982 resultados para eleições
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In the second consecutive election for the Brazilian Chamber ofDeputies, the majority of incumbents (75% in 1998 and again 75% in 2002) decided to run for reelection and at least 70% ofthem in both elections were successful, suggesting thus it would be incorrect to ignore static ambition as the main target of Brazilian legislators. It also raises doubts about the assertion that incumbents use their posts to pursue their post-Iegislative careers. However, this number also suggests that not alIlegislators seek reelection, indicating that it is also incorrect to assume alI of them are driven by similar motivations. In their attempts at career survival, incumbents may also run for higher offices (Senator, Governor, Vicegovernor). A minority still, may run for state leveI offices (regressive ambition).Given that static and progressive ambition are the two main types of career choice in Brazil, we focus on the factors that influence the career decision and electoral success of those who choose to run for reelection and those who choose to run for higher-level offices, i.e. senator and governor. We use data recently colIected from the 2002 elections.
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This article first presents an econometric study suggesting that intergovernmental transfers to Brazilian municipalities are strongly partisan motivated. In light of that stylized fact, it develops an extension to Rogoff (1990)’s model to analyze the effect of partisan motivated transfers into sub-national electoral and fiscal equilibria. The main finding is that important partisan transfers may undo the positive selection aspect of political budget cycles. Indeed, partisan transfers may, on one hand, eliminate the political budget cycle, solving a moral hazard problem, but, on the other hand, they may retain an incompetent incumbent in office, bringing about an adverse selection problem.
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This article presents a game-theoretic partisan model of voting and political bargaining. In a two-period setup, voters ¯rst elect an executive incumbent and the legislators from a pool of candidates belonging to di®erent parties. Once elected, the executive and the legislature bargain over a budget. Party origin and a relevant parameter of the economy, the state of the world, in°uence the bargaining cost, such that political gridlocks may occur. At the end of the ¯rst period voters observe the outcome of bargaining but do not observe the true estate of the world, and decide whether or not to reelect the same parties for the Executive and the Legislature. The model con¯rms the very recent literature by showing that voters tend to have more °exible reelection criteria when they believe the true state of the world is likely to be unfavorable. On the other hand, when voters believe the true state of the world is likely to be favorable, they become more demanding in order to reelect the incumbents. In particular, there will be government shutdown with positive probability in equilibrium. Gridlocks occur due to the imperfect information of voters and they constitute indeed an information revelation mechanism that improves electoral control in the second period.
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O espaço público virtual constituído nas “redes” perpassa hoje o privado e o público e revela um potencial inaudito para revigorar a democracia, que, no mundo inteiro, vivencia uma crise. Ele eleva a capacidade de transparência do Estado, auxiliando a tomada de decisões, o monitoramento pela sociedade civil e a superação de eventuais déficits de representação apresentados pelo sistema político brasileiro.
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Much research has explored the relationship between economics and elections, and scholars have begun to explore how institutions mediate that link. However, the relationship between presidential institutions and electoral accountability remains largely unexplored in comparative politics. Because voters in presidential systems can cast votes for executive and legislative elections separately, we have good reasons to suspect that the institutions of presidentialism might generate different forms or degrees of accountability than parliamentarism. Powell and Whitten (1993) suggest that the partisan or institutional “clarity of responsibility” might mediate the relationship between economics and elections: when responsibility for outcomes is clear, the relationship should be strong, and vice-versa. I develop this notion for use in presidential systems, and explore executive and legislative elections in 24 countries. The results indicate that economics always influences the incumbent vote in executive elections, regardless of the partisan or institutional clarity of responsibility. Economics also affects vote swings in legislative elections, but the institutional clarity of responsibility does mediate this relationship: legislative accountability for national economic outcomes is lowest when clarity of responsibility is highest, a situation that arises when the president is relatively more powerful and the bases for electing legislators and the president differ. By providing an empirical basis for a discussion of accountability under presidentialism, these findings contribute to important debates in comparative politics.
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This paper uses a unique dataset of political corruption, constructed from municipal audit reports obtained from Brazil’s randomized anti-corruption program, to test whether reelection incentives affect the level of rent extraction of incumbent politicians. In order to identify reelection incentives, we use the existence of a term limit in Brazil’s municipal elections. We find that in municipalities where mayors are in their second and final term, there is significantly more corruption compared to similar municipalities where mayors are in their first-term. In particular, in municipalities with second-term mayors there is, on average, R$188,431 more diversion of resources and the incidence of irregularities is 23% higher. We also find more pronounced effects where the costs of rent-extraction are lower (municipalities without media and judicial presence), and the density of pivotal voters is higher (more political competition). Finally, we show that first-term mayors, while less corrupt, have a larger incidence of poor administration suggesting that there may exist a trade-off between corruption and quality in public good provision.
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This paper examines whether access to information enhances political accountabil- ity. Based upon the results of Brazil's recent anti-corruption program that randomly audits municipal expenditures of federally-transferred funds, it estimates the e®ects of the disclosure of local government corruption practices upon the re-election success of incumbent mayors. Comparing municipalities audited before and after the elections, we show that the audit policy reduced the incumbent's likelihood of re-election by approximately 20 percent, and was more pronounced in municipalities with radio sta- tions. These ¯ndings highlight the value of information and the role of the media in reducing informational asymmetries in the political process.
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Aborto, investimentos em saneamento básico e o estado da economia brasileira foram os temas que tiveram maior repercussão nas redes durante o debate entre os presidenciáveis realizado na noite desta segunda (1º). Os resultados foram obtidos a partir de análise do Pulso do País, ferramenta de monitoramento em tempo real da internet lançado ontem pela DAPP-FGV em parceria com O Globo. No total, foram registradas cerca de 60 mil menções ligadas ao debate.
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As políticas de combate à fome e as propostas de reforma política estiveram entre os temas mais debatidos nas redes sociais durante o debate presidencial promovido ontem pela CNBB. Nas quase duas horas e meia em que os candidatos discutiram posições em torno de diversas questões, foram registradas cerca de 53 mil menções relativas ao debate, das quais 23 mil se referiram a “fome”, “reforma política” e “democracia” – indicando que políticas de segurança alimentar encontram amparo entre os eleitores, mas também que, diante de um quadro de crise de representação, a discussão sobre reforma institucional possui respaldo social.
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Retirada do Jornal O Globo.
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Informação retirada do Jornal O Globo
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O primeiro debate do segundo turno entre os candidatos à Presidência, realizado ontem (14) à noite, foi marcado por denúncias de corrupção de ambas as partes e por discussões em torno de programas sociais, seguidas por questões ligadas à economia. Os temas comportamentais, como aborto, drogas e homofobia, que marcaram os debates no primeiro turno, ficaram em segundo plano, marcando uma importante diferença entre a agenda pública debatida antes de 5 de outubro pelos candidatos e a agenda que se coloca para a etapa final da campanha.
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O segundo debate do 2º turno entre os candidatos à Presidência da República, realizado ontem (16), foi marcado por discussões a respeito da Petrobras e as acusações de nepotismo dos dois lados. Discussões sobre economia e o estado de Minas Gerais, origem dos dois candidatos, também tiveram relevância nas redes. O debate foi criticado pela ausência de temas de políticas públicas e pela frequente troca de acusações entre os candidatos.
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O terceiro debate do 2º turno entre os candidatos à Presidência da República, realizado ontem (19), foi marcado por menções nas redes sociais a Minas Gerais e educação. Discussões sobre corrupção e economia também tiveram presença forte online. O debate nas redes apresentou uma pauta mais abrangente, incluindo não só as constantes referências a casos de corrupção, mas também menções a politicas públicas de educação e economia.
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O quarto e último debate do 2º turno entre os candidatos à Presidência da República, ocorrido nesta sexta-feira, 24 de outubro, (24), apresentou grande número de menções nas redes sociais à corrupção, às políticas sociais e à crise hídrica. O debate mais propositivo do segundo turno teve reflexos nas redes: foi o maior volume de menções registrado nos debates em 2014. A pauta das discussões online seguiu a tendência do último debate de mesclar referências aos casos de corrupção e aos programas sociais, principalmente de educação e habitação.