Advertising bans

I show that an advertising ban is more likely to increase -- ratherthan decrease -- total consumption when advertising does not bring abouta large expansion of market demand at given prices and when it increasesproduct differentiation (thus allowing firms to command higher prices). Inthis case, the main impact of a ban on advertising is to reduce equilibriumprices and thus increase demand. I argue that this is more likely tohappen in mature industries where consumer goods are ex--ante (i.e.without advertising) similar and advertising is of the `persuasive' type.The ban is the more likely to increase profits of the firms the weakerthe ability of advertising to expand total demand and the less advertisingserves to induce product differentiation.

Bargaining, coalitions and competition

We study a decentralized matching model in a large exchange economy,in which trade takes place through non--cooperative bargaining in coalitionsof finite size. Under essentially the same conditions of core equivalence, we show that the strategic equilibrium outcomes of our model coincide with theWalrasian allocations of the economy. Our method of proof exploits equivalenceresults between the core and Walrasian equilibria. Our model relaxes differentiability and convexity of preferences thereby covering the caseof indivisible goods.

Network revenue management with product-specific no-shows

Revenue management practices often include overbooking capacity to account for customerswho make reservations but do not show up. In this paper, we consider the network revenuemanagement problem with no-shows and overbooking, where the show-up probabilities are specificto each product. No-show rates differ significantly by product (for instance, each itinerary andfare combination for an airline) as sale restrictions and the demand characteristics vary byproduct. However, models that consider no-show rates by each individual product are difficultto handle as the state-space in dynamic programming formulations (or the variable space inapproximations) increases significantly. In this paper, we propose a randomized linear program tojointly make the capacity control and overbooking decisions with product-specific no-shows. Weestablish that our formulation gives an upper bound on the optimal expected total profit andour upper bound is tighter than a deterministic linear programming upper bound that appearsin the existing literature. Furthermore, we show that our upper bound is asymptotically tightin a regime where the leg capacities and the expected demand is scaled linearly with the samerate. We also describe how the randomized linear program can be used to obtain a bid price controlpolicy. Computational experiments indicate that our approach is quite fast, able to scale to industrialproblems and can provide significant improvements over standard benchmarks.

Globalization and risk sharing

We study the effects of globalization on risk sharing and welfare. Like previous literature, weassume that countries cannot commit to repay their debts. Unlike previous literature, we assumethat countries cannot discriminate between domestic and foreign creditors when repaying theirdebts. This creates novel interactions between domestic and international trade in assets. (i)Increases in domestic trade raise the bene.ts of enforcement and facilitate international trade.In fact, in our setup countries can obtain international risk sharing even in the absence of defaultpenalties. (ii) Increases in foreign trade .i.e. globalization.raise the costs of enforcement andhamper domestic trade. As a result, globalization may worsen domestic risk sharing and lowerwelfare. We show how these e¤ects depend on various characteristics of tradable goods andexplore the roles of borrowing limits, debt renegotiations, and trade policy.

Market and institutional determinants in the regulation of conveyancers

Demand for law professionals in the conveyancing of property is decreasing because of market and institutional changes. On the market side, many transactions feature large, well-known parties and standardized transactions, which make professionals less effective or necessary for protecting the parties to private contracts. On the institutional side, public titling makes it possible to dispense with a broadening set of their former functions. Recording of deeds made professionals redundant as depositories of deeds and reduced demand for them to design title guarantees. Effective registration of rights increasingly substitutes professionals for detecting title conflicts with third parties and gathering their consent. Market changes undermine the information asymmetry rationale for regulating conveyancing, while institutional changes facilitate liberalizing not only conduct but also license regulations. These arguments are supported here by disentangling the logic of titling systems and presenting empirical evidence from the European and USA markets.

Additive utility with intransitive indifference and without independence: A homogeneous case

In the homogeneous case of one type of goods or objects, we prove theexistence of an additive utility function without assuming transitivityof indifference and independence. The representation reveals a positivefactor smaller than 1 that infuences rational choice beyond the utilityfunction and explains departures from these standard axioms of utilitytheory (factor equals to 1).

¿Es posible reducir el gasto sanitario a través del subsidio a los seguros sanitarios privados? La doble cobertura sanitaria en Catalunya. Estimación de patrones de utilización de servicios sanitarios y simulación de costes asociados a la asistencia

The objective of this study consists in quantifying in money terms thepotential reduction in usage of public health care outlets associatedto the tenure of double (public plus private) insurance. In order to address the problem, a probabilistic model for visits to physicians is specified and estimated using data from the Catalonian Health Survey. Also, a model for the marginal cost of a visit to a physician is estimated using data from a representative sample of fee-for-service payments from a major insurer. Combining the estimates from the two models it is possible to quantify in money terms the cost/savings of alternative policies which bear an impact on the adoption of double insurance by the population. The results suggest that the private sector absorbs an important volumeof demand which would be re-directed to the public sector if consumerscease to hold double insurance.

The effects of poor financial information systems on the long term sustainability of local public services. Empirical evidence from the Catalan Municipalities

In this paper we describe the existence of financial illusion in public accountingand we comment on its effects for the future sustainability of local publicservices. We relate these features to the lack of incentives amongst publicmanagers for improving the financial reporting and thus management of publicassets. Financial illusion pays off for politicians and managers since it allowsfor larger public expenditure increases and managerial slack, these beingarguments in their utility functions. This preference is strengthen by the shorttime perspective of politically appointed public managers. Both factors runagainst public accountability. This hypothesis is tested for Spain by using anunique sample. We take data from around forty Catalan local authorities withpopulation above 20,000 for the financial years 1993-98. We build this databasis from the Catalan Auditing Office Reports in a way that it can be linkedto some other local social and economic variables in order to test ourassumptions. The results confirm that there is a statistical relationship between the financialillusion index (FI as constructed in the paper) and higher current expenditure.This reflects on important overruns and increases of the delay in payingsuppliers, as well as on a higher difficulties to face capital finance. Mechanismsfor FI creation have to do among other factors, with delays in paying suppliers(and thereafter higher future financial costs per unit of service), no adequateprovision for bad debts and lack of appropriate capital funding either forreposition or for new equipments. For this, it is crucial to monitor the way inwhich capital transfers are accounted in local public sheet balances. As a result,for most of the Municipalities we analyse, the funds for guaranteeing continuityand sustainability of public services provision are today at risk.Given managerial incentives at present in public institutions, we conclude thatpublic regulation recently enforced for assuring better information systems inlocal public management may not be enough to change the current state of affairs.

Wage rigidity and job creation

Recent research in macroeconomics emphasizes the role of wage rigidity in accounting for the volatility of unemployment fluctuations. We use worker-level datafrom the CPS to measure the sensitivity of wages of newly hired workers to changesin aggregate labor market conditions. The wage of new hires, unlike the aggregatewage, is volatile and responds almost one-to-one to changes in labor productivity.We conclude that there is little evidence for wage stickiness in the data. We alsoshow, however, that a little wage rigidity goes a long way in amplifying the responseof job creation to productivity shocks.

A multi-objective model for a multi-period distribution management problem

The problems arising in commercial distribution are complex and involve several players and decision levels. One important decision is relatedwith the design of the routes to distribute the products, in an efficient and inexpensive way.This article deals with a complex vehicle routing problem that can beseen as a new extension of the basic vehicle routing problem. The proposed model is a multi-objective combinatorial optimization problemthat considers three objectives and multiple periods, which models in a closer way the real distribution problems. The first objective is costminimization, the second is balancing work levels and the third is amarketing objective. An application of the model on a small example, with5 clients and 3 days, is presented. The results of the model show the complexity of solving multi-objective combinatorial optimization problems and the contradiction between the several distribution management objective.

Strategies for sequential prediction of stationary time series

We present simple procedures for the prediction of a real valued sequence. The algorithms are based on a combinationof several simple predictors. We show that if the sequence is a realization of a bounded stationary and ergodic random process then the average of squared errors converges, almost surely, to that of the optimum, given by the Bayes predictor. We offer an analog result for the prediction of stationary gaussian processes.

Stepwise multiple testing as formalized data snooping

It is common in econometric applications that several hypothesis tests arecarried out at the same time. The problem then becomes how to decide whichhypotheses to reject, accounting for the multitude of tests. In this paper,we suggest a stepwise multiple testing procedure which asymptoticallycontrols the familywise error rate at a desired level. Compared to relatedsingle-step methods, our procedure is more powerful in the sense that itoften will reject more false hypotheses. In addition, we advocate the useof studentization when it is feasible. Unlike some stepwise methods, ourmethod implicitly captures the joint dependence structure of the teststatistics, which results in increased ability to detect alternativehypotheses. We prove our method asymptotically controls the familywise errorrate under minimal assumptions. We present our methodology in the context ofcomparing several strategies to a common benchmark and deciding whichstrategies actually beat the benchmark. However, our ideas can easily beextended and/or modied to other contexts, such as making inference for theindividual regression coecients in a multiple regression framework. Somesimulation studies show the improvements of our methods over previous proposals. We also provide an application to a set of real data.

Portfolio choice and the effects of liquidity

This paper shows how to introduce liquidity into the well known mean-variance framework of portfolio selection. Either by estimating mean-variance liquidity constrained frontiers or directly estimating optimal portfolios for alternative levels of risk aversion and preference for liquidity, we obtain strong effects of liquidity on optimal portfolio selection. In particular, portfolio performance, measured by the Sharpe ratio relative to the tangency portfolio, varies significantly with liquidity. Moreover, although mean-variance performance becomes clearly worse, the levels of liquidity onoptimal portfolios obtained when there is a positive preference for liquidity are much lower than on those optimal portfolios where investors show no sign of preference for liquidity.

Monetary policy rules and macroeconomic stability: Evidence and some theory

We estimate a forward-looking monetary policy reaction function for thepostwar United States economy, before and after Volcker's appointmentas Fed Chairman in 1979. Our results point to substantial differencesin the estimated rule across periods. In particular, interest ratepolicy in the Volcker-Greenspan period appears to have been much moresensitive to changes in expected inflation than in the pre-Volckerperiod. We then compare some of the implications of the estimated rulesfor the equilibrium properties of inflation and output, using a simplemacroeconomic model, and show that the Volcker-Greenspan rule is stabilizing.

Mobile termination and mobile penetration

In this paper, we study how access pricing affects network competition when subscription demand is elastic and each network uses non-linear prices and can applytermination-based price discrimination. In the case of a fixed per minute terminationcharge, we find that a reduction of the termination charge below cost has two opposing effects: it softens competition but helps to internalize network externalities. Theformer reduces mobile penetration while the latter boosts it. We find that firms always prefer termination charge below cost for either motive while the regulator preferstermination below cost only when this boosts penetration.Next, we consider the retail benchmarking approach (Jeon and Hurkens, 2008)that determines termination charges as a function of retail prices and show that thisapproach allows the regulator to increase penetration without distorting call volumes.