993 resultados para non-cooperative oligopoly
Resumo:
ABSTRACT Atlantirivulus riograndensis (Costa & Lanés, 2009) is a fish registered to the basin of Patos lagoon and the adjacent coastal plains in southern states of Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina, Brazil, found in shallow water courses with that have large quantities of aquatic vegetation and forest edges. The objective of this study was to investigate the reproductive strategy and tactics of this species including the sex ratio, the length at first maturity, spawning type, fecundity and the possible associations among reproduction and abiotic factors. Sampling of specimens occurred in perennial wetlands within the Banhado dos Pachecos wildlife refuge, in the city of Viamão, state of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil, which is a conservation unit that belongs to an area of environmental protection in the Pampa Biome. The capture of 30 A. riograndensis specimens per month occurred from January to December of 2012. A total of 188 females and 172 males were captured and the total sex ratio was 1:1 in the sampled population. Sexual maturity of the species occurs after 13.59 and 11.92 mm (SL) for females and males, respectively. Both a multiple spawning and a long reproductive period (since August to March) were confirmed by the presence of post-ovulatory follicles that were observed through histological analysis and the values of the gonadosomatic index in females considered spawning capable. The average absolute fecundity of the species is of 19.33 (± 6.18) vitellogenic oocytes in mature ovaries. No significant relationship was found between mean GSI and the abiotic data. Reproductive tactics presented by A. riograndensis indicate a species with an opportunistic reproductive strategy, following the pattern of other species of the Rivulidae family.
Resumo:
Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt
Resumo:
Information sharing in oligopoly has been analyzed by assuming that firms behave as a sole economic agent. In this paper I assume that ownership and management are separated. Managers are allowed to falsely report their costs to owners and rivals. Under such circumstances, if owners want to achieve information sharing they must use managerial contracts that implement truthful cost reporting by managers as a dominant strategy. I show that, contrary to the classical result, without the inclusion of message-dependent payments in managerial contracts there will be no information sharing. On the other hand, with the inclusion of such publicly observable payments and credible ex-ante commitment by owners not to modify these payments, there will be perfect information sharing without the need for third parties. Keywords: Information sharing, Delegation, Managerial contracts. JEL classification numbers: D21, D82, L13, L21
Resumo:
This note describes ParallelKnoppix, a bootable CD that allows econometricians with average knowledge of computers to create and begin using a high performance computing cluster for parallel computing in very little time. The computers used may be heterogeneous machines, and clusters of up to 200 nodes are supported. When the cluster is shut down, all machines are in their original state, so their temporary use in the cluster does not interfere with their normal uses. An example shows how a Monte Carlo study of a bootstrap test procedure may be done in parallel. Using a cluster of 20 nodes, the example runs approximately 20 times faster than it does on a single computer.
Resumo:
This note describes ParallelKnoppix, a bootable CD that allows creation of a Linux cluster in very little time. An experienced user can create a cluster ready to execute MPI programs in less than 10 minutes. The computers used may be heterogeneous machines, of the IA-32 architecture. When the cluster is shut down, all machines except one are in their original state, and the last can be returned to its original state by deleting a directory. The system thus provides a means of using non-dedicated computers to create a cluster. An example session is documented.
Resumo:
We consider the allocation of a finite number of indivisible objects to the same number of agents according to an exogenously given queue. We assume that the agents collaborate in order to achieve an efficient outcome for society. We allow for side-payments and provide a method for obtaining stable outcomes.
Resumo:
We study the location-inventory model as introduced by Teo et al. (2001) to analyze the impact of consolidation of distribution centers on facility and inventory costs. We extend their result on profitability of consolidation. We associate a cooperative game with each location-inventory situation and prove that this game has a non-empty core for identical and independent demand processes. This illustrates that consolidation does not only lower joint costs (which was shown by Teo et al. (2001)), but it allows for a stable division of the minimal costs as well.
Resumo:
In this paper we consider a model of cooperative production in which rational agents have the possibility to engage in sabotage activities that decrease output. It is shown that sabotage depends on the interplay between the degree of congestion, the technology of sabotage, the number of agents the degree of meritocracy and the form of the sharing rule. In particular it is shown that, ceteries paribus, meritocratic systems give more incentives to sabotage than egalitarian systems. We address two questions: The degree of meritocracy that is compatible with absence of sabotage and the existence of a Nash equilibrium with and without sabotage.
Resumo:
We study of noncompact Euclidean cone manifolds with cone angles less than c&2π and singular locus a submanifold. More precisely, we describe its structure outside a compact set. As a corol lary we classify those with cone angles & 2π/3 and those with cone angles = 2π/3.