Taiwan strait crises and Chiang Kai-shek's strategic thinking : a perspective from the Taiwan's archive

This paper uses Taiwan's archival documents to reexamine the two Taiwan Strait crises and the characteristics of Chiang Kai-shek's strategic thinking. Section 2 examines the oscillation of U.S. policy concerning the ROC's offensive toward mainland China and the defense of the Da-chen islands before and after the initiation of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1954-1955. Doing so will highlight the contradictory U.S. attitude that contributed to the crisis and weakened its ability to control Chiang. Section 3 focuses on Chiang Kai-shek's strategic vision toward East Asia. In particular, this section focuses on his strategic thinking and tries to assess whether or not he was a "reckless" or "irrational" leader as often described in the previous research on his personality.

Un paseo por el lado oscuro de la red: Entrevista con Evgeny Morozov

En 2011, con sólo 26 años y un único libro publicado -El desengaño de Internet: los mitos de la libertad en la red-, Evgeny Morozov (Bielorrusia, 1984) se convirtió en una figura de referencia a la hora de hablar del papel que desempeñan las nuevas tecnologías de la comunicación en nuestro mundo político, económico y cultural. Miembro de New American Foundation, editor de la revista Foreign Policy y profesor visitante en la Universidad de Standford, colabora habitualmente con cabeceras como The Economist, The New York Times, The Guardian, The Wall Street Journal o El País. Su enfoque afiliado y escéptico ha quedado de nuevo de manifiesto en su segundo libro- To Save Everything, Click Here (2013)-, en el que aborda la tendencia contemporánea a buscar soluciones tecnológicas a lo que en el fondo son problemas políticos, morales o incluso antropológicos.

Role Expectations and State Socialization: Germany's Rediscovery of the Use of Force 1990-1995

This dissertation engages the question of why German political elites accepted the use of force during the 1990s and started to commit the country's armed forces to multilateral peacekeeping missions. Previous governments of the Federal Republic had opposed foreign deployment of the military and Germany was characterized by a unique strategic culture in which the efficacy of military force was widely regarded as negative. The rediscovery of the use of force constituted a significant reorientation of German security policy with potentially profound implications for international relations. I use social role theory to explain Germany's security policy reorientation. I argue that political elites shared a national role conception of their country as a dependable and reliable ally. Role expectations of the international security environment changed as a result of a general shift to multilateral intervention as means to address emerging security problems after the Cold War. Germany's resistance to the use of force was viewed as inappropriate conduct for a power possessing the economic and military wherewithal of the Federal Republic. Elites from allied countries exerted social pressure to have Germany contribute commensurate with capabilities. German political elites adapted role behavior in response to external expectations in an effort to preserve the national role conception of a dependable and reliable ally. Security policy reorientation to maintain Germany's national role conception was pursued by conservative elites who acted as 'role entrepreneurs'. CDU/CSU politicians initiated a process of role adaptation to include the use of force for non-defensive missions. They persuaded Social Democrats and Alliance 90/Green party politicians that the maintenance of the country's role conception necessitated a reorientation in security policy to accommodate the changes in the security environment.

The International Human Rights Policies of New Democracies: Brazil and Chile in Comparative Perspective

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the majority of Latin American states have attempted to incorporate in some way or another human rights concern into their respective foreign policies, highlighting a history of human rights abuses and the return of democratic political rule as a trigger for galvanizing a commitment to assist in preventing such violations in other countries. Yet, while human rights have come to play a non-trivial role in the contemporary foreign policy of many Latin American states, there is great diversity in the ways and the extent to which they go about incorporating human rights concerns into their foreign policies. Explaining the diversity of human rights foreign policies of new Latin American democracies is at the heat of this project. The main research questions are the following: Why do new democracies incorporate human rights into their foreign policies? And what explains the different international human rights policies of new democracies? To answer these questions, this research compares the human rights foreign policies of Chile and Brazil for over two decades starting from their respective transitions to democracy. The study argues that states commitment to international human rights is the result of the intersection of domestic and international influences. At the international level, the search for international legitimacy and the desire for recognition and credibility affected the adoption of international human rights in both cases but with different degrees of impact. International values and pressures by themselves, while necessary, are an insufficient condition for human rights initiatives perceived to have not insubstantial political, economic or strategic costs. New democracies will be more or less likely to actively include human rights in their international policies depending on the following four domestic conditions: political leadership legitimizing the inclusion of human rights into a state's policies, civil society groups connected to international human rights advocacy networks with a capacity to influencing the foreign policy decisions of their government, and the Foreign Ministry's attitudes towards international human rights and the degree of influence it exercises over the outcome of the foreign policy process.

China's Strategic Choices towards North Korea and Iran

This study tests two hypotheses. First, China cooperates with the United States only when it is able to obtain material rewards. Second, without material incentives from the United States, China straddles between the United States on one hand and Iran and North Korea on the other. My findings show that neither Structural Realism, which holds anti-hegemonism alliance, nor Constructivism, which holds positive assimilation of the nuclear nonproliferation norm explains Chinese international behavior comprehensively. My balance of interest model explains Chinese foreign policy on the noncompliant states better. The cases cover the Sino-North Korean and Sino-Iranian diplomatic histories from 1990 to 2013 vis-à-vis the United States. The study is both a within-case comparison—that is, changes of China’s stance across time—and a cross-case comparison in China’s position regarding Iran and North Korea. My comparisons contribute to theoretical and empirical analyses in international relations literature. Theoretically, the research creates different options for the third party between the two antagonistic actors. China will have seven different types of reaction: balancing, bandwagoning, mediating, and abetting that foster strategic clarity versus hiding, delaying, and straddling which are symptomatic of strategic ambiguity. I argue that there is a gradation between pure balancing and pure supporting. Empirically, the test results show that Chinese leaders have tried to find a balance between its material interests and international reputation by engaging in straddling and delaying inconsistently. There are two major findings. First, China’s foreign policy has been reactive. Whereas prior to 2006, balancing against the U.S. had been a dominant strategy, since 2006, China has shown strategic ambiguity. Second, Chinese leaders believe that the preservation of stability in the region outweighs denuclearization of the noncompliant states, because it is in China’s interest to maintain a manageable tension between the U.S. and the noncompliant states. The balance of interest model suggests that the best way to understand China’s preferences is to consider them as products of rough calculation of risks and rewards on both the U.S. and the noncompliant states.

El juego estratégico de Rusia en el Cáucaso Sur: Sochi 2014

La propuesta de la ciudad de Sochi como sede de los Juegos Olímpicos de Invierno y de la 16° fecha del Gran Premio de Fórmula 1 de 2014, y como una de las sedes de la futura Copa Mundial de Futbol 2018, son una ratificación de la importancia estratégica que representa el Cáucaso para Rusia. Asimismo, el anclaje en el Cáucaso y en las costas del Mar Negro, con toda la inversión en infraestructura y en seguridad que representa la organización de eventos deportivos mundiales, implica la puesta en juego de una estrategia geopolítica que expresa la importancia de Rusia como potencia regional. En el calidoscopio de poder e intereses que se despliegan en la región caucásica, la sombra de Rusia se proyecta con fuerza. Abordar el rol que ejerce este país en el Cáucaso Sur, permitirá comprender las perspectivas actuales de la política exterior de Rusia en esta región, así como conocer de qué modo se despliega en el territorio el juego estratégico del poder a través de eventos deportivos que se observan desde todos los lugares del mundo.

1 + 1 = 3? EU-US voting cohesion in the United Nations General Assembly. EU Diplomacy Paper 07/2012, September 2012

This paper investigates the factors that explain the voting cohesion of the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) on foreign policy issues in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). It is often argued that the EU and the US are simply too different to cooperate within international organizations and thus to vote the same way, for example, in the UNGA. However, there is still a lack of research on this point and, more importantly, previous studies have not analyzed which factors explain EU-US voting cohesion. In this paper, I try to fill this gap by studying voting cohesion from 1980 until 2011 on issues of both ‘high’ politics (security) and ‘low’ politics (human rights) not only as regards EU-US voting cohesion, but also concerning voting cohesion among EU member states. I test six hypotheses derived from International Relations theories, and I argue that EU-US voting cohesion is best explained by the topic of the issue voted upon, whether an issue is marked as ‘important’ by the US government, and by the type of resolution. On the EU level, the length of Union membership and transaction costs matter most.

De Gaulle and Europe: Historical Revision and Social Science Theory. Program for the Study of Germany and Europe Working Paper Series 8.5

The thousands of books and articles on Charles de Gaulle's policy toward European integration, whether written by historians, social scientists, or commentators, universally accord primary explanatory importance to the General's distinctive geopolitical ideology. In explaining his motivations, only secondary significance, if any at all, is attached to commercial considerations. This paper seeks to reverse this historiographical consensus by examining the four major decisions toward European integration during de Gaulle's presidency: the decisions to remain in the Common Market in 1958, to propose the Foucher Plan in the early 1960s, to veto British accession to the EC, and to provoke the "empty chair" crisis in 1965-1966, resulting in the "Luxembourg Compromise." In each case, the overwhelming bulk of the primary evidence-speeches, memoirs, or government documents-suggests that de Gaulle's primary motivation was economic, not geopolitical or ideological. Like his predecessors and successors, de Gaulle sought to promote French industry and agriculture by establishing protected markets for their export products. This empirical finding has three broader implications: (1) For those interesred in the European Union, it suggests that regional integration has been driven primarily by economic, not geopolitical considerations--even in the "least likely" case. (2) For those interested in the role of ideas in foreign policy, it suggests that strong interest groups in a democracy limit the impact of a leader's geopolitical ideology--even where the executive has very broad institutional autonomy. De Gaulle was a democratic statesman first and an ideological visionary second. (3) For those who employ qualitative case-study methods, it suggests that even a broad, representative sample of secondary sources does not create a firm basis for causal inference. For political scientists, as for historians, there is in many cases no reliable alternative to primary-source research.

Continental regionalism: Brazil's prominent role in the Americas. CEPS Working Document No. 374, February 2013

Brazil has a dual identity as a Latin American country and one of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). The regional and global dimensions of Brasilia’s foreign policy have been closely intertwined. Inspired by the idea of development and autonomy in the last ten years, Brazil has assumed a stronger regional leadership role. The result has been the emergence of a South American space, with Mercosur and Unasur as the main integration schemes. For Brazil, regionalism is not only a goal in itself but also an instrument for exerting global influence and for ‘soft-balancing’ the United States. Washington’s lower profile in the region has facilitated Brazil’s rise as a regional and even continental player, with a strong influence on the Latin American puzzle composed of many different pieces or concentric circles.

O Serviço Europeu de Acção Externa

Com esta dissertação pretendemos analisar o Serviço Europeu de Ação Externa como uma das principais inovações do Tratado de Lisboa. O Serviço Europeu de Ação Externa é o corpo diplomático da União Europeia que se define pela coesão, cooperação, e divulgação da Politica Externa da União Europeia. No entanto, os seus primeiros anos não foram fáceis, iniciou a sua vigência em plena crise económica e suscitou várias dúvidas aos Estados-Membros, no que diz respeito à soberania. Contudo, defendemos que o SEAE mostra a verdadeira força da União, pois permite a coesão dos Estados-Membros que falam a uma só voz perante outros Estados e organizações. Para além disso, o papel do SEAE afigura-se relevante pelo número de cidadãos que residem em Estados terceiros, cabendo assim à União Europeia através do SEAE a proteção destes cidadãos europeus.

Facilitated dialogue in the Balkans vindicates the EEAS. CEPS Commentary, 29 April 2013

As a result of EEAS-led facilitated dialogue, on April 19th the prime ministers of Serbia and Kosovo reached their first agreement on the principles governing the normalisation of relations. The agreement handed Catherine Ashton a diplomatic victory she badly needed and offered proof of the added value of the European External Action Service (EEAS) as a new EU foreign policy actor.

British Balance of Competence Reviews, Part I: ‘Competences about right, so far’. EPIN Working Paper No. 35, October 2013

The first in a series for a CEPS-EPIN project entitled “The British Question and the Search for a Fresh European Narrative” this paper is pegged on an ambitious ongoing exercise by the British government to review all the competences of the European Union. The intention is that this should provide a basis for informed debate before the referendum on the UK remaining in the EU or not, which is scheduled for 2017. This paper summarises the first six reviews, each of which runs to around 80 pages, covering foreign policy, development policy, taxation, the single market, food safety, and public health. The present authors then add their own assessments of these materials. While understandably giving due place to British interests, they are of general European relevance. The substantive conclusions of this first set of reviews are that the competences of the EU are judged by respondents to be ‘about right’ on the whole, which came as a surprise to eurosceptic MPs and the tabloid media. Our own view is that the reviews are objective and impressively researched, and these populist complaints are illustrating the huge gap between the views of informed stakeholders and general public opinion, and therefore also the hazard of subjecting the ‘in or out’ choice for decision by referendum. If the referendum is to endorse the UK’s continuing membership there will have to emerge some fresh popular narratives about the EU. The paper therefore concludes with some thoughts along these lines, both for the UK and the EU as a whole.

The EU Special Representatives: A dying breed? CEPS Commentary

The recent decision by Baroness Ashton to end the mandate of a number of European Union Special Representatives (EUSRs) and her proposal to integrate these posts within the European External Action Service have raised concerns among member states. In the view of Erwan Fouéré, these developments underline the urgency of a more comprehensive and strategic discussion between Baroness Ashton and the member states on the future role of EUSRs in the EU's expanding foreign policy tool box.

To Be or Not to Be a Normative Power: The EU’s Promotion of Human Rights and Democracy in Russia. Bruges Regional Integration & Global Governance Papers 2/2013

The ‘Normative Power Europe’ debate has been a leitmotif in the academic discourse for over a decade. Far from being obsolete, the topic is as relevant as when the term was first coined by Ian Manners in 2002.1 ‘To be or not to be a normative power’ is certainly one of the existential dilemmas in the foreign policy of the European Union. This paper, however, intends to move beyond the black-and-white debate on whether the European Union is a normative power and to make it more nuanced by examining the factors that make it such. Contrary to the conventional perception that the European Union is a necessarily ‘benign’ force in the world, it assumes that it has aspirations to be a viable international actor. Consequently, it pursues different types of foreign policy behaviour with a varying degree of normativity in them. The paper addresses the question of under what conditions the European Union is a ‘normative power’. The findings of the study demonstrate that the ‘normative power’ of the European Union is conditioned upon internal and external elements, engaged in a complex interaction with a decisive role played by the often neglected external elements.

A European sanctions compensation fund? CEPS Commentary, 12 August 2014

Daniel Gros explores in a new CEPS Commentary the feasibility of creating a common fund to provide compensation for the economic costs of sanctions as an integral part of the EU’s foreign-policy stance that is now emerging towards Russia, albeit slowly and painfully.