954 resultados para Gross motor coordination
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Motor Vehicle Crash Fatalities
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Vehicle fatalities from around the state of Iowa.
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Motor Vehicle Crash Fatalities
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Motor Vehicle Crash Fatalities
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Motor Vehicle Crash Fatalities
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Motor Vehicle Crash Fatalities
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The Spanish automobile industry had a late start. Although the country proved capable of short production runs of high-quality vehicles during the first third of the century it never managed to build up its own industry, unlike Great Britain, France, or Italy. What then, were the critical shortcomings that prevented the establishment of large Spanish motor manufacturers? Put another way, why did all of the companies set up during the first half-century fail to survive? This paper attempts to shed some light on these questions, employing a wide-ranging analysis of both internal and external factors affecting the industry. A feeble internal market, lack of resources and production factors are usually adduced as reasons, as are Spain's general economic backwardness and the role played by the public authorities. However, this paper mainly focuses on the internal factors concerning company strategy and organisation. A comparison with the Italian case helps put the traditional arguments in proper perspective and highlights those covering business strategies. Finally, we argue that a broad range of factors needs to be analysed to fully understand why Spain failed to establish a motor industry.
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Record of the Fatalities for Motor Vehicle Accidents in Iowa per week.
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Motor Vehicle Crash Fatalities
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Motor Vehicle Crash Fatalities
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We lay out a model of wage bargaining with two leading features:bargaining is ex post to relevant investments and there isindividual bargaining in firms without a Union. We compareindividual ex post bargaining to coordinated ex post bargainingand we analyze the effects on wage formation. As opposed to exante bargaining models, the costs of destroying the employmentrelationship play a crucial role in determining wages. Highfiring costs in particular yield a rent for employees. Ourtheory points to a employer size-wage effect that is independentof the production function and market power. We derive a simpleleast squares specification from the theoretical model thatallow us to estimate components of the wage premium fromcoordination. We reject the hypothesis that labor coordinationdoes not alter the extensive form of the bargaining game. Laborcoordination substantially increases bargaining power butdecreases labor's ability to pose costly threats to the firm.
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We analyze the role of commitment in pre-play communication for ensuringefficient evolutionarily stable outcomes in coordination games. All players are a priori identical as they are drawn from the same population. In games where efficient outcomes can be reached by players coordinating on the same action we find commitment to be necessary to enforce efficiency. In games where efficienct outcomes only result from play of different actions, communication without commitment is most effective although efficiency can no longer be guaranteed. Only when there are many messages then inefficient outcomes are negligible as their basins of attraction become very small.
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Motor Vehicle Crash Fatalities
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Motor Vehicle Crash Fatalities
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We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertaintyabout the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models that have beenused in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problemsof equilibrium indeterminacy. In our experiment each subject receives anoisy signal about the true payoffs. This game has a unique strategyprofile that survives the iterative deletion of strictly dominatedstrategies (thus a unique Nash equilibrium). The equilibrium outcomecoincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome ofthe underlying coordination game. The behavior of the subjects convergesto the theoretical prediction after enough experience has been gained. The data (and the comments) suggest that subjects do not apply through"a priori" reasoning the iterated deletion of dominated strategies.Instead, they adapt to the responses of other players. Thus, the lengthof the learning phase clearly varies for the different signals. We alsotest behavior in a game without uncertainty as a benchmark case. The gamewith uncertainty is inspired by the "global" games of Carlsson and VanDamme (1993).