Campaign effects in direct-democratic votes in Switzerland

The purpose of this article is to analyse the conditions under which referendum campaigns have an impact on voting choices. Based on a model of opinion formation that integrates both campaign effects and partisan effects, we argue that campaign effects vary according to the context of the popular vote (size and type of conflict among the party elite and intensity and direction of the referendum campaign). We test our hypotheses with two-step estimations for hierarchical models on data covering 25 popular votes on foreign, European and immigration policy in Switzerland. Our results show strong campaign effects and they suggest that their strength and nature are indeed highly conditional on the context of the vote: the type of party coalition pre-structures the patterns of individual voting choices, campaign effects are higher when the campaign is highly intense and they are more symmetric when it is balanced.

Continuity of Government Planning Interim Study Committee, March 2007

The Legislative Council established the Continuity of Government Planning Interim Study Committee in 2006 and authorized the Committee to meet during the 2006 Legislative Interim. The Committee was given the following charge: Examine issues relating to the continued functioning of state government following a disaster, including gubernatorial succession, replacement of constitutional officers and department heads, legislative elections to fill vacancies, and continued funding of state government if the General Assembly is unable to meet and pass a budget.

From severance pay to self-insurance: Effects of severance payments savings accounts in Colombia

In 1990 Colombia replaced its traditional system of severance paymentswith a new system of severance payments savings accounts (SPSAs). Althoughseverance payments often are justified on the grounds that they provideinsurance against earnings loss, they also increase costs for employersand distort employment decisions. The impact of severance payments dependslargely on how much of the costs to employers can be shifted to workers.The theoretical analysis in this paper shows that, in contrast to atraditional system of severance payments, the system of SPSAs facilitatesthe shifting of severance payments costs to workers in the form of lowerwages. Empirical results using the Colombian National Household Surveysindicate that the introduction of SPSAs shifted around 80% of the totalseverance payments contributions to wages and had a positive effect onweekly hours. Results using the 1997 Colombian Living Standards MeasurementSurvey suggest that, although SPSAs in part replaced employer insurancewith self-insurance, SPSAs continue to play a consumption smoothing rolefor the non-employed.

Are Voting Advice Applications (VVAs) more than Toys ? : First findings on Impact and Accountability of VAAs

To what extent do Voting Advice Applications (VAA) have an influence on voting behaviour and to what extent should providers be hold accountable for such tools? This paper puts forward some empirical evidence from the Swiss VAA smartvote. The enormous popularity of smartvote in the last national elections in 2007 and the feedback of users and candidates let us come to the conclusion that smartvote is more than a toy and likely to have an influence on the voting decisions. Since Swiss citizens not only vote for parties but also for candidates, and the voting recommendation of smartvote is based on the political positions of the candidates, smartvote turns out to be particularly helpful. Political scientists must not keep their hands off such tools. Scientific research is needed to understand their functioning and possibilities to manipulate elections. On the bases of a legal study we come to the conclusion, that a science driven way of setting up such tools is essential for their legitimacy. However, we do not believe that there is a single best way of setting up such a tool and rather support a market like solution with different competing tools, provided they meet minimal standards like transparency and equal access for all parties and candidates. Once the process of selecting candidates and parties are directly linked to the act of voting, all these questions will become even more salient.

Cerambycidae (Coleoptera) da Colômbia: IV. Cerambycinae com olhos grosseiramente granulados

New records for Colombian Cerambycidae - Achrysonini: Achryson immaculipenne Gounelle, 1909, A. lineolatum Erichson, 1847, A. quadrimaculatum (Fabricius, 1792); Ectenessini: Ectenessa lurida Martins, 1973; Cerambycini: Jupoata rufipennnis (Gory, 1831), Poeciloxestia carlyslei Fragoso, 1978, P. paraensis Lane, 1965; Elaphidionini: Ambonus electus (Gahan & Arrow, 1903), Paramallocera cribripennis (Bates, 1885), Periboeum pubescens (Olivier, 1790), Stizocera plicicollis (Germar, 1824), S. poeyi (Guérin-Méneville, 1838), Pantonyssus glabricollis Fuchs, 1961; Piezocerini: Haruspex lineolatus Bates, 1870; Eligmodermini: Eligmoderma spinicolle Aurivillius, 1923, E. ziczac Nonfried, 1895. New species described: Pantonyssus suturale sp. nov. (Santander); Anelaphus colombianus sp. nov. (Santander); A. sparsus sp. nov. (Magdalena).

Under-achievement and the glass ceiling: Evidence from a TV game show

We use a Colombian TV game show to test gender differences in competitivebehavior where there is no opportunity for discrimination and females face no genderspecificexternal constraints. Each game started with six contestants who had toanswer general knowledge questions in private. There were five rounds of questionsand, at the end of each, one participant was eliminated. Despite equality in startingnumbers, women earn less than men and exit the game at a faster rate. In particular,there are more voluntary withdrawals by women than men. We draw an analogybetween the game and the process by which employees rise through the levels of acorporation. As such, we note that glass ceilings may result, in part, from women sown behavior and this raises the issue of how women are socialized to behave. At thesame time, our results illustrate that maintaining and promoting gender diversity at thelower/middle ranks of organizations is necessary to obtain gender diversity at the top.

Social capital, government expenditures, and growth

Countries with greater social capital have higher economic growth. We show that socialcapital is also highly positively correlated across countries with government expenditureon education. We develop an infinite-horizon model of public spending and endogenousstochastic growth that explains both facts through frictions in political agency whenvoters have imperfect information. In our model, the government provides servicesthat yield immediate utility, and investment that raises future productivity. Voters aremore likely to observe public services, so politicians have electoral incentives to underprovidepublic investment. Social capital increases voters' awareness of all governmentactivity. As a consequence, both politicians' incentives and their selection improve.In the dynamic equilibrium, both the amount and the efficiency of public investmentincrease, permanently raising the growth rate.

The political cost of reforms

This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politiciansperceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters.To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknownand investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politiciansmake too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannotbe fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary tothe conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may,under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study howpolitical rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistentwith a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection.They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economicuncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

An agenda-setting model of electoral competition

This paper presents a model of electoral competition focusing on the formation of thepublic agenda. An incumbent government and a challenger party in opposition competein elections by choosing the issues that will key out their campaigns. Giving salience toan issue implies proposing an innovative policy proposal, alternative to the status-quo.Parties trade off the issues with high salience in voters concerns and those with broadagreement on some alternative policy proposal. Each party expects a higher probabilityof victory if the issue it chooses becomes salient in the voters decision. But remarkably,the issues which are considered the most important ones by a majority of votes may notbe given salience during the electoral campaign. An incumbent government may survivein spite of its bad policy performance if there is no sufficiently broad agreement on apolicy alternative. We illustrate the analytical potential of the model with the case of theUnited States presidential election in 2004.

The In Vitro Mass-Produced Model Mycorrhizal Fungus, Rhizophagus irregularis, Significantly Increases Yields of the Globally Important Food Security Crop Cassava.

The arbuscular mycorrhizal symbiosis is formed between arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi (AMF) and plant roots. The fungi provide the plant with inorganic phosphate (P). The symbiosis can result in increased plant growth. Although most global food crops naturally form this symbiosis, very few studies have shown that their practical application can lead to large-scale increases in food production. Application of AMF to crops in the tropics is potentially effective for improving yields. However, a main problem of using AMF on a large-scale is producing cheap inoculum in a clean sterile carrier and sufficiently concentrated to cheaply transport. Recently, mass-produced in vitro inoculum of the model mycorrhizal fungus Rhizophagus irregularis became available, potentially making its use viable in tropical agriculture. One of the most globally important food plants in the tropics is cassava. We evaluated the effect of in vitro mass-produced R. irregularis inoculum on the yield of cassava crops at two locations in Colombia. A significant effect of R. irregularis inoculation on yield occurred at both sites. At one site, yield increases were observed irrespective of P fertilization. At the other site, inoculation with AMF and 50% of the normally applied P gave the highest yield. Despite that AMF inoculation resulted in greater food production, economic analyses revealed that AMF inoculation did not give greater return on investment than with conventional cultivation. However, the amount of AMF inoculum used was double the recommended dose and was calculated with European, not Colombian, inoculum prices. R. irregularis can also be manipulated genetically in vitro, leading to improved plant growth. We conclude that application of in vitro R. irregularis is currently a way of increasing cassava yields, that there is a strong potential for it to be economically profitable and that there is enormous potential to improve this efficiency further in the future.

It's parties that choose electoral systems (or Duverger's Law upside down)

This article presents, discusses and tests the hypothesis that it is the number of parties what can explain the choice of electoral systems, rather than the other way round. Already existing political parties tend to choose electoral systems that, rather than generate new party systems by themselves, will crystallize, consolidate or reinforce previously existing party configurations. A general model develops the argument and presents the concept of 'behavioral-institutional equilibrium' to account for the relation between electoral systems and party systems. The most comprehensive dataset and test of these notions to date, encompassing 219 elections in 87 countries since the 19th century, are presented. The analysis gives strong support to the hypotheses that political party configurations dominated by a few parties tend to establish majority rule electoral systems, while multiparty systems already existed before the introduction of proportional representation. It also offers the new theoretical proposition that strategic party choice of electoral systems leads to a general trend toward proportional representation over time.

Campaign rhetoric: A model of reputation

We analyze conditions under which a candidate's campaignrhetoric may affect the beliefs of the voters over whatpolicy the candidate will implement in case he wins theelection. We develop a model of repeated elections withcomplete information in which candidates are purely ideological. Voter's strategies involve a credible threat to punish candidates that renege of their campaignpromises, and in equilibrium all campaign promises arebelieved by voters, and honored by candidates. We obtainthat the degree to which promises are credible in equilibriumis an increasing function of the value of a candidate'sreputation.

Voting with preferences over margins of victory

This paper analyzes a two-alternative voting model with the distinctive feature that voters have preferences over margins of victory. We study voting contests with a finite as well as an infinite number of voters, and with and without mandatory voting. The main result of the paper is the existence and characterization of a unique equilibrium outcome in all those situations. At equilibrium, voters who prefer a larger support for one of the alternatives vote for such alternative.The model also provides a formal argument for the conditional sincerity voting condition in Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) and the benefit of voting function in Llavador (2006). Finally, we offer new insights on explaining why some citizens may vote strategically for an alternative different from the one declared as the most preferred.

Iowa election day registration guide, January 2008

A guide describing the steps, requirements and procedures necessary to register to vote in Iowa.