Intra-Group Competition and Inter-Group Conflict: An Application to Northern Ireland

This paper reviews four economic theories of leadership selection in conflictual settings. The first of these by Cukierman and Tomassi (1998) labeled the ‘information rationale’, argues that hawks may actually be necessary to initiate peace agreements. The second labeled the ‘bargaining rationale’ borrowing from Hamlin and Jennings (2007) agrees with the conventional wisdom that doves are more likely to secure peace, but post-conflict there are good reasons for hawks to be rationally selected. The third found in Jennings and Roelfsema (2008) is labeled the social psychological rationale. This captures the idea of a competition over which group can form the strongest identity, so can apply to group choices which do not impinge upon bargaining power. As in the bargaining rationale, dove selection can be predicted during conflict, but hawk selection post-conflict. Finally, the expressive rationale is discussed which predicts that regardless of the underlying structure of the game (informational, bargaining, psychological) the large group nature of decision-making by making individual decision makers non-decisive in determining the outcome of elections may cause them to make choices based primarily on emotions which may be invariant with the mode of group interaction, be it conflictual or peaceful. Finally, the paper analyses the extent to which the theories can throw light on Northern Ireland electoral history over the last 25 years.

The Good, the Bad and the Populist: A Model of Political Agency with Emotional Voters

This paper attempts to extend existing models of political agency to an environment in which voting may be divided between informed and instrumental, informed and ‘expressive’ (Brennan and Lomasky (1993)) and uninformed due to ‘rational irrationality’ (Caplan (2007)). It constructs a model where politicians may be good, bad or populist. Populists are more willing than good politicians to pander to voters who may choose inferior policies in a large-group electoral setting because their vote is insignificant compared with those that voters would choose were their vote decisive in determining the electoral outcome. Bad politicians would ideally like to extract tax revenue for their own ends. Initially we assume the existence of only good and populist politicians. The paper investigates the incentives for good politicians to pool with or separate from populists and focuses on three key issues – (1) how far the majority of voter’s preferences are from those held by the better informed incumbent politician (2) the extent to which the population exhibits rational irrationality and expressiveness (jointly labelled as emotional) and (3) the cost involved in persuading uninformed voters to change their views in terms of composing messages and spreading them. This paper goes on to consider how the inclusion of bad politicians may affect the behaviour of good politicians and suggests that a small amount of potential corruption may be socially useful. It is also argued that where bad politicians have an incentive to mimic the behaviour of good and populist politicians, the latter types of politician may have an incentive to separate from bad politicians by investing in costly public education signals. The paper also discusses the implications of the model for whether fiscal restraints should be soft or hard.

Screening of highly modular sugar-based ligand libraries in the enantioselective C-C coupling reactions

Projecte de recerca elaborat a partir d’una estada a la University of Nottingham, Gran Bretanya, entre març i abril del 2007. Aquest treball s’ha centrat en l’aplicació de compostos derivats de la D-(+)-glucosa, de la D-(+)-fructosa i la D-galactosa com a lligands de catalitzadors homogenis quirals en dos reaccions asimètriques: addició 1,2 a aldehids catalitzada per níquel i addició 1,4 conjugada catalitzada per coure.(veure figura adjunta al final del document). En primer lloc, s’ha estudiat l’aplicació dels compostos L1-L6 a les reaccions d’addició 1,2 a aldehids catalitzades per níquel. S’ha observat que la selectivitat del procés depèn principalment del grup funcional unit a l’esquelet del lligand, de les propietats estèriques del substituent en la funció oxazolina i de l’estructura del substrat. S’ha obtingut fins a un 59% d’excés enantiomèric utilitzant el precursor de catalitzador que conté el lligand L3a. En segon lloc, aquest treball descriu l’aplicació de les tres famílies de compostos (L1-L11) com a lligands en la reacció d’addició 1,4 catalitzada per coure de compostos organometàl•lics a diferents enones amb diferents propietats estèriques. L’ús de les llibreries de compostos fosfit-oxazolina (L1-L5) i fosfit-fosforamidit (L6) han proporcionat bones enantioselectivitats (fins a 80%) en l’addició de reactius de trialquilalumini a diferents enones. En canvi, la llibreria de compostos monofosfit (L7-L11) ha mostrat bones activitats però enantioselectivitats fins a 57%.

The disadvantage of winning an election

This paper analyzes the problem that an incumbent faces during the legislature when deciding how to react to popular initiatives or policy proposals coming from different sources. We argue that this potential source of electoral disadvantage that the incumbent obtains after being elected can jeopardize the reelection possibilities of the incumbent. We analyze the decision of the incumbent when facing reelection and we characterize the conditions under which the advantages that the incumbent obtains can overcome the disadvantages. Finally, we use the results of this analysis to discuss some implications of the use of mechanisms of direct democracy like referenda and popular assemblies on electoral competition.

(Don’t) Make My Vote Count

Proponents of proportional electoral rules often argue that majority rule depresses turnout and may lower welfare due to the 'tyranny of the majority' problem. The present paper studies the impact of electoral rules on turnout and social welfare. We analyze a model of instrumental voting where citizens have private information over their individual cost of voting and over the alternative they prefer. The electoral rule used to select the winning alternative is a combination of majority rule and proportional rule. Results show that the above arguments against majority rule do not hold in this set up. Social welfare and turnout increase with the weight that the electoral rule gives to majority rule when the electorate is expected to be split, and they are independent of the electoral rule employed when the expected size of the minority group tends to zero. However, more proportional rules can increase turnout within the minority group. This effect is stronger the smaller the minority group. We then conclude that majority rule fosters overall turnout and increases social welfare, whereas proportional rule fosters the participation of minorities.

Mafia in the ballot box

We study the impact of organized crime on electoral competition. Assuming that the mafia is able to bring votes to the supported party in exchange of money, we show that (i) the strongest party is willing to pay the highest price to secure mafia services; (ii) the volume of electoral trade with the mafia increases with political competition and with the efficiency of the mafia. Studying in detail parliamentary elections in Sicily for the period 1946- 1992, we document the significant support given by the Sicilian Mafia to the Christian Democratic party, starting at least from the 1970s. This is consistent with our theoretical predictions, as political competition became much tighter during the 1970s and the Sicilian mafia experienced an extensive centralization process towards the end of the 1960s, which increased substantially its control of the territory. We also provide evidence that in exchange for its electoral support the mafia got economic advantages for its activities in the construction industry.

The Political Economy of Resource Rent Distribution

I model the link between political regime and level of diversification following a windfall of natural resource revenues. The explanatory variables I make use of are the political support functions embedded within each type of regime and the disparate levels of discretion, openness, transparency, and accountability of government. I show that a democratic government seeks to maximize the long-term consumption path of the representative consumer, in order to maximize its chances of re-election, while an authoritarian government, in the absence of any electoral mechanism of accountability, seeks to buy off and entrench a group of special interests loyal to the government and potent enough to ensure its short-term survival. Essentially the contrast in the approaches towards resource rent distribution comes down to a variation in political weights on aggregate welfare and rentierist special interests endogenized by distinct political support functions.

Exposició de Varietats de Préssec, Nectarina i Poma d'Estiu. Jornada Tècnica, 27 d'agost de 2009

A la jornada tècnica que es va celebrar a l’IRTA Mas Badia a La Tallada d’Empordà (Girona) el passat 27 d’agost, es va presentar una nova tècnica d’aclarida mecànica de pomes (fils de plàstic que giren i fan caure un determinat número de flors) que podria ser una alternativa a les actuals estratègies d’aclarida, com són l’aclarida amb fitoreguladors i l’aclarida manual. Pràcticament s’ha acabat la collita de les primeres pomes de l’any que corresponen a les varietats del grup Gala. La campanya d’enguany es caracteritza per unes altes temperatures, per una excessiva càrrega de fruits en els arbres i per una bona qualitat de sucres, però insuficient color dels fruits. En les altes temperatures poc es pot influir, però és possible intervenir en deixar el número adequat de fruits als arbres per tal que aquests tinguin el màxim de qualitat, calibre i color. En aquest sentit la primera presentació de la jornada va explicar les noves estratègies per facilitar l’aclarida de la poma. La poda anomenada centrifuga és una alternativa vàlida però no suficient, l’aclarida amb els fitoreguladors actuals té un efecte insuficient i les noves matèries actives assajades mostren uns resultats interessants. Finalment, l’aclarida mecànica permet una significativa innovació en aquesta fase de l’itinerari de la producció. Aquesta tècnica és una estratègia neta, efectiva i econòmicament molt més sostenible que les habituals aclarides manuals que es realitzen avui dia. A la jornada, també es va informar dels nous clons de Gala, la coloració dels quals és significativament més alta (33%) que algunes de les varietats que hi han plantades a la actualitat. També es van exposar i presentar les noves varietats més destacades de pera, préssec, nectarina i préssecs plans. En la jornada técnica celebrada en el IRTA Mas Badia en La Tallada de Empordà (Gerona) el pasado 27 de agosto, se presentó una nueva técnica de aclareo mecánico de manzanas (hilos de plástico que giran y hacen caer un determinado número de flores) que podría ser una alternativa a las actuales estrategias de aclareo, como son el aclareo con fitoreguladores y el aclareo manual. Prácticamente ha finalizado la cosecha de las primeras manzanas del año que corresponden a las variedades del grupo Gala. Este año la campaña se caracteriza por unas altas temperaturas, por una excesiva carga de frutos en los árboles y por una buena calidad de azúcares, pero insuficiente color de los frutos. En las altas temperaturas poco puede influirse, pero es posible intervenir en dejar el número adecuado de frutos en los árboles para que estos tengan el máximo de calidad, calibre y color. En este sentido la primera presentación de la jornada expuso las nuevas estrategias para facilitar el aclareo de la manzana. La poda llamada centrifuga es una alternativa válida pero no suficiente, el aclareo con los fitoreguladores actuales tiene un efecto insuficiente y las nuevas materias activas ensayadas muestran unos resultados interesantes. Finalmente, el aclareo mecánico permite una significativa innovación en esta fase del itinerario de la producción. Esta técnica es una estrategia limpia, efectiva y económicamente mucho más sostenible que las habituales técnicas de aclareo manuales que se realizan hoy en día. En la jornada, también se informó de los nuevos clones de Gala, la coloración de los cuales es significativamente más alta (33%) que algunas de las variedades que hay plantadas en la actualidad. También se expusieron y presentaron las nuevas variedades más destacadas de pera, melocotón, nectarina y melocotón planos.

Patrones de tomate: resistencia variable frente al nematodo Meloidogyne

Los patrones de tomate se han propuesto como una alternativa no química al uso del bromuro de metilo. En este estudio se evaluó la respuesta de resistencia de diez patrones de tomate (comerciales y experimentales) a nematodos del género Meloidogyne mediante un ensayo de campo realizado en un invernadero de plástico cuyo suelo se hallaba infestado por Meloidogyne javanica. Al finalizar la campaña agrícola (marzo a julio), siete de los patrones ensayados mostraron altos niveles de resistencia, uno presentó resistencia intermedia y dos resultaron ser susceptibles al nematodo.

Inter-regional redistribution through infrastructure investment: tactical or programmatic?

In this paper we analyze the effects of both tactical and programmatic politics on the inter-regional allocation of infrastructure investment. We use a panel of data for the Spanish electoral districts during the period 1964-2004 to estimate an equation where investment depends both on economic and political variables. The results show that tactical politics do matter since, after controlling for economic traits, the districts with more ‘Political power’ still receive more investment. These districts are those where the incumbents’ Vote margin of victory/ defeat in the past election is low, where the Marginal seat price is low, where there is Partisan alignment between the executives at the central and regional layers of government, and where there are Pivotal regional parties which are influential in the formation of the central executive. However, the results also show that programmatic politics matter, since inter-regional redistribution (measured as the elasticity of investment to per capita income) is shown to increase with the arrival of the Democracy and EU Funds, with Left governments, and to decrease the higher is the correlation between a measure of ‘Political power’ and per capita income.

Descentralización y estrategias organizativas: las relaciones especiales entre partidos de ámbito estatal (PAE) y partidos de ámbito no estatal (PANE) en España

El objetivo de este artículo es desarrollar un marco analítico que permita examinar y, eventualmente, clasificar qué son y cómo han evolucionado las relaciones especiales entre Partidos de Ámbito Estatal (PAEs) y Partidos de Ámbito No Estatal (PANEs) que acuerdan un marco estable de cooperación no sólo en el ámbito electoral sino también organizativo. Este marco analítico, basado en los conceptos de integración vertical y de autonomía, se aplicará al caso español para analizar las relaciones del Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) con el Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC); el Partido Popular (PP) con Unión del Pueblo Navarro (UPN); e Izquierda Unida (IU) con Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds (ICV).

La Ley de Igualdad 3/2007 y las elecciones al Congreso de los Diputados de 2004 y 2008

La desigual representación de sexos en el Congreso de los Diputados continúa siendo una realidad, a pesar de la aplicación de la Ley de Igualdad, que modifica la normativa electoral para impulsar la presencia de mujeres en la elite política. A través del presente artículo se explica metódicamente con datos empíricos porque la implementación de las cuotas femeninas por ley no ha modificado la composición del Parlamento español según sexo. Por un lado, se analiza la primera fase de reclutamiento de los diputados, es decir, las listas electorales. Por otro, se estudia el escenario parlamentario, en concreto la consolidación de esta elite política femenina.

Las Respuestas estratégicas de los partidos de ámbito estatal a los desafíos de la competición multinivel: la política de alianzas del PP y el PSOE en las Comunidades Autónomas de España (1980-2008)

Este trabajo se propone analizar las estrategias electorales y de coalición del PP y del PSOE en las distintas Comunidades Autónomas con el objetivo de demostrar que un mismo partido puede adoptar simultáneamente respuestas. Este comportamiento según el planteamiento que aquí se sostiene se debe que cada comunidad presenta una dinámica de la competencia diferenciada, sobre todo aquellas que cuentan con partidos de ámbito no estatal relevantes.

Impact of voting advice applications on voters's decision-making

So-called online Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) have become very popular all over Europe. Millions of voters are using them as an assistance to make up their minds for which party they should vote. Despite this popularity there are only very few studies about the impact of these tools on individual electoral choice. On the basis of the Swiss VAA smartvote we present some first findings about the question whether VAAs do have a direct impact on the actual vote of their users. In deed, we find strong evidence that Swiss voters were affected by smartvote. However, our findings are somewhat contrary to the results of previous studies from other countries. Furthermore, the quality of available data for such studies needs to be improved. Future studies should pay attention to both: the improvement of the available data, as well as the explanation of the large variance of findings between the specific European countries.

Fiscal Federalism at the Ballot Box : The Relevance of Expressive Voting

This paper explores the impact of citizens' motivation to vote on the pattern of fiscal federalism. If the only concern of instrumental citizens was outcome they would have little incentive to vote because the probability that a single vote might change an electoral outcome is usually minuscule. If voters turn out in large numbers to derive intrinsic value from action, how will these voters choose when considering the role local jurisdictions should play? The first section of the paper assesses the weight that expressive voters attach to an instrumental evaluation of alternative outcomes. Predictions are tested with reference to case study analysis of the way Swiss voters assessed the role their local jurisdiction should play. The relevance of this analysis is also assessed with reference to the choice that voters express when considering other local issues. Textbook analysis of fiscal federalism is premised on the assumption that voters register choice just as 'consumers' reveal demand for services in a market, but how robust is this analogy.