World fishing fleets : an analysis of distant-water fleet operations, past, present, future. prepared by Frederick H. Beaudry, William B. Folsom.

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World fishing fleets : an analysis of distant-water fleet operations, past, present, future. prepared by Milan Kravanja, Ellen Shapiro.

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Delegation and information sharing in oligopoly

Information sharing in oligopoly has been analyzed by assuming that firms behave as a sole economic agent. In this paper I assume that ownership and management are separated. Managers are allowed to falsely report their costs to owners and rivals. Under such circumstances, if owners want to achieve information sharing they must use managerial contracts that implement truthful cost reporting by managers as a dominant strategy. I show that, contrary to the classical result, without the inclusion of message-dependent payments in managerial contracts there will be no information sharing. On the other hand, with the inclusion of such publicly observable payments and credible ex-ante commitment by owners not to modify these payments, there will be perfect information sharing without the need for third parties. Keywords: Information sharing, Delegation, Managerial contracts. JEL classification numbers: D21, D82, L13, L21

Sharing the surplus: a just and efficient proposal for environments with externalities

Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This in turn leads to disputes regarding the compensation levels to the various parties affected. We propose a general, yet simple, method of deciding upon the distribution of the gains (costs) of cooperation in the presence of externalities. This method is shown to be the unique one satisfying several desirable properties. Furthermore, we illustrate the use of this method to resolve the sharing of benefits generated by international climate control agreements.

Information-sharing implications of horizontal mergers

We analyze the effects of uncertainty and private information on horizontal mergers. Firms face uncertain demands or costs and receive private signals. They may decide to merge sharing their private information. If the uncertainty parameters are independent and the signals are perfect, uncertainty generates an informational advantage only to the merging firms, increasing merger incentives and decreasing free-riding effects. Thus, mergers become more profitable and stable. These results generalize to the case of correlated parameters if the correlation is not very severe, and for perfect correlation if the firms receive noisy signals. From the normative point of view, mergers are socially less harmful compared to deterministic markets and may even be welfare enhancing. If the signals are, instead, publicly observed, uncertainty does not necessarily give more incentives to merge, and mergers are not always less socially harmful.

Economic impacts of alternative water policy scenarios in the Spanish production system: an input-output analysis

The objective of this paper is to analyse the economic impacts of alternative water policies implemented in the Spanish production system. The methodology uses two versions of the input-output price model: a competitive formulation and a mark-up formulation. The input-output framework evaluates the impact of water policy measures on production prices, consumption prices, intermediate water demand and private welfare. Our results show that a tax on the water used by sectors considerably reduces the intermediate water demand, and increases the production and consumption prices. On the other hand, according to Jevons' paradox, an improvement in technical efficiency, which leads to a reduction in the water requirements of all sectors and an increase in water production, increases the amount of water consumed. The combination of a tax on water and improved technical efficiency takes the pressure off prices and significantly reduces intermediate water demand. JEL Classification: C67 ; D57 ; Q25. Keywords: Production prices; Consumption prices; Water uses; Water policy; Water taxation.

Investor protection, risk sharing and inequality

This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, financial risk sharing and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes investors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk while lending to firms. This implies lower cost of external finance and better risk sharing between financiers and entrepreneurs. Investor protection, by boosting the market for risk sharing plays the twofold role of encouraging agents to undertake risky enterprises and providing them with insurance. By increasing the number of risky projects, it raises income inequality. By extending insurance to more agents, it reduces it. As a result, the relationship between the size of the market for risk sharing and income inequality is hump-shaped. Empirical evidence from a cross-section of sixty-eight countries, and a panel of fifty countries over the period 1976-2000, supports the predictions of the model.

Gold, Water

Combined media on paper. 82" x 40", Fire River Series. Hammer Museum, UCLA

Quantitative method of viral pollution determination for large volume of water using ferric hydroxide gel impregnated on the surface of glassfibre cartridge

Quantitative method of viral pollution determination for large volume of water using ferric hydroxide gel impregnated on the surface of glassfibre cartridge filter. The use of ferric hydroxide gel, impregnated on the surface of glassfibre cartridge filter enable us to recover 62.5% of virus (Poliomylitis type I, Lsc strain) exsogeneously added to 400 liters of tap-water. The virus concentrator system consists of four cartridge filters, in which the three first one are clarifiers, where the contaminants are removed physically, without significant virus loss at this stage. The last cartridge filter is impregnated with ferric hydroxide gel, where the virus is adsorbed. After the required volume of water has been processed, the last filter is removed from the system and the viruses are recovered from the gel, using 1 liter of glycine/NaOH buffer, at pH 11. Immediately the eluate is clarified through series of cellulose acetate membranes mounted in a 142mm Millipore filter. For the second step of virus concentration, HC1 1N is added slowly to the eluate to achieve pH 3.5-4. MgC1, is added to give a final concentration of 0.05M and the viruses are readsorbed on a 0.45 , porosity (HA) cellulose acetate membrane, mounted in a 90 mm Millipore filter. The viruses are recovered using the same eluent plus 10% of fetal calf serum, to a final volume of 3 ml. In this way, it was possible to concentrate virus from 400 liters of tap-water, into 1 liter in the first stage of virus concentration and just to 3 ml of final volume in a second step. The efficiency, simplicity and low operational cost, provded by the method, make it feasible to study viral pollution of recreational and tap-water sources.

A water-borne hepatitis A outbreak in Rio de Janeiro

An excess of hepatitis cases, in the research center of Petrobrás located in the Fundaão Island, within the city of Rio de Janeiro, was notified during the second half of March 1980. In recent years this center has had an average of four cases per year, but between March 5th and April 25th, sixteen cases were reported. The cause and possible source of infection were investigated. A serologic diagnosis of hepatitis A was made by showing IgG serum antibodies against this virus in patients. No subclinical cases among a group of 60 healthy employees could be identified. A questionnaire was circulated to investigate a possible commom source of infection. Evaluation of the water supply system indicated that it had recently been contaminated. Information obtained from other medical services in the island failed to reveal that the episode was part of a larger outbreak.

Evolution of sarcoma 180 in mice treated with hyperchlorinated water

Mice treated with hyperchlorinated water (50 ppm of chlorine) and control mice, drinking tap water (1-3 ppm of chlorine) were inoculated with 2.5 x 10 [raised to the power of 6] sarcoma 180 cells, by intraperitoneal route. Tumor evolution was measured by enumeration of tumor cells in peritoneal cavity and by evaluation of weight gain at different time intervals after tumor implantation. In mice treated with excessive amounts of chlorine there was enhancement of tumor growth demonstrated by: (a) shorter incubation period and increased weight gain (ascites formation) after tumor implantation; (b) increased number of tumor cells in the peritoneal cavity 2, 3 and 4 days after tumor challenge. The number of peritoneal cells exsudated after tumor implantation was lower in mice treated with hyperchlorinated water than in controls. The tumor enhancement observed after excessive chlorine ingestion would be due to: (a) reduction of the number of peritoneal macrophages that migrate to the peritoneal cavity and (b) reduction of the tumoricidal capacity of peritonela macrophages induced by the direct effect of chlorine or by the reduction of the amount of endogenous endotoxins due to the bactericidal effect of chlorine.

Two new serovars of Salmonella: S. Natal and S. potengi, isolated from fluvial water in Natal, Rio Grande do Norte State, Brazil

Two new serovars of Salmonella from estuary waters of potengi river in Natal, Rio Grande do Norte, were isolated. They were named S. natal (9,12: z4, z24:-) and S. potengi (18;z: -). Both types belong to the subgenus I, or subspecies 1, thought they showed atypical behaviour (KCN +).

Competitive interactions between species of fresh-water snails: I. Laboratory. IC. Comparative survival of Biomphalaria glabrata and B. Straminea kept out of water

Biomphalaria glabrata and B. straminea were submitted to an out-door laboratory experiment for testing their comparative ability to resist desiccation. Results have shown that B. straminea is significantly higher resistant than B. glabrata. After five months under such distressing condition the survival ratios were: B. glabrata 8.1 per cent and B. straminea 18.4 per cent.