Influencia de un nuevo marco jurídico en la competitividad del sistema portuario español

El sistema portuario español movió en el año 2013 aproximadamente 458,54 millones de toneladas, 13,8 millones de TEUs, con un total de 131.128 buques que accedieron a puerto para el conjunto de las 28 Autoridades Portuarias. Con el 62% de las exportaciones y el 86% de las importaciones realizadas por vía marítima, una rentabilidad del 2,34 %, muy cerca del objetivo del 2,5 % de rentabilidad media annual establecida legalmente, y una cifra de negocios aproximada de 1.028 millones de euros equivalentes al 1,1 % del PIB que genera un empleo directo e indirecto vinculado de 145.000 personas, concluimos que estamos hablando de un sector estratégico para la economía del país. Desde hace décadas, en muchos puertos del mundo se han venido desarrollando terminales “hub” o de concentración y distribución de cargas. Las navieras concentran entre este tipo de terminales sus líneas transoceánicas con buques de enormes dimensiones y capacidad de carga para producir los tránsitos de contenedores desde estas líneas a otras líneas llamadas “feeder”, con buques de menor tamaño que enlazan el “hub” con los puertos de su área marítima de influencia. La excepcional ubicación geoestratégica de España, con aproximadamente ocho mil kilómetros de costa, ha originado que los puertos españoles de mayor dimensión aspiren a incorporarse a esta red marítima internacional de contenedores y determina que en nuestro sistema portuario los movimientos de contenedores de tránsito tengan gran importancia. Sin embargo, la crisis económica ha tenido un efecto decisivo en el sector marítimo, determinando una lucha feroz entre todos los puertos, nacionales e internacionales, por captar este tipo de tráficos, lo que origina una búsqueda de las compañías navieras de puertos cada vez más eficientes en términos calidad/coste del servicio. La entrada en vigor del Texto Refundido de la Ley de Puertos y la piedra angular de su reforma, la Ley 33/2010, plantea como objetivo principal la mejora de la competitividad del sistema portuario español y liderar su recuperación, ofreciendo unas condiciones de entorno favorables a los puertos españoles que acaben por incentivar la captación de tráficos e inversión privada a través de una oferta de servicios e infraestructura de calidad y a precios competitivos que consoliden su posición dentro del tráfico marítimo mundial. Surge, por tanto, la conveniencia de investigar la influencia de las medidas propuestas por dicha norma legal y las soluciones ofrecidas a las demandas de un sector considerado estratégico para la economía del país, y cuya resolución se considera imprescindible para consolidar su recuperación. Por eso, se han analizado los aspectos más importantes de la reforma mediante la realización de un resumen ejecutivo y se ha estudiado la influencia de las medidas que incorpora desde el punto de vista de tres factores, que previamente se han considerado como fundamentales para la recuperación del sistema portuario español, y que históricamente habían sido demandados por el mismo, como son, en primer lugar, un progresivo sistema de flexibilización tributaria que permitiera a los puertos españoles ganar en términos de competitividad respecto a otros modelos portuarios mucho más flexibles en materia tarifaria, en segundo lugar, una necesaria liberalización del régimen de prestación de los servicios portuarios que posibilite el libre acceso a cualquier interesado en su prestación y, en último lugar, el progresivo abaratamiento de los costes inherentes a dichos servicios, fundamentalmente la manipulación de mercancías. Con posterioridad se ha investigado el trámite parlamentario al que se ha sometido la ley, fruto del enorme consenso alcanzado entre las dos principales fuerzas políticas del país, que determinó que se presentaran más de 700 enmiendas al proyecto original, y en algunos casos, se ha prestado especial atención a determinadas enmiendas que se consideran, en opinión de este investigador, novedosas y aventuradas, razón por la cual quizás no fueron incorporadas definitivamente al texto legal. Y se han analizado las principales demandas y aportaciones extraídas de la Sesión Informativa sobre la tramitación del entonces proyecto de ley ofrecida por la Comisión de Fomento del Congreso de los Diputados a los principales representantes del sector, comunidad portuaria, universidad y sindicatos. Siendo conscientes de la incidencia que tiene el servicio portuario de manipulación de mercancías en el paso de la mercancía por el puerto, se ha hecho una referencia concreta al peculiar régimen jurídico y laboral del personal vinculado al servicio. Avanzamos que las características de la relación laboral especial, y su peculiar régimen jurídico, con una dualidad de relaciones laborales, tiene una influencia decisiva en la nómina del trabajador que se repercute en los usuarios del servicio, fundamentalmente el naviero y el operador de la terminal, que en definitiva, incide en la competitividad del puerto. Y se ha constatado el auge aperturista de numerosas legislaciones portuarias europeas, prestando especial atención al proyecto frustrado de liberalización de los servicios portuarios en la Unión Europea de la conocida como Directiva Loyola de Palacio del año 2003 y al Libro Blanco de Transportes del año 2011. Así como a las deficiencias advertidas por el Dictamen de la Comisión Europea de fecha 27/09/2012 en relación al régimen jurídico del servicio portuario de manipulación de mercancías, que lo considera disconforme y contrario con las normas de libertad de establecimiento en Europa y que amenaza con una previsible reforma unilateral de la legislación portuaria española, a instancias europeas. Bajo este planteamiento, se ha procedido a analizar el marco de prestación de dichos servicios desde el punto de vista de la propia comunidad portuaria. Inicialmente, a través de un estudio de fuerzas de la competitividad del sector de los servicios portuarios en el sistema portuario español que nos permitirá trazar un mapa estratégico del mismo a través del “Modelo de las Cinco Fuerzas de Porter” concluyendo, que el poder de los prestadores de servicios portuarios como proveedores de los mismos, fundamentalmente en la manipulación de mercancías, es máximo, con un único colectivo, los estibadores portuarios, que al amparo de la normativa legal vigente tienen la exclusividad de su prestación. Dichas circunstancias restan competitividad al sistema frente a alternativas portuarias más flexibles y desincentivan la inversión privada. Y, en segundo lugar, mediante un proceso participativo en distintas encuestas sobre el modelo legislativo y sobre el marco formativo del sector con los propios agentes afectados dentro de la comunidad portuaria, desde la triple perspectiva de la vertiente pública que representan las Autoridades Portuarias, como gestores de las infraestructuras, la vertiente privada que representan los usuarios y prestadores de servicios, como principal cliente del puerto y desde el punto de vista de la propia mano de obra portuaria materializada en la representación sindical de dichos trabajadores. Los resultados nos permitirán concluir, respectivamente, la incidencia del servicio portuario mercancía por el puerto, por representar más de la mitad de los costes. Así como la aspiración de los trabajadores adscritos a dicho servicio de consolidar un título formativo que unifique y potencie su capacitación profesional, circunstancia esta última, también demandada por toda comunidad portuaria. Analizadas las conclusiones extraídas en cada una de las líneas de investigación se han detectado una serie de ineficiencias dentro del mismo que dicho marco regulador no ha sabido resolver, por lo que se ha considerado la conveniencia de formular, como herramienta de ayuda a gestores del sistema portuario español, una relación de medidas que, en opinión de este investigador, se consideran necesarias para mejorar el régimen de prestación de los servicios portuarios y se ha propuesto un borrador de modificación del actual Texto Refundido que pueda servir de base para materializar una futura reforma legal. Las conclusiones obtenidas en la investigación deben sentar las bases de una profunda reflexión sobre la necesidad de encaminar, como alternativa a una previsible modificación a instancias europeas, una reforma legal que decididamente apueste por la competitividad del sistema portuario español desde el punto de vista de la liberalización de servicios, el abaratamiento de los costes de la estiba y la necesaria profesionalización de los trabajadores adscritos al servicio portuario de manipulación de mercancías. During 2013 the Spanish Port System moved nearly 458,54 million tons of freight, 13,8 million TEUs, involving a total of 131.128 ships for the 28 existing Port Authorities. With 62% of exports and 86% of imports made through sea transportation, a 2,34% profit, close to the 2,5% average annual profit goal legally established, revenues of 1.028 million € equivalent to a 1.1% of Spain’s GDP and a figure of 145.000 people a directly or indirectly employed we can conclude that maritime industry is undoubtedly one of the strategic and key sectors for the country’s economy. Since several decades many ports in the world have been increasingly developing “Hub” terminals, those which concentrate and distribute freight. Shipping companies place among these type of terminals their transoceanic sea liners along with huge dimension & capacity ships to make the container transit from these liners to other called “feeder” which are smaller freight ships that connect the “hub” with the ports within its maritime area of influence. Spain’s exceptional geostrategic location with over 8.000 km of coastline has originated that those big dimension Spanish ports aspire to become a part of a container international maritime network which also determines that transit container move is key within our port system. Nevertheless the economic crisis has had a decisive impact on the maritime sector originating a fierce battle between all ports, national and international ones, all of them fight against each other to catch this type of maritime traffic which triggers an ongoing shipping companies search in cost/service quality efficient ports. The cornerstone of the Restated Text of Port Law is Law 33/2010, which lays out as main goal the Spanish Port System competitiveness improvement and lead its recovery offering favorable environment conditions to Spanish ports which help encourage maritime traffic attraction and private investment through a wide offer of services, quality of infrastructure and competitive prices which can consolidate its positioning within the world’s maritime traffic. It is therefore key to investigate the influence of the measures proposed by the above mentioned law and also the solutions offered to the demands of a sector which is considered strategic for the country’s economy and which solution is essential to consolidate the recovery. It is because of this that the most important aspects of the reform have been analyzed through the making of an executive summary and it has also been studied the influence of the measures it includes from the point of view of three factors which have previously been considered as key for the Spanish port system recovery. The system has historically demanded a progressive tax flexibility, which would permit Spanish ports be more competitive compared to other port models much more flexible in rates, a necessary liberalization of the port service provision regime and last but not least, to cut the price of costs related to those services, mainly freight handling. Following this, the parliamentary process of the law has also been studied as a consequence of the vast consensus reached by the main political forces in the country which clearly determined that more than 700 amendments to the original project were presented. In some cases the focus has been on amendments which are adventurous and new, reason why they were finally not included to the final legal text. Being well aware of the importance that freight handling procedure has, I have made a specific reference to the legal and working framework of those employees related to this service. We conclude that the special working relationship, its different legal regime, along with the working relationship dualism has a big impact and decisive influence over the worker’s salary which also affects service users, mainly shipowners and terminal operators, having a bad effect on the port’s competitiveness. The above confirms the new opening trend of main European port laws with special attention to the frustrated European Union port services liberalization project, also known as Directive Loyola de Palacio (2003) and the White Paper on Transports (2011). It is important to highlight that the European Commission has also observed several deficiencies with regard to the freight handling port service Law Regime being in disagreement with it, considering it is against the free establishment rules in Europe. The Commission is likely to present a unilateral reform to the Spanish Port Law. Under this approach the service provision framework is being analyzed from the Port Community point of view. Initially the analysis will focus on the study of the competition forces within the port services industry in Spain, this will allow us to draw up an strategic map through “Porter’s Five Forces Model” concluding that the power of port services providers as freight handlers is maximum, with an only collective, stevedores, which has the exclusivity for their services. All these circumstances not only decrease the system’s competitiveness versus other more flexible but also restrain private investments. Secondly, through a participating procedure in different surveys about the legislative model and about the training framework with the affected agents within the port community, there is a triple perspective: Public point of view represented by Port Authorities as infrastructure managers, Private point of view represented by users and service suppliers as main Port’s customer and finally, port workforce, represented by union leaders. Results will let us conclude that freight handling service is the most critical port service and represents more than half of the costs. This service related workers aspire to obtain a training certificate that unifies and boosts their professional role which is also chased by the entire port community. Once conclusions have been analyzed for all research lines, several deficiencies have been found and the regulatory framework hasn’t yet been able to solve them, it has therefore been a series of necessary measures that help improve the port services provision regime. A new proposal to the Restated Law Text has been drafted as the first step to embrace a future legal reform. Conclusions obtained on the research should set the new basis of a deep reflection about the need to bent on a new legal reform which firmly bets on Spanish port system competitiveness from three key points of view, service liberalization, ship load cost reduction and professionalization of freight handling related workers.

Tutorial/Curso Web Components

Hoy en día, Internet juega un papel muy importante en nuestras vidas y las páginas web son el embalaje de todo aquello que nos ofrece. Sin embargo, existen muchos dominios inactivos o abandonados, muchas veces debido bien a la dificultad que supone crear uno mismo su propia página web y mantenerla actualizada a lo largo del tiempo, bien al gran coste que conlleva contratar a alguien para que lo haga, ya que muchas veces se requieren conocimientos expertos de HTML, JavaScript y CSS para construir una página web de calidad. Por tanto, lo que necesitan tanto diseñadores web expertos como aquellos que no lo son, es una técnica que les permita facilitar tanto el proceso de creación de páginas web como su mantenimiento; Web Components es una tecnología HTML novedosa que nos ayuda en este sentido, siendo el objetivo de este documento exponer los principios básicos de su funcionamiento. El punto principal de este Proyecto es realizar un tutorial, que por un lado explique los fundamentos de Web Components, y que por otro lado muestre un ejemplo más elaborado de uso de esta tecnología a nivel de producción, todo ello empleando las cuatro especificaciones de Web Components: Custom Elements, HTML Templates, HTML Imports y Shadow DOM.

Evaluación de las Consecuencias de la Nueva Regulación de la OMI sobre Combustibles Marinos

El 10 de octubre de 2008 la Organización Marítima Internacional (OMI) firmó una modificación al Anexo VI del convenio MARPOL 73/78, por la que estableció una reducción progresiva de las emisiones de óxidos de azufre (SOx) procedentes de los buques, una reducción adicional de las emisiones de óxidos de nitrógeno (NOx), así como límites en las emisiones de dióxido de Carbono (CO2) procedentes de los motores marinos y causantes de problemas medioambientales como la lluvia ácida y efecto invernadero. Centrándonos en los límites sobre las emisiones de azufre, a partir del 1 de enero de 2015 esta normativa obliga a todos los buques que naveguen por zonas controladas, llamadas Emission Control Area (ECA), a consumir combustibles con un contenido de azufre menor al 0,1%. A partir del 1 de enero del año 2020, o bien del año 2025, si la OMI decide retrasar su inicio, los buques deberán consumir combustibles con un contenido de azufre menor al 0,5%. De igual forma que antes, el contenido deberá ser rebajado al 0,1%S, si navegan por el interior de zonas ECA. Por su parte, la Unión Europea ha ido más allá que la OMI, adelantando al año 2020 la aplicación de los límites más estrictos de la ley MARPOL sobre las aguas de su zona económica exclusiva. Para ello, el 21 de noviembre de 2013 firmó la Directiva 2012 / 33 / EU como adenda a la Directiva de 1999. Tengamos presente que la finalidad de estas nuevas leyes es la mejora de la salud pública y el medioambiente, produciendo beneficios sociales, en forma de reducción de enfermedades, sobre todo de tipo respiratorio, a la vez que se reduce la lluvia ácida y sus nefastas consecuencias. La primera pregunta que surge es ¿cuál es el combustible actual de los buques y cuál será el que tengan que consumir para cumplir con esta Regulación? Pues bien, los grandes buques de navegación internacional consumen hoy en día fuel oil con un nivel de azufre de 3,5%. ¿Existen fueles con un nivel de azufre de 0,5%S? Como hemos concluido en el capítulo 4, para las empresas petroleras, la producción de fuel oil como combustible marino es tratada como un subproducto en su cesta de productos refinados por cada barril de Brent, ya que la demanda de fuel respecto a otros productos está bajando y además, el margen de beneficio que obtienen por la venta de otros productos petrolíferos es mayor que con el fuel. Así, podemos decir que las empresas petroleras no están interesadas en invertir en sus refinerías para producir estos fueles con menor contenido de azufre. Es más, en el caso de que alguna compañía decidiese invertir en producir un fuel de 0,5%S, su precio debería ser muy similar al del gasóleo para poder recuperar las inversiones empleadas. Por lo tanto, el único combustible que actualmente cumple con los nuevos niveles impuestos por la OMI es el gasóleo, con un precio que durante el año 2014 estuvo a una media de 307 USD/ton más alto que el actual fuel oil. Este mayor precio de compra de combustible impactará directamente sobre el coste del trasporte marítimo. La entrada en vigor de las anteriores normativas está suponiendo un reto para todo el sector marítimo. Ante esta realidad, se plantean diferentes alternativas con diferentes implicaciones técnicas, operativas y financieras. En la actualidad, son tres las alternativas con mayor aceptación en el sector. La primera alternativa consiste en “no hacer nada” y simplemente cambiar el tipo de combustible de los grandes buques de fuel oil a gasóleo. Las segunda alternativa es la instalación de un equipo scrubber, que permitiría continuar con el consumo de fuel oil, limpiando sus gases de combustión antes de salir a la atmósfera. Y, por último, la tercera alternativa consiste en el uso de Gas Natural Licuado (GNL) como combustible, con un precio inferior al del gasóleo. Sin embargo, aún existen importantes incertidumbres sobre la evolución futura de precios, operación y mantenimiento de las nuevas tecnologías, inversiones necesarias, disponibilidad de infraestructura portuaria e incluso el desarrollo futuro de la propia normativa internacional. Estas dudas hacen que ninguna de estas tres alternativas sea unánime en el sector. En esta tesis, tras exponer en el capítulo 3 la regulación aplicable al sector, hemos investigado sus consecuencias. Para ello, hemos examinado en el capítulo 4 si existen en la actualidad combustibles marinos que cumplan con los nuevos límites de azufre o en su defecto, cuál sería el precio de los nuevos combustibles. Partimos en el capítulo 5 de la hipótesis de que todos los buques cambian su consumo de fuel oil a gasóleo para cumplir con dicha normativa, calculamos el incremento de demanda de gasóleo que se produciría y analizamos las consecuencias que este hecho tendría sobre la producción de gasóleos en el Mediterráneo. Adicionalmente, calculamos el impacto económico que dicho incremento de coste producirá sobre sector exterior de España. Para ello, empleamos como base de datos el sistema de control de tráfico marítimo Authomatic Identification System (AIS) para luego analizar los datos de todos los buques que han hecho escala en algún puerto español, para así calcular el extra coste anual por el consumo de gasóleo que sufrirá el transporte marítimo para mover todas las importaciones y exportaciones de España. Por último, en el capítulo 6, examinamos y comparamos las otras dos alternativas al consumo de gasóleo -scrubbers y propulsión con GNL como combustible- y, finalmente, analizamos en el capítulo 7, la viabilidad de las inversiones en estas dos tecnologías para cumplir con la regulación. En el capítulo 5 explicamos los numerosos métodos que existen para calcular la demanda de combustible de un buque. La metodología seguida para su cálculo será del tipo bottom-up, que está basada en la agregación de la actividad y las características de cada tipo de buque. El resultado está basado en la potencia instalada de cada buque, porcentaje de carga del motor y su consumo específico. Para ello, analizamos el número de buques que navegan por el Mediterráneo a lo largo de un año mediante el sistema AIS, realizando “fotos” del tráfico marítimo en el Mediterráneo y reportando todos los buques en navegación en días aleatorios a lo largo de todo el año 2014. Por último, y con los datos anteriores, calculamos la demanda potencial de gasóleo en el Mediterráneo. Si no se hace nada y los buques comienzan a consumir gasóleo como combustible principal, en vez del actual fuel oil para cumplir con la regulación, la demanda de gasoil en el Mediterráneo aumentará en 12,12 MTA (Millones de Toneladas Anuales) a partir del año 2020. Esto supone alrededor de 3.720 millones de dólares anuales por el incremento del gasto de combustible tomando como referencia el precio medio de los combustibles marinos durante el año 2014. El anterior incremento de demanda en el Mediterráneo supondría el 43% del total de la demanda de gasóleos en España en el año 2013, incluyendo gasóleos de automoción, biodiesel y gasóleos marinos y el 3,2% del consumo europeo de destilados medios durante el año 2014. ¿Podrá la oferta del mercado europeo asumir este incremento de demanda de gasóleos? Europa siempre ha sido excedentaria en gasolina y deficitaria en destilados medios. En el año 2009, Europa tuvo que importar 4,8 MTA de Norte América y 22,1 MTA de Asia. Por lo que, este aumento de demanda sobre la ya limitada capacidad de refino de destilados medios en Europa incrementará las importaciones y producirá también aumentos en los precios, sobre todo del mercado del gasóleo. El sector sobre el que más impactará el incremento de demanda de gasóleo será el de los cruceros que navegan por el Mediterráneo, pues consumirán un 30,4% de la demanda de combustible de toda flota mundial de cruceros, lo que supone un aumento en su gasto de combustible de 386 millones de USD anuales. En el caso de los RoRos, consumirían un 23,6% de la demanda de la flota mundial de este tipo de buque, con un aumento anual de 171 millones de USD sobre su gasto de combustible anterior. El mayor incremento de coste lo sufrirán los portacontenedores, con 1.168 millones de USD anuales sobre su gasto actual. Sin embargo, su consumo en el Mediterráneo representa sólo el 5,3% del consumo mundial de combustible de este tipo de buques. Estos números plantean la incertidumbre de si semejante aumento de gasto en buques RoRo hará que el transporte marítimo de corta distancia en general pierda competitividad sobre otros medios de transporte alternativos en determinadas rutas. De manera que, parte del volumen de mercancías que actualmente transportan los buques se podría trasladar a la carretera, con los inconvenientes medioambientales y operativos, que esto produciría. En el caso particular de España, el extra coste por el consumo de gasóleo de todos los buques con escala en algún puerto español en el año 2013 se cifra en 1.717 millones de EUR anuales, según demostramos en la última parte del capítulo 5. Para realizar este cálculo hemos analizado con el sistema AIS a todos los buques que han tenido escala en algún puerto español y los hemos clasificado por distancia navegada, tipo de buque y potencia. Este encarecimiento del transporte marítimo será trasladado al sector exterior español, lo cual producirá un aumento del coste de las importaciones y exportaciones por mar en un país muy expuesto, pues el 75,61% del total de las importaciones y el 53,64% del total de las exportaciones se han hecho por vía marítima. Las tres industrias que se verán más afectadas son aquellas cuyo valor de mercancía es inferior respecto a su coste de transporte. Para ellas los aumentos del coste sobre el total del valor de cada mercancía serán de un 2,94% para la madera y corcho, un 2,14% para los productos minerales y un 1,93% para las manufacturas de piedra, cemento, cerámica y vidrio. Las mercancías que entren o salgan por los dos archipiélagos españoles de Canarias y Baleares serán las que se verán más impactadas por el extra coste del transporte marítimo, ya que son los puertos más alejados de otros puertos principales y, por tanto, con más distancia de navegación. Sin embargo, esta no es la única alternativa al cumplimiento de la nueva regulación. De la lectura del capítulo 6 concluimos que las tecnologías de equipos scrubbers y de propulsión con GNL permitirán al buque consumir combustibles más baratos al gasoil, a cambio de una inversión en estas tecnologías. ¿Serán los ahorros producidos por estas nuevas tecnologías suficientes para justificar su inversión? Para contestar la anterior pregunta, en el capítulo 7 hemos comparado las tres alternativas y hemos calculado tanto los costes de inversión como los gastos operativos correspondientes a equipos scrubbers o propulsión con GNL para una selección de 53 categorías de buques. La inversión en equipos scrubbers es más conveniente para buques grandes, con navegación no regular. Sin embargo, para buques de tamaño menor y navegación regular por puertos con buena infraestructura de suministro de GNL, la inversión en una propulsión con GNL como combustible será la más adecuada. En el caso de un tiempo de navegación del 100% dentro de zonas ECA y bajo el escenario de precios visto durante el año 2014, los proyectos con mejor plazo de recuperación de la inversión en equipos scrubbers son para los cruceros de gran tamaño (100.000 tons. GT), para los que se recupera la inversión en 0,62 años, los grandes portacontenedores de más de 8.000 TEUs con 0,64 años de recuperación y entre 5.000-8.000 TEUs con 0,71 años de recuperación y, por último, los grandes petroleros de más de 200.000 tons. de peso muerto donde tenemos un plazo de recuperación de 0,82 años. La inversión en scrubbers para buques pequeños, por el contrario, tarda más tiempo en recuperarse llegando a más de 5 años en petroleros y quimiqueros de menos de 5.000 toneladas de peso muerto. En el caso de una posible inversión en propulsión con GNL, las categorías de buques donde la inversión en GNL es más favorable y recuperable en menor tiempo son las más pequeñas, como ferris, cruceros o RoRos. Tomamos ahora el caso particular de un buque de productos limpios de 38.500 toneladas de peso muerto ya construido y nos planteamos la viabilidad de la inversión en la instalación de un equipo scrubber o bien, el cambio a una propulsión por GNL a partir del año 2015. Se comprueba que las dos variables que más impactan sobre la conveniencia de la inversión son el tiempo de navegación del buque dentro de zonas de emisiones controladas (ECA) y el escenario futuro de precios del MGO, HSFO y GNL. Para realizar este análisis hemos estudiado cada inversión, calculando una batería de condiciones de mérito como el payback, TIR, VAN y la evolución de la tesorería del inversor. Posteriormente, hemos calculado las condiciones de contorno mínimas de este buque en concreto para asegurar una inversión no sólo aceptable, sino además conveniente para el naviero inversor. En el entorno de precios del 2014 -con un diferencial entre fuel y gasóleo de 264,35 USD/ton- si el buque pasa más de un 56% de su tiempo de navegación en zonas ECA, conseguirá una rentabilidad de la inversión para inversores (TIR) en el equipo scrubber que será igual o superior al 9,6%, valor tomado como coste de oportunidad. Para el caso de inversión en GNL, en el entorno de precios del año 2014 -con un diferencial entre GNL y gasóleo de 353,8 USD/ton FOE- si el buque pasa más de un 64,8 % de su tiempo de navegación en zonas ECA, conseguirá una rentabilidad de la inversión para inversores (TIR) que será igual o superior al 9,6%, valor del coste de oportunidad. Para un tiempo en zona ECA estimado de un 60%, la rentabilidad de la inversión (TIR) en scrubbers para los inversores será igual o superior al 9,6%, el coste de oportunidad requerido por el inversor, para valores del diferencial de precio entre los dos combustibles alternativos, gasóleo (MGO) y fuel oil (HSFO) a partir de 244,73 USD/ton. En el caso de una inversión en propulsión GNL se requeriría un diferencial de precio entre MGO y GNL de 382,3 USD/ton FOE o superior. Así, para un buque de productos limpios de 38.500 DWT, la inversión en una reconversión para instalar un equipo scrubber es más conveniente que la de GNL, pues alcanza rentabilidades de la inversión (TIR) para inversores del 12,77%, frente a un 6,81% en el caso de invertir en GNL. Para ambos cálculos se ha tomado un buque que navegue un 60% de su tiempo por zona ECA y un escenario de precios medios del año 2014 para el combustible. Po otro lado, las inversiones en estas tecnologías a partir del año 2025 para nuevas construcciones son en ambos casos convenientes. El naviero deberá prestar especial atención aquí a las características propias de su buque y tipo de navegación, así como a la infraestructura de suministros y vertidos en los puertos donde vaya a operar usualmente. Si bien, no se ha estudiado en profundidad en esta tesis, no olvidemos que el sector marítimo debe cumplir además con las otras dos limitaciones que la regulación de la OMI establece sobre las emisiones de óxidos de Nitrógeno (NOx) y Carbono (CO2) y que sin duda, requerirán adicionales inversiones en diversos equipos. De manera que, si bien las consecuencias del consumo de gasóleo como alternativa al cumplimiento de la Regulación MARPOL son ciertamente preocupantes, existen alternativas al uso del gasóleo, con un aumento sobre el coste del transporte marítimo menor y manteniendo los beneficios sociales que pretende dicha ley. En efecto, como hemos demostrado, las opciones que se plantean como más rentables desde el punto de vista financiero son el consumo de GNL en los buques pequeños y de línea regular (cruceros, ferries, RoRos), y la instalación de scrubbers para el resto de buques de grandes dimensiones. Pero, por desgracia, estas inversiones no llegan a hacerse realidad por el elevado grado de incertidumbre asociado a estos dos mercados, que aumenta el riesgo empresarial, tanto de navieros como de suministradores de estas nuevas tecnologías. Observamos así una gran reticencia del sector privado a decidirse por estas dos alternativas. Este elevado nivel de riesgo sólo puede reducirse fomentando el esfuerzo conjunto del sector público y privado para superar estas barreras de entrada del mercado de scrubbers y GNL, que lograrían reducir las externalidades medioambientales de las emisiones sin restar competitividad al transporte marítimo. Creemos así, que los mismos organismos que aprobaron dicha ley deben ayudar al sector naviero a afrontar las inversiones en dichas tecnologías, así como a impulsar su investigación y promover la creación de una infraestructura portuaria adaptada a suministros de GNL y a descargas de vertidos procedentes de los equipos scrubber. Deberían además, prestar especial atención sobre las ayudas al sector de corta distancia para evitar que pierda competitividad frente a otros medios de transporte por el cumplimiento de esta normativa. Actualmente existen varios programas europeos de incentivos, como TEN-T o Marco Polo, pero no los consideramos suficientes. Por otro lado, la Organización Marítima Internacional debe confirmar cuanto antes si retrasa o no al 2025 la nueva bajada del nivel de azufre en combustibles. De esta manera, se eliminaría la gran incertidumbre temporal que actualmente tienen tanto navieros, como empresas petroleras y puertos para iniciar sus futuras inversiones y poder estudiar la viabilidad de cada alternativa de forma individual. ABSTRACT On 10 October 2008 the International Maritime Organization (IMO) signed an amendment to Annex VI of the MARPOL 73/78 convention establishing a gradual reduction in sulphur oxide (SOx) emissions from ships, and an additional reduction in nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions and carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from marine engines which cause environmental problems such as acid rain and the greenhouse effect. According to this regulation, from 1 January 2015, ships travelling in an Emission Control Area (ECA) must use fuels with a sulphur content of less than 0.1%. From 1 January 2020, or alternatively from 2025 if the IMO should decide to delay its introduction, all ships must use fuels with a sulphur content of less than 0.5%. As before, this content will be 0.1%S for voyages within ECAs. Meanwhile, the European Union has gone further than the IMO, and will apply the strictest limits of the MARPOL directives in the waters of its exclusive economic zone from 2020. To this end, Directive 2012/33/EU was issued on 21 November 2013 as an addendum to the 1999 Directive. These laws are intended to improve public health and the environment, benefiting society by reducing disease, particularly respiratory problems. The first question which arises is: what fuel do ships currently use, and what fuel will they have to use to comply with the Convention? Today, large international shipping vessels consume fuel oil with a sulphur level of 3.5%. Do fuel oils exist with a sulphur level of 0.5%S? As we conclude in Chapter 4, oil companies regard marine fuel oil as a by-product of refining Brent to produce their basket of products, as the demand for fuel oil is declining in comparison to other products, and the profit margin on the sale of other petroleum products is higher. Thus, oil companies are not interested in investing in their refineries to produce low-sulphur fuel oils, and if a company should decide to invest in producing a 0.5%S fuel oil, its price would have to be very similar to that of marine gas oil in order to recoup the investment. Therefore, the only fuel which presently complies with the new levels required by the IMO is marine gas oil, which was priced on average 307 USD/tonne higher than current fuel oils during 2014. This higher purchasing price for fuel will have a direct impact on the cost of maritime transport. The entry into force of the above directive presents a challenge for the entire maritime sector. There are various alternative approaches to this situation, with different technical, operational and financial implications. At present three options are the most widespread in the sector. The first option consists of “doing nothing” and simply switching from fuel oil to marine gas oil in large ships. The second option is installing a scrubber system, which would enable ships to continue consuming fuel oil, cleaning the combustion gases before they are released to the atmosphere. And finally, the third option is using Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), which is priced lower than marine gas oil, as a fuel. However, there is still significant uncertainty on future variations in prices, the operation and maintenance of the new technologies, the investments required, the availability of port infrastructure and even future developments in the international regulations themselves. These uncertainties mean that none of these three alternatives has been unanimously accepted by the sector. In this Thesis, after discussing all the regulations applicable to the sector in Chapter 3, we investigate their consequences. In Chapter 4 we examine whether there are currently any marine fuels on the market which meet the new sulphur limits, and if not, how much new fuels would cost. In Chapter 5, based on the hypothesis that all ships will switch from fuel oil to marine gas oil to comply with the regulations, we calculate the increase in demand for marine gas oil this would lead to, and analyse the consequences this would have on marine gas oil production in the Mediterranean. We also calculate the economic impact such a cost increase would have on Spain's external sector. To do this, we also use the Automatic Identification System (AIS) system to analyse the data of every ship stopping in any Spanish port, in order to calculate the extra cost of using marine gas oil in maritime transport for all Spain's imports and exports. Finally, in Chapter 6, we examine and compare the other two alternatives to marine gas oil, scrubbers and LNG, and in Chapter 7 we analyse the viability of investing in these two technologies in order to comply with the regulations. In Chapter 5 we explain the many existing methods for calculating a ship's fuel consumption. We use a bottom-up calculation method, based on aggregating the activity and characteristics of each type of vessel. The result is based on the installed engine power of each ship, the engine load percentage and its specific consumption. To do this, we analyse the number of ships travelling in the Mediterranean in the course of one year, using the AIS, a marine traffic monitoring system, to take “snapshots” of marine traffic in the Mediterranean and report all ships at sea on random days throughout 2014. Finally, with the above data, we calculate the potential demand for marine gas oil in the Mediterranean. If nothing else is done and ships begin to use marine gas oil instead of fuel oil in order to comply with the regulation, the demand for marine gas oil in the Mediterranean will increase by 12.12 MTA (Millions Tonnes per Annum) from 2020. This means an increase of around 3.72 billion dollars a year in fuel costs, taking as reference the average price of marine fuels in 2014. Such an increase in demand in the Mediterranean would be equivalent to 43% of the total demand for diesel in Spain in 2013, including automotive diesel fuels, biodiesel and marine gas oils, and 3.2% of European consumption of middle distillates in 2014. Would the European market be able to supply enough to meet this greater demand for diesel? Europe has always had a surplus of gasoline and a deficit of middle distillates. In 2009, Europe had to import 4.8 MTA from North America and 22.1 MTA from Asia. Therefore, this increased demand on Europe's already limited capacity for refining middle distillates would lead to increased imports and higher prices, especially in the diesel market. The sector which would suffer the greatest impact of increased demand for marine gas oil would be Mediterranean cruise ships, which represent 30.4% of the fuel demand of the entire world cruise fleet, meaning their fuel costs would rise by 386 million USD per year. ROROs in the Mediterranean, which represent 23.6% of the demand of the world fleet of this type of ship, would see their fuel costs increase by 171 million USD a year. The greatest cost increase would be among container ships, with an increase on current costs of 1.168 billion USD per year. However, their consumption in the Mediterranean represents only 5.3% of worldwide fuel consumption by container ships. These figures raise the question of whether a cost increase of this size for RORO ships would lead to short-distance marine transport in general becoming less competitive compared to other transport options on certain routes. For example, some of the goods that ships now carry could switch to road transport, with the undesirable effects on the environment and on operations that this would produce. In the particular case of Spain, the extra cost of switching to marine gas oil in all ships stopping at any Spanish port in 2013 would be 1.717 billion EUR per year, as we demonstrate in the last part of Chapter 5. For this calculation, we used the AIS system to analyse all ships which stopped at any Spanish port, classifying them by distance travelled, type of ship and engine power. This rising cost of marine transport would be passed on to the Spanish external sector, increasing the cost of imports and exports by sea in a country which relies heavily on maritime transport, which accounts for 75.61% of Spain's total imports and 53.64% of its total exports. The three industries which would be worst affected are those with goods of lower value relative to transport costs. The increased costs over the total value of each good would be 2.94% for wood and cork, 2.14% for mineral products and 1.93% for manufactured stone, cement, ceramic and glass products. Goods entering via the two Spanish archipelagos, the Canary Islands and the Balearic Islands, would suffer the greatest impact from the extra cost of marine transport, as these ports are further away from other major ports and thus the distance travelled is greater. However, this is not the only option for compliance with the new regulations. From our readings in Chapter 6 we conclude that scrubbers and LNG propulsion would enable ships to use cheaper fuels than marine gas oil, in exchange for investing in these technologies. Would the savings gained by these new technologies be enough to justify the investment? To answer this question, in Chapter 7 we compare the three alternatives and calculate both the cost of investment and the operating costs associated with scrubbers or LNG propulsion for a selection of 53 categories of ships. Investing in scrubbers is more advisable for large ships with no fixed runs. However, for smaller ships with regular runs to ports with good LNG supply infrastructure, investing in LNG propulsion would be the best choice. In the case of total transit time within an ECA and the pricing scenario seen in 2014, the best payback periods on investments in scrubbers are for large cruise ships (100,000 gross tonnage), which would recoup their investment in 0.62 years; large container ships, with a 0.64 year payback period for those over 8,000 TEUs and 0.71 years for the 5,000-8,000 TEU category; and finally, large oil tankers over 200,000 deadweight tonnage, which would recoup their investment in 0.82 years. However, investing in scrubbers would have a longer payback period for smaller ships, up to 5 years or more for oil tankers and chemical tankers under 5,000 deadweight tonnage. In the case of LNG propulsion, a possible investment is more favourable and the payback period is shorter for smaller ship classes, such as ferries, cruise ships and ROROs. We now take the case of a ship transporting clean products, already built, with a deadweight tonnage of 38,500, and consider the viability of investing in installing a scrubber or changing to LNG propulsion, starting in 2015. The two variables with the greatest impact on the advisability of the investment are how long the ship is at sea within emission control areas (ECA) and the future price scenario of MGO, HSFO and LNG. For this analysis, we studied each investment, calculating a battery of merit conditions such as the payback period, IRR, NPV and variations in the investors' liquid assets. We then calculated the minimum boundary conditions to ensure the investment was not only acceptable but advisable for the investor shipowner. Thus, for the average price differential of 264.35 USD/tonne between HSFO and MGO during 2014, investors' return on investment (IRR) in scrubbers would be the same as the required opportunity cost of 9.6%, for values of over 56% ship transit time in ECAs. For the case of investing in LNG and the average price differential between MGO and LNG of 353.8 USD/tonne FOE in 2014, the ship must spend 64.8% of its time in ECAs for the investment to be advisable. For an estimated 60% of time in an ECA, the internal rate of return (IRR) for investors equals the required opportunity cost of 9.6%, based on a price difference of 244.73 USD/tonne between the two alternative fuels, marine gas oil (MGO) and fuel oil (HSFO). An investment in LNG propulsion would require a price differential between MGO and LNG of 382.3 USD/tonne FOE. Thus, for a 38,500 DWT ship carrying clean products, investing in retrofitting to install a scrubber is more advisable than converting to LNG, with an internal rate of return (IRR) for investors of 12.77%, compared to 6.81% for investing in LNG. Both calculations were based on a ship which spends 60% of its time at sea in an ECA and a scenario of average 2014 prices. However, for newly-built ships, investments in either of these technologies from 2025 would be advisable. Here, the shipowner must pay particular attention to the specific characteristics of their ship, the type of operation, and the infrastructure for supplying fuel and handling discharges in the ports where it will usually operate. Thus, while the consequences of switching to marine gas oil in order to comply with the MARPOL regulations are certainly alarming, there are alternatives to marine gas oil, with smaller increases in the costs of maritime transport, while maintaining the benefits to society this law is intended to provide. Indeed, as we have demonstrated, the options which appear most favourable from a financial viewpoint are conversion to LNG for small ships and regular runs (cruise ships, ferries, ROROs), and installing scrubbers for large ships. Unfortunately, however, these investments are not being made, due to the high uncertainty associated with these two markets, which increases business risk, both for shipowners and for the providers of these new technologies. This means we are seeing considerable reluctance regarding these two options among the private sector. This high level of risk can be lowered only by encouraging joint efforts by the public and private sectors to overcome these barriers to entry into the market for scrubbers and LNG, which could reduce the environmental externalities of emissions without affecting the competitiveness of marine transport. Our opinion is that the same bodies which approved this law must help the shipping industry invest in these technologies, drive research on them, and promote the creation of a port infrastructure which is adapted to supply LNG and handle the discharges from scrubber systems. At present there are several European incentive programmes, such as TEN-T and Marco Polo, but we do not consider these to be sufficient. For its part, the International Maritime Organization should confirm as soon as possible whether the new lower sulphur levels in fuels will be postponed until 2025. This would eliminate the great uncertainty among shipowners, oil companies and ports regarding the timeline for beginning their future investments and for studying their viability.

ANALISANDO A RELAÇÃO DOS VOLUMES DE EXPORTAÇÃO E DE IMPORTAÇÃO, PIB, TAXAS DE CÂMBIO E INFLAÇÃO NO PERÍODO DE 2004 A 2014.

Esta dissertação visa deslumbrar uma análise macroeconômica do Brasil, especialmente no que se refere à relação dos índices mensais dos volumes das exportações e das importações com os volumes mensais do PIB, da Taxa SELIC e as Taxas de Câmbio, conforme dados coletados no período de janeiro de 2004 a dezembro de 2014, através de pesquisa literária referente aos históricos sobre cada conceito envolvido no âmbito da macroeconomia das varáveis estudadas. Foi realizado um estudo de caso embasado em dados de sites governamentais, no período delimitado, empregando-se o método de regressão linear, com base na Teoria da correlação de Pearson, demonstrando os resultados obtidos no período do estudo para as varáveis estudadas. Desta maneira, conseguiu-se estudar e analisar como as variáveis dependentes (resposta): volume das exportações e volume das importações estão relacionadas com as varáveis independentes (explicativas): PIB, Taxa Selic e taxa de Câmbio. Os resultados apurados no presente estudo permitem identificar que existe correlação moderada e negativa, quando analisadas a Taxa Selic e a Taxa de Câmbio com os volumes das exportações e das importações, enquanto o PIB apresenta correlação forte e positiva na análise com os volumes das exportações e das importações

A protein required for nuclear-protein import, Mog1p, directly interacts with GTP–Gsp1p, the Saccharomyces cerevisiae Ran homologue

We previously isolated 25 temperature-sensitive gsp1 alleles of Saccharomyces cerevisiae Ran homologue, each of which possesses amino acid changes that differ from each other. We report here isolation of three multicopy suppressors—PDE2, NTF2, and a gene designated MOG1—all of which rescued a growth defect of these gsp1 strains. The gsp1 suppression occurred even in the absence of GSP2, another S. cerevisiae GSP1-like gene. Previously, NTF2 was reported to suppress gsp1 but not PDE2. Mog1p, with a calculated molecular mass of 24 kDa, was found to be encoded by the yeast ORF YJR074W. Both MOG1 and NTF2 suppressed a series of gsp1 alleles with similar efficiency, and both suppressed gsp1 even with a single gene dose. Consistent with the high efficiency of gsp1 suppression, Mog1p directly bound to GTP, but not to GDP-Gsp1p. The disruption of MOG1 made yeast temperature-sensitive for growth. Δmog1, which was suppressed by overexpression of NTF2, was found to have a defect in both classic and nonclassic nuclear localization signal-dependent nuclear-protein imports, but not in mRNA export. Thus, Mog1p, which was localized in the nucleus, is a Gsp1p-binding protein involved in nuclear-protein import and that functionally interacts with Ntf2p. Furthermore, the finding that PDE2 suppressed both gsp1 and rna1–1 indicates that the Ran GTPase cycle is regulated by the Ras-cAMP pathway.

Análise do impacto das políticas de intervenção no setor do agronegócio sobre a cadeia de carne bovina na Venezuela

O objetivo deste trabalho foi analisar o desempenho da cadeia de carne bovina na Venezuela sob o efeito de políticas de intervenção estatal principalmente nas últimas décadas. Para tanto, foi empregada a abordagem teórica do enfoque sistêmico em conjunto com metodologia que se apoiou em um modelo econométrico para explicar o efeito de variáveis tecnológicas e macroeconômicas no agronegócio vis a vis a resultante da produção doméstica de carne bovina nas últimas décadas. Os resultados mostram que, no marco de mudanças institucionais estabelecidas desde a década de 1980 e especialmente as intervenções governamentais vigentes a partir do ano de 2003, a cadeia de carne bovina da Venezuela apresenta um desempenho negocial preocupante e não sustentável. Na última década, a Venezuela decresceu seu inventário bovino a uma taxa média anual de 2,56% entre 2003 e 2014. O número de cabeças/habitante diminuiu a uma taxa anual de 1,30% entre 1960 e 2014, ficando em 0,38 cabeças/habitante. O número de cabeças abatidas sobre o total do rebanho (taxa de desfrute geral do rebanho) foi de 10,82% para o ano de 2014, inferior à média de países vizinhos como Colômbia e Brasil que ficaram em 20,85% e 19,42% respectivamente. A produção doméstica de carne bovina decresceu a uma taxa anual de 2,22% entre 1997 e 2014 (mesmo considerando o abate de bovinos importados). A quantidade de carne oriunda de animais importados cresceu até alcançar um máximo de 58,51% do abate nacional, em 2013. Isto significou um decréscimo real da produção endógena de 71,55% entre os anos de 1997 e 2013. Neste contexto, a produção nacional percapita diminuiu de 18,31 kg/habitante (em 1997) para um mínimo de 3,97 kg/habitante (em 2013). Para o atendimento da demanda doméstica passou-se a contar, crescentemente, com importações de carne in natura que cresceram em volume inicial de 0,59 mil toneladas (t) de equivalente carcaça (em 1997) para um máximo de 307,57 mil t em 2008. A taxa de penetração das importações de carne bovina equivalente (carne e bovinos em pé) resultou em 79,54% do atendimento da demanda doméstica em 2013 (cerca de 15,45 kg/habitante/ano). Neste contexto, as intervenções mais relevantes têm sido a Lei de Terras que propiciou um ambiente de insegurança jurídica; os controles de preços e a política cambial que criaram distorções no mercado; e, a crescente influência nas redes de distribuição de alimentos, com forte dependência do comércio exterior, alavancado com os incrementos no preço internacional do petróleo entre 2003 e 2014. Tudo isto tem resultado em um cenário de desmonte da produção interna da carne bovina, que pode ser visualizado em episódios crescentes de escassez deste produto no mercado interno. Ao final, são sugeridas algumas práticas de políticas pública e setoriais para a reversão desse quadro insustentável para esta importante cadeia de negócios da Venezuela.

O uso de medidas antidumping como mecanismo de barreira à entrada no mercado brasileiro

As medidas antidumping são uma exceção ao livre comércio e como tal deveriam ser usadas com restrição. No entanto, desde o GATT 1947 há preocupação com o uso abusivo de tais medidas, podendo ser o mecanismo utilizado não apenas para possibilitar a recuperação da indústria doméstica prejudicada pelas importações objeto de dumping, objetivo do Acordo Antidumping (AAD), mas com o fim de proteger a indústria nacional da concorrência estrangeira. Desta forma, o objetivo do presente trabalho é apresentar as principais características do AAD firmado ao final da Rodada Uruguai que culminou na constituição da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC), incluindo seus antecedentes históricos e a possibilidade de aplicação discricionária, demonstrando como uma norma surgida no plano internacional em decorrência de um acordo multilateral vem sendo utilizada pelo Brasil, com a finalidade de se demonstrar a possibilidade de uso das medidas antidumping como barreira à entrada no mercado brasileiro. Confirmada a possibilidade de uso abusivo desse instrumento de defesa comercial, ainda que no plano teórico, uma vez que não é possível analisar os efeitos reais das medidas aplicadas, serão apresentadas as formas de contrabalanço ao protecionismo atualmente existentes no próprio AAD e sua incorporação e utilização pelo Brasil bem como a possibilidade de questionamento de tais medidas como práticas anticompetitivas com fundamento na legislação antitruste perante as autoridades de defesa da concorrência. Serão ainda analisadas outras possibilidades de contrabalanço ao uso exacerbado das medidas antidumping em debate e viabilidade das mesmas no cenário atual em que se verifica, de um lado, o aumento de uso de tais medidas pelos países Membros da OMC, destacando-se o Brasil e, de outro lado, impasse nas negociações multilaterais, cabendo aos Membros tomarem decisões unilaterais sobre a aplicação de tais medidas, seu grau de intensidade e forma de aplicação a depender da proteção que se pretende garantir à indústria nacional.

Import competition from China and unemployment. An analysis using Spanish workers’micro-data.

In the period 1997-2011, import competition from China multiplied by five in the Spanish manufacturing sector. In this paper we analyze whether this severe increase in import competition from China is associated with a higher probability of becoming unemployed in the Spanish manufacturing sector. Linking industry-level data on imports with the working histories of 141,000 manufacturing workers, we show that import competition from China is positively associated with the probability of becoming unemployed. In particular, a standard deviation increase in import competition from China raises the probability of becoming unemployed between 0.8 and 3.5 percentage points, which represents between a 9% and a 44% increase relative to the unconditional probability of becoming unemployed. In contrast, we do not find any effect of import competition from China on manufacturing wages. Also, our estimations show that there is weak evidence of a positive association between a higher import competition from China and the probability of switching to an employment outside the manufacturing sector.

Setting Congress Up to Fail

In Shelby County v. Holder the Supreme Court invalidated key provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 based on Congress’s failure to justify the formula used to determine which jurisdictions would be subject to the Act’s pre-clearance requirement of submitting all changes to voting procedures to the Justice Department for prior approval. This short essay explores one problematic feature of the Court’s analysis: its refusal to consider the legislative record as adequate because it was created to justify the coverage formula after the fact, rather than to facilitate deliberation on the coverage formula before a decision had been made. This reasoning essentially imports from administrative law a rule called the Chenery principle, and as this essay explains, it does so without justification. The differences between administrative and legislative decision making processes compel different treatment by the courts, and treating legislative records like administrative ones, in essence, asks of Congress something it is institutionally ill-equipped to perform. It sets Congress up to fail.

The chronic food deficit of early modern Portugal : curse or myth?

Two historiographical currents have debated whether early modern Portugal was cursed by an excessive dependence on foreign food imports as a result of being unable to feed its population, or not. In this short paper, the first long-run systematic quantitative study of this question, we show that the former view is a myth and therefore could not be a curse. Throughout the entire period, a certain amount of grain was in fact imported but cereal purchases abroad never represented more than a diminutive percentage of total food consumption. More importantly, the country carried out a diversified trade in foodstuffs which was seldom seriously out of balance. Portuguese agriculture showed itself consistently capable of specializing in different foodstuffs for export. It was thus not hopelessly inefficient and succeeded reasonably well in meeting the basic nutritional needs of the population.

Electricity without borders: a plan to make the internal market work. Bruegel Blueprint Series 20, 5 September 2013

The most straightforward European single energy market design would entail a European system operator regulated by a single European regulator. This would ensure the predictable development of rules for the entire EU, significantly reducing regulatory uncertainty for electricity sector investments. But such a first-best market design is unlikely to be politically realistic in the European context for three reasons. First, the necessary changes compared to the current situation are substantial and would produce significant redistributive effects. Second, a European solution would deprive member states of the ability to manage their energy systems nationally. And third, a single European solution might fall short of being well-tailored to consumers’ preferences, which differ substantially across the EU. To nevertheless reap significant benefits from an integrated European electricity market, we propose the following blueprint: First, we suggest adding a European system-management layer to complement national operation centres and help them to better exchange information about the status of the system, expected changes and planned modifications. The ultimate aim should be to transfer the day-to-day responsibility for the safe and economic operation of the system to the European control centre. To further increase efficiency, electricity prices should be allowed to differ between all network points between and within countries. This would enable throughput of electricity through national and international lines to be safely increased without any major investments in infrastructure. Second, to ensure the consistency of national network plans and to ensure that they contribute to providing the infrastructure for a functioning single market, the role of the European ten year network development plan (TYNDP) needs to be upgraded by obliging national regulators to only approve projects planned at European level unless they can prove that deviations are beneficial. This boosted role of the TYNDP would need to be underpinned by resolving the issues of conflicting interests and information asymmetry. Therefore, the network planning process should be opened to all affected stakeholders (generators, network owners and operators, consumers, residents and others) and enable the European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) to act as a welfare-maximising referee. An ultimate political decision by the European Parliament on the entire plan will open a negotiation process around selecting alternatives and agreeing compensation. This ensures that all stakeholders have an interest in guaranteeing a certain degree of balance of interest in the earlier stages. In fact, transparent planning, early stakeholder involvement and democratic legitimisation are well suited for minimising as much as possible local opposition to new lines. Third, sharing the cost of network investments in Europe is a critical issue. One reason is that so far even the most sophisticated models have been unable to identify the individual long-term net benefit in an uncertain environment. A workable compromise to finance new network investments would consist of three components: (i) all easily attributable cost should be levied on the responsible party; (ii) all network users that sit at nodes that are expected to receive more imports through a line extension should be obliged to pay a share of the line extension cost through their network charges; (iii) the rest of the cost is socialised to all consumers. Such a cost-distribution scheme will involve some intra-European redistribution from the well-developed countries (infrastructure-wise) to those that are catching up. However, such a scheme would perform this redistribution in a much more efficient way than the Connecting Europe Facility’s ad-hoc disbursements to politically chosen projects, because it would provide the infrastructure that is really needed.

On Ukrainian Gas Transit and South Stream. There may be more than meets the eye. CEPS Commentaries, 21 March 2014

The EU relies to a considerable degree on imports to meet its demand for natural gas. Whereas Norwegian export pipelines are directly connected to the EU gas system, a major share of Russian gas flows through the Ukrainian territory before reaching consumers located other consumers located down in the supply chain (e.g. Slovakia, Hungary or Italy). But is the Ukrainian gas transit route still a risk? Will the construction of the South Stream pipeline further reduce the importance of Ukraine as a transit country? Or is there more at stake here than meets the eye?

Is Europe vulnerable to Russian gas cuts? CEPS Commentaries, 12 March 2014

The EU relies heavily on imports to meet its demand for natural gas. Nearly 23% of the gas burned by the EU member states is produced in Russian gas fields. Ukraine remains one of the main supply routes for Russian gas flowing into Europe. Consequently, mounting tensions between Russia and Ukraine concerning the Crimean Peninsula brought back memories of past gas supply disruptions, most notably of 2009. The question today is whether the EU in 2014 is equally vulnerable to potential (forced or voluntary) cuts in Russian gas supplies as it was five years ago. In this commentary, Arno Behrens and Julian Wieczorkiewicz look into two different scenarios. First, could Europe sustain longer cuts in gas supplies from Russia? And second, what impact would disruptions of Russian gas deliveries to Ukraine have on the EU? Essentially the authors argue that Russia is highly dependent on gas exports to Europe, while Europe could resort to alternatives to Russian gas. In addition, Europe is much better prepared for potential short-term supply disruptions than it was five years ago.

Ukrainian economy overshadowed by war. OSW Commentary No. 148, 08.10.2014

Ukraine’s financial results over the past few months prove that the economic crisis which has been ongoing since mid 2012 has exacerbated. According to data from the Ukrainian Ministry of Economy, Gross Domestic Product for the first six months of 2014 shrank by 3%. In the second quarter, it fell by 4.6%1 and may further be reduced by as much as 8–10% over the year as a whole. After the first six months of this year, the balance of payments deficit reached US$4.3 billion. After deflation last year, prices grew by 12%, and the hryvnia dropped to a historic low. Although a surplus was seen in Ukrainian foreign trade in goods and services, reaching over US$3 billion at the end of June, its trade volume is shrinking. The main reason behind this deteriorating situation is the actions taken by Russia. Moscow has been fomenting the conflict in Donbas since April, has consistently imposed embargoes on imports of more and more Ukrainian goods and cut gas supplies to Ukraine in June. This has forced the government to focus on the current management of state finances and to carry out budget sequestration twice this year. The government has also used this as an excuse not to implement necessary systemic reforms. The increasing share of military expenditure, the shrinking exports (-5% in the first six months), including in particular to Russia, which until recently was Ukraine’s key trade partner, and the rapid fall in industrial production and investments have all made the situation even worse. All that saves Ukraine from an economic collapse is the loan from the International Monetary Fund and higher taxes, which allows the government to maintain budget liquidity. However, if the conflict in Donbas lasts longer and if Russia continues its economic blackmail, including withholding gas supplies, the economic crisis may prove to be long-lasting.

Security of Russian gas supplies to the EU - the question of infrastrucutral connections. OSW Point of View, February 2005

The energy security of countries importing energy resources depends largely on the shape and quality of operational transport connections. This is particularly important in the case of natural gas supplies. Natural gas is transported mostly by gas pipelines which permanently connect gas producers and consumers. Thus Europe as a consumer is "tied" to certain gas suppliers for anywhere between a dozen and several tens of years. As their own resources are becoming depleted, the EU Member States get increasingly dependent on import of natural gas. The present paper discusses the existing and projected gas transport routes from Russia to the EU. The first part deals with the importance of gas exports to the economy of the Russian Federation, and the second delves into the EU Member States' dependence on gas imports. Then this paper examines the differences in perceiving the energy security issue between the old and the new Member States, those differences stemming from the different degrees of their dependence on Russian supplies. In the third part, two new transport route projects for Russian gas supplies to the EU are compared and it is argued that from the point of view of the Community's interests, the Yamal gas pipeline is a better solution than the North European (Trans-Baltic) gas pipeline.