Geen leger, is onbetaalbaar = No Belgian armed forces is unaffordable. Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 61, February 2015

In this Security Policy Brief Jo Coelmont examines the challenges Belgium is facing at present. On the one hand there is the declared political objective to henceforth provide its defence forces with the means of achieving all of its tasks and, furthermore, to develop a new Strategic Plan, while taking decisions on replacing its current fleet of F16 fighter aircraft and determine strategic orientations on the replacement of frigates, mine hunter vessels and other major equipment programmes. On the other hand, the already taken austerity measures impose severe structural cuts on its defence budget for the upcoming five years. In this context the author is proposing some « dos and don’ts«.

Transatlantic Conflict and Cooperation Concerning Trade Issues. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 13, July 2014

From the Introduction. Transatlantic relations have undergone significant changes within the past twenty-five years. During the Cold War era, the United States and Western Europe were bound together by a perceived common threat from the Soviet Union. Consequently, economic issues commanded less attention than security issues. After the Cold War ended, economic issues were thought to be the glue that would hold the transatlantic relationship together. Much attention was given for several years to fostering economic cooperation through the development of intergovernmental initiatives. After the terrorist incidents of September 11, 2001 in the United States, and the subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, security issues again came to the forefront of the relationship. However, in contrast to the earlier era that was mainly characterized by close cooperation, disagreements between the United States and major countries of Western Europe about how to deal with the terrorist threat created severe strains in the relationship. By 2003, the third year of the George W Bush administration, transatlantic political relations had reached perhaps their lowest point since World War II. They have gradually improved since then, but with a significant setback from Wikileaks revelations, and even more serious strains resulting from the revelations by Edward Snowden concerning United States surveillance activities. Security issues have come to the forefront also in connection with regional unrest in the Middle East, EU nations’ dependence on Russian oil and gas, and Russian intrusions into Ukraine.

Flashlight Europe N°2–February 2015. “Europe must now get involved in a very big way”

More than three years after al-Gaddafi was overthrown, Libya has still not returned to some semblance of normality. In many places, the Libyan state exists only on paper. No less than two governments and dozens of rival tribes, all with their own militias and armed to the teeth, are trying to come to power. In the midst of this chaos “IS,” the terrorist organization, has now entered the fray. Evidence of this is provided by the brutal murder of 21 Egyptian Copts, which could trigger off a civil war that will pose a threat to the entire region and to Europe. Mirco Keilberth, an expert on Libya, explains what is going on.

Between continuation and adaptation: The Baltic states’ security policy and armed forces. OSW COMMENTARY 190/23.11.2015

The Baltic states have responded to the annexation of Crimea and the increased Russian military activity in the Nordic and Baltic region by taking measures to strengthen their own military potential. At the same time, they have intensified efforts to have the USA and NATO step up their military presence on their respective territories. Changes concerning the security policies and the armed forces of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have included increases in defence spending, the number of soldiers and members of volunteer Territorial Defence Forces, speeding up modernisation programmes, and – in the case of Lithuania – the reintroduction of conscription. In the coming years the Baltic states will focus on developing those of their military capabilities directly related to the defence of the country’s territory. However, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia will not stop participating in the foreign missions of NATO, which is the guarantor of their security. The extent to which these plans can be implemented will depend primarily on the economic and demographic situations of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

Germany’s engagement in the resolution of the Syrian conflict. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 194/25.01.2016

German Tornado Recce aircraft have been engaged in reconnaissance operations over Syria since January 2016. In December 2015 the German government and parliament decided that up to 1,200 Bundeswehr soldiers would take part in the international coalition fighting Islamic State in Syria. This decision marks a new chapter in Germany’s activity in the Middle East. The increasing destabilisation of the southern neighbourhood and the consequences this has for the EU and Germany have forced the German government to increase its level of engagement in the region. Even though Germany is a third-rate player in the Middle Eastern game, it is nonetheless ever more engaged politically and wants to be viewed as a neutral mediator between the competing actors in the region. It has also allocated more funds on regional development co-operation and humanitarian aid. Germany, whose attention has been directed towards Europe’s eastern neighbourhood, is currently turning its attention to the South. The Middle East (and Africa) is taking on increasing significance in German foreign and security policy. This may affect NATO’s eastern flank and the EU’s eastern neighbourhood since part of Germany’s instruments and funds may be redirected to the South.

The EU cannot remain a passive observer of the Karabakh conflict. EPC Commentary, 7 April 2016

When Federica Mogherini visited the South Caucasus in March, she was quoted as saying that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was a top priority for the EU. Facts, however, do not seem to match the words of the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. As violent clashes in the conflict zone unfolded over the past week, the EU was a passive observer, with few visible signs of engagement apart from a cursory phone call urging Armenia and Azerbaijan to show restraint. The escalation has shown how quickly and dangerously the situation can develop, and the unassailable nature of the Line of Contact (LoC). If the diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict show no progress, a repetition is very probable. Furthermore, it is likely the next incident will be more devastating in human and material costs than this recent one, and may not be contained so quickly. The EU needs to be part of the renewed diplomatic effort.

A constitution for Erdoğan. Consequences of the political conflict in Turkey. OSW COMMENTARY No. 213, 2016-06-01

Since mid-2015 Turkey has been affected by a deep internal crisis, caused by rising political polarisation, increased levels of terrorist threat (posed by the Kurds and Islamic radicals) and the revived conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). As a consequence of this crisis, over 350,000 residents of south-eastern Turkey have been forced to leave their homes. At the same time, due to the migration crisis and despite mutual distrust in relations between Turkey and the EU, cooperation between Ankara and Brussels has been intensifying. Turkey’s ongoing destabilisation does not challenge the status of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), which is de facto controlled by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan; paradoxically, it strengthens the party. The internal crisis which the authorities have been deliberately fuelling is an element of a plan to rubber-stamp political change by introducing a presidential system of government. This is happening amid a thorough reconstruction of the socio-political order which has been underway for over a decade. In the upcoming months it is expected to result in the constitution being changed and, as a consequence, the institutionalisation of Erdoğan’s autocratic rule.

Ethnic Politics, Regime Support and Conflict in Central and Eastern Europe

Ethnicity and ethnic parties have often been portrayed as a threat to political stability. There is also no shortage of conflicts with an ethnic flavor. Yet, this book challenges the notion that the organization of politics in heterogeneous societies should necessarily overcome ethnicity. Rather, descriptive representation of ethnic groups arguably has potential to increase regime support and reduce conflict. The book studies partisan-descriptive representation of up to 130 ethnic groups in central and eastern European democracies. Ethnic minority parties are found to only run and succeed if they can expect electoral support sufficient to pass the electoral threshold. Conditional on gender and strategies of representation, ethnic representation increases satisfaction with democracy among the minority population. While protest rises given moderate levels of representation, it is reduced once ethnic groups have access to executives. In conclusion, a proportional vision of power-sharing between ethnic groups receives some qualified empirical support.

Crisis Coming Home? Firm Performance During the Economic Crisis and Managers‘ Work-Family Conflict

The economic crisis over the past years has challenged managers in many ways. In our longitudinal study during the global recession, we examine how perceived firm performance interacts with sources of supervisor support and stress to affect managers’ work-family conflict. First, we draw from Conservation of Resources theory to analyze how sources of supervisor support and stress relate to managers’ work-family conflict. Second, we explore how perceived firm performance modifies the relationships between these factors and work-family conflict. Our surveys of 182 managers before and during the crisis reveal that perceived firm performance significantly alters the effectiveness of sources of supervisor support in relieving work-family conflict. Additionally, perceived poor firm performance was found to intensify the negative effect of stressors on work-family conflict. Our results highlight the need to consider an organization’s perceived health when studying managers’ attitudes and career outcomes.

The Impact of Relationship Conflict on subjective Family Firm Valuation

The present paper empirically investigates the impact of family relationship conflict on subjective firm valuation by family firm owner managers. Drawing on the emerging socioemotional wealth perspective of corporate ownership, we find a U-shaped relationship between relationship conflict inside the family firm and subjective family firm valuation. This finding suggests that negatively valenced emotions induced by the conflict, at low levels of conflict, lead to emotion congruent withdrawal behavior and hence lower valuation. With conflicts gaining in fervor and severity, owner-managers start endowing and pricing sunk costs related to the conflict. This finding suggests that emotions do indeed have spill-over effects on monetary value perceptions and that negatively valenced emotions induced by relationship conflict are not linearly appraised. Rather, to understand the impact of negative emotions on corporate ownership appraisal and attachment it is required to reconcile the emotion congruency with the prospect theory perspective.

El Salvador at war : an oral history of conflict from the 1979 insurrection to the present /

Mode of access: Internet.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization : an alliance of shared values : report of the Delegation to NATO Countries--1982, of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Ninety-seventh Congress, second session.

Mode of access: Internet.

The new Soviet legislature : Committee on Defense and State Security : report of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred First Congress, second session.

"The attached report was prepared ... by Dr. Mark Lowenthal ..."--p. iv.