The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

Prospective, paired crossover comparison of multiple, single-needle plateletpheresis procedures with the Amicus and Trima Accel cell separators

BACKGROUND: The Baxter Amicus Version 2.51 (A) and the Gambro BCT Trima Accel Version 5.0 (T) cell separators may produce multiple platelet (PLT) concentrates within a single donation. STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS: The single-needle multiple plateletpheresis procedures of the two devices were compared in a prospective, randomized, paired crossover study in 60 donors. The 120 donations were compared for donor comfort, collection efficiency, residual white blood cell (WBC) count, and (in selected patients) corrected count increment (CCI). RESULTS: The mean PLT yield and the resultant mean number of units per donation were significantly lower for A (6.06 x 10(11) vs. 7.48 x 10(11) and 2.57 vs. 3.19, respectively, both p < 0.001), in spite of a longer apheresis duration (89 min vs. 79 min; p < 0.001). This resulted in a higher collection rate of T (5.68 x 10(11) PLTs/hr vs. 4.10 x 10(11) PLTs/hr, p < 0.001). Residual WBC count of every unit was fewer than 5 x 10(6), but significantly fewer A-PLT donations contained more than 10(5) WBCs per unit (1 vs. 9, p = 0.008). Although the ACD-A consumption was slightly higher for A (489 mL vs. 469 mL, p = 0.04), a trend to a higher frequency of side effects was found for T (42.4% vs. 23.7%, p = 0.06). The 1-hour CCIs of 33 transfused A-PLT units were comparable with those of 43 T-PLT units (11.8 vs. 13.9, p = 0.480). CONCLUSIONS: Both cell separators showed safe collections of up to 4 PLT units per donation with adequate CCI. T produced a higher PLT yield despite shorter apheresis duration, but with slightly higher residual WBC counts and a trend to a higher side-effect frequency.

Analysis of patient flows for orthopedic procedures using small area analysis in Switzerland

BACKGROUND: In general cantons regulate and control the Swiss health service system; patient flows within and between cantons are thereby partially disregarded. This paper develops an alternative spatial model, based upon the construction of orthopedic hospital service areas (HSAOs), and introduces indices for the analysis of patient streams in order to identify areas, irrespective of canton, with diverse characteristics, importance, needs, or demands. METHODS: HSAOs were constructed using orthopedic discharge data. Patient streams between the HSAOs were analysed by calculating three indices: the localization index (% local residents discharged locally), the netindex (the ratio of discharges of nonlocal incoming residents to outgoing local residents), and the market share index (% of local resident discharges of all discharges in local hospitals). RESULTS: The 85 orthopedic HSAOs show a median localization index of 60.8%, a market share index of 75.1%, and 30% of HSAOs have a positive netindex. Insurance class of bed, admission type, and patient age are partially but significantly associated with those indicators. A trend to more centrally provided health services can be observed not only in large urban HSAOs such as Geneva, Bern, Basel, and Zurich, but also in HSAOs in mountain sport areas such as Sion, Davos, or St.Moritz. Furthermore, elderly and emergency patients are more frequently treated locally than younger people or those having elective procedures. CONCLUSION: The division of Switzerland into HSAOs provides an alternative spatial model for analysing and describing patient streams for health service utilization. Because this small area model allows more in-depth analysis of patient streams both within and between cantons, it may improve support and planning of resource allocation of in-patient care in the Swiss healthcare system.

Prescription procedures in medication for relapse prevention after inpatient treatment for alcohol use disorders in Switzerland

In randomized controlled trials with high internal validity, pharmacotherapy using acamprosate, naltrexone, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, disulfiram has proved effective in preventing relapse in patients with alcohol use disorders (AUD). There remains, however, a paucity of studies with sufficient external validity in which the effectiveness of pharmacotherapy in clinical practice is investigated. This study aimed to make a contribution to close this gap in research.

Surgical Manual of Implant Dentistry: Step-by-Step Procedures

The purpose of this practical manual is to describe and illustrate each step of the basic surgical procedures involved in the placement of implants in qualified patients. To that end, each procedure is briefly but lucidly described; carefully illustrated in a series of drawings of the techniques and instrumentation used; and reinforced through clinical photographs, including radiographic and postoperative follow-up views. In addition to the basic implant surgical principles, evidence-based indications and procedures for guided bone regeneration in apical fenestration and crestal dehiscence defects, and for simultaneous sinus floor elevation via the lateral window and osteotome techniques are featured.