Beyond indifferent players: on the existence of prisoners dilemmas in games with amicable and adversarial preferences

Why don’t agents cooperate when they both stand to gain? This question ranks among the most fundamental in the social sciences. Explanations abound. Among the most compelling are various configurations of the prisoner’s dilemma (PD), or public goods problem. Payoffs in PD’s are specified in one of two ways: as primitive cardinal payoffs or as ordinal final utility. However, as final utility is objectively unobservable, only the primitive payoff games are ever observed. This paper explores mappings from primitive payoff to utility payoff games and demonstrates that though an observable game is a PD there are broad classes of utility functions for which there exists no associated utility PD. In particular we show that even small amounts of either altruism or enmity may disrupt the mapping from primitive payoff to utility PD. We then examine some implications of these results.

The Bayesian Foundations of solution concepts of games

We transform a non co-operati ve game into a -Bayesian decision problem for each player where the uncertainty faced by a player is the strategy choices of the other players, the pr iors of other players on the choice of other players, the priors over priors and so on.We provide a complete characterization between the extent of knowledge about the rationality of players and their ability to successfulIy eliminate strategies which are not best responses. This paper therefore provides the informational foundations of iteratively unàominated strategies and rationalizable strategic behavior (Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984». Moreover, sufficient condi tions are also found for Nash equilibrium behavior. We also provide Aumann's (1985) results on correlated equilibria .

On the impossibility of prisoner's dilemmas in adversarial preference games

Why don't agents cooperate when they both stand to gain? This question ranks among the most fundamental in the social sciences. Explanations abound. Among the most compelling are various configurations of the prisonerís dilemma (PD), or public goods problem. Payoffs in PDís are specified in one of two ways: as primitive cardinal payoffs or as ordinal final utility. However, as final utility is objectively unobservable, only the primitive payoff games are ever observed. This paper explores mappings from primitive payoff to utility payoff games and demonstrates that though an observable game is a PD there are broad classes of utility functions for which there exists no associated utility PD. In particular we show that even small amounts of either altruism or jealousy may disrupt the mapping from primitive payoff to utility PD. We then examine some implications of these results ñ including the possibility of conflict inducing growth.

Existence of nash equilibrium in competitive nonlinear pricing games with adverse selection

We show that for a large class of competitive nonlinear pricing games with adverse selection, the property of better-reply security is naturally satisfied - thus, resolving via a result due to Reny (1999) the issue of existence of Nash equilibrium for a large class of competitive nonlinear pricing games.

Towards an ontology for mathematical modeling with application to epidemiology

EMAp - Escola de Matemática Aplicada

Flexible information acquisition and optimal Tobin tax in tractable dynamic global games

My dissertation focuses on dynamic aspects of coordination processes such as reversibility of early actions, option to delay decisions, and learning of the environment from the observation of other people’s actions. This study proposes the use of tractable dynamic global games where players privately and passively learn about their actions’ true payoffs and are able to adjust early investment decisions to the arrival of new information to investigate the consequences of the presence of liquidity shocks to the performance of a Tobin tax as a policy intended to foster coordination success (chapter 1), and the adequacy of the use of a Tobin tax in order to reduce an economy’s vulnerability to sudden stops (chapter 2). Then, it analyzes players’ incentive to acquire costly information in a sequential decision setting (chapter 3). In chapter 1, a continuum of foreign agents decide whether to enter or not in an investment project. A fraction λ of them are hit by liquidity restrictions in a second period and are forced to withdraw early investment or precluded from investing in the interim period, depending on the actions they chose in the first period. Players not affected by the liquidity shock are able to revise early decisions. Coordination success is increasing in the aggregate investment and decreasing in the aggregate volume of capital exit. Without liquidity shocks, aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to frictions like a tax on short term capitals. In this case, a Tobin tax always increases success incidence. In the presence of liquidity shocks, this invariance result no longer holds in equilibrium. A Tobin tax becomes harmful to aggregate investment, which may reduces success incidence if the economy does not benefit enough from avoiding capital reversals. It is shown that the Tobin tax that maximizes the ex-ante probability of successfully coordinated investment is decreasing in the liquidity shock. Chapter 2 studies the effects of a Tobin tax in the same setting of the global game model proposed in chapter 1, with the exception that the liquidity shock is considered stochastic, i.e, there is also aggregate uncertainty about the extension of the liquidity restrictions. It identifies conditions under which, in the unique equilibrium of the model with low probability of liquidity shocks but large dry-ups, a Tobin tax is welfare improving, helping agents to coordinate on the good outcome. The model provides a rationale for a Tobin tax on economies that are prone to sudden stops. The optimal Tobin tax tends to be larger when capital reversals are more harmful and when the fraction of agents hit by liquidity shocks is smaller. Chapter 3 focuses on information acquisition in a sequential decision game with payoff complementar- ity and information externality. When information is cheap relatively to players’ incentive to coordinate actions, only the first player chooses to process information; the second player learns about the true payoff distribution from the observation of the first player’s decision and follows her action. Miscoordination requires that both players privately precess information, which tends to happen when it is expensive and the prior knowledge about the distribution of the payoffs has a large variance.

Mathematical analysis of maximum power generated by photovoltaic systems and fitting curves for standard test conditions

The rural electrification is characterized by geographical dispersion of the population, low consumption, high investment by consumers and high cost. Moreover, solar radiation constitutes an inexhaustible source of energy and in its conversion into electricity photovoltaic panels are used. In this study, equations were adjusted to field conditions presented by the manufacturer for current and power of small photovoltaic systems. The mathematical analysis was performed on the photovoltaic rural system I- 100 from ISOFOTON, with power 300 Wp, located at the Experimental Farm Lageado of FCA/UNESP. For the development of such equations, the circuitry of photovoltaic cells has been studied to apply iterative numerical methods for the determination of electrical parameters and possible errors in the appropriate equations in the literature to reality. Therefore, a simulation of a photovoltaic panel was proposed through mathematical equations that were adjusted according to the data of local radiation. The results have presented equations that provide real answers to the user and may assist in the design of these systems, once calculated that the maximum power limit ensures a supply of energy generated. This real sizing helps establishing the possible applications of solar energy to the rural producer and informing the real possibilities of generating electricity from the sun.

The use of software Mapavox for teaching graphics and games to blind and low vision students: a development through practices

Current policies on education to visually impaired point for a growing trend of including students with special educational needs in regular schools. However, most often this inclusion is not accompanied by an appropriate professional trained or infrastructure, which has been presented as a big problem for regular school teachers who have students with visual impairments in their classroom. Based on this situation, the Group of Extension in Tactile Cartography from UNESP - University of the State of São Paulo - Campus de Rio Claro - SP - Brazil has been developing educational material of geography and cartography to blind students at a special school. Among the materials developed in this study highlight the development of graphics and board games provided with sound capabilities through MAPAVOX, software developed in partnership with UFRJ - Federal University from Rio de Janeiro - RJ - Brazil. Through this software, sound capabilities can be inserted into built materials, giving them a multi-sensory character. In most cases the necessary conditions for building specific materials to students with visual impairments is expensive and beyond the reach of features from a regular school, so the survey sought to use easy access and low cost materials like Cork, leaf aluminum, material for fixing and others. The development of these materials was supported by preparation in laboratory and its subsequent test through practices involving blind students. The methodology used on the survey is based on qualitative research and non comparative analysis of the results. In other words, the material is built based on the special students perception and reality construction, not being mere adaptations of visual materials, but a construction focused on the reality of the visually impaired. The results proved were quite successful as the materials prepared were effective on mediating the learning process of students with disabilities. Geographical and cartographic concepts were seized by the students through the technology used, associated with the use of materials that took into account in its building process the perception of the students.

GPS Satellite Kinematic Relative Positioning: Analyzing and Improving the Functional Mathematical Model Using Wavelets

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Mathematical tests about the existence and applications of PPS-wavelets in function approximation problems

Neural networks and wavelet transform have been recently seen as attractive tools for developing eficient solutions for many real world problems in function approximation. Function approximation is a very important task in environments where computation has to be based on extracting information from data samples in real world processes. So, mathematical model is a very important tool to guarantee the development of the neural network area. In this article we will introduce one series of mathematical demonstrations that guarantee the wavelets properties for the PPS functions. As application, we will show the use of PPS-wavelets in pattern recognition problems of handwritten digit through function approximation techniques.