General circulation model estimates of aerosol transport and radiative forcing during the Indian Ocean Experiment

Aerosol sources, transport, and sinks are simulated, and aerosol direct radiative effects are assessed over the Indian Ocean for the Indian Ocean Experiment (INDOEX) Intensive Field Phase during January to March 1999 using the Laboratoire de Me´te´orologie Dynamique (LMDZT) general circulation model. The model reproduces the latitudinal gradient in aerosol mass concentration and optical depth (AOD). The model-predicted aerosol concentrations and AODs agree reasonably well with measurements but are systematically underestimated during high-pollution episodes, especially in the month of March. The largest aerosol loads are found over southwestern China, the Bay of Bengal, and the Indian subcontinent. Aerosol emissions from the Indian subcontinent are transported into the Indian Ocean through either the west coast or the east coast of India. Over the INDOEX region, carbonaceous aerosols are the largest contributor to the estimated AOD, followed by sulfate, dust, sea salt, and fly ash. During the northeast winter monsoon, natural and anthropogenic aerosols reduce the solar flux reaching the surface by 25 W m�2, leading to 10–15% less insolation at the surface. A doubling of black carbon (BC) emissions from Asia results in an aerosol single-scattering albedo that is much smaller than in situ measurements, reflecting the fact that BC emissions are not underestimated in proportion to other (mostly scattering) aerosol types. South Asia is the dominant contributor to sulfate aerosols over the INDOEX region and accounts for 60–70% of the AOD by sulfate. It is also an important but not the dominant contributor to carbonaceous aerosols over the INDOEX region with a contribution of less than 40% to the AOD by this aerosol species. The presence of elevated plumes brings significant quantities of aerosols to the Indian Ocean that are generated over Africa and Southeast and east Asia.

An experiment on Prisoner’s Dilemma with confirmed proposals

We suggest an alternating proposals protocol with a confirmation stage as a way of solving a Prisoner's Dilemma game. We interpret players' proposals and (no) confirmation of outcomes of the game as a tacit communication device. The protocol leads to unprecedented high levels of cooperation in the laboratory. Assigning the power of confirmation to one of the two players alone, rather than alternating the role of a leader significantly increases the probability of cooperation in the first bargaining period. We interpret pre-agreement strategies as tacit messages on players' willingness to cooperate and as signals pursuing individualistic objectives like publicizing one's bargaining abilities or eliciting those of the opponent.

How do markets manage water resources? An experiment

We experimentally test how a private monopoly, a duopoly and a public utility allocate water of differing qualities to households and farmers. Most of our results are in line with the theoretical predictions. Overexploitation of the resources is observed independently of the market structure. Stock depletion for the public utility is the fastest, followed by the private duopoly and private monopoly. On the positive aspects of centralized public management, we find that the average quality to price ratio offered by the public monopoly is substantially higher than that offered by the private monopoly or duopoly.

An experiment on spatial competition with endogenous pricing

Hotelling's (1929) principle of minimum differentiation and the alternative prediction that firms will maximally differentiate from their rivals in order to relax price competition have not been explicitly tested so far. We report results from experimental spatial duopolies designed to address this issue. The levels of product differentiation observed are systematically lower than predicted in equilibrium under risk neutrality and compatible with risk aversion. The observed prices are consistent with collusion attempts. Our main findings are robust to variations in three experimental conditions: automated vs. human market sharing rule for ties, individual vs. collective decision making, and even vs. odd number of locations.

An ultimatum bargaining experiment on trade union efficiency

We present an ultimatum wage bargaining experiment showing that a trade union facilitating non-binding communication among workers, raises wages by simultaneously increasing employers’ posted offers and toughening the bargaining position of employees, without reducing overall market efficiency.

Managing a duopolistic water market with confirmed proposals. An experiment

We report results from experimental water markets in which owners of two different sources of water supply water to households and farmers. The final water quality consumed by each type of consumer is determined through mixing of qualities from two different resources. We compare the standard duopolistic market structure with an alternative market clearing mechanism inspired by games with confirmed strategies (which have been shown to yield collusive outcomes). As in the static case, complex dynamic markets operating under a confirmed proposals protocol yield less efficient outcomes because coordination among independent suppliers has the usual effects of restricting output and increasing prices to the users. Our results suggest that, when market mechanisms are used to allocate water to its users, the rule of thumb used by competition authorities can also serve as a guide towards water market regulation.

Identified consumers: an experiment on the informativeness of cross-demand price effects

Often, firms have no information on the specification of the true demand model they are faced with. It is, however, a well established fact that trial-and-error algorithms may be used by them in order to learn how to make optimal decisions. Using experimental methods, we identify a property of the information on past actions which helps the seller of two asymmetric demand substitutes to reach the optimal prices more precisely and faster. The property concerns the possibility of disaggregating changes in each product’s demand into client exit/entry and shift from one product to the other.

An experiment on subjective game valuations

We report experimental results on a prisoners' dilemma implemented in a way which allows us to elicit incentive−compatible valuations of the game. We test the hypothesis that players' valuations coincide with their Nash equilibrium earnings. Our results offer significantly less support for this hypothesis than for the prediction of Dominant Strategy (DS) play.

Inside the black box: unravelling the development viability appraisal process

Over the last decade issues related to the financial viability of development have become increasingly important to the English planning system. As part of a wider shift towards the compartmentalisation of planning tasks, expert consultants are required to quantify, in an attempt to rationalise, planning decisions in terms of economic ‘viability’. Often with a particular focus on planning obligations, the results of development viability modelling have emerged as a key part of the evidence base used in site-specific negotiations and in planning policy formation. Focussing on the role of clients and other stakeholders, this paper investigates how development viability is tested in practice. It draws together literature on the role of calculative practices in policy formation, client feedback and influence in real estate appraisals and stakeholder engagement and consultation in the planning literature to critically evaluate the role of clients and other interest groups in influencing the production and use of development viability appraisal models. The paper draws upon semi-structured interviews with the main producers of development viability appraisals to conclude that, whilst appraisals have the potential to be biased by client and stakeholder interests, there are important controlling influences on potential opportunistic behaviour. One such control is local authorities’ weak understanding of development viability appraisal techniques which limits their capacity to question the outputs of appraisal models. However, this also is of concern given that viability is now a central feature of the town planning system.

Studying economics reduces overexploitation in a common resource experiment

This paper studies the economic behavior of agents, who make decisions regarding the sustainability of Common-Pool Resources (CPR). For this purpose, economic experiments are applied to simulate the yield of a CPR, taking into account the influence of economics training on the learning process of individuals, regarding their decisions for sustainability. Based on a non-cooperative game with simultaneous choices, the results of experiments show that after several rounds the existence of economics knowledge reflects a better learning process for making decisions regarding sustainability of CPR.

An industry viewpoint on the role of farm assurance in delivering food safety to the consumer: the case of the dairy sector in England and Wales

Food safety, alongside food quality, remains a primary concern of both consumers and those along the whole food supply chain, leading to regulation by government alongside private third party certification. Much has been written about the value of these systems primarily from the perception of the consumer. This paper reports on a study that examined industry perceptions on the regulatory and assurance systems within the dairy sector of England and Wales. It found that the primary producer found value in both systems, although from a food hygiene focus regulation was seen to be more rigorous. Other stakeholders along the dairy food supply chain saw the assurance scheme as more rigorous. All stakeholders recognised the need to reduce duplication in delivering food safety through combining key elements of both systems with the added potential for better communication of both food safety and quality to the final consumer.