Remote Effects Modulating the Spin Equilibrium of the Resting State of Cytochrome P450cam –An Investigation Using Active Site Analogues

The crystal structure of the resting state of cytochrome P450cam (CYP101), a heme thiolate protein, shows a cluster of six water molecules in the substrate binding pocket, one of which is coordinating to iron(III) as sixth ligand. The resting state is low-spin and changes to high-spin when substrate camphor binds and H2O is removed. In contrast to the protein, previously synthesised enzyme models such as H2O[BOND]FeIII(porph)(ArS−) were shown to be purely high-spin. Iron(S−)porphyrins with different distal sites mimicking proposed remote effects have been prepared and studied by cw-EPR. The results indicate that the low-spin of the resting state of P450cam is due to the fact that the water molecule coordinating to iron has an OH−-like character because of hydrogen bonding and polarisation of the water cluster, respectively.

Reconstructing Arguments: Formalization and Reflective Equilibrium

Traditional logical reconstruction of arguments aims at assessing the validity of ordinary language arguments. It involves several tasks: extracting argumentations from texts, breaking up complex argumentations into individual arguments, framing arguments in standard form, as well as formalizing arguments and showing their validity with the help of a logical formalism. These tasks are guided by a multitude of partly antagonistic goals, they interact in various feedback loops, and they are intertwined with the development of theories of valid inference and adequate formalization. This paper explores how the method of reflective equilibrium can be used for modelling the complexity of such reconstructions and for justifying the various steps involved. The proposed approach is illustrated and tested in a detailed reconstruction of the beginning of Anselm’s De casu diaboli.

The behaviour of incompatible elements during hydrous melting of metasomatized peridotite at 4–6 GPa and 1000 °C–1200 °C

Trace element behavior during hydrous melting of a metasomatized garnet–peridotite was examined at pressures of 4–6 GPa and temperatures of 1000 °C–1200 °C, conditions appropriate for fluid penetrating the mantle wedge atop the subducting slab. Experiments were performed in a rocking multi-anvil apparatus using a diamond-trap setup. The compositions of the fluid and melt phases were measured using the cryogenic LA-ICP-MS technique. The water-saturated solidus of the K-lherzolite composition is located between 900 °C and 1000 °C at 4 GPa and between 1000 °C and 1100 °C at 5 and 6 GPa. The partition coefficients between fluid or melt and clinopyroxene reveal an asymmetric MREE trough with a minimum at Dy. The clinopyroxene in equilibrium with aqueous fluids is characterized by DUfluid–cpx > DThfluid–cpx while DUmelt–cpx tends to be similar to DThmelt–cpx. The partition coefficients between fluid or melt and garnet reveal very strong light to heavy REE fractionation, DLa/DLu from 95 (hydrous melt) to 1600 (aqueous fluid). The LILE are highly incompatible with partition coefficients > 50. The behavior of HFSE are decoupled, with DZr,Hf close to 1 while DNb,Ta > 10. Garnet is characterized by DUmelt/fluid–garnet < DThmelt/fluid–garnet. A comparison of our experimental partitioning results for trivalent cations as well as the results from the literature and the calculations carried out using the lattice strain model adapted to the presence of water in the bulk system indicates that H2O in the fluid or melt phase has a prominent effect on trace element partitioning. Garnet in mantle rocks in equilibrium with an aqueous fluid is characterized by significantly higher Do(3 +) for REE in the X site of the garnet compared with the partitioning values of the optimal cation in garnet in equilibrium with hydrous melts. Our data show for the first time that the change in the nature of the mobile phase (fluid vs. melt) does affect the affinities of trace elements into the garnet crystal at conditions below the second critical endpoint of the system. The same also applies for clinopyroxene, although this is less clear. Consequently, our new data allow for refinements in predictive modeling of element transfer from the slab to the mantle wedge and of possible compositions of metasomatized mantle that sources OIB magmatism.

Nonperturbative estimate of the heavy quark momentum diffusion coefficient

We estimate the momentum diffusion coefficient of a heavy quark within a pure SU(3) plasma at a temperature of about 1.5Tc. Large-scale Monte Carlo simulations on a series of lattices extending up to 1923×48 permit us to carry out a continuum extrapolation of the so-called color-electric imaginary-time correlator. The extrapolated correlator is analyzed with the help of theoretically motivated models for the corresponding spectral function. Evidence for a nonzero transport coefficient is found and, incorporating systematic uncertainties reflecting model assumptions, we obtain κ=(1.8–3.4)T3. This implies that the “drag coefficient,” characterizing the time scale at which heavy quarks adjust to hydrodynamic flow, is η−1D=(1.8–3.4)(Tc/T)2(M/1.5  GeV)  fm/c, where M is the heavy quark kinetic mass. The results apply to bottom and, with somewhat larger systematic uncertainties, to charm quarks.

Constraints on barium isotope fractionation during aragonite precipitation by corals

We present a barium (Ba) isotope fractionation study of marine biogenic carbonates (aragonitic corals). The major aim is to provide first constraints on the Ba isotope fractionation between modern surface sea water and coral skele- ton. Mediterranean surface sea water was found to be enriched in the heavy Ba isotopes compared to previously reported values for marine open ocean authi- genic and terrestrial minerals. In aquarium experiments with a continuous sup- ply of Mediterranean surface water, the Ba isotopic composition of the bulk sample originating from cultured, aragonitic scleractinian corals (d137/134Ba between +0.16 +/- 0.12permil and +0.41 +/-0.12permil) were isotopically identical or lighter than that of the ambient Mediterranean surface sea water (d137/134Ba = +0.42 +/- 0.07permil, 2SD), which corresponds to an empirical maximum value of Ba isotope fractionation of D137/134Bacoral-seawater = -0.26 +/- 0.14permil at 25°C. This maximum Ba isotope fractionation is close and identical in direction to previous results from inorganic precipitation experiments with aragonite- structured pure BaCO3 (witherite). The variability in measured Ba concentrations of the cultured corals is at odds with a uniform distribution coefficient, DBa/Ca, thus indicating stronger vital effects on isotope than element discrimination. This observation supports the hypothesis that the Ba isotopic compositions of these corals do not result from simple equilibrium between the skeleton and the bulk sea water. Complementary coral samples from natural settings (tropical shallow-water corals from the Bahamas and Florida and cold- water corals from the Norwegian continental shelf) show an even wider range in d137/134Ba values (+0.14 +/- 0.08permil and +0.77 +/- 0.11permil), most probably due to additional spatial and/or temporal sea water heterogeneity, as indicated by recent publications.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

THE EQUILIBRIUM CONSTANT FOR THE GLYCINE SYNTHASE REACTION (ONE-CARBON, METABOLISM, FOLATE)

The equilibrium constant (K(,c)) under physiological conditions (38(DEGREES)C, 0.25 M ionic strength (I), pH 7.0) for the glycine synthase (GS) reaction (E C 2.1.2.1.0) (Equation 1) has been determined. (UNFORMATTED TABLE FOLLOWS)^ 5,10-CH(,2)-H(,4)Folate NADH NH (,4)+ CO(,2) ^ K(,c) = Eq. 1^ H(,4)Folate NAD('+) GLY ^(TABLE ENDS)^ The enzymatic instability of the GS enzyme complex itself has made it necessary to determine the overall K(,c) from the product of constants for the partial reactions of GS determined separately under the same conditions. The partial reactions are the H(,4)Folate-formaldehyde (CH(,2)(OH)(,2)) condensation reaction (Reaction 1) the K(,c) for which has been reported by this laboratory (3.0 x 10('4)), the lipoate (LipS(,2)) dehydrogenase reaction (LipDH) (Reaction 2) and the Gly-Lip^ decarboxylase reaction (Reaction 3) forming reduced lipoate (Lip(SH)(,2)), NH(,4)('+), CO(,2) and CH(,2)(OH)(,2.) (UNFORMATTED TABLE FOLLOWS)(,)^ H(,4)Fote + CH(,2)(OH)(,2) 5,10-CH(,2)-H(,4)Folate (1)^ Lip(SH)(,2) + NAD('+) LipS(,2) + NADH + H('+) (2)^ H('+) + Gly + LipS(,2) Lip(SH)(,2) + NH(,4)('+) CO(,2) + CH(,2)(OH)(,2) (3)^(TABLE ENDS)^ In this work the K(,c) for Reactions 2 and 3 are reported.^ The K(,c)' for the LipDH reaction described by other authors was reported with unexplainable conclusions regarding the pH depend- ence for the reaction. These conclusions would imply otherwise unexpected acid dissociation constants for reduced and oxidized lipoate. The pK(,a)',s for these compounds have been determined to resolve discrepancy. The conclusions are as follows: (1) The K(,c) for the LipDH reaction is 2.08 x 10('-8); (2) The pK(,a)',s for Lip(SH)(,2) are 4.77(-COOH), 9.91(-SH), 11.59(-SH); for LipS(,2) the carboxyl pK(,a)' is 4.77; (3) Contrary to previous literature, the log K(,c)' for the LipDH reaction is a linear function of the pH, a conclusion supported by the values for the dissociation constants.^ The K(,c) for Reaction 3 is the product of constants for Reactions 4-7. (UNFORMATTED TABLE FOLLOWS)^ LipSHSCH(,2)OH + H(,2)O Lip(SH)(,2) + CH(,2)(OH)(,2) (4)^ H(,2)O + LipSHSCH(,2)NH(,3)('+) LipSHSCH(,2)OH + NH(,4)('+) (5)^ LipSHSCH(,2)NH(,2) + H('+) LipSHSCH(,2)NH(,3)('+) (6)^ Gly + LipS(,2) LipSHSCH(,2)NH(,2) + CO(,2) (7)^(TABLE ENDS)^ Reactions 4-6 are non-enzymatic reactions whose constants were determined spectrophotometrically. Reaction 7 was catalyzed by the partially purified P-protein of GS with equilibrium approached from both directions. The value for K(,c) for this reaction is 8.15 x 10('-3). The combined K(,c) for Reactions 4-7 or Reaction 3 is 2.4 M.^ The overall K(,c) for the GS reaction determined by combination of values for Reactions 1-3 is 1.56 x 10('-3). ^

An Equilibrium Model of Lawmaking

This paper embeds a model of lawmaking in an equilibrium framework in which the demand for trials is rationed by court delay. The lawmaking process depends on a combination of selective litigation, judicial bias, and precedent. The steady state equilibrium of the model determines both the length of delay and the distribution of legal rules. Comparative statics show that an increase in the supply of trials reduces delay but may or may not increase the proportion of efficient rules. An increase in the fraction of judges biased in favor of the efficient rule, however, will likely improve efficiency on both counts.

Nitric Oxide Equilibrium

The explicit formulas for following the passage to chemical equilibrium are derived.

Advance P. Chem. Problems (I) Populations, Partition Functions, Particle in Box, Harmonic Oscillators, Angular Momentum and Rigid Rotor

This is a set of P. Chem. problems posed at slightly higher than the normal text book level, for students who are continuing in the study of this subject.

Stationary Markovian Equilibrium in Overlapping Generation Models with Stochastic Nonclassical Production

This paper provides new sufficient conditions for the existence, computation via successive approximations, and stability of Markovian equilibrium decision processes for a large class of OLG models with stochastic nonclassical production. Our notion of stability is existence of stationary Markovian equilibrium. With a nonclassical production, our economies encompass a large class of OLG models with public policy, valued fiat money, production externalities, and Markov shocks to production. Our approach combines aspects of both topological and order theoretic fixed point theory, and provides the basis of globally stable numerical iteration procedures for computing extremal Markovian equilibrium objects. In addition to new theoretical results on existence and computation, we provide some monotone comparative statics results on the space of economies.

On the Existence and Characterization of Markovian Equilibrium in Models with Simple Non-Paternalistic Altruism

This paper provides sufficient conditions for existence of Markovian equilibrium in models with non-paternalistic altruism extending to one generation ahead. When utility is non-separable, we show that each equilibrium savings policy correspondence is increasing everywhere and single-valued, except perhaps on a countable number of points. It is also upper hemi-continuous where it is single valued. When utility is separable, we show that the equilibrium is unique, increasing, and continuous, and we provide an algorithm converging uniformly to the equilibrium.

Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Nonoptimal Unbounded Infinite Horizon Economies

In applied work in macroeconomics and finance, nonoptimal infinite horizon economies are often studied in the the state space is unbounded. Important examples of such economies are single vector growth models with production externalities, valued fiat money, monopolistic competition, and/or distortionary government taxation. Although sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of Markovian equilibrium are well known for the compact state space case, no similar sufficient conditions exist for unbounded growth. This paper provides such a set of sufficient conditions, and also present a computational algorithm that will prove asymptotically consistent when computing Markovian equilibrium.