Etiology and management of recurrent parotid pleomorphic adenoma

The objective of this review study was to encompass the relevant literature and current best practice options for this challenging, sometimes incurable problem. The source of the data was Ovid MEDLINE from 1946 to 2014. Review methods consisted of articles with clinical correlates. The most important cause of recurrence is enucleation with rupture and incomplete tumor excision at operation. Incomplete pseudocapsule, extracapsular extension, pseudopods of pleomorphic adenoma tissue, and satellite pleomorphic beyond the pseudocapsule are also likely linked to recurrent pleomorphic adenoma. Most recurrent pleomorphic adenoma are multinodular. Magnetic resonance imaging is the imaging study of choice for recurrent pleomorphic adenoma. Nerve integrity monitoring may reduce morbidity for recurrent pleomorphic adenoma. Treatment of recurrent pleomorphic adenoma must be individualized. Total parotidectomy, given the multicentricity of recurrent pleomorphic adenoma, is appropriate in many patients, but may be inadequate to control recurrent pleomorphic. There is accumulating evidence from retrospective series that postoperative radiation therapy results in significantly better local control. LEVEL OF EVIDENCE NA Laryngoscope, 2014.

Consensus report of the European Federation of Conservative Dentistry: erosive tooth wear-diagnosis and management

OBJECTIVE Due to an increased focus on erosive tooth wear (ETW), the European Federation of Conservative Dentistry (EFCD) considered ETW as a relevant topic for generating this consensus report. MATERIALS AND METHODS This report is based on a compilation of the scientific literature, an expert conference, and the approval by the General Assembly of EFCD. RESULTS ETW is a chemical-mechanical process resulting in a cumulative loss of hard dental tissue not caused by bacteria, and it is characterized by loss of the natural surface morphology and contour of the teeth. A suitable index for classification of ETW is the basic erosive wear examination (BEWE). Regarding the etiology, patient-related factors include the pre-disposition to erosion, reflux, vomiting, drinking and eating habits, as well as medications and dietary supplements. Nutritional factors relate to the composition of foods and beverages, e.g., with low pH and high buffer capacity (major risk factors), and calcium concentration (major protective factor). Occupational factors are exposition of workers to acidic liquids or vapors. Preventive management of ETW aims at reducing or stopping the progression of the lesions. Restorative management aims at reducing symptoms of pain and dentine hypersensitivity, or to restore esthetic and function, but it should only be used in conjunction with preventive strategies. CONCLUSIONS Effective management of ETW includes screening for early signs of ETW and evaluating all etiological factors. CLINICAL RELEVANCE ETW is a clinical condition, which calls for the increased attention of the dental community and is a challenge for the cooperation with other medical specialities.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Long-term central venous catheter-related candidemia: A new approach towards diagnosis and management

A case-series analysis of approximately 811 cancer patients who developed Candidemia between 1989 and 1998 and seen at M. D. Anderson Cancer Center, was studied to assess the impact and timing of central venous catheter (CVC) removal on the outcome of fungal bloodstream infections in cancer patients with primary catheter-related Candidemia as well as secondary infections. ^ This study explored the diagnosis and the management of vascular catheter-associated fungemia in patients with cancer. The microbiologic and clinical factors were determined to predict catheter-related Candidemia. Those factors included, in addition to basic demographics, the underlying malignancy, chemotherapy, neutropenia, and other salient data. Statistical analyses included univariate and multivariate logistic regression to determine the outcome of Candidemia in relation to the timing of catheter removal, type of species, and to identify predictors of catheter-related infections. ^ The conclusions of the study aim at enhancing our mastery of issues involving CVC removal and potentially will have an impact on the management of nosocomial bloodstream infections related to timing of CVC removal and the optimal duration of treatment of catheter-related Candidemia. ^

Asymmetric Information, Tax Evasion and Alternative Instruments of Government Revenue

Using a pure-exchange overlapping generations model, characterized with tax evasion and information asymmetry between the government (the social planner) and the financial intermediaries, we try and seek for the optimal tax and seigniorage plans, derived from the welfare maximizing objective of the social planner. We show that irrespective of whether the economy is characterized by tax evasion, or asymmetric information, a benevolent social planner, maximizing welfare and simultaneously financing the budget constraint, should optimally rely on explicit rather than implicit taxation.