The influence of momentum addition on the acceleration of the solar and stellar winds

The influence of the momentum addition, which may be associated with the average or fluctuation transverse component of the magnetic field or others, on the acceleration the solar wind or stellar wind is studied in a local streamtube. The results show that the larger the momentum addition the stronger the acceleration of the wind. For example, if the typical transverse magnetic field is about 0.1 of the longitudinal field, the velocity of the solar wind at 1 AU may be increased by 40%. The coronal hole may be considered as a streamtube, the presence of a high stream from the coronal hole may be explained by the existence of an average or fluctuation transverse magnetic field in the streamtube. A similar conclusion may be applied to the polar region, where the velocity of the solar wind will be larger than elsewhere as if there is a transverse component of magnetic field, as well as to the stellar wind. The influence of other parameters on the acceleration of the solar wind is also discussed. From the viewpoint of the solar wind mechanism, the present paper shows that the momentum addition in the subsonic flow region can increase the velocity of the solar wind at 1 AU.

A Behavioral Foundation for Models of Evolutionary Drift

Binmore and Samuelson (1999) have shown that perturbations (drift) are crucial to study the stability properties of Nash equilibria. We contribute to this literature by providing a behavioural foundation for models of evolutionary drift. In particular, this article introduces a microeconomic model of drift based on the similarity theory developed by Tversky (1977), Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Rubinstein (1988),(1998). An innovation with respect to those works is that we deal with similarity relations that are derived from the perception that each agent has about how well he is playing the game. In addition, the similarity relations are adapted to a dynamic setting. We obtain different models of drift depending on how we model the agent´s assessment of his behaviour in the game. The examples of the ultimatum game and the chain-store game are used to show the conditions for each model to stabilize elements in the component of Nash equilibria that are not subgame- perfect. It is also shown how some models approximate the laboratory data about those games while others match the data.