Why Do Some International Institutions Contain Strong Dispute Settlement Provisions: New Evidence from Preferential Trade Agreements

To understand why some international institutions have stronger dispute settlement mechanisms (DSMs) than others, we investigate the dispute settlement provisions of nearly 600 preferential trade agreements (PTAs), which possess several desirable case-selection features and are evoked more than is realized. We broaden the study of dispute settlement design beyond “legalization” and instead reorient theorizing around a multi-faceted conceptualization of the strength of DSMs. We posit that strong DSMs are first and foremost a rational response to features of agreements that require stronger dispute settlement, such as depth and large memberships. Multivariate empirical tests using a new data set on PTA design confirm these expectations and reveal that depth – the amount of policy change specified in an agreement – is the most powerful and consistent predictor of DSM strength, providing empirical support to a long-posited but controversial conjecture. Yet power also plays a sizeable role, since agreements among asymmetric members are more likely to have strong DSMs due to their mutual appeal, as are those involving the United States. Important regional differences also emerge, as PTAs across the Americas are designed with strong dispute settlement, as are Asian PTAs, which contradicts the conventional wisdom about Asian values and legalization. Our findings demonstrate that rationalism explains much of international institutional design, yet it can be enhanced by also incorporating power-based and regional explanations.

.08 BAC limit saves lives: why every state needs a .08 BAC law.

Mode of access: Internet.

Why some farms earn so much more than others /

Cover title.

Unemployment compensation, what and why? /

"This brief study of the purposes and operation of the unemployment compensation systems was written by Gladys R. Friedman, technical advisor in the Division of legislative aid." -- p. [II].

Why the Indonesians revolt /

Map on cover.

Why not "Russellism"? : alias "Millennial Dawnism" /

Mode of access: Internet.

Department of Defense inventory : why does the Pentagon buy so much? : hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Second Congress, first session, March 11, 1992.

Shipping list no.: 93-0097-P.

Mass-rule government, and why is a new constitution inperative? The principles, devices, education, and organization required to give to the qualified citizens the supreme power over their government,

Mode of access: Internet.

Why few succeed and millions fail,

CONDITION: Good.

Why people drink and drive: the bases of drinking-and-driving decisions. Final report.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Washington, D.C.

Vehicle safety: why the market did not encourage it and how it might be made to do so.

National Highway Safety Bureau, Washington, D.C.

Why I Am Not a Likelihoodist

Frequentist statistical methods continue to predominate in many areas of science despite prominent calls for "statistical reform." They do so in part because their main rivals, Bayesian methods, appeal to prior probability distributions that arguably lack an objective justification in typical cases. Some methodologists find a third approach called likelihoodism attractive because it avoids important objections to frequentism without appealing to prior probabilities. However, likelihoodist methods do not provide guidance for belief or action, but only assessments of data as evidence. I argue that there is no good way to use those assessments to guide beliefs or actions without appealing to prior probabilities, and that as a result likelihoodism is not a viable alternative to frequentism and Bayesianism for statistical reform efforts in science.

Why?

Mode of access: Internet.

Why die,

Mode of access: Internet.