Mr. Gannett's Acct. for Commencement Dinner, 1781 July

Handwritten itemized list of costs for food and supplies purchased for the 1781 Commencement dinner. Signed by Caleb Gannett.

[Fragment of quarterly account], 1781-1790 July

One-page handwritten unidentified accounting with entries between August 1781 and August 1790 following the format: date, weeks, rate, and total. The first entry reads: "Aug. 28 1781 ... 761 weeks ... @ 3/6 ... 133.3.6."

Corporation Dinner, 1783 May 16

Handwritten itemized list of costs for food and supplies purchased for a Corporation dinner held May 16, 1783.

[Taxation research notes, 1794]

One leaf containing a handwritten incomplete text arguing for the creation of tables containing financial data found in government records and account books, as a means of comparing the value of real estate, silver, and salaries, in part to "ascertain how much of the present expense of supporting a family is to be attributed to the present mode of living." The page has the remnants of a red wax seal.

Letter from Artemas Ward to Benjamin Stone, 1787 July 18

Artemas Ward wrote this letter to Benjamin Stone on July 18, 1787, expressing his concern about the expense of his son, Henry Dana Ward's, imminent studies at Harvard. Ward complains to Stone about his own debts and the failure of the government to honor their financial obligations to him, and he also expresses hope that the President of Harvard will allow his son to spend part of his time "keeping a school" during his freshman and sophomore years, thus earning an income sufficient to pay for his studies. Ward also suggests that it might be preferable that his son board with a respectable family, rather than live at the College.

An account of my quarter bills, charges &c from July 11th 1743 to July 13th 1748 at Harvard College

Handwritten account book kept while Storer was a student at Harvard College. The well-organized volume is arranged by expense type and then date and was updated periodically, usually quarterly. The information offers a glimpse at the expenses of a Harvard student and provides information about the larger community that supported student life. The precise entries indicate the lifelong habits of Storer as a careful and methodical financial manager that would prove so valuable when he served as Harvard's treasurer more than thirty years later. Storer documents accounts with the steward, butler, sweeper, glazier, barber, and lists these individuals by name. The volume also includes notes on expenses for boarding, transportation, wood, and pocket expenses. While most entries do not list specific purchases, Storer provides details on the cost of a Harvard Commencement in 1747 (including the cost of a diploma, money to the President, hiring a house, a boat, a woman, and "2 Negroes"), and a specific accounting of the different food purchased for the event; Storer also lists expenses for an 1748 "supper for the graduates."

Theses, in Comitiis publicis Harvardini Collegii quod est Cantabrigiae Nov-Anglorum, defensae & pro viribus propugnatae a Juvenibus in Artibus initiatis, [1660-1753]

The bound volume holds handwritten transcriptions of selected Harvard Commencement Theses copied by Isaac Mansfield (Harvard AB 1742). The manuscript volume holds only the Theses chosen for public disputation. The volume includes Theses transcriptions for which no original broadsides are known to still exists.

Theses of 1663

Handwritten document written in Latin and dated August 1663 purported to be the Harvard College Commencement Theses of 1663, but considered by John Noble of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts to be a contemporary parody. Noble notes of the 1663 Theses, that "there seems to be no reason to doubt that this is a genuine, original manuscript of the date which it bears," but describes it as a "blaze of literary and scholastic pyrotechnics" that suggests it was created satirically (John Noble, "Harvard Theses of 1663" in the Publications of the Colonial Society, Volume V: Transactions, April 1898, pages 322-339).

Unemployment is the scourge, not youth unemployment per se. The misguided policy preoccupation with youth. CEPS Policy Brief No. 294, 26 June 2013

This Policy Brief argues that too much effort and political capital is being spent by the Commission and member states on being seen to be doing something quickly about youth unemployment when, in fact, the structural measures proposed will only have long-term effects. Expectations of immediate relief are running well above what can be delivered, especially at the EU level. Given the macroeconomic situation, no policy option will deliver a significant dent in either youth unemployment or unemployment in general. The EU policies on the table that are supposed to have an immediate effect, such as increased lending from the European Investment Bank to SMEs for the hiring of young people, will only have a very marginal impact on youth unemployment. Moreover, this impact will come mostly to the detriment of older unemployed persons excluded from such a scheme. Given the perceived need to ‘be seen to be doing something’, we fear that policies subsidising young workers de facto at the expense of older workers or, even worse, policies that subsidise older workers for not taking young people’s jobs, will proliferate. In fact, it is not at all clear that young people suffer more from being unemployed than older people, or even disproportionately more than older unemployed individuals. In particular, it is not clear that the much-publicised notion of a ‘lost generation’ with permanent ‘scars’ is relevant only to the young generation. The paper ends by highlighting the much-neglected policy option of encouraging labour mobility within the internal market. Although the Commission is ‘upgrading and modernising’ its tools, much more could be done in this area – to the benefit of the individuals concerned, the member states, and European integration in general.

Who decides? Resolving failed banks in a European framework. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/16, 29 November 2013

As the basis for a European regime for resolving failing and failed banks, the European Commission has proposed the Bank Resolution and Recovery Directive (BRRD) and a regulation establishing a European Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and a Single Bank Resolution Fund (SBRF). There is a debate about which parts of the proposed SRM-SBRF to add to the BRRD. The BRRD sets out a resolution toolkit that can be used by national resolution authorities. The SRM would involve European institutions more at the expense of national resolution authorities. This change could affect resolution outcomes. Domestic resolution authorities might be more generous than supranational authorities in providing assistance to banks. A supranational approach might be more effective in minimising costs for taxpayers. But regardless of the final design, more attention is needed to ensure that resolution authorities are politically independent from governments. When public support is provided to failed institutions it should come from a bankfunded resolution fund. This would reduce taxpayers’ direct costs, and would make banks less likely to take risks and advocate for bailouts.

The Treaty of Lisbon or intergovernmental temptation?

From the Introduction. This question goes to the very heart of the European project: it is fundamental for the future of the European Union and its role in the world. The Treaty of Lisbon emerged from the ashes of the European Constitution. Driven forward by Angela Merkel, as President of the European Council, Nicolas Sarkozy and José Manuel Barroso, the main advances made in the Constitution were preserved at the expense of a few concessions and symbolic sacrifices in order to make the Union more effective and more democratic.

An economy with unrealistic indicators: an evaluation of the economic situation in Belarus and a forecast for 2013. OSW Commentary No. 103, 2013-02-20

The macroeconomic results achieved by Belarus in 2012 laid bare the weakness and the inefficiency of its economy. Belarus’s GDP and positive trade balance were growing in the first half of last year. However, this trend was reversed when Russia blocked the scheme of extremely lucrative manipulations in the re-export of Russian petroleum products by Belarus and when the demand for potassium fertilisers fell on the global market. It became clear once again that the outdated Belarusian model of a centrally planned economy is unable to generate sustainable growth, and the Belarusian economy needs thorough structural reforms. Nevertheless, President Alyaksandr Lukashenka consistently continues to block any changes in the system and at the same time expects that the economic indicators this year will reach levels far beyond the possibilities of the Belarusian economy. Therefore, there is a risk that the Belarusian government may employ – as they used to do – instruments aimed at artificially stimulating domestic demand, including money creation. This may upset the relative stability of state finances, which the regime managed to achieve last year. The worst case scenario would see a repeat of what happened in 2011, when a serious financial crisis occurred, forcing Minsk to make concessions (including selling the national network of gas pipelines) to Moscow, its only real source of loans. It thus cannot be ruled out that also this time the only way to recover from the slump will be to receive additional loan support and energy subsidies from Russia at the expense of selling further strategic companies to Russian investors.

The Party of Regions monopolises power in Ukraine. OSW Commentary No. 40, 2010-09-29

Since the Party of Regions took power in Ukraine, the process of strengthening the executive branch of government at the expense of the others, together with the instrumental use of the law, has been progressing steadily. By seeking to restrict criticism of the government, the ruling party is aiming at marginalisation of opposition groups and establishing informal control over the main media (largely by exerting pressure on their owners). The role of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) is growing, as it is used increasingly frequently to put pressure on Western-oriented NGOs. The government’s control over the judiciary is expanding. These trends had existed before the Party of Regions’ ascension to power, but they were much weaker, as the previous governments did not enjoy such a strong position or the ability to achieve their ends so efficiently. The Party of Regions is planning to take another step towards total power during the local elections scheduled for October 2010. The party is determined to establish control over the local self-governments; to this end, it has amended the legislation in a way which now undermines local civil initiatives. These changes not only illustrate the interests and political standpoint of the ruling elite; they also result from systemic reasons, and these are deeply rooted in the Soviet past. The present Ukrainian state has evolved through the evolutionary transformation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. As a result, the main features of the previous system have been sustained, including the weakness of the representative bodies and the instrumental use of the law. Twenty years into its independent development, Ukraine has developed a merely formal democracy, which is distant from EU standards.

Tug-of-war over EU's policy towards its neighbours. OSW Commentary No. 49, 2011-03-09

The revolutions in North Africa, the approaching end of the ‘strategic review’ of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) initiated by the European Commission, and the beginning of negotiations on the European Union’s new financial perspective, have intensified the debate among the member states and EU institutions on what policy the EU will adopt towards its neighbourhood in the future. The discussion concerns not only the shape of the ENP but also non-ENPI foreign policy instruments which Brussels applies towards neighbouring countries, such as the thematic instruments and loan support. Serious differences of opinion have emerged among the member states. The countries located in the southern part of the EU want Brussels to boost its policy towards North Africa, even at the expense of engagement in Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus. Meanwhile Central European countries, including Germany, favour a more balanced approach towards both directions. The future shape of the ENP, as well as the EU’s other foreign policy instruments, will have a strong impact on the approach the EU adopts towards its Eastern neighbourhood. If some of the proposals are realised, especially the southern member states’ request to transfer some of the funds from the Eastern to the Southern neighbourhood, the chances of meeting the Eastern Partnership goals, such as the association of the partner countries with the EU and the creation of deep and comprehensive free trade areas, could be reduced.

'The power gained, we will never surrender': Russian ruling elite versus the succession and economic crisis. OSW Point of View (Policy Brief), October 2009

Even though the economic crisis proved harmful to the Russian economy and people's living standards, it has nonetheless failed to make the elite revise its policy. Despite some problems, the government has managed to sustain economic and political stability, thanks to the reserves it amassed in the times of prosperity, and to the propaganda campaign that protected it, above all Vladimir Putin. The crisis failed to force the elite to implement deeper structural and political reforms. Moreover, it has actually reinforced existing tendencies, such as state control over the economy and its oil-oriented character, the elite's economic expansion at the expense of private businesses, and the preservation of political power. Thus, the crisis has so far failed to dismantle Putinism, indeed quite the reverse - it has in fact contributed to its becoming 'set in stone'.