A statistical approach to define some tofu processing conditions

The aim of this work was to make tofu from soybean cultivar BRS 267 under different processing conditions in order to evaluate the influence of each treatment on the product quality. A fractional factorial 2(5-1) design was used, in which independent variables (thermal treatment, coagulant concentration, coagulation time, curd cutting, and draining time) were tested at two different levels. The response variables studied were hardness, yield, total solids, and protein content of tofu. Polynomial models were generated for each response. To obtain tofu with desirable characteristics (hardness ~4 N, yield 306 g tofu.100 g-1 soybeans, 12 g proteins.100 g-1 tofu and 22 g solids.100 g-1 tofu), the following processing conditions were selected: heating until boiling plus 10 minutes in water bath, 2% dihydrated CaSO4 w/w, 10 minutes coagulation, curd cutting, and 30 minutes draining time.

Fish crackers development from minced fish and starch: an innovative approach to a traditional product

This study aimed to develop sensory acceptable, high nutritional value fish crackers that could be kept at room temperature for 180 days. Minced fish of different low-value species was the raw material employed to produce two types of fish crackers: a) the traditional keropok cracker, which was expanded by deep frying; and b) a low-fat fish cracker, expanded by microwave cooking. The protein content of the fried fish crackers (FFCs) and that of the microwaved fish crackers (MFCs) were high (10.86 and 14.70%, respectively). The essential amino acid contents of the two types of fish cracker were above the FAO requirements for adults, and the lysine content was above the requirements for children. Sensory analysis, performed by adult panelists, resulted in a general level of acceptability of 90% for the MFCs and of 97% for the FFCs. Vacuum packaging maintained microbiological and physicochemical properties for a storage period of 180 days at room temperature.

A novel procedure to measure the antioxidant capacity of Yerba maté extracts

Yerba maté extracts have in vitro antioxidant capacity attributed to the presence of polyphenolic compounds, mainly chlorogenic acids and dicaffeoylquinic acid derivatives. DPPH is one of the most used assays to measure the antioxidant capacity of pure compounds and plant extracts. It is difficult to compare the results between studies because this assay is applied in too many different conditions by the different research groups. Thus, in order to assess the antioxidant capacity of yerba maté extracts, the following procedure is proposed: 100 µL of an aqueous dilution of the extracts is mixed in duplicate with 3.0 mL of a DPPH 'work solution in absolute methanol (100 µM.L-1), with an incubation time of 120 minutes in darkness at 37 ± 1 °C, and then absorbance is read at 517 nm against absolute methanol. The results should be expressed as ascorbic acid equivalents or Trolox equivalents in mass percentage (g% dm, dry matter) in order to facilitate comparisons. The AOC of the ethanolic extracts ranged between 12.8 and 23.1 g TE % dm and from 9.1 to 16.4 g AAE % dm. The AOC determined by the DPPH assay proposed in the present study can be related to the total polyphenolic content determined by the Folin-Ciocalteu assay.

A software engineering approach to distributed systems for composite modeling

The goal of this thesis is to define and validate a software engineering approach for the development of a distributed system for the modeling of composite materials, based on the analysis of various existing software development methods. We reviewed the main features of: (1) software engineering methodologies; (2) distributed system characteristics and their effect on software development; (3) composite materials modeling activities and the requirements for the software development. Using the design science as a research methodology, the distributed system for creating models of composite materials is created and evaluated. Empirical experiments which we conducted showed good convergence of modeled and real processes. During the study, we paid attention to the matter of complexity and importance of distributed system and a deep understanding of modern software engineering methods and tools.

Incentivising Innovation? The competition law approach to the new challenge clauses in the competition rules for technology licensing agreements of the EU

Tutkielman aiheena on EU:n kilpailuoikeudellinen lähestymistapa challenge-lausekkeisiin teknologinsiirtosopimuksia koskevassa ryhmäpoikkeusasetuksessa. Teknologian lisensoinnin katsotaan olevan tärkeä väline teknologian kehityksen levittämisessä ja innovaation edistämisessä. Joissakin tapauksissa lisenssisopimus voi sisältää kilpailua rajoittavia lausekkeita, joiden voidaan kuitenkin nähdä hyödyttävän kilpailua kokonaisuutta arvostellen. Tällaisia lausekkeita ovat niin sanotut ”no-challenge” – lauseke, eli sopimusehto, jonka nojalla lisenssinsaaja sitoutuu olemaan haastamatta lisensoidun immateriaalioikeuden pätevyyttä ja ”termination-on-challenge” – lauseke, joka antaa lisensoijalle haastettaessa oikeuden päättää lisenssisopimus. Tutkielmassa perehdytään challenge -lausekkeiden hyväksyttävyyden arviointiin Euroopan unionin kilpailuoikeuden näkökulmasta uuden 1.5.2014 voimaan tulleen ryhmäpoikkeusasetuksen valossa. Muissa kuin yksinoikeuksia luovissa teknologiansiirtosopimuksissa olevat termination-on-challenge – lausekkeita tulee uusimmassa ryhmäpoikkeusetuksessa aina perustua yritysten itse suorittamaan tapauskohtaiseen arviointiin. No-challenge – lausekkeet ovat jatkossakin aiemman käytännön mukaisesti ryhmäpoikkeuksen soveltamisalan ulkopuolella. Komission on perustellut challenge - lausekkeiden jättämistä asetuksen ulkopuolelle julkisella intressillä, joka on päästä eroon mitättömistä immateriaalioikeuksista. Komission on katsonut, että challenge – lausekkeiden kilpailua rajoittava ominaisuus on mitättömien immateriaalioikeuksien esiintyminen markkinoilla, mikä osaltaan vääristää kilpailua ja hidastaa toimijoiden markkinoille pääsyä. Toisaalta lausekkeiden voidaan sanoa edistävän kilpailua, sillä ne usein tarjoavat immateriaalioikeuden haltijalle riittävän oikeussuojan ja kannustimen lisensoida teknologia, mikä lisää kilpailua, keksijöiden kannustimia panostaa innovaatioihin sekä vähentää transaktiokustannuksia. Tutkielman keskeinen tulos on ennen kaikkea challenge-lausekkeiden kilpailuvaikutusten tunnistamisessa ja komission perusteluiden kriittisessä arvioinnissa. Komission linjauksen perustelut eivät saa riittävää tukea ottaen huomioon vaikutustenarvioinnin, EU:n tuomioistuinkäytännön sekä taloustieteellisen lähestymistavan. Tutkielman tulosten pohjalta ja tukeutuen eri oikeuslähteisiin, taloustieteellisiin argumentteihin ja oikeusvertailevaan tutkimukseen, on mahdollista tehdä johtopäätöksiä niistä seikoista ja argumenteista, joilla on merkitystä uuden politiikkalinjauksen kilpailuvaikutuksiin.

From transcendental to practical intersubjectivity: a social psychological approach to Kant's musical aesthetics

It is well known that Kant’s aesthetics is framed intersubjectively because he upholds the claim of taste to universality. However, the transcendental foundation of this shared universality is a supersensible ground which is taken for granted but which cannot be brought directly into communicative experience. Kant’s reliance on the synthetic a priori structure of aesthetic judgment also removes it from the sphere of observable personal interaction. This argumentative strategy exposes it to skeptical challenge and generates inaccessible references to inner representations (be they intuitions, categories of the understanding or rational ideas). It is not sufficient, as Kant did, to propose a description of aesthetic experience that is subjectively plausible and thereby claim its intersubjective validity. It is indispensable to embody intersubjectivity in behavior and language. In practical intersubjectivity, aesthetic attitudes are dealt with in a concrete and accessible manner without relying on mentalistic assumptions as a foundation. Conceptual terms such as 'agreeable’, 'beauty’, 'sublime’, 'ugly’, 'universality’ acquire new meaning in a conversational context and aesthetic claims are tested in a dialogical game semantics model.

Families of the traumatically brian-injured : a case study approach to perceptions of quality of service, degree of satisfaction, and family needs /

The purpose of this qualitative research study was to foster an understanding of the rehabilitation counselling practice offamilies of the brain-injured. Specifically, the study explores the perceptions of stakeholders in regards to the degree of satisfaction with the quality of service received. Questionnaires were administered, and semi-structured, openended interviews were conducted, with six participating families (n=8). Preliminary data were collected via two instruments: (i) the Family Participant Questionnaire, consisting of participants' sample characteristics, information pertaining to the history of the family, details of the injury, and information relating to the type, use, and need offamily services utilized; and (ii) the Community Integration Questionnaire, a measurement of the degree of social displacementllevel of community integration of the injured family member. Utilizing the procedural steps outlined by Colaizzi's (1978) method of protocol analysis, recommendations for a future program based on related and current family needs are discussed in detail. Substantiating and supporting information are offered to rehabilitation practitioners, educational planners, and policymakers alike, concerning the degree of satisfaction with rehabilitative service, and the means of improving upon the overall quality of health care to families of the brain-injured. Implications for clinical practice and research are also raised for discussion.

The Midnight express phenomenon : a historical materialist approach to the reception of the film Midnight express /

This thesis examines the Midnight Express phenomenon focusing on the film's reception by audiences in Europe, North America, and Turkey between 1978-2003. Using and enhancing the "historical materialist approach" to film reception developed by Janet Staiger, the thesis considers the historical determinants of the film's nationally and culturally differential readings in different periods and of the transformations in those readings. The thesis argues that while Midnight Express was most likely read in the late 1970s as an attempt to reaffirm American social identity by projecting Turks as an instance of the negative Other, there has been an important shift in the reception of the film in the West during the 1990s due to the changes in the discursive contexts in which the film has been circulating. One does not observe any specific reference to Turkish prisons as a part of the issue of human rights violations in Turkey in the initial reception of the film by European and American critics, whereas these issues appear to be important constituents of a particular reception of the film in the West in the present. The thesis explains this shift by pointing to the constitution of a particular discourse on human rights violations in Turkey after 1980, and especially throughout the 1990s, which has become a part of the discursive repertoires of the Western audience. Therefore, the thesis argues that today, Midnight Express functions as a more legitimate political statement about Turkey in the eyes of some Western audiences than it had been in the 1970s. On the other hand, parallel to the increasing desire of Turkey to connect itself to the West, particularly to become a member of the European Union, one observes an immense increase in the belief in and defense against the negative effects of Midnight Express on Turkey's international representation since the 1990s. The historical and current discourses that audiences, both in Turkey and abroad, bring into play suggest that these audiences engage with Midnight Express by assuming or denying not only the subject positions constructed by the film text but also certain history-specific extra-filmic subject positions produced by other social and discursive formations.

Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.