Audit report on the Chariton Valley Planning & Development Council of Governments in Centerville, Iowa for the year ended June 30, 2012

Audit report on the Chariton Valley Planning & Development Council of Governments in Centerville, Iowa for the year ended June 30, 2012

Audit report on the Central Iowa Juvenile Detention Center in Eldora, Iowa for the year ended June 30, 2012

Audit report on the Central Iowa Juvenile Detention Center in Eldora, Iowa for the year ended June 30, 2012

Audit report on the Great River Regional Waste Authority for the year ended June 30, 2012

Audit report on the Great River Regional Waste Authority for the year ended June 30, 2012

Eliciting preferences for collectively financed health programmes : the "willingness to assign" approach

Improving public involvement in health system decision making stands as a primary goal in health systems reform. However, still limited evidence is found on how best to elicit preferences for health care programs. This paper examines a contingent choice technique to elicit preferences among health programs so called, willingness to assign (WTAS): Moreover, we elicited contingents rankings as well as the willingness to pay extra taxes for comparative purposes. We argue that WTAS reveals relative ( monetary-based) values of a set of competing public programmes under a hypothetical healthcare budget assessment. Experimental evidence is reported from a delibertive empirical study valuing ten health programmes in the context of the Catalan Health Services. Evidence from a our experimental study reveals that perferences are internally more consistent and slightly less affected by "preference reversals" as compared to values revealed from the willingness to pay (WTP) extra taxes approach. Consistent with prior studies, we find that the deliberative approach helped to avoid possible misunderstandings. Interestingly, although programmes promoting health received the higher relative valuation, those promoting other health benefits also ranked highly

Optimal fiscal policy in overlapping generations models

[eng] This paper provides, from a theoretical and quantitative point of view, an explanation of why taxes on capital returns are high (around 35%) by analyzing the optimal fiscal policy in an economy with intergenerational redistribution. For this purpose, the government is modeled explicitly and can choose (and commit to) an optimal tax policy in order to maximize society's welfare. In an infinitely lived economy with heterogeneous agents, the long run optimal capital tax is zero. If heterogeneity is due to the existence of overlapping generations, this result in general is no longer true. I provide sufficient conditions for zero capital and labor taxes, and show that a general class of preferences, commonly used on the macro and public finance literature, violate these conditions. For a version of the model, calibrated to the US economy, the main results are: first, if the government is restricted to a set of instruments, the observed fiscal policy cannot be disregarded as sub optimal and capital taxes are positive and quantitatively relevant. Second, if the government can use age specific taxes for each generation, then the age profile capital tax pattern implies subsidizing asset returns of the younger generations and taxing at higher rates the asset returns of the older ones.

The Unemployment Benefit System: a Redistributive or an Insurance Institution?

[eng] In this paper we analyze how the composition of labor taxation affects unemployment in a unionized economy with capital accumulation and an unemployment benefit system. We show that if the unemployment benefit system is gross Bismarckian then the unemployment rate is reduced if wage taxes are decreased (and thus payroll taxes are increased). However, if the unemployment benefit system is net Bismarckian then the unemployment rate does not depend on how the system is financed. Besides, in a Beveridgean system the labor tax composition does not affect the unemployment rate if and only if the unemployed do not pay taxes and the employed pay a constant marginal tax rate. We also analyze when an unemployment benefit budget-balanced rule makes the economy to have a hysteresis process.

Educational attainment and timing of fertility decisions

This paper focuses on timing of fertility decisions, conditional on the level of educational attainment of parents. Timing of fertility and educational attainment of parents rationalize the negative relationship observed in the data between hourly wages and childbearing. It is shown how the recent evolution in total fertility rates observed in developed countries could be in part the result of a transition from an early childbearing regime to a late childbearing regime. I develop a general equilibrium overlapping generations model in order to understand the joint determination of timing of childbearing decisions together with other household economic decisions in a life cycle framework. I show how idiosyncratic uncertainty might have asymmetric efects on completed fertility depending on timing of childbearing, generating the diferences in completed fertility observed between households that difer in their level of educational attainment.

Parents’ Investments and Education Returns

[cat] Aquest article analitza la relació entre els ingressos dels pares i l’educació dels seus fills. En un context d’altruïsme perfecte, el model descriu les decisions dels pares sobre quant consumir i quant invertir en l’educació dels seus fills. El model prediu que els rendiments de l’educació en termes de sous haurien de ser lineals. Usant aquest model en una economia competitiva, es mostra com el resultat depèn dels subsidis o impostos del govern sobre l’educació. El compromís habitual igualtat-eficiència apareix en aquest context. Finalment, el model dóna intuïcions sobre la relació entre educació i productivitat.

Decomposing Cross-Country Gaps in Obesity and Overweight: Does the Social Environment Matter?

[cat] Una qüestió clau sobre la producció de salut relativament poc explorada es refereix a la influència dels factors socioeconòmics i mediambientals sobre el pes i l’obesitat. Aquesta problemàtica adquireix particular rellevància quan es comparen dos països Mediterranis com Itàlia i Espanya. És interessant adonar-se que l’obesitat a Espanya és 5 punts percentual més elevada al 2003 mentre que a l’any 1990 era aproximadament la mateixa en ambdós països. Aquesta article presenta una descomposició no lineal dels gaps o diferencials en taxes de sobrepès (índex de massa corporal – IMC- entre 25 i 29.9 9 kg/m2), obesitat classe 1 (IMC≥30 kg/m2) i classe 2 (IMC≥35 kg/m2) entre Espanya i Itàlia per gènere i grups d’edat. En explicar aquests gaps entre països aïllem les influències dels estils de vida, els efectes socioeconòmics i els mediambientals. Els nostres resultats indiquen que quan no es controla pels efectes mediambientals (efectes de grup o ‘peer effects’) els hàbits alimentaris i el nivell educatiu són els principals predictors del gaps totals entre països (36-52%), si bé aquests dos factors exerceixen un impacte diferenciat segons gènere i edat. Un tant paradoxalment, quan controlem pels efectes de grup aquests predictors perden la seva capacitat explicativa i els efectes de grup passen a explicar entre el 46-76% dels gaps en sobrepès i obesitat i mostren un patró creixent amb l’edat.

Audit report on the Northeast Iowa Schools Insurance Trust for the year ended June 30, 2012

Audit report on the Northeast Iowa Schools Insurance Trust for the year ended June 30, 2012

Audit report on the North Iowa Juvenile Detention Services Commission for the year ended June 30, 2012

Audit report on the North Iowa Juvenile Detention Services Commission for the year ended June 30, 2012

Audit report on Mid-Iowa School Improvement Consortium, Carlisle, Iowa for the year ended June 30, 2012

Audit report on Mid-Iowa School Improvement Consortium, Carlisle, Iowa for the year ended June 30, 2012

Audit report on the Xenia Rural Water District for the year ended December 31, 2012

Audit report on the Xenia Rural Water District for the year ended December 31, 2012

Audit report on Pleasantville Emergency Services Association, Pleasantville, Iowa for the year ended June 30, 2012

Audit report on Pleasantville Emergency Services Association, Pleasantville, Iowa for the year ended June 30, 2012

Iowa Turkey Marketing Council Independent accountant’s report on applying agreed upon procedures for the period January 1, 2011 through December 31, 2012.

Agreed upon procedures report on the Iowa Turkey Marketing Council for the period January 1, 2011 through December 31, 2012