The Creative Life of Law: Improvisation, Between Tradition and Suspicion

Originally applying solely to chefs, waiters, dishwashers and the like, New York City (NYC) regulations governing cabaret employees were altered in 1943 to include musicians and entertainers, who until the late 1960’s would be required to hold a NYC Cabaret Employee’s Identification Card. The introduction of these notorious “police cards” occurred roughly contemporaneously to the emergence in after-hours night clubs in Harlem of a new and supposedly “wild”, improvisatory brand of jazz: bebop. This article adds to the many rather practical theories on why these cards were introduced a more abstract discussion coined in terms of the relationship between suspicion and tradition and focusing on differing essences of law and improvisatory jazz. While law breathes tradition and is suspicious of improvisation and unpredictability, the converse is true of jazz. Allusion to tradition in jazz improvisation is often viewed as a betrayal of its creative and spontaneous nature. And yet it is only through its departure from the stable transmission of past meaning that improvisation gains meaning. Law, in contrast, while appearing to be entirely composed of tradition, to transmit some sort of determinate and fixed meaning, is constantly betraying itself. As no two legal actions can be exactly the same, judges must improvise on tradition and past precedent every time they are asked to decide a case. Law can thus neither dispense with nor be completely determined by tradition. The legal decision instead lies on the border between what it “is” and what it otherwise could be and every judicial act is, in some sense, a species of improvisation. This article uses the cabaret cards to explore this uncertain terrain between law and improvisation, between tradition and suspicion.

When is the second local multiplier algebra of a C*-algebra equal to the first?

We discuss necessary as well as sufficient conditions for the second iterated local multiplier algebra of a separable C*-algebra to agree with the first.

The problem with law in books and law in computers - the oral nature of law

It is becoming clear that, contrary to earlier expectations, the application of AI techniques to law is not as easy nor as effective as some claimed. Unfortunately, for most AI researchers, there seems to be little understanding of just why this is. In this paper I argue, from empirical study of lawyers in action, just why there is a mismatch between the AI view of law, and law in practice. While this is important and novel, it also - if my arguments are accepted - demonstrates just why AI will never have success in producing the computerised lawyer.