999 resultados para Pérez, Pascual
Resumo:
A new species of Hapalopus Ausserer, 1875 (Araneae, Theraphosidae, Theraphosinae) from Bolivia is described and illustrated, based in males and females.
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On the southern Brazilian coast, the penaeid pink shrimp Farfantepenaeus paulensis (Pérez-Farfante, 1967) is intensively captured by both artisanal and industrial fisheries. In the Ibiraquera Lagoon, artisanal fishing of juvenile stocks has declined sharply over the last 15 years. The traditional management methods used by fishermen are no longer sustainable due to conflicts with the demands of tourism and weak environmental and public agencies. The dynamics of the timing of the artificial opening and natural reformation of a sandbar across the mouth of the lagoon are regarded as a central socio-ecological problem. We evaluated the abundance and biomass variation of F. paulensis throughout the year and along a spatial gradient measured from the sandbar into the lagoon. We also explored the influence of opening the sandbar on the shrimp population. Samples were collected monthly from February 2004 to February 2005, using a 27 mm mesh cast net, in four different areas, with three sites being sampled per area. Small numbers of large shrimps were captured in the upper area, while greater biomass and abundance of small shrimps were observed near the sandbar, suggesting the role of the inner area as a refuge for growing. The highest records for biomass and abundance were recorded during warm months, regardless if the lagoon was open or closed by the sandbar. The Ibiraquera Lagoon could be more productive for fishermen if the sandbar opening was coincident to the period of natural post-larvae influx. Furthermore, coastal stocks could be improved by opening the sandbar again during summer in conjunction with fishing quotas.
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Munduruku gen. nov. is proposed for the type species Munduruku bicoloratum sp. nov., from Juruti and Santarém, Pará, Brazil. The main diagnostic character of Munduruku gen. nov. is the presence of a subapical, lanceolate keel on the male palpal bulb, which is unique among the basal taxa of Theraphosinae with type III-IV urticating setae. The female spermathecae consist of two spheroid receptacles with funnel-shaped necks, each of which bears a sclerotized area. In both sexes, the abdomen is remarkably patterned, an uncommon feature in adults of New World theraphosids. Both the bulbus lanceolate keel and the abdominal color pattern are hypothesized as synapomorphies of the genus.
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ABSTRACT A new species of Phrixotrichus Simon, 1889, P. pucara sp. nov., is described and illustrated based on a male from Pucará river, Neuquén province, Argentina. Male can be distinguished from all other species of the genus by the presence of a long strong spine on inner face of prolateral branch of tibial apophysis; also, it differs from P. scrofa (Molina, 1788) and P. vulpinus (Karsch, 1880) by a serrated prolateral keel of the male palpal bulb. Male resembles P. jara Perafán & Pérez-Miles, 2014 but can be distinguished by the uniform color on dorsal cephalothorax and by the palpal organ morphology being wider on the bulb base and embolus shorter and thicker, with the tip of embolus not so directed retrolaterally and prolateral keel bearing a serrated edge with three teeth. Additionally, P. vulpinus is reported for the first time for Argentina along with new distributional data.
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En esta investigación se analizan los factores que influyen en la revelación de información tanto obligatoria como voluntaria (activos intangibles) en las entidades de crédito españolas en sus informes anuales, contrastando si son diferentes los factores que influyen en la revelación de una u otra información.
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Despite the huge increase in processor and interprocessor network performace, many computational problems remain unsolved due to lack of some critical resources such as floating point sustained performance, memory bandwidth, etc... Examples of these problems are found in areas of climate research, biology, astrophysics, high energy physics (montecarlo simulations) and artificial intelligence, among others. For some of these problems, computing resources of a single supercomputing facility can be 1 or 2 orders of magnitude apart from the resources needed to solve some them. Supercomputer centers have to face an increasing demand on processing performance, with the direct consequence of an increasing number of processors and systems, resulting in a more difficult administration of HPC resources and the need for more physical space, higher electrical power consumption and improved air conditioning, among other problems. Some of the previous problems can´t be easily solved, so grid computing, intended as a technology enabling the addition and consolidation of computing power, can help in solving large scale supercomputing problems. In this document, we describe how 2 supercomputing facilities in Spain joined their resources to solve a problem of this kind. The objectives of this experience were, among others, to demonstrate that such a cooperation can enable the solution of bigger dimension problems and to measure the efficiency that could be achieved. In this document we show some preliminary results of this experience and to what extend these objectives were achieved.
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We propose a simple mechanism that implements the Ordinal Shapley Value (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein [2005]) for economies with three or less agents.
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We implement a family of efficient proposals to share benefits generated in environments with externalities. These proposals extend the Shapley value to games with externalities and are parametrized through the method by which the externalities are averaged. We construct two slightly different mechanisms: one for environments with negative externalities and the other for positive externalities. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of these mechanisms coincide with the sharing proposals.
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Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) and Veszteg (2004) propose the use of a multibidding mechanism for situations where agents have to choose a common project. Examples are decisions involving public goods (or public "bads"). We report experimental results to test the practical tractability and effectiveness of the multibidding mechanisms in environments where agents hold private information concerning their valuation of the projects. The mechanism performed quite well in the laboratory: it provided the ex post efficient outcome in roughly three quarters of the cases across the treatments; moreover, the largest part of the subject pool formed their bids according to the theoretical bidding behavior.
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We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and call it the Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). We characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone and anonymous. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapely value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.
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In a market where firms with different characteristics decide upon both the level of emissions and their reports, we study the optimal audit policy for an enforcement agency whose objective is to minimize the level of emissions. We show that it is optimal to devote the resources primarily to the easiest-to-monitor firms and to those firms that value pollution the less. Moreover, unless the budget for monitoring is very large, there are always firms that do not comply with the environmental objective and others that do comply; but all of them evade the environmental taxes.
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Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This in turn leads to disputes regarding the compensation levels to the various parties affected. We propose a general, yet simple, method of deciding upon the distribution of the gains (costs) of cooperation in the presence of externalities. This method is shown to be the unique one satisfying several desirable properties. Furthermore, we illustrate the use of this method to resolve the sharing of benefits generated by international climate control agreements.
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In this paper, we suggest a simple sequential mechanism whose subgame perfect equilibria give rise to efficient networks. Moreover, the payoffs received by the agents coincide with their Shapley value in an appropriately defined cooperative game.