Gestão estratégica no Poder Legislativo: o caso da Assembleia Legislativa do Estado de Minas Gerais

O objetivo do artigo é registrar, criticamente, o processo de implantação da gestão estratégica na Assembleia Legislativa de Minas Gerais, com o propósito de revelar seusantecedentes e motivações; os momentos-chave; as facilidades e dificuldades; os resultados alcançados e os desafios futuros. A abordagem escolhida foi a histórico-descritiva e as ações de pesquisa envolveram revisão bibliográfica, pesquisa documental e entrevistas semiestruturadas. As conclusões apontam que a implantação da gestão estratégica na Assembleia Legislativa de Minas Gerais é um processo complexo e multifacetado, diante de suas características de órgão público, hierarquizado, com alta divisão de trabalho. O avanço da implantação é lento, devido aos fatores dificultadores apontados. O caso traz elementos relevantes para a pesquisa sobre gestão estratégica no setor público, seja por apresentar o processo de forma analítica e confrontada com a teoria, seja por se tratar especificamente de um órgão do Poder Legislativo

Strategic Interaction and Conventions

The scope of the paper is the literature that employs coordination games to study social norms and conventions from the viewpoint of game theory and cognitive psychology. We claim that those two alternative approaches are complementary, as they provide different insights to explain how people converge to a unique system of self-fulfilling expectations in presence of multiple, equally viable, conventions. While game theory explains the emergence of conventions relying on efficiency and risk considerations, the psychological view is more concerned with frame and labeling effects. The interaction between these alternative (and, sometimes, competing) effects leads to the result that coordination failures may well occur and, even when coordination takes place, there is no guarantee that the convention eventually established will be the most efficient.

Choice of Flexible Production Technologies Under Strategic Delegation

This work analyzes a managerial delegation model in which firms can choose between a flexible production technology which allows them to produce two different products and a dedicated production technology which limits production to only one product. We analyze whether the incentives to adopt the flexible technology are smaller or greater in a managerial delegation model than under strict profit maximization. We obtain that the asymmetric equilibrium in which only one firm adopts the flexible technology can be sustained under strategic delegation but not under strict profit maximization when products are substitutes. We extend the analysis to consider welfare implications.

Cost-Saving production technologies and strategic delegation

This work analyzes a managerial delegation model in which firms that produce a differentiated good can choose between two production technologies: a low marginal cost technology and a high marginal cost technology. For the former to be adopted more investment is needed than for the latter. By giving managers of firms an incentive scheme based on a linear combination of profit and sales revenue, we find that Bertrand competition provides a stronger incentive to adopt the cost-saving technology than the strict profit maximization case. However, the results may be reversed under Cournot competition. We show that if the degree of product substitutability is sufficiently low (high), the incentive to adopt the cost-saving technology is larger under strict profit maximization (strategic delegation).

On the strategic equivalence of multiple-choice test scoring rules

A disadvantage of multiple-choice tests is that students have incentives to guess. To discourage guessing, it is common to use scoring rules that either penalize wrong answers or reward omissions. These scoring rules are considered equivalent in psychometrics, although experimental evidence has not always been consistent with this claim. We model students' decisions and show, first, that equivalence holds only under risk neutrality and, second, that the two rules can be modified so that they become equivalent even under risk aversion. This paper presents the results of a field experiment in which we analyze the decisions of subjects taking multiple-choice exams. The evidence suggests that differences between scoring rules are due to risk aversion as theory predicts. We also find that the number of omitted items depends on the scoring rule, knowledge, gender and other covariates.