The Political cost of reforms

This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politicians perceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters. To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknown and investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians make too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannot be fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may, under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study how political rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistent with a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection. They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economic uncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

Different approaches to modelling the cost-effectiveness of schistosomiasis control

This paper reviews three different approaches to modelling the cost-effectiveness of schistosomiasis control. Although these approaches vary in their assessment of costs, the major focus of the paper is on the evaluation of effectiveness. The first model presented is a static economic model which assesses effectiveness in terms of the proportion of cases cured. This model is important in highlighting that the optimal choice of chemotherapy regime depends critically on the level of budget constraint, the unit costs of screening and treatment, the rates of compliance with screening and chemotherapy and the prevalence of infection. The limitations of this approach is that it models the cost-effectiveness of only one cycle of treatment, and effectiveness reflects only the immediate impact of treatment. The second model presented is a prevalence-based dynamic model which links prevalence rates from one year to the next, and assesses effectiveness as the proportion of cases prevented. This model was important as it introduced the concept of measuring the long-term impact of control by using a transmission model which can assess reduction in infection through time, but is limited to assessing the impact only on the prevalence of infection. The third approach presented is a theoretical framework which describes the dynamic relationships between infection and morbidity, and which assesses effectiveness in terms of case-years prevented of infection and morbidity. The use of this model in assessing the cost-effectiveness of age-targeted treatment in controlling Schistosoma mansoni is explored in detail, with respect to varying frequencies of treatment and the interaction between drug price and drug efficacy.

Alveolar echinococcosis: from a deadly disease to a well-controlled infection. Relative survival and economic analysis in Switzerland over the last 35 years.

BACKGROUND/AIMS: Alveolar echinococcosis (AE) is a serious liver disease. The aim of this study was to explore the long-term prognosis of AE patients, the burden of this disease in Switzerland and the cost-effectiveness of treatment. METHODS: Relative survival analysis was undertaken using a national database with 329 patient records. 155 representative cases had sufficient details regarding treatment costs and patient outcome to estimate the financial implications and treatment costs of AE. RESULTS: For an average 54-year-old patient diagnosed with AE in 1970 the life expectancy was estimated to be reduced by 18.2 and 21.3 years for men and women, respectively. By 2005 this was reduced to approximately 3.5 and 2.6 years, respectively. Patients undergoing radical surgery had a better outcome, whereas the older patients had a poorer prognosis than the younger patients. Costs amount to approximately Euro108,762 per patient. Assuming the improved life expectancy of AE patients is due to modern treatment the cost per disability-adjusted life years (DALY) saved is approximately Euro6,032. CONCLUSIONS: Current treatments have substantially improved the prognosis of AE patients compared to the 1970s. The cost per DALY saved is low compared to the average national annual income. Hence, AE treatment is highly cost-effective in Switzerland.

Counting the Cost of Diabetes on the Island of Ireland

A new report published by the Institute of Public Health in Ireland (IPH) and released on Monday 9 July 2007, predicts a 26% increase in diabetes in Northern Ireland and a 37% increase in the Republic over the ten year period (2005-2015). The new report entitled, Making Diabetes Count: What does the future hold? is the second such report from the authors - The Irish Diabetes Prevalence Working Group.

Unit Cost Review Greenpark Healthcare Trust (289 KB)

DHSSPS Unit Cost Review Green Park Healthcare Trust

Air services on thin routes: Regional versus low-cost airlines

An examination of the impact in the US and EU markets of two major innovations in the provision of air services on thin routes - regional jet technology and the low-cost business model - reveals significant differences. In the US, regional airlines monopolize a high proportion of thin routes, whereas low-cost carriers are dominant on these routes in Europe. Our results have different implications for business and leisure travelers, given that regional services provide a higher frequency of flights (at the expense of higher fares), while low-cost services offer lower fares (at the expense of lower flight frequencies). Keywords: air transportation; regional jet technology; low-cost business model; thin markets. JEL Classification Numbers: L13; L2; L93.

Re: Cost effectiveness of strategies to combat cardiovascular disease, diabetes, and tobacco use in sub-Saharan Africa and South East Asia: mathematical modelling study.

Rapid response to: Ortegón M, Lim S, Chisholm D, Mendis S. Cost effectiveness of strategies to combat cardiovascular disease, diabetes, and tobacco use in sub-Saharan Africa and South East Asia: mathematical modelling study. BMJ. 2012 Mar 2;344:e607. doi: 10.1136/bmj.e607. PMID: 22389337.

Infection latente a M. tuberculosis, mise a jour 2011 [Latent M. tuberculosis infection, update 2011].

It is estimated that one third of the world population is latently infected by Mycobacterium tuberculosis and thus at risk of reactivation. Latent tuberculosis (TB) impact in Switzerland is often overlooked. Diagnosis and prophylaxis are insufficiently undertaken, especially for people at higher risk of reactivation due to immunosuppression. Interferon-gamma release assays replace tuberculosis skin tests for diagnosis of latent infection in adults. It is still recommended to treat prophylactically a case of latent TB infection with 9 months of isoniazid; however therapy with rifampicin for 4 months, currently an alternative option, is linked to improved adherence and favorable cost-benefit ratio.

Cost of Residential and Nursing Care - Volume 1

Cost of Residential and Nursing Care - Volume 1

Cost of Residential and Nursing Care - Volume 2

Cost of Residential and Nursing Care - Volume 2

Public sector rationing and private sector selection [paper accepted and forthcoming in Journal of Public Economic Theory]

We study the interaction between nonprice public rationing and prices in the private market. Under a limited budget, the public supplier uses a rationing policy. A private firm may supply the good to those consumers who are rationed by the public system. Consumers have different amounts of wealth, and costs of providing the good to them vary. We consider two regimes. First, the public supplier observes consumers' wealth information; second, the public supplier observes both wealth and cost information. The public supplier chooses a rationing policy, and, simultaneously, the private firm, observing only cost but not wealth information, chooses a pricing policy. In the first regime, there is a continuum of equilibria. The Pareto dominant equilibrium is a means-test equilibrium: poor consumers are supplied while rich consumers are rationed. Prices in the private market increase with the budget. In the second regime, there is a unique equilibrium. This exhibits a cost-effectiveness rationing rule; consumers are supplied if and only if their costbenefit ratios are low. Prices in the private market do not change with the budget. Equilibrium consumer utility is higher in the cost-effectiveness equilibrium than the means-test equilibrium [Authors]