Reduced capacity of peritoneal exudate cells for oxidative killing of Schistosoma mansoni schistosomula

Peritoneal exudate cells from mice infected with Schistosoma mansoni (S-PEC) can kill schistosomula in vitro in the presence of immune serum. S-PEC produce a low level of respiratory burst, and schistosomula mortality in their presence is not reduced when exogenous antioxidants are added, suggesting that with S-PEC, oxidative killing is not important. Hydrogen peroxide (H2O2) and superoxide production by S-PEC, and cells from BCG and thioglycollate (THGL) injected non-infected mice, non-specifically stimulated with opsonized zymosan, were measured. Levels of H2O2 produced by S-PEC were significantly lower than BCG or THGL PEC, and were below the H2O2 threshold for schistosomula killing. This resulted in lower levels of cell-mediated killing of schistosomula in vitro by S-PEC than by BCG or THGL PEC. Superoxide levels, however, were similar between the three cell populations. The efficiency of PEC to kill schistosomules in vitro correlated with H2O2 rather than superoxide levels. The lower tolerance of schistosomula, compared to adult S. mansoni to GSH depleting agents increases their sensitivity to oxidative attack and resulted in higher levels of cell-mediated killing in vitro.

Using information from telephone panel surveys to predict reasons for refusal

One of the key problems in conducting surveys is convincing people to participate.¦However, it is often difficult or impossible to determine why people refuse. Panel surveys¦provide information from previous waves that can offer valuable clues as to why people¦refuse to participate. If we are able to anticipate the reasons for refusal, then we¦may be able to take appropriate measures to encourage potential respondents to participate¦in the survey. For example, special training could be provided for interviewers¦on how to convince potential participants to participate.¦This study examines different influences, as determined from the previous wave,¦on refusal reasons that were given by the respondents in the subsequent wave of the¦telephone Swiss Household Panel. These influences include socio-demography, social¦inclusion, answer quality, and interviewer assessment of question understanding and¦of future participation. Generally, coefficients are similar across reasons, and¦between-respondents effects rather than within-respondents effects are significant.¦While 'No interest' reasons are easier to predict, the other reasons are more situational. Survey-specific issues are able to distinguish¦different reasons to some extent.

The Complete Information First. Price Auction or the Importance of Being Indivisible

Abstract Despite the popularity of auction theoretical thinking, it appears that no one has presented an elementary equilibrium analysis of the first-price sealed-bid auction mechanism under complete information. This paper aims to remedy that omission. We show that the existence of pure strategy undominated Nash equilibria requires that the bidding space is not "too divisible" (that is, a continuum). In fact, when bids must form part of a finite grid there always exists a "high price equilibrium". However, there might also be "low price equilibria" and when the bidding space is very restrictive the revenue obtained in these "low price equilibria" might be very low. We discuss the properties of the equilibria and an application of auction theoretical thinking in which "low price equilibria" may be relevant. Keywords: First-price auctions, undominated Nash equilibria. JEL Classification Numbers: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D44 (Auctions).

A follow-up study on the quality of alcohol dependence-related information on the web.

ABSTRACT: In order to evaluate the one-year evolution of web-based information on alcohol dependence, we re-assessed alcohol-related sites in July 2007 with the same evaluating tool that had been used to assess these sites in June 2006. Websites were assessed with a standardized form designed to rate sites on the basis of accountability, presentation, interactivity, readability, and content quality. The DISCERN scale was also used, which aimed to assist persons without content expertise in assessing the quality of written health publications. Scores were highly stable for all components of the form one year later (r = .77 to .95, p < .01). Analysis of variance for repeated measures showed no time effect, no interaction between time and scale, no interaction between time and group (affiliation categories), and no interaction between time, group, and scale. The study highlights lack of change of alcohol-dependence-related web pages across one year.

"MIATA"-minimal information about T cell assays.

Immunotherapy, especially therapeutic vaccination, has a great deal of potential in the treatment of cancer and certain infectious diseases such as HIV (Allison et al., 2006; Fauci et al., 2008; Feldmann and Steinman, 2005). Numerous vaccine candidates have been tested in patients with a variety of tumor types and chronic viral diseases. Often, the best way to assess the clinical potential of these vaccines is to monitor the induced T cell response, and yet there are currently no standards for reporting these results. This letter is an effort to address this problem.

Sex biased spatial strategies relying on the integration of multimodal cues in a rat model of schizophrenia: impairment in predicting future context?

Male and female Wistar rats were treated postnatally (PND 5-16) with BSO (l-buthionine-(S,R)-sulfoximine) to provide a rat model of schizophrenia based on transient glutathione deficit. In the watermaze, BSO-treated male rats perform very efficiently in conditions where a diversity of visual information is continuously available during orientation trajectories [1]. Our hypothesis is that the treatment impairs proactive strategies anticipating future sensory information, while supporting a tight visual adjustment on memorized snapshots, i.e. compensatory reactive strategies. To test this hypothesis, BSO rats' performance was assessed in two conditions using an 8-arm radial maze task: a semi-transparent maze with no available view on the environment from maze centre [2], and a modified 2-parallel maze known to induce a neglect of the parallel pair in normal rats [3-5]. Male rats, but not females, were affected by the BSO treatment. In the semi-transparent maze, BSO males expressed a higher error rate, especially in completing the maze after an interruption. In the 2-parallel maze shape, BSO males, unlike controls, expressed no neglect of the parallel arms. This second result was in accord with a reactive strategy using accurate memory images of the contextual environment instead of a representation based on integrating relative directions. These results are coherent with a treatment-induced deficit in proactive decision strategy based on multimodal cognitive maps, compensated by accurate reactive adaptations based on the memory of local configurations. Control females did not express an efficient proactive capacity in the semi-transparent maze, neither did they show the significant neglect of the parallel arms, which might have masked the BSO induced effect. Their reduced sensitivity to BSO treatment is discussed with regard to a sex biased basal cognitive style.

Bargaining and Conflict with Incomplete Information

This paper studies bargaining and conflict under incomplete information, provides an overview and a critical account of the literature on the topic and contributes with original research. We first revise models of mechanism design and sequential bargaining that take confrontation as final. Conflict and inefficiencies are to be expected in these models whenever parties have optimistic prospects on the outcome of the all-out conflict. After examining the causes and reasons for this optimism, we move to the analysis of the recent literature that considers the existence of limited confrontations that allow bargaining to resume. In the presence of private information, these limited conflicts convey information and thus become a bargaining instrument. The paper closes with a discussion on the related empirical literature, the challenges that it faces and some potential avenues for further research.

Spatial modelling of biodiversity at the community level

1. Statistical modelling is often used to relate sparse biological survey data to remotely derived environmental predictors, thereby providing a basis for predictively mapping biodiversity across an entire region of interest. The most popular strategy for such modelling has been to model distributions of individual species one at a time. Spatial modelling of biodiversity at the community level may, however, confer significant benefits for applications involving very large numbers of species, particularly if many of these species are recorded infrequently. 2. Community-level modelling combines data from multiple species and produces information on spatial pattern in the distribution of biodiversity at a collective community level instead of, or in addition to, the level of individual species. Spatial outputs from community-level modelling include predictive mapping of community types (groups of locations with similar species composition), species groups (groups of species with similar distributions), axes or gradients of compositional variation, levels of compositional dissimilarity between pairs of locations, and various macro-ecological properties (e.g. species richness). 3. Three broad modelling strategies can be used to generate these outputs: (i) 'assemble first, predict later', in which biological survey data are first classified, ordinated or aggregated to produce community-level entities or attributes that are then modelled in relation to environmental predictors; (ii) 'predict first, assemble later', in which individual species are modelled one at a time as a function of environmental variables, to produce a stack of species distribution maps that is then subjected to classification, ordination or aggregation; and (iii) 'assemble and predict together', in which all species are modelled simultaneously, within a single integrated modelling process. These strategies each have particular strengths and weaknesses, depending on the intended purpose of modelling and the type, quality and quantity of data involved. 4. Synthesis and applications. The potential benefits of modelling large multispecies data sets using community-level, as opposed to species-level, approaches include faster processing, increased power to detect shared patterns of environmental response across rarely recorded species, and enhanced capacity to synthesize complex data into a form more readily interpretable by scientists and decision-makers. Community-level modelling therefore deserves to be considered more often, and more widely, as a potential alternative or supplement to modelling individual species.

Optimal contracting with private information on cost expectation and variability

We study the screening problem that arises in a framework where, initially, the agent is privately informed about both the expected production cost and the cost variability and, at a later stage, he learns privately the cost realization. The speci c set of relevant incentive constraints, and so the characteristics of the optimal mechanism, depend nely upon the curvature of the principal s marginal surplus function as well as the relative importance of the two initial information problems. Pooling of production levels is optimally induced with respect to the cost variability when the principal's knowledge imperfection about the latter is sufficiently less important than that about the expected cost.

Expert Information and Majority Decisions

This paper studies dichotomous majority voting in common interest committees where each member receives not only a private signal but also a public signal observed by all of them. The public signal represents, e.g. expert information presented to an entire committee and its quality is higher than that of each individual private signal. We identify two informative symmetric strategy equilibria, namely i) the mixed strategy equilibrium where each member randomizes between following the private and public signals should they disagree; and ii) the pure strategy equilibrium where they follow the public signal for certain. The former outperforms the latter. The presence of the public signal precludes the equilibrium where every member follows their own signal, which is an equilibrium in the absence of the public signal. The mixed strategy equilibrium in the presence of the public signal outperforms the sincere voting equilibrium without the public signal, but the latter may be more efficient than the pure strategy equilibrium in the presence of the public signal. We suggest that whether expert information improves committee decision making depends on equilibrium selection.

The Market for "Rough Diamonds": Information, Finance and Wage Inequality

During the past four decades both between and within group wage inequality increased significantly in the US. I provide a microfounded justification for this pattern, by introducing private employer learning in a model of signaling with credit constraints. In particular, I show that when financial constraints relax, talented individuals can acquire education and leave the uneducated pool, this decreases unskilled inexperienced wages and boosts wage inequality. This explanation is consistent with US data from 1970 to 1997, indicating that the rise of the skill and the experience premium coincides with a fall in unskilled-inexperienced wages, while at the same time skilled or experienced wages do not change much. The model accounts for: (i) the increase in the skill premium despite the growing supply of skills; (ii) the understudied aspect of rising inequality related to the increase in the experience premium; (iii) the sharp growth of the skill premium for inexperienced workers and its moderate expansion for the experienced ones; (iv) the puzzling coexistence of increasing experience premium within the group of unskilled workers and its stable pattern among the skilled ones. The results hold under various robustness checks and provide some interesting policy implications about the potential conflict between inequality of opportunity and substantial economic inequality, as well as the role of minimum wage policy in determining the equilibrium wage inequality.

How private is private information? The ability to spot deception in an economic game

We provide experimental evidence on the ability to detect deceit in a buyer-seller game with asymmetric information. Sellers have private information about the buyer's valuation of a good and sometimes have incentives to mislead buyers. We examine if buyers can spot deception in face-to-face encounters. We vary (1) whether or not the buyer can interrogate the seller, and (2) the contextual richness of the situation. We find that the buyers' prediction accuracy is above chance levels, and that interrogation and contextual richness are important factors determining the accuracy. These results show that there are circumstances in which part of the information asymmetry is eliminated by people's ability to spot deception.

What is the Causal Effect of Information and Learning about a Public Good on Willingness to Pay?

In this study we elicit agents’ prior information set regarding a public good, exogenously give information treatments to survey respondents and subsequently elicit willingness to pay for the good and posterior information sets. The design of this field experiment allows us to perform theoretically motivated hypothesis testing between different updating rules: non-informative updating, Bayesian updating, and incomplete updating. We find causal evidence that agents imperfectly update their information sets. We also field causal evidence that the amount of additional information provided to subjects relative to their pre-existing information levels can affect stated WTP in ways consistent overload from too much learning. This result raises important (though familiar) issues for the use of stated preference methods in policy analysis.

The Impact of Information Provision on Agglomeration Bonus Performance: An Experimental Study on Local Networks

The Agglomeration Bonus (AB) is a mechanism to induce adjacent landowners to spatially coordinate their land use for the delivery of ecosystem services from farmland. This paper uses laboratory experiments to explore the performance of the AB in achieving the socially optimal land management configuration in a local network environment where the information available to subjects varies. The AB poses a coordination problem between two Nash equilibria: a Pareto dominant and a risk dominant equilibrium. The experiments indicate that if subjects are informed about both their direct and indirect neighbors’ actions, they are more likely to coordinate on the Pareto dominant equilibrium relative to the case where subjects have information about their direct neighbors’ action only. However, the extra information can only delay – and not prevent – the transition to the socially inferior risk dominant Nash equilibrium. In the long run, the AB mechanism may only be partially effective in enhancing delivery of ecosystem services on farming landscapes featuring local networks.