A model to estimate the US term structure of interest rates

The US term structure of interest rates plays a central role in fixed-income analysis. For example, estimating accurately the US term structure is a crucial step for those interested in analyzing Brazilian Brady bonds such as IDUs, DCBs, FLIRBs, EIs, etc. In this work we present a statistical model to estimate the US term structure of interest rates. We address in this report all major issues which drove us in the process of implementing the model developed, concentrating on important practical issues such as computational efficiency, robustness of the final implementation, the statistical properties of the final model, etc. Numerical examples are provided in order to illustrate the use of the model on a daily basis.

Essays on the monetary aspects of the term structure of nominal interest rates

Interest rates are key economic variables to much of finance and macroeconomics, and an enormous amount of work is found in both fields about the topic. Curiously, in spite of their common interest, finance and macro research on the topic have seldom interacted, using different approaches to address its main issues with almost no intersection. Concerned with interest rate contingent claims, finance term structure models relate interest rates to lagged interest rates; concerned with economic relations and macro dynamics, macro models regress a few interest rates on a wide variety of economic variables. If models are true though simplified descriptions of reality, the relevant factors should be captured by both the set of bond yields and that of economic variables. Each approach should be able to address the other field concerns with equal emciency, since the economic variables are revealed by the bond yields and these by the economic variables.

A utilização de modelos de duração para gerenciar risco de crédito

Os modelos hazard, também conhecidos por modelos de tempo até a falência ou duração, são empregados para determinar quais variáveis independentes têm maior poder explicativo na previsão de falência de empresas. Consistem em uma abordagem alternativa aos modelos binários logit e probit, e à análise discriminante. Os modelos de duração deveriam ser mais eficientes que modelos de alternativas discretas, pois levam em consideração o tempo de sobrevivência para estimar a probabilidade instantânea de falência de um conjunto de observações sobre uma variável independente. Os modelos de alternativa discreta tipicamente ignoram a informação de tempo até a falência, e fornecem apenas a estimativa de falhar em um dado intervalo de tempo. A questão discutida neste trabalho é como utilizar modelos hazard para projetar taxas de inadimplência e construir matrizes de migração condicionadas ao estado da economia. Conceitualmente, o modelo é bastante análogo às taxas históricas de inadimplência e mortalidade utilizadas na literatura de crédito. O Modelo Semiparamétrico Proporcional de Cox é testado em empresas brasileiras não pertencentes ao setor financeiro, e observa-se que a probabilidade de inadimplência diminui sensivelmente após o terceiro ano da emissão do empréstimo. Observa-se também que a média e o desvio-padrão das probabilidades de inadimplência são afetados pelos ciclos econômicos. É discutido como o Modelo Proporcional de Cox pode ser incorporado aos quatro modelos mais famosos de gestão de risco .de crédito da atualidade: CreditRisk +, KMV, CreditPortfolio View e CreditMetrics, e as melhorias resultantes dessa incorporação

Does location matter to explain loan interest rates? evidence from Brazilian highly concentrad local markets

O setor bancário brasileiro é altamente concentrado. Embora concentração não signifique necessariamente que o mercado se comporta de forma não competitiva, o grau de competição é freqüentemente questionado no país. Utilizando uma base de dados extensiva e única do mercado de crédito brasileiro, este trabalho procura avaliar muitos dos fatores que contribuem para a variação nas taxas de juros cobradas pelos bancos nos diferentes mercados locais em duas categorias de empréstimos. A concentração não é significante ou mesmo associada a taxas de juros mais baixas, em parte devido ao papel dos bancos públicos. O prêmio de default é positivo e significante, e há alguma evidência de imperfeição de mercado. Neste trabalho, analisamos também o comportamento de precificação dos bancos em diferentes regiões do país, e encontramos que a localização é importante para explicar as taxas de juros dos empréstimos.

A general lagrangian approach for non-concave moral hazard problems

We establish a general Lagrangian for the moral hazard problem which generalizes the well known first order approach (FOA). It requires that besides the multiplier of the first order condition, there exist multipliers for the second order condition and for the binding actions of the incentive compatibility constraint. Some examples show that our approach can be useful to treat the finite and infinite state space cases. One of the examples is solved by the second order approach. We also compare our Lagrangian with 1\1irrlees'.

Convex combinations of long memory estimates from different sampling rates

Convex combinations of long memory estimates using the same data observed at different sampling rates can decrease the standard deviation of the estimates, at the cost of inducing a slight bias. The convex combination of such estimates requires a preliminary correction for the bias observed at lower sampling rates, reported by Souza and Smith (2002). Through Monte Carlo simulations, we investigate the bias and the standard deviation of the combined estimates, as well as the root mean squared error (RMSE), which takes both into account. While comparing the results of standard methods and their combined versions, the latter achieve lower RMSE, for the two semi-parametric estimators under study (by about 30% on average for ARFIMA(0,d,0) series).

Stochastic growth and monetary policy: the impacts on the term structure of interest rates

This paper builds a simple, empirically-verifiable rational expectations model for term structure of nominal interest rates analysis. It solves an stochastic growth model with investment costs and sticky inflation, susceptible to the intervention of the monetary authority following a policy rule. The model predicts several patterns of the term structure which are in accordance to observed empirical facts: (i) pro-cyclical pattern of the level of nominal interest rates; (ii) countercyclical pattern of the term spread; (iii) pro-cyclical pattern of the curvature of the yield curve; (iv) lower predictability of the slope of the middle of the term structure; and (v) negative correlation of changes in real rates and expected inflation at short horizons.

Microeconomic instability and children's human capital accumulation: the effects of idiosyncratic shocks to father's income on child labor, school drop-outs and repetition rates in Brazil

This paper evaluates the long-run effects of economic instability. In particular, we study the impact of idiosyncratic shocks to father’s income on children’s human capital accumulation variables such as school drop-outs, repetition rates and domestic and non-domestic labor. Although, the problem of child labor in Brazil has declined greatly during the last decade, the number of children working is still substantial. The low levels of educational attainment in Brazil are also a main cause for concern. The large rotating panel data set used allows for the estimation of the impacts of changes in occupational and income status of fathers on changes in his child’s time allocation circumstances. The empirical analysis is restricted to families with fathers, mothers and at least one child between 10 and 15 years of age in the main Brazilian metropolitan areas during the 1982-1999 period. We perform logistic regressions controlling for child characteristics (gender, age, if he/she is behind in school for age), parents characteristics (grade attainment and income) and time and location variables. The main variables analyzed are dynamic proxies of impulses and responses, namely: shocks to household head’s income and unemployment status, on the one hand and child’s probability of dropping out of school, of repeating a grade and of start working, on the other. The findings suggest that father’s income has a significant positive correlation with child’s dropping out of school and of repeating a grade. The findings do not suggest a significant relationship between a father’s becoming unemployed and a child entering the non-domestic labor market. However, the results demonstrate a significant positive relationship between a father becoming unemployed and a child beginning to work in domestic labor. There was also a positive correlation between father becoming unemployed and a child dropping out and repeating a grade. Both gender and age were highly significant with boys and older children being more likely to work, drop-out and repeat grades.

A general lagrangian approach for non-concave moral hazard problems

We establish a general Lagrangian for the moral hazard problem which generalizes the well known first order approach (FOA). It requires that besides the multiplier of the first order condition, there exist multipliers for the second order condition and for the binding actions of the incentive compatibility constraint. Some examples show that our approach can be useful to treat the finite and infinite state space cases. One of the examples is solved by the second order approach. We also compare our Lagrangian with 1\1irrlees'.

US real interest rates and default risk in emerging economies

This paper empirically investigates the impact of changes in US real interest rates on sovereign default risk in emerging economies using the method of identification through heteroskedasticity. Policy-induced increases in US interest rates starkly raise default risk in emerging market economies. However, the overall correlation between US real interest rates and the risk of default is negative, demonstrating that the effects of other variables dominate the anterior relationship

Moral hazard and nonlinear pricing in a general equilibrium model

The paper analyzes a two period general equilibrium model with individual risk and moral hazard. Each household faces two individual states of nature in the second period. These states solely differ in the household's vector of initial endowments, which is strictly larger in the first state (good state) than in the second state (bad state). In the first period households choose a non-observable action. Higher leveis of action give higher probability of the good state of nature to occur, but lower leveIs of utility. Households have access to an insurance market that allows transfer of income across states of oature. I consider two models of financiaI markets, the price-taking behavior model and the nonlínear pricing modelo In the price-taking behavior model suppliers of insurance have a belief about each household's actíon and take asset prices as given. A variation of standard arguments shows the existence of a rational expectations equilibrium. For a generic set of economies every equilibrium is constraíned sub-optímal: there are commodity prices and a reallocation of financiaI assets satisfying the first period budget constraint such that, at each household's optimal choice given those prices and asset reallocation, markets clear and every household's welfare improves. In the nonlinear pricing model suppliers of insurance behave strategically offering nonlinear pricing contracts to the households. I provide sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and investigate the optimality properties of the modeI. If there is a single commodity then every equilibrium is constrained optimaI. Ir there is more than one commodity, then for a generic set of economies every equilibrium is constrained sub-optimaI.

Does liquidity constraints matter for Ricardian equivalence?

The paper analysis a general equilibrium model with two periods, several households and a government that has to finance some expenditures in the first period. Households may have some private information either about their type (adverse selection) or about some action levei chosen in the first period that affects the probability of certain states of nature in the second period (moral hazard). Trade of financiai assets are intermediated by a finite collection of banks. Banks objective functions are determined in equilibrium by shareholders. Due to private information it may be optimal for the banks to introduce constraints in the set of available portfolios for each household as wellas household specific asset prices. In particular, households may face distinct interest rates for holding the risk-free asset. The government finances its expenditures either by taxing households in the first period or by issuing bonds in the first period and taxing households in the second period. Taxes may be state-dependent. Suppose government policies are neutml: i) government policies do not affect the distribution of wealth across households; and ii) if the government decides to tax a household in the second period there is a portfolio available for the banks that generates the Mme payoff in each state of nature as the household taxes. Tben, Ricardian equivalence holds if and only if an appropriate boundary condition is satisfied. Moreover, at every free-entry equilibrium the boundary condition is satisfied and thus Ricardian equivalence holds. These results do not require any particular assumption on the banks' objective function. In particular, we do not assume banks to be risk neutral.

Contracting with repeated moral hazard and private evaluations

A repeated moral hazard setting in which the Principal privately observes the Agent’s output is studied. It is shown that there is no loss from restricting the analysis to contracts in which the Agent is supposed to exert effort every period, receives a constant efficiency wage and no feedback until he is fired. The optimal contract for a finite horizon is characterized, and shown to require burning of resources. These are only burnt after the worst possible realization sequence and the amount is independent of both the length of the horizon and the discount factor (δ). For the infinite horizon case a family of fixed interval review contracts is characterized and shown to achieve first best as δ → 1. The optimal contract when δ << 1 is partially characterized. Incentives are optimally provided with a combination of efficiency wages and the threat of termination, which will exhibit memory over the whole history of realizations. Finally, Tournaments are shown to provide an alternative solution to the problem.

The distribution of average and marginal effective tax rates in European Union member states

Macro-based summary indicators of effective tax burdens do not capture differences in effective tax rates facing different sub-groups of the population. They also cannot provide information on the level or distribution of the marginal effective tax rates thought to influence household behaviour. I use EUROMOD, an EU-wide tax-benefit microsimulation model, to compute distributions of average and marginal effective tax rates across the household population in fourteen European Union Member States. Using different definitions of ‘net taxes’, the tax base and the unit of analysis I present a range of measures showing the contribution of the tax-benefit system to household incomes, the average effective tax rates applicable to income from labour and marginal effective tax rates faced by working men and women. In a second step, effective tax rates are broken down to separately show the influence of each type of tax-benefit instrument. The results show that measures of effective tax rates vary considerably depending on incomes, labour market situations and family circumstances. Using single averages or macro-based indicators will therefore provide an inappropriate picture of tax burdens faced by large parts of the population.