Economic cycles, asymmetric crises and tourism competitiveness: emerging versus mature destinations

This paper considers the influence of business cycles and economic crises on tourism destinations competitiveness. This competitiveness is measured by its share in world tourism. Analysing a period of forty years, the differential permanent or temporary effects that economic crises has on competitiveness of mature and emerging destinations are observed. Furthermore, it identifies the economic transmission mechanisms operating within this context, analysing them using the framework of the most relevant explanatory models of tourism destination competitiveness. The preliminary results obtained suggest that the effects of these shocks on competitiveness are not neutral. In mature destinations the negative effects are more persistent in highly intensive crises. In emerging destinations with a growing natural trend on tourism demand, the effects of the economic crises are softer and limited, reinforcing the process of convergence between destinations. This effect works through two basic transmission mechanisms: the reduction of internal and external tourism demand and the decrease on investment.

Economic crises and tourism competitiveness: A Markov swtiching regression approach

Authors discuss the effects that economic crises generate on the global market shares of tourism destinations, through a series of potential transmission mechanisms based on the main economic competitiveness determinants identified in the previous literature using a non-linear approach. Specifically a Markov Switching Regression approach is used to estimate the effect of two basic transmission mechanisms: reductions of internal and external tourism demands and falling investment.

Granger causality and systemic risk

Building on the concept of Granger causality in risk in Hong et al. (2009), and focusing on an international sample of large-capitalization banks, we test for predictability in comovements in the left tails of returns of individual banks and the global system. The main results show that large individual shocks (defined as balance-sheet contractions exceeding the 1% VaR level) are a strong predictor of subsequent shocks in the global system. This evidence is particularly strong for US banks with large desks of proprietary trading. Similarly, we document strong evidence of financial vulnerabilities (exposures) to systemic shocks in US subprime creditors.

Visions of the Spanish Revolution: identities and conflicts in post-welfare societies

This is a case study that analyzes photographic documents of the social protest in Spain between 2011 and 2013. The analysis is qualitative and considers the use of space, the visual expression of the messages and the orientation toward the causes or effects of political, economic and social changes. Visual sociology allows us to appreciate, in the case of the Spanish Revolution, a dynamic of “reflexivity” unrecognizable from other research approaches. Two successive waves of social mobilization in response to two different shocks can be appreciated. The first is given by political corruption, unemployment and the threat to consumer society. The second shock is caused by the savage cuts in the Welfare State. Social mobilization is expressed differently in each phase, and the forms taken by the protests show how the class structure in post industrial society shapes the reactions to the crisis of the Welfare State.

The effects of economic crises on tourism success: an integrated model

This paper provides a theoretical model of the influence of economic crises on tourism destination performance. It discusses the temporary and permanent effects of economic crises on the global market shares of tourism destinations through a series of potential transmission mechanisms based on the main economic competitiveness determinants identified in the literature. The proposed model explains the non-neutrality of economic shocks in tourism competitiveness. The model is tested on Spain's tourism industry, which is among the leaders of the global tourism sector, for the period 1970–2013 using non-linear econometric techniques. The empirical analysis confirms that the proposed model is appropriate for explaining the changes in the market positions caused by the economic crises.

Essays in dynamic optimal taxation: working experience, unemployment scarring and poverty

This thesis investigates the design of optimal tax systems in dynamic environments. The first essay characterizes the optimal tax system where wages depend on stochastic shocks and work experience. In addition to redistributive and efficiency motives, the taxation of inexperienced workers depends on a second-best requirement that encourages work experience, a social insurance motive and incentive effects. Calibrations using U.S. data yield higher expected optimal marginal income tax rates for experienced workers for most of the inexperienced workers. They confirm that the average marginal income tax rate increases (decreases) with age when shocks and work experience are substitutes (complements). Finally, more variability in experienced workers' earnings prospects leads to increasing tax rates since income taxation acts as a social insurance mechanism. In the second essay, the properties of an optimal tax system are investigated in a dynamic private information economy where labor market frictions create unemployment that destroys workers' human capital. A two-skill type model is considered where wages and employment are endogenous. I find that the optimal tax system distorts the first-period wages of all workers below their efficient levels which leads to more employment. The standard no-distortion-at-the-top result no longer holds due to the combination of private information and the destruction of human capital. I show this result analytically under the Maximin social welfare function and confirm it numerically for a general social welfare function. I also investigate the use of a training program and job creation subsidies. The final essay analyzes the optimal linear tax system when there is a population of individuals whose perceptions of savings are linked to their disposable income and their family background through family cultural transmission. Aside from the standard equity/efficiency trade-off, taxes account for the endogeneity of perceptions through two channels. First, taxing labor decreases income, which decreases the perception of savings through time. Second, taxation on savings corrects for the misperceptions of workers and thus savings and labor decisions. Numerical simulations confirm that behavioral issues push labor income taxes upward to finance saving subsidies. Government transfers to individuals are also decreased to finance those same subsidies.

International Capital Flows and Monetary Policy Spillovers

This dissertation examines the drivers and implications of international capital flows. The overarching motivation is the observation that countries not at the centre of global financial markets are subject to considerable spillovers from centre countries, notably from their monetary policy. I present new empirical evidence on the determinants of the observed patterns of international capital flows and monetary policy spillovers, and study their effect on both financial markets and the real economy. In Chapter 2 I provide evidence on the determinants of a puzzling negative correlation observed between productivity growth and net capital inflows to developing and emerging market economies (EMEs) since 1980. By disaggregating net capital inflows into their gross components, I show that this negative correlation is explained by capital outflows related to purchases of very liquid assets from the fastest growing countries. My results suggest a desire for international portfolio diversification in liquid assets by fast growing countries is driving much of the original puzzle. In the reminder of my dissertation I pivot to study the foreign characteristics that drive international capital flows and monetary policy spillovers, with a particular focus on the role of unconventional monetary policy in the United States (U.S.). In Chapter 3 I show that a significant portion of the heterogeneity in EMEs' asset price adjustment following the quantitative easing operations by the Federal Reserve (the Fed) during 2008-2014 can be explained by the degree of bilateral capital market frictions between these countries and the U.S. This is true even after accounting for capital controls, exchange rate regimes, and domestic monetary policies. Chapter 4, co-authored with Michal Ksawery Popiel, studies unconventional monetary policy in a small open economy, looking specifically at the case of Canada since the global financial crisis. We quantify the effect Canadian unconventional monetary policy shocks had on the real economy, while carefully controlling for and quantifying spillovers from U.S. unconventional monetary policy. Our results indicate that the Bank of Canada's unconventional monetary policy increased Canadian output significantly from 2009-2010, but that spillovers from the Fed's policy were even more important for increasing Canadian output after 2008.

Principles of a Two-Tier European Deposit (Re-)Insurance System. CEPS Policy Brief No. 287, 17 April 2013.

There is general agreement that banking supervision and resolution have to be organised at the same level. It is often argued, however, that there is no need to tackle deposit insurance because it is too politically sensitive. This note proposes to apply the principles of subsidiarity and re-insurance to deposit insurance: Existing national deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) would continue to operate much as before (with only minimal standards set by an EU directive), but they would be required to take out re-insurance against risks that would be too large to be covered by them. A European Reinsurance Fund (EReIF) would provide this reinsurance financed by premia paid by the national DGSs, just as any reinsurance company does in the private sector. The European Fund would pay out only in case of large losses. This ‘deductible’ would provide the national authorities with the proper incentives, but the reinsurance cover would stabilize depositor confidence even in the case of large shocks. Ideally the national DGSs would be responsible also for resolution. Experience has shown banking systems are more stable if deposit insurers are also responsible for resolution. The approach proposed here could thus be also used to design the ‘Single Resolution Mechanism’ (SRM) which is being discussed as a complement to the ‘Single Supervisory Mechanism’ (SSM). It will of course take time to build up the funding for such a reinsurance fund. This approach is thus not meant to deal with legacy problems from the current crisis.

Inflation persistence in Central and Eastern European countries. Bruegel Working Paper 2013/04, 22 July 2013

This paper studies inflation persistence with time-varying coefficient autoregressions for twelve central European countries,in comparison with the United States and the euro area. Inflation persistence tends to be higher in times of high inflation. Since the oil price shocks, inflation persistence has declined both in the US and euro-area. In most central and eastern European countries, for which our study covers 1993-2012, inflation persistence has also declined, with the main exceptions of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia, where persistence seems to be rather stable.

Fiscal policy, banks and the financial crisis. National Bank of Belgium Working Paper No. 234, October 2012

This paper studies the effectiveness of Euro Area (EA) fiscal policy, during the recent financial crisis, using an estimated New Keynesian model with a bank. A key dimension of policy in the crisis was massive government support for banks—that dimension has so far received little attention in the macroeconomics literature. We use the estimated model to analyze the effects of bank asset losses, of government support for banks, and other fiscal stimulus measures, in the EA. Our results suggest that support for banks had a stabilizing effect on EA output, consumption and investment. Increased government purchases helped to stabilize output, but crowded out consumption. Higher transfers to households had a positive impact on private consumption, but a negligible effect on output and investment. Banking shocks and increased government spending explain half of the rise in the public debt/GDP ratio since the onset of the crisis.

Proposal for a Stabilisation Fund for the EMU. CEPS Working Document No. 385, 14 October 2013

This paper argues that it should be possible to complement Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union with an insurance-type shock absorption mechanism to increase the resilience of member countries to economic shocks and reduce output volatility. Such a mechanism would neither require the establishment of a central authority, nor would it lead to permanent transfers between countries. For this mechanism to become a reality, however, it would be necessary to overcome certain technical problems linked to the difficulty of anticipating correctly the position of an economy in the business cycle.

Essays on the Effects of Corporate Taxation

Cette thèse est une collection de trois articles en macroéconomie et finances publiques. Elle développe des modèles d'Equilibre Général Dynamique et Stochastique pour analyser les implications macroéconomiques des politiques d'imposition des entreprises en présence de marchés financiers imparfaits. Le premier chapitre analyse les mécanismes de transmission à l'économie, des effets d'un ré-échelonnement de l'impôt sur le profit des entreprises. Dans une économie constituée d'un gouvernement, d'une firme représentative et d'un ménage représentatif, j'élabore un théorème de l'équivalence ricardienne avec l'impôt sur le profit des entreprises. Plus particulièrement, j'établis que si les marchés financiers sont parfaits, un ré-échelonnement de l'impôt sur le profit des entreprises qui ne change pas la valeur présente de l'impôt total auquel l'entreprise est assujettie sur toute sa durée de vie n'a aucun effet réel sur l'économie si l'état utilise un impôt forfaitaire. Ensuite, en présence de marchés financiers imparfaits, je montre qu'une une baisse temporaire de l'impôt forfaitaire sur le profit des entreprises stimule l'investissement parce qu'il réduit temporairement le coût marginal de l'investissement. Enfin, mes résultats indiquent que si l'impôt est proportionnel au profit des entreprises, l'anticipation de taxes élevées dans le futur réduit le rendement espéré de l'investissement et atténue la stimulation de l'investissement engendrée par la réduction d'impôt. Le deuxième chapitre est écrit en collaboration avec Rui Castro. Dans cet article, nous avons quantifié les effets sur les décisions individuelles d'investis-sement et de production des entreprises ainsi que sur les agrégats macroéconomiques, d'une baisse temporaire de l'impôt sur le profit des entreprises en présence de marchés financiers imparfaits. Dans un modèle où les entreprises sont sujettes à des chocs de productivité idiosyncratiques, nous avons d'abord établi que le rationnement de crédit affecte plus les petites (jeunes) entreprises que les grandes entreprises. Pour des entreprises de même taille, les entreprises les plus productives sont celles qui souffrent le plus du manque de liquidité résultant des imperfections du marché financier. Ensuite, nous montré que pour une baisse de 1 dollar du revenu de l'impôt, l'investissement et la production augmentent respectivement de 26 et 3,5 centimes. L'effet cumulatif indique une augmentation de l'investissement et de la production agrégés respectivement de 4,6 et 7,2 centimes. Au niveau individuel, nos résultats indiquent que la politique stimule l'investissement des petites entreprises, initialement en manque de liquidité, alors qu'elle réduit l'investissement des grandes entreprises, initialement non contraintes. Le troisième chapitre est consacré à l'analyse des effets de la réforme de l'imposition des revenus d'entreprise proposée par le Trésor américain en 1992. La proposition de réforme recommande l'élimination des impôts sur les dividendes et les gains en capital et l'imposition d'une seule taxe sur le revenu des entreprises. Pour ce faire, j'ai eu recours à un modèle dynamique stochastique d'équilibre général avec marchés financiers imparfaits dans lequel les entreprises sont sujettes à des chocs idiosyncratiques de productivité. Les résultats indiquent que l'abolition des impôts sur les dividendes et les gains en capital réduisent les distorsions dans les choix d'investissement des entreprises, stimule l'investissement et entraîne une meilleure allocation du capital. Mais pour être financièrement soutenable, la réforme nécessite un relèvement du taux de l'impôt sur le profit des entreprises de 34\% à 42\%. Cette hausse du taux d'imposition décourage l'accumulation du capital. En somme, la réforme engendre une baisse de l'accumulation du capital et de la production respectivement de 8\% et 1\%. Néanmoins, elle améliore l'allocation du capital de 20\%, engendrant des gains de productivité de 1.41\% et une modeste augmentation du bien être des consommateurs.

Strong governments, weak banks. CEPS Policy Brief No. 305, 25 November 2013

Banks in the northern eurozone have capital ratios that are, on average, less than half of the capital ratios of banks in the eurozone’s periphery. The authors explain this by the fact that northern eurozone banks profit from the financial solidity of their governments and follow business strategies aimed at issuing too much subsidised debt. In doing so, they weaken their balance sheets and become more fragile – less able to withstand future shocks. Paradoxically, financially strong governments breed fragile banks. The opposite occurs in countries with financially weak governments. In these countries banks are forced to strengthen themselves because they are unable to rely on their governments. As a result they have significantly more capital and reserves than banks in the northern eurozone. Recommendations More than in the south, the governments of northern Europe should stand up and force the banks to issue more equity. This should go much further than what is foreseen in the Basel III accord. If the experience of the southern eurozone countries is any guide, banks in the north of the eurozone should at least double the capital and the reserves as a percentage of their balance sheets. Failure to do so risks destroying the financial solidity of the northern European governments when, in the future, negative shocks force these governments to come to the rescue of their undercapitalised banks. The new responsibilities entrusted to the European Central Bank as the single supervisor in the eurozone create a unique opportunity for that institution to change the regulatory and supervisory culture in the eurozone – one that has allowed the large banks to continue living dangerously, with insufficient capital.

Why firms avoid cutting wages: Survey evidence from European firms. National Bank of Belgium Working Paper No. 251, December 2013

The rarity with which firms reduce nominal wages has been frequently observed, even in the face of considerable negative economic shocks. This paper uses a unique survey of fourteen European countries to ask firms directly about the incidence of wage cuts and to assess the relevance of a range of potential reasons for why they avoid cutting wages. Concerns about the retention of productive staff and a lowering of morale and effort were reported as key reasons for downward wage rigidity across all countries and firm types. Restrictions created by collective bargaining were found to be an important consideration for firms in euro area countries but were one of the lowest ranked obstacles in non-euro area countries. The paper examines how firm characteristics and collective bargaining institutions affect the relevance of each of the common explanations put forward for the infrequency of wage cuts.

The long haul: managing exit from financial assistance. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue 2014/03, 20 February 2014

Countries can make a clean exit from financial assistance, or enter a new programme or a precautionary programme, depending on the sustainability of their public debt and their vulnerability to shocks. Ireland made a clean exit in December 2013, supported by significant budgetary and current-account adjustment and signs of economic recovery. But Irish debt sustainability is not guaranteed and prudence will be needed to avoid future difficulties. A clean exit for Portugal is not recommended when its programme ends in May 2014, because compared to Ireland it faces higher interest rates, has poorer growth prospects and has probably less ability to generate a consistently high primary surplus. A precautionary arrangement would be advisable. In case debt sustainability proves difficult to achieve later, some form of debt restructuring may prove necessary. It is unlikely that Greece will be able to exit its programme in December 2014. A third programme should be put in place to take Greece out of the market until 2030, accompanied by enhanced budgetary and structural reform commitments by Greece, a European boost to economic growth in the euro-area periphery and willingness on the part of lenders to reduce loan charges below their borrowing costs, should public debt levels prove unsustainable despite Greece meeting the loan conditions. Even assuming all goes well, the three countries will be subject to enhanced post-pro-gramme surveillance for decades. Managing such long-term relationships will be a key challenge.