The Mirage of the State: Why the West has failed in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and Central African Republic? Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 15, July 2014

The state still matters. However, the members of the Euro-Atlantic community may be misinterpreting this crucial baseline prior launching their military interventions since 2001. The latest violence and collapse of the state of Iraq after the invasion of Northern Iraq by a radical Sunni Muslim terrorist group, so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), demonstrate once again the centrality and requirement of a functioning state in order to maintain violent forces to disrupt domestic and regional stability. Since 2001, the US and its European allies have waged wars against failed-states in order to increase this security and national interests, and then have been involved in some type of state-building.1 This has been the case in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali, and Central African Republic (CAR). France went into Mali (2012) and CAR (2013), which preceded two European Union military and civilian Common Security and Defense Policy missions (CSDP), in order to avoid the collapse of these two states. The threat of the collapse of both states was a concern for the members of the Euro-Atlantic community as it could have spread to the region and causing even greater instabilities. In Mali, the country was under radical Islamic pressures coming from the North after the collapse of Libya ensuing the 2011 Western intervention, while in CAR it was mainly an ethno-religious crisis. Failed states are a real concern, as they can rapidly become training grounds for radical groups and permitting all types of smuggling and trafficking.2 In Mali, France wanted to protect its large French population and avoid the fall of Mali in the hands of radical Islamic groups directly or indirectly linked to Al-Qaeda. A fallen Mali could have destabilized the region of the Sahel and ultimately affected the stability of Southern European borders. France wanted to avoid the development of a safe haven across the Sahel where movements of people and goods are uncontrolled and illegal.3 Since the end of the Cold War, Western powers have been involved in stabilizing neighborhoods and regions, like the Balkans, Africa, and Middle East, which at the exceptions of the Balkans, have led to failed policies. 9/11 changes everything. The US, under President George W. Bush, started to wage war against terrorism and all states link to it. This started a period of continuous Western interventions in this post-9/11 era in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and CAR. If history has demonstrated one thing, the members of the Euro-Atlantic community are struggling and will continue to struggle to stabilize Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and Central African Republic (CAR) for one simple reason: no clear endgame. Is it the creation of a state à la Westphalian in order to permit these states to operate as the sole guarantor of security? Or is the reestablishment of status quo in these countries permitting to exit and end Western operations? This article seeks to analyze Western interventions in these five countries in order to reflect on the concept of the state and the erroneous starting point for each intervention.4 In the first part, the political status of each country is analyzed in order to understand the internal and regional crisis. In a second time, the concept of the state, framed into the Buzanian trinity, is discussed and applied to the cases. In the last part the European and American civilian-military doctrines are examined in accordance with their latest military interventions and in their broader spectrum.

Transatlantic Conflict and Cooperation Concerning Trade Issues. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 13, July 2014

From the Introduction. Transatlantic relations have undergone significant changes within the past twenty-five years. During the Cold War era, the United States and Western Europe were bound together by a perceived common threat from the Soviet Union. Consequently, economic issues commanded less attention than security issues. After the Cold War ended, economic issues were thought to be the glue that would hold the transatlantic relationship together. Much attention was given for several years to fostering economic cooperation through the development of intergovernmental initiatives. After the terrorist incidents of September 11, 2001 in the United States, and the subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, security issues again came to the forefront of the relationship. However, in contrast to the earlier era that was mainly characterized by close cooperation, disagreements between the United States and major countries of Western Europe about how to deal with the terrorist threat created severe strains in the relationship. By 2003, the third year of the George W Bush administration, transatlantic political relations had reached perhaps their lowest point since World War II. They have gradually improved since then, but with a significant setback from Wikileaks revelations, and even more serious strains resulting from the revelations by Edward Snowden concerning United States surveillance activities. Security issues have come to the forefront also in connection with regional unrest in the Middle East, EU nations’ dependence on Russian oil and gas, and Russian intrusions into Ukraine.

Alone in virtue. The "New Turkish" ideology in Turkey's foreign policy. OSW Point of View Number 49, April 2015

Once the West’s ally, Turkey has been an ever more problematic partner in recent years. The Turkish leadership no longer views the alliance with the European Union and membership in NATO as based on shared values; rather, it is now merely a cherry-picked and shaky community of interests. Turkey is also increasingly alienated politically in the Middle East. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring and the regional developments which followed, Ankara has lost much of the influence it had built in region in previous years. Turkey’s growing international isolation is a consequence of the country ever more fully subordinating its foreign policy to the ideology of the ruling AKP. The world vision offered by that ideology does not square with the diagnoses of Turkey’s partners. The objectives it sets for Turkish foreign policy are incompatible with its partners’ expectations. Moreover, a foreign policy rooted in ideology is less flexible and less capable of adjusting to current international dynamics.

U.S. Democracy Promotion from Bush to Obama. EUSpring Working Paper No. 1, April 2015

Throughout the twenty-first century the United States (U.S.) has attempted to balance its traditional national security interests, whilst also seeking to promote the long-term transformation of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) towards democracy based on liberal values. With the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks providing a catalyst for policy change, the U.S. has moved away from its twentieth-century policy of pursuing a regional status quo and instinctively balking at political change. Yet, the U.S. has not abandoned its reliance on autocratic regimes that cooperate on more immediate national security interests such as counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, and the free-flow energy sources into the global market. Rather, U.S. democracy promotion in the MENA has become incremental by design and is characterized by its gradualist and often collaborative nature. U.S. foreign policy in the MENA is, therefore, depicted by a cautious evolutionary stance rather than supporting revolutionary shifts in power.

Balancing realism and vision - The prospects of EU-Israel relations in times of change and uncertainty. European Policy Brief, 28 May 2015

In this joint EPC-FSD Policy Brief, Andrea Frontini and Eran Etzion assess the state of play and the future prospects of EU-Israel relations in the light of recent domestic and regional political developments. They argue that, despite frequent cacophony and recurring stalemates, the EU-Israel partnership still has the potential to pursue shared strategic objectives. The two sides have to realign their relations, taking into account new realities and common challenges in the Middle East and Northern Africa region, and the current state of the Middle East Peace Process. More careful differentiation and stronger prioritisation of the policy dossiers at stake are urgently needed. An autonomous but joined up review of the overall relationship, guided by courage, pragmatism and stronger strategic direction, is crucial in order to move ahead.

The great leap. Turkey under Erdogan. OSW Point of View 51, 27 May 2015

Since the AKP took power in 2002, Turkey has seen a replacement of the state’s elites, a real change of the political system and a redefinition of the state identity. All this has been accompanied by economic development and rapid social transformation. The pro-democratic reforms and improved prosperity in the first decade of the AKP’s rule created the opportunity for Turkey to become part of the West in terms of legal and political standards, while maintaining its cultural distinctness. However, from the point of view of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the leader of a new Turkey, the political reforms turned out not to be a goal per se but a means to the end of achieving a monopoly on power. Once this goal was achieved, Erdogan began leading Turkey towards the status of an autocratic state focused on the Middle East and resentful towards the West. This trend is unlikely to be reversed under Erdogan’s rule. However, even if the government were to change, there would be no return to the Turkey from before the AKP era. In turn, the Turkish public will have to answer the questions regarding its civilisational identity and the vision of the political and social order.

After a nuclear deal: What next for Iranian oil and gas? EPC Policy Brief, 23 June 2015

On 2 April in Lausanne, after months of intense negotiations, Iran and the E3+3 (France, Germany, and the UK plus China, Russia, and the US) agreed on a framework deal for the resolution of the nuclear dispute. EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, and Iran's Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, issued a joint statement announcing that "solutions on key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action" have been found. While differences remain on several issues, including the scope of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections and sanctions relief, the statement has nevertheless raised hopes that a final deal may be reached this summer. If accomplished, an agreement would bring an end to more than a decade of tensions between Iran and the international community. This would result in the lifting of several sanctions, which were adopted against Iran by the United Nations, the EU, and the US. Unsurprisingly therefore, Iran's economy and in particular its energy sector are now the subject of worldwide attention.

EU-Iran relations post-Vienna: the way forward. EPC Commentary, 16 July 2015

From the Introduction. After 18 days of marathon talks over Iran’s nuclear programme, the E3 plus 3 (US, Russia, China, Britain, France, Germany) and Iran agreed on the final text of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), opening a new chapter in relations between Iran and the West after a 12-year standoff.

The nuclear deal with Iran: Le moment suprême? CEPS Commentary, 16 July 2015

More than two years in the making, the agreement concluded by China, the EU, France, Germany, Russia, the UK and the US with Iran to prevent the ‘weaponisation’ of the latter’s nuclear programme is a big deal. But, cautions Steven Blockmans in this CEPS Commentary, it is not the silver bullet to the normalisation of relations. Implementation will be a tortuous process, fraught with suspicion and friction. Although Europe has been called upon to seize the moment and to shift to a relationship with Iran based on engagement, not containment, the EU and its member states would be better advised not to move beyond their nuclear focus too quickly, but rather to show a sense of duty and loyal cooperation with their international partners by supporting the effective execution of the accord.

US Democracy Promotion from Bush to Obama. EUSpring Working Paper No. 1, 15 April 2015

Throughout the twenty-first century the United States (U.S.) has attempted to balance its traditional national security interests, whilst also seeking to promote the long-term transformation of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) towards democracy based on liberal values. With the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks providing a catalyst for policy change, the U.S. has moved away from its twentieth-century policy of pursuing a regional status quo and instinctively balking at political change. Yet, the U.S. has not abandoned its reliance on autocratic regimes that cooperate on more immediate national security interests such as counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, and the free-flow energy sources into the global market. Rather, U.S. democracy promotion in the MENA has become incremental by design and is characterized by its gradualist and often-collaborative nature. U.S. foreign policy in the MENA is, therefore, depicted by a cautious evolutionary stance rather than supporting revolutionary shifts in power.

The consequences for Russia of the nuclear deal with Iran. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 177/03.08.2015

The five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the USA, the United Kingdom, China, France and Russia) plus Germany and the European Union signed a deal with Iran on 14 July in Vienna (a Plan of Action with five appendices, henceforth referred to as the Vienna Agreement). Under this agreement, Iran undertook to restrict its nuclear programme and to bring it under international scrutiny for 15 years in exchange for a gradual lifting of international sanctions (both those imposed between 2006 and 2010 by the UN Security Council and the unilateral US and EU sanctions). Even though Russia has officially reacted positively to this deal, the consequences it will have are rather ambiguous from Moscow’s point of view. Iran looks set to become stronger and will possibly normalise its relations with the West, and especially the United States. This, in political terms, is a disadvantage for Russia. The Kremlin’s ability to use its policy towards Iran as a bargaining chip in contacts with Washington will be reduced significantly. In turn, the benefits will include improving the perception of Russia in the West and the opening up of new opportunities for the geopolitical game in the region, both with Iran and its opponents in the Arab world. Similarly, in economic terms, the possible lifting of sanctions will offer Russia new opportunities to achieve immediate benefits owing to co-operation in the nuclear and military-technical areas. In the short term, the lifting of sanctions will not pose any threat to Russia’s position on the global energy markets. However, in the long term, the end of Iran’s international isolation may bring negative consequences for Russia, such as the dominant position of Western and/or Chinese companies in the Iranian upstream sector, rising exports of Iranian oil and gas to EU and Asian markets (which are essential for Russia) and the downward pressure on oil and gas prices.

Syria: An end to the hands-off policy. CEPS Commentary, 31 August 2015

After a year of focusing on the nuclear deal with Iran, international diplomacy is returning to consider resolution of the civil war in Syria, with each side now a little less firm in their positions as the situation on the ground deteriorates further. In this new CEPS Commentary Steven Blockmans sheds light on the highly complex and volatile environment in the Middle East, concluding that failure to seize the new diplomatic momentum to resolve this conflict will likely mean that Syria falls into the hands of IS.

Treat the root causes of the asylum crisis, not the symptoms. CEPS commentary, 11 September 2015 Friday, 11 September 2015

In the wake of the long-awaited State of the Union address delivered by Jean-Claude Juncker on September 9th, Sergio Carrera and Karel Lannoo express deep disappointment with the EU’s response, both in scope and in ambition. In their view, two key challenges lie behind the current asylum crisis. First, existing EU rules do not fit the purpose and the second challenge relates to the systemic failure of states like Greece, Hungary and Italy to adhere to the democratic rule of law principles and fundamental rights.

Who is leading the European Union?. European Policy Briefs No. 33, March 2014

The European Union will only be reconciled with its citizens when they will be able to identify leaders at the level of the institutions.

Homo Jihadicus. Islam in the former USSR and the phenomenon of the post-Soviet militants in Syria and Iraq. OSW REPORT 2015-09-21

The post-Soviet area, along with the countries of the Middle East, North Africa and Western Europe, have become one of the main global exporters of Islamic militants. Currently on the territory of Syria, and to a lesser extent of Iraq, there are several thousands of foreign fighters from the post-Soviet states. The causes of the war migration from the former USSR states to the Middle East have their roots in the dynamic changes taking place inside Islam in the post-Soviet area: primarily the growth of Salafism and militant Islam, as well as the internationalisation and globalisation of the local Islam. The deep political, economic, social and ideological changes which Muslims underwent after the collapse of the USSR, led to the creation of a specific group within them, for which Islam in its radical form became the main element of their identity. Homo sovieticus, without fully eradicating his Soviet part, became Homo jihadicus who not only identifies himself with the global Ummah, but is also ready to leave his country and join jihad beyond its borders in the name of the professed ideas.