market squid fishery. Both panel and audience members addressed issues such as: the direct and indirect effects of commercial harvesting upon squid biomass; the effects of harvest and the role of squid in the broader marine community; the effects of environmental variation on squid population dynamics; the sustainability of the fishery from the point of view of both scientists and the fishers themselves; and the conservation management options for what is currently an open access and unregulated fishery. Herein are the key points of the ecosystem management panel discussion in the form of a preface, an executive summary, and transcript. (PDF contains 33 pages.)