Ottimizzazione di microcanali con condizioni al contorno diverse

Negli ultimi due decenni i microcanali hanno un'ampia gamma di applicazioni pratiche in ambiti specializzati, come le micropompe, l’ingegneria biomedica, la microfluidica, ecc. Quindi il miglioramento della capacità di scambio termico è molto significativo e, per questo motivo, è interessante studiare come influisce sullo scambio termico la variazione della geometria dei microcanali. Per descrivere le prestazioni associate ad una superficie di scambio termico ci si riferisce a dei parametri adimensionali. Ad esempio, si possono utilizzare numero di Poiseuille fRe e numero di Nusselt Nu, a cui sono associate, rispettivamente, le prestazioni in termini di attrito meccanico e di scambio termico convettivo della superficie. E si vedrà il comportamento termoidraulico al variare di parametri geometrici come il fattore di forma ed il raggio di curvatura degli spigoli della sezione attraverso simulazioni effettuate tramite FlexPDE. L’ottimizzazione delle sezioni di microcanali attraverso i Performance Evaluation Criteria (PEC) è basata su un’analisi condotta dal punto di vista della prima legge della termodinamica: l'ottimizzazione della funzione obiettivo è il suo unico scopo. Ma non ha tenuto conto dell’entropia generata nello scambiatore, che varia dopo l’ottimizzazione. Poiché l’entropia prodotta da un generico sistema termodinamico è direttamente legata alle perdite per irreversibilità nello stesso, quindi coincide l’efficienza del sistema dal punto di vista termodinamico. Per questo motivo, Bejan propone una procedura di ottimizzazione basata sulla seconda legge della termodinamica, in cui anche l’entropia è trattata come una funzione obiettivo che dovrà essere sempre minimizzata. Dopo una prima fase di analisi dal punto di vista fisico, il modello è stato applicato a casi concreti, in cui funzione obiettivo e numero di generazione entropica sono stati espressi in dipendenza dell’incognita geometrica da valutare.

Modifiche al protocollo di trasporto LTP per migliorarne le prestazioni in presenza di perdite elevate

La presente tesi si pone come obiettivo quello di analizzare il protocollo LTP (in particolare in ION) e proporre dei miglioramenti utili al caso in cui siano presenti perdite elevate. Piu in dettaglio, una prima parte introduttiva motiva l'inefficacia del TCP/IP in ambito interplanetario e introduce l'architettura DTN Bundle Protocol (Cap.1). La tesi prosegue con la descrizione delle specifiche del protocollo LTP (Cap.2), in particolar modo evidenziando come un bundle venga incapsulato in un blocco LTP, come questo sia successivamente diviso in tanti segmenti LTP e come questi vengano successivamente inviati con il protocollo UDP o con un protocollo analogo. Viene quindi presentata un'approfondita analisi delle penalizzazioni dovute alle perdite dei segmenti LTP, sia di tipo dati che di segnalazione (Cap. 3). Quest'analisi permette di dimostrare la criticita degli effetti delle perdite, in particolare per quello che riguarda i segmenti LTP di segnalazione. Mentre in presenza di perdite basse tali effetti hanno in media un impatto minimo sul tempo di consegna di un blocco LTP (quindi del bundle in esso contenuto), in quanto avvengono raramente, in presenza di perdite elevate rappresentano un collo di bottiglia per il tempo di consegna di un blocco LTP. A tal proposito sono state proposte alcune modifiche che permettono di migliorare le prestazioni di LTP (Cap. 4) compatibilmente con le specifiche RFC in modo da garantire l'interoperabilita con le diverse implementazioni del protocollo. Successivamente nel Cap. 5 viene mostrato come sono state implementate le modifiche proposte in ION 3.4.1. Nel capitolo finale (Cap. 6) sono presenti i risultati numerici relativi ad alcuni test preliminari eseguiti confrontando la versione originale del protocollo con le versioni modificate contenenti i miglioramenti proposti. I test sono risultati molto positivi per elevate perdite, confermando cosi la validita dell'analisi e dei miglioramenti introdotti.

Compensation, Incentives and Risk: Economic Theory and Russian Practise

Mr. Pechersky set out to examine a specific feature of the employer-employee relationship in Russian business organisations. He wanted to study to what extent the so-called "moral hazard" is being solved (if it is being solved at all), whether there is a relationship between pay and performance, and whether there is a correlation between economic theory and Russian reality. Finally, he set out to construct a model of the Russian economy that better reflects the way it actually functions than do certain other well-known models (for example models of incentive compensation, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model etc.). His report was presented to the RSS in the form of a series of manuscripts in English and Russian, and on disc, with many tables and graphs. He begins by pointing out the different examples of randomness that exist in the relationship between employee and employer. Firstly, results are frequently affected by circumstances outside the employee's control that have nothing to do with how intelligently, honestly, and diligently the employee has worked. When rewards are based on results, uncontrollable randomness in the employee's output induces randomness in their incomes. A second source of randomness involves the outside events that are beyond the control of the employee that may affect his or her ability to perform as contracted. A third source of randomness arises when the performance itself (rather than the result) is measured, and the performance evaluation procedures include random or subjective elements. Mr. Pechersky's study shows that in Russia the third source of randomness plays an important role. Moreover, he points out that employer-employee relationships in Russia are sometimes opposite to those in the West. Drawing on game theory, he characterises the Western system as follows. The two players are the principal and the agent, who are usually representative individuals. The principal hires an agent to perform a task, and the agent acquires an information advantage concerning his actions or the outside world at some point in the game, i.e. it is assumed that the employee is better informed. In Russia, on the other hand, incentive contracts are typically negotiated in situations in which the employer has the information advantage concerning outcome. Mr. Pechersky schematises it thus. Compensation (the wage) is W and consists of a base amount, plus a portion that varies with the outcome, x. So W = a + bx, where b is used to measure the intensity of the incentives provided to the employee. This means that one contract will be said to provide stronger incentives than another if it specifies a higher value for b. This is the incentive contract as it operates in the West. The key feature distinguishing the Russian example is that x is observed by the employer but is not observed by the employee. So the employer promises to pay in accordance with an incentive scheme, but since the outcome is not observable by the employee the contract cannot be enforced, and the question arises: is there any incentive for the employer to fulfil his or her promises? Mr. Pechersky considers two simple models of employer-employee relationships displaying the above type of information symmetry. In a static framework the obtained result is somewhat surprising: at the Nash equilibrium the employer pays nothing, even though his objective function contains a quadratic term reflecting negative consequences for the employer if the actual level of compensation deviates from the expectations of the employee. This can lead, for example, to labour turnover, or the expenses resulting from a bad reputation. In a dynamic framework, the conclusion can be formulated as follows: the higher the discount factor, the higher the incentive for the employer to be honest in his/her relationships with the employee. If the discount factor is taken to be a parameter reflecting the degree of (un)certainty (the higher the degree of uncertainty is, the lower is the discount factor), we can conclude that the answer to the formulated question depends on the stability of the political, social and economic situation in a country. Mr. Pechersky believes that the strength of a market system with private property lies not just in its providing the information needed to compute an efficient allocation of resources in an efficient manner. At least equally important is the manner in which it accepts individually self-interested behaviour, but then channels this behaviour in desired directions. People do not have to be cajoled, artificially induced, or forced to do their parts in a well-functioning market system. Instead, they are simply left to pursue their own objectives as they see fit. Under the right circumstances, people are led by Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of impersonal market forces to take the actions needed to achieve an efficient, co-ordinated pattern of choices. The problem is that, as Mr. Pechersky sees it, there is no reason to believe that the circumstances in Russia are right, and the invisible hand is doing its work properly. Political instability, social tension and other circumstances prevent it from doing so. Mr. Pechersky believes that the discount factor plays a crucial role in employer-employee relationships. Such relationships can be considered satisfactory from a normative point of view, only in those cases where the discount factor is sufficiently large. Unfortunately, in modern Russia the evidence points to the typical discount factor being relatively small. This fact can be explained as a manifestation of aversion to risk of economic agents. Mr. Pechersky hopes that when political stabilisation occurs, the discount factors of economic agents will increase, and the agent's behaviour will be explicable in terms of more traditional models.

Study of water use and supply in the district of Independencia, Peru

Peru is a developing country with abundant fresh water resources, yet the lack of infrastructure leaves much of the population without access to safe water for domestic uses. The author of this report was a Peace Corps Volunteer in the sector of water & sanitation in the district of Independencia, Ica, Peru. Independencia is located in the arid coastal region of the country, receiving on average 15 mm of rain annually. The water source for this district comes from the Pisco River, originating in the Andean highlands and outflowing into the Pacific Ocean near the town of Pisco, Peru. The objectives of this report are to assess the water supply and sanitation practices, model the existing water distribution system, and make recommendations for future expansion of the distribution system in the district of Independencia, Peru. The assessment of water supply will be based on the results from community surveys done in the district of Independencia, water quality testing done by a detachment of the U.S. Navy, as well as on the results of a hydraulic model built in EPANET 2.0 to represent the distribution system. Sanitation practice assessments will be based on the surveys as well as observations from the author while living in Peru. Recommendations for system expansions will be made based on results from the EPANET model and the municipality’s technical report for the existing distribution system. Household water use and sanitation surveys were conducted with 84 families in the district revealing that upwards of 85% store their domestic water in regularly washed containers with lids. Over 80% of those surveyed are drinking water that is treated, mostly boiled. Of those surveyed, over 95% reported washing their hands and over 60% mentioned at least one critical time for hand washing when asked for specific instances. From the surveys, it was also discovered that over 80% of houses are properly disposing of excrement, in either latrines or septic tanks. There were 43 families interviewed with children five years of age or under, and just over 18% reported the child had a case of diarrhea within the last month at the time of the interview. Finally, from the surveys it was calculated that the average water use per person per day is about 22 liters. Water quality testing carried out by a detachment of the U.S. Navy revealed that the water intended for consumption in the houses surveyed was not suitable for consumption, with a median E. coli most probable number of 47/100 ml for the 61 houses sampled. The median total coliforms was 3,000 colony forming units per 100 ml. EPANET was used to simulate the water delivery system and evaluate its performance. EPANET is designed for continuous water delivery systems, assuming all pipes are always flowing full. To account for the intermittent nature of the system, multiple EPANET network models were created to simulate how water is routed to the different parts of the system throughout the day. The models were created from interviews with the water technicians and a map of the system created using handheld GPS units. The purpose is to analyze the performance of the water system that services approximately 13,276 people in the district of Independencia, Peru, as well as provide recommendations for future growth and improvement of the service level. Performance evaluation of the existing system is based on meeting 25 liters per person per day while maintaining positive pressure at all nodes in the network. The future performance is based on meeting a minimum pressure of 20 psi in the main line, as proposed by Chase (2000). The EPANET model results yield an average nodal pressure for all communities of 71 psi, with a range from 1.3 – 160 psi. Thus, if the current water delivery schedule obtained from the local municipality is followed, all communities should have sufficient pressure to deliver 25 l/p/d, with the exception of Los Rosales, which can only supply 3.25 l/p/d. However, if the line to Los Rosales were increased from one to four inches, the system could supply this community with 25 l/p/d. The district of Independencia could greatly benefit from increasing the service level to 24-hour water delivery and a minimum of 50 l/p/d, so that communities without reliable access due to insufficient pressure would become equal beneficiaries of this invaluable resource. To evaluate the feasibility of this, EPANET was used to model the system with a range of population growth rates, system lifetimes, and demands. In order to meet a minimum pressure of 20 psi in the main line, the 6-inch diameter main line must be increased and approximately two miles of trench must be excavated up to 30 feet deep. The sections of the main line that must be excavated are mile 0-1 and 1.5-2.5, and the first 3.4 miles of the main line must be increased from 6 to 16 inches, contracting to 10 inches for the remaining 5.8 miles. Doing this would allow 24-hour water delivery and provide 50 l/p/d for a range of population growth rates and system lifetimes. It is expected that improving the water delivery service would reduce the morbidity and mortality from diarrheal diseases by decreasing the recontamination of the water due to transport and household storage, as well as by maintaining continuous pressure in the system to prevent infiltration of contaminated groundwater. However, this expansion must be carefully planned so as not to affect aquatic ecosystems or other districts utilizing water from the Pisco River. It is recommended that stream gaging of the Pisco River and precipitation monitoring of the surrounding watershed is initiated in order to begin a hydrological study that would be integrated into the district’s water resource planning. It is also recommended that the district begin routine water quality testing, with the results available to the public.

Learning Curves of Temporary Workers in Manual Order Picking Activities

Person-to-stock order picking is highly flexible and requires minimal investment costs in comparison to automated picking solutions. For these reasons, tradi-tional picking is widespread in distribution and production logistics. Due to its typically large proportion of manual activities, picking causes the highest operative personnel costs of all intralogistics process. The required personnel capacity in picking varies short- and mid-term due to capacity requirement fluctuations. These dynamics are often balanced by employing minimal permanent staff and using seasonal help when needed. The resulting high personnel fluctuation necessitates the frequent training of new pickers, which, in combination with in-creasingly complex work contents, highlights the im-portance of learning processes in picking. In industrial settings, learning is often quantified based on diminishing processing time and cost requirements with increasing experience. The best-known industrial learning curve models include those from Wright, de Jong, Baloff and Crossman, which are typically applied to the learning effects of an entire work crew rather than of individuals. These models have been validated in largely static work environments with homogeneous work contents. Little is known of learning effects in picking systems. Here, work contents are heterogeneous and individual work strategies vary among employees. A mix of temporary and steady employees with varying degrees of experience necessitates the observation of individual learning curves. In this paper, the individual picking performance development of temporary employees is analyzed and compared to that of steady employees in the same working environment.

Identity, incentives and the value of information

We examine the impact of identity preferences on the interrelation between incentives and performance measurement. In our model, a manager identifies with an organization and loses utility to the extent that his actions conflict with effort-standards issued by the principal. Contrary to prior arguments in the literature, we find conditions under which a manager who identifies strongly with the organization receives stronger incentives and faces more performance evaluation reports than a manager who does not identify with the organization. Our theory predicts that managers who experience events that boost their identification with the firm can decrease their effort in short-term value creation. We also find that firms are more likely to employ less precise but more congruent performance measures, such as stock prices, when contracting with managers who identify little with the organization. In contrast, they use more precise but less congruent measures, such as accounting earnings, when contracting with managers who identify strongly with the firm.

A real-time video quality estimator for emerging wireless multimedia systems

Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) are increasingly deployed to enable thousands of users to share, create, and access live video streaming with different characteristics and content, such as video surveillance and football matches. In this context, there is a need for new mechanisms for assessing the quality level of videos because operators are seeking to control their delivery process and optimize their network resources, while increasing the user’s satisfaction. However, the development of in-service and non-intrusive Quality of Experience assessment schemes for real-time Internet videos with different complexity and motion levels, Group of Picture lengths, and characteristics, remains a significant challenge. To address this issue, this article proposes a non-intrusive parametric real-time video quality estimator, called MultiQoE that correlates wireless networks’ impairments, videos’ characteristics, and users’ perception into a predicted Mean Opinion Score. An instance of MultiQoE was implemented in WMNs and performance evaluation results demonstrate the efficiency and accuracy of MultiQoE in predicting the user’s perception of live video streaming services when compared to subjective, objective, and well-known parametric solutions.

How Welfare States Shape the Democratic Public: Policy Feedback, Participation, Voting and Attitudes

This crucial volume significantly advances the study of policy feedbacks. With contributions from many subfields and methodological approaches, it offers both sophisticated theorizing and new empirical examples that show how policies make politics in a variety of ways. Innovative research designs provide more convincing inference than ever. And the normative questions engaged about welfare performance, evaluation, participation, and accountability could not be more important or timely in this era of austerity and discord over the future of welfare states.’

Opportunistic Routing for Multi-flow Video Dissemination over Flying Ad-Hoc Networks

A reliable and robust routing service for Flying Ad-Hoc Networks (FANETs) must be able to adapt to topology changes. User experience on watching live video sequences must also be satisfactory even in scenarios with buffer overflow and high packet loss ratio. In this paper, we introduce a Cross-layer Link quality and Geographical-aware beaconless opportunistic routing protocol (XLinGO). It enhances the transmission of simultaneous multiple video flows over FANETs by creating and keeping reliable persistent multi-hop routes. XLinGO considers a set of cross-layer and human-related information for routing decisions, as performance metrics and Quality of Experience (QoE). Performance evaluation shows that XLinGO achieves multimedia dissemination with QoE support and robustness in a multi-hop, multi-flow, and mobile network environments.

Information-Centric Networking in Mobile and Opportunistic Networks

Information Centric Networking (ICN) as an emerging paradigm for the Future Internet has initially been rather focusing on bandwidth savings in wired networks, but there might also be some significant potential to support communication in mobile wireless networks as well as opportunistic network scenarios, where end systems have spontaneous but time-limited contact to exchange data. This chapter addresses the reasoning why ICN has an important role in mobile and opportunistic networks by identifying several challenges in mobile and opportunistic Information-Centric Networks and discussing appropriate solutions for them. In particular, it discusses the issues of receiver and source mobility. Source mobility needs special attention. Solutions based on routing protocol extensions, indirection, and separation of name resolution and data transfer are discussed. Moreover, the chapter presents solutions for problems in opportunistic Information-Centric Networks. Among those are mechanisms for efficient content discovery in neighbour nodes, resume mechanisms to recover from intermittent connectivity disruptions, a novel agent delegation mechanisms to offload content discovery and delivery to mobile agent nodes, and the exploitation of overhearing to populate routing tables of mobile nodes. Some preliminary performance evaluation results of these developed mechanisms are provided.

Essays on behavioral aspects of the design and disclosure of compensation contracts

This thesis consists of four essays on the design and disclosure of compensation contracts. Essays 1, 2 and 3 focus on behavioral aspects of mandatory compensation disclosure rules and of contract negotiations in agency relationships. The three experimental studies develop psychology- based theory and present results that deviate from standard economic predictions. Furthermore, the results of Essay 1 and 2 also have implications for firms’ discretion in how to communicate their top management’s incentives to the capital market. Essay 4 analyzes the role of fairness perceptions for the evaluation of executive compensation. For this purpose, two surveys targeting representative eligible voters as well as investment professionals were conducted. Essay 1 investigates the role of the detailed ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’, which is part of the Security and Exchange Commission’s 2006 regulation, on investors’ evaluations of executive performance. Compensation disclosure complying with this regulation clarifies the relationship between realized reported compensation and the underlying performance measures and their target achievement levels. The experimental findings suggest that the salient presentation of executives’ incentives inherent in the ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’ makes investors’ performance evaluations less outcome dependent. Therefore, investors’ judgment and investment decisions might be less affected by noisy environmental factors that drive financial performance. The results also suggest that fairness perceptions of compensation contracts are essential for investors’ performance evaluations in that more transparent disclosure increases the perceived fairness of compensation and the performance evaluation of managers who are not responsible for a bad financial performance. These results have important practical implications as firms might choose to communicate their top management’s incentive compensation more transparently in order to benefit from less volatile expectations about their future performance. Similar to the first experiment, the experiment described in Essay 2 addresses the question of more transparent compensation disclosure. However, other than the first experiment, the second experiment does not analyze the effect of a more salient presentation of contract information but the informational effect of contract information itself. For this purpose, the experiment tests two conditions in which the assessment of the compensation contracts’ incentive compatibility, which determines executive effort, is either possible or not. On the one hand, the results suggest that the quality of investors’ expectations about executive effort is improved, but on the other hand investors might over-adjust their prior expectations about executive effort if being confronted with an unexpected financial performance and under-adjust if the financial performance confirms their prior expectations. Therefore, in the experiment, more transparent compensation disclosure does not lead to more correct overall judgments of executive effort and to even lower processing quality of outcome information. These results add to the literature on disclosure which predominantly advocates more transparency. The findings of the experiment however, identify decreased information processing quality as a relevant disclosure cost category. Firms might therefore carefully evaluate the additional costs and benefits of more transparent compensation disclosure. Together with the results from the experiment in Essay 1, the two experiments on compensation disclosure imply that firms should rather focus on their discretion how to present their compensation disclosure to benefit from investors’ improved fairness perceptions and their spill-over on performance evaluation. Essay 3 studies the behavioral effects of contextual factors in recruitment processes that do not affect the employer’s or the applicant’s bargaining power from a standard economic perspective. In particular, the experiment studies two common characteristics of recruitment processes: Pre-contractual competition among job applicants and job applicants’ non-binding effort announcements as they might be made during job interviews. Despite the standard economic irrelevance of these factors, the experiment develops theory regarding the behavioral effects on employees’ subsequent effort provision and the employers’ contract design choices. The experimental findings largely support the predictions. More specifically, the results suggest that firms can benefit from increased effort and, therefore, may generate higher profits. Further, firms may seize a larger share of the employment relationship’s profit by highlighting the competitive aspects of the recruitment process and by requiring applicants to make announcements about their future effort. Finally, Essay 4 studies the role of fairness perceptions for the public evaluation of executive compensation. Although economic criteria for the design of incentive compensation generally do not make restrictive recommendations with regard to the amount of compensation, fairness perceptions might be relevant from the perspective of firms and standard setters. This is because behavioral theory has identified fairness as an important determinant of individuals’ judgment and decisions. However, although fairness concerns about executive compensation are often stated in the popular media and even in the literature, evidence on the meaning of fairness in the context of executive compensation is scarce and ambiguous. In order to inform practitioners and standard setters whether fairness concerns are exclusive to non-professionals or relevant for investment professionals as well, the two surveys presented in Essay 4 aim to find commonalities in the opinions of representative eligible voters and investments professionals. The results suggest that fairness is an important criterion for both groups. Especially, exposure to risk in the form of the variable compensation share is an important criterion shared by both groups. The higher the assumed variable share, the higher is the compensation amount to be perceived as fair. However, to a large extent, opinions on executive compensation depend on personality characteristics, and to some extent, investment professionals’ perceptions deviate systematically from those of non-professionals. The findings imply that firms might benefit from emphasizing the riskiness of their managers’ variable pay components and, therefore, the findings are also in line with those of Essay 1.

AN OCCUPATIONAL INJURY MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS HEALTH SCIENCE CENTER AT HOUSTON

The purpose of this research and development project was to develop a method, a design, and a prototype for gathering, managing, and presenting data about occupational injuries.^ State-of-the-art systems analysis and design methodologies were applied to the long standing problem in the field of occupational safety and health of processing workplace injuries data into information for safety and health program management as well as preliminary research about accident etiologies. The top-down planning and bottom-up implementation approach was utilized to design an occupational injury management information system. A description of a managerial control system and a comprehensive system to integrate safety and health program management was provided.^ The project showed that current management information systems (MIS) theory and methods could be applied successfully to the problems of employee injury surveillance and control program performance evaluation. The model developed in the first section was applied at The University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston (UTHSCH).^ The system in current use at the UTHSCH was described and evaluated, and a prototype was developed for the UTHSCH. The prototype incorporated procedures for collecting, storing, and retrieving records of injuries and the procedures necessary to prepare reports, analyses, and graphics for management in the Health Science Center. Examples of reports, analyses, and graphics presenting UTHSCH and computer generated data were included.^ It was concluded that a pilot test of this MIS should be implemented and evaluated at the UTHSCH and other settings. Further research and development efforts for the total safety and health management information systems, control systems, component systems, and variable selection should be pursued. Finally, integration of the safety and health program MIS into the comprehensive or executive MIS was recommended. ^

International Transfer Pricing for Goods and Intangible Asset Licenses in a Decentralized Multinational Corporation: Review and Extensions

We review and extend the core literature on international transfer price manipulation to avoid or evade taxes. Under negotiated transfer pricing with a viable bargaining structure, including performance evaluation disconnected from the transfer price, divisions voluntarily exchange accurate information to obtain firm-wide optimality, a result not dependent on restraint from exercising internal market power. For intangible licenses, a larger optimal profit shift for a given tax rate change strengthens incentives for transfer pricing abuse. In practice, an intangible's arm's length range is viewed as a guideline, a context where incentives for abuse materialize. Transfer pricing for intangibles obliges greater tax authority scrutiny.

Evaluación de desempeño docente : valoración de la situación funcional

El sistema de evaluación de desempeño docente está reglamentado desde 1993 en la Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, año en que se puso en vigencia en la Facultad de Ciencias Agrarias. La normativa que lo rige menciona la situación funcional como elemento a evaluar, sin embargo no aporta criterios para ello. El objetivo de este trabajo fue relevar variables que, solas o en la forma de indicadores, permitieran detectar causas de actividad diferenciada por categoría, dedicación y ubicación curricular de los docentes. Se utilizó una encuesta autogestionada, asignada a los docentes mediante muestreo aleatorio estratificado. Los datos se procesaron mediante técnicas uni, bi y multivariadas. Con relación a las cuatro categorías establecidas en el Estatuto no se advirtieron diferencias notables en los tipos de actividades realizadas. Se hallaron diferencias para la dedicación docente y los ciclos curriculares (básico, instrumental y profesional). Se concluyó que: a) las categorías trabajan en forma pareja, pero los Profesores Titulares tienen mayor participación en posgrado; b) sólo los docentes de dedicación exclusiva cuentan con tiempo para realizar tareas de investigación, servicios y extensión; c) los docentes de los ciclos básico e instrumental desarrollan actividad más intensa en todas las áreas que los del ciclo profesional.

A modelling language for the resilience assessment of networked systems of systems

Systems of Systems (SoS) present challenging features and existing tools result often inadequate for their analysis, especially for heteregeneous networked infrastructures. Most accident scenarios in networked systems cannot be addressed by a simplistic black or white (i.e. functioning or failed) approach. Slow deviations from nominal operation conditions may cause degraded behaviours that suddenly end up into unexpected malfunctioning, with large portions of the network affected. In this paper,we present a language for modelling networked SoS. The language makes it possible to represent interdependencies of various natures, e.g. technical, organizational and human. The representation of interdependencies is based on control relationships that exchange physical quantities and related information. The language also makes it possible the identification of accident scenarios, by representing the propagation of failure events throughout the network. The results can be used for assessing the effectiveness of those mechanisms and measures that contribute to the overall resilience, both in qualitative and quantitative terms. The presented modelling methodology is general enough to be applied in combination with already existing system analysis techniques, such as risk assessment, dependability and performance evaluation