973 resultados para Strategic Decision
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In monetary unions, monetary policy is typically made by delegates of the member countries. This procedure raises the possibility of strategic delegation - that countries may choose the types of delegates to influence outcomes in their favor. We show that without commitment in monetary policy, strategic delegation arises if and only if three conditions are met: shocks affecting individual countries are not perfectly correlated, risk-sharing across countries is imperfect, and the Phillips Curve is nonlinear. Moreover, inflation rates are inefficiently high. We argue that ways of solving the commitment problem, including the emphasis on price stability in the agreements constituting the European Union are especially valuable when strategic delegation is a problem.
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This report outlines the strategic plan for Department of Administrative Services, including, motto, goals and mission.
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Audit report on Wave 2 of the Phase II Strategic Sourcing Initiative implemented by the Department of Administrative Services
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Many have observed that political candidates running for election areoften purposefully expressing themselves in vague and ambiguous terms. In thispaper we provide a simple formal model of this phenomenon. We model theelectoral competition between two candidates as a two--stage game. In thefirst stage of the game two candidates simultaneously choose their ideologies,and in the second stage they simultaneously choose their level of ambiguity.Our results show that ambiguity, although disliked by voters, may be sustainedin equilibrium. The introduction of ambiguity as a strategic choice variablefor the candidates can also serve to explain why candidates with the sameelectoral objectives end up ``separating'', that is, assuming different ideological positions.
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We analyze empirically the allocation of rights and monetary incentives in automobile franchise contracts. These contracts substantially restrict the decision rights of dealers and grant manufacturers extensive contractual completion and enforcement powers, converting the manufacturers, de facto, in a sort of quasi-judiciary instance. Variation in the allocation of decision rights andincentive intensity is explained by the incidence of moral hazard in the relation. In particular, when the cost of dealer moral hazard is higher and the risk of manufactureropportunism is lower, manufacturers enjoy more discretion in determining the performance required from their dealers and in using mechanisms such as monitoring, termination and monetary incentives to ensure such performance is provided. We also explore the existence of interdependencies between the different elements of the system. and find some complementarities between completion and termination rights, and between monitoring rights and the intensity of incentives.
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This paper argues that the strategic use of debt favours the revelationof information in dynamic adverse selection problems. Our argument is basedon the idea that debt is a credible commitment to end long term relationships.Consequently, debt encourages a privately informed party to disclose itsinformation at early stages of a relationship. We illustrate our pointwith the financing decision of a monopolist selling a good to a buyerwhose valuation is private information. A high level of (renegotiable)debt, by increasing the scope for liquidation, may induce the highvaluation buyer to buy early at a high price and thus increase themonopolist's expected payoff. By affecting the buyer's strategy, it mayreduce the probability of excessive liquidation. We investigate theconsequences of good durability and we examine the way debt mayalleviate the ratchet effect.
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We analyze which normal form solution concepts capture the notion offorward induction, as defined by van Damme (JET, 1989) in the classof generic two player normal form games preceded by an outsideoption. We find that none of the known strategic stability concepts(including Mertens stable sets and hyperstable sets) captures this form of forward induction. On the other hand, we show that the evolutionary concept of EES set (Swinkels, JET, 1992) is always consistent with forward induction.
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We investigate whether the gender composition of teams affect theireconomic performance. We study a large business game, played in groups ofthree, where each group takes the role of a general manager. There are twoparallel competitions, one involving undergraduates and the other involvingMBAs. Our analysis shows that teams formed by three women aresignificantly outperformed by any other gender combination, both at theundergraduate and MBA levels. Looking across the performancedistribution, we find that for undergraduates, three women teams areoutperformed throughout, but by as much as 10pp at the bottom and by only1pp at the top. For MBAs, at the top, the best performing group is two menand one woman. The differences in performance are explained bydifferences in decision-making. We observe that three women teams are lessaggressive in their pricing strategies, invest less in R&D, and invest more insocial sustainability initiatives, than any other gender combination teams.Finally, we find support for the hypothesis that it is poor work dynamicsamong the three women teams that drives the results.
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INTRODUCTION: A clinical decision rule to improve the accuracy of a diagnosis of influenza could help clinicians avoid unnecessary use of diagnostic tests and treatments. Our objective was to develop and validate a simple clinical decision rule for diagnosis of influenza. METHODS: We combined data from 2 studies of influenza diagnosis in adult outpatients with suspected influenza: one set in California and one in Switzerland. Patients in both studies underwent a structured history and physical examination and had a reference standard test for influenza (polymerase chain reaction or culture). We randomly divided the dataset into derivation and validation groups and then evaluated simple heuristics and decision rules from previous studies and 3 rules based on our own multivariate analysis. Cutpoints for stratification of risk groups in each model were determined using the derivation group before evaluating them in the validation group. For each decision rule, the positive predictive value and likelihood ratio for influenza in low-, moderate-, and high-risk groups, and the percentage of patients allocated to each risk group, were reported. RESULTS: The simple heuristics (fever and cough; fever, cough, and acute onset) were helpful when positive but not when negative. The most useful and accurate clinical rule assigned 2 points for fever plus cough, 2 points for myalgias, and 1 point each for duration <48 hours and chills or sweats. The risk of influenza was 8% for 0 to 2 points, 30% for 3 points, and 59% for 4 to 6 points; the rule performed similarly in derivation and validation groups. Approximately two-thirds of patients fell into the low- or high-risk group and would not require further diagnostic testing. CONCLUSION: A simple, valid clinical rule can be used to guide point-of-care testing and empiric therapy for patients with suspected influenza.
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This report outlines the strategic plan for Iowa Department of Corrections including,goals and mission.
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This report outlines the strategic plan for Commission and Division on the Status of Iowans of Asian and Pacific Islander Heritage (CAPI) 2007-2010 Strategic Plan including,goals and mission.
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This report outlines the strategic plan for Iowa Civil Rights Commission Strategic Plan 2005-2006 including,goals and mission.
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This report outlines the strategic plan for Iowa College Student Aid Commissions including,goals and mission.
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This report outlines the strategic plan for Iowa Alcoholic Beverages Division including, goals and mission.
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This report outlines the strategic plan for Iowa Utilities Board including, goals and mission.