Assessment of total uncertainty in cocaine and benzoylecgonine wastewater load measurements

To check the effectiveness of campaigns preventing drug abuse or indicating local effects of efforts against drug trafficking, it is beneficial to know consumed amounts of substances in a high spatial and temporal resolution. The analysis of drugs of abuse in wastewater (WW) has the potential to provide this information. In this study, the reliability of WW drug consumption estimates is assessed and a novel method presented to calculate the total uncertainty in observed WW cocaine (COC) and benzoylecgonine (BE) loads. Specifically, uncertainties resulting from discharge measurements, chemical analysis and the applied sampling scheme were addressed and three approaches presented. These consist of (i) a generic model-based procedure to investigate the influence of the sampling scheme on the uncertainty of observed or expected drug loads, (ii) a comparative analysis of two analytical methods (high performance liquid chromatography-tandem mass spectrometry and gas chromatography-mass spectrometry), including an extended cross-validation by influent profiling over several days, and (iii) monitoring COC and BE concentrations in WW of the largest Swiss sewage treatment plants. In addition, the COC and BE loads observed in the sewage treatment plant of the city of Berne were used to back-calculate the COC consumption. The estimated mean daily consumed amount was 107 ± 21 g of pure COC, corresponding to 321 g of street-grade COC.

Interhemispheric connections shape subjective experience of bistable motion

The right and left visual hemifields are represented in different cerebral hemispheres and are bound together by connections through the corpus callosum. Much has been learned on the functions of these connections from split-brain patients [1-4], but little is known about their contribution to conscious visual perception in healthy humans. We used diffusion tensor imaging and functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate which callosal connections contribute to the subjective experience of a visual motion stimulus that requires interhemispheric integration. The "motion quartet" is an ambiguous version of apparent motion that leads to perceptions of either horizontal or vertical motion [5]. Interestingly, observers are more likely to perceive vertical than horizontal motion when the stimulus is presented centrally in the visual field [6]. This asymmetry has been attributed to the fact that, with central fixation, perception of horizontal motion requires integration across hemispheres whereas perception of vertical motion requires only intrahemispheric processing [7]. We are able to show that the microstructure of individually tracked callosal segments connecting motion-sensitive areas of the human MT/V5 complex (hMT/V5+; [8]) can predict the conscious perception of observers. Neither connections between primary visual cortex (V1) nor other surrounding callosal regions exhibit a similar relationship.

Factors influencing subjective quality of life in patients with schizophrenia and other mental disorders: a pooled analysis

Subjective quality of life (SQOL) is an important outcome in the treatment of patients with schizophrenia. However, there is only limited evidence on factors influencing SQOL, and little is known about whether the same factors influence SQOL in patients with schizophrenia and other mental disorders. This study aimed to identify the factors associated with SQOL and test whether these factors are equally important in schizophrenia and other disorders. For this we used a pooled data set obtained from 16 studies that had used either the Lancashire Quality of Life Profile or the Manchester Short Assessment of Quality of Life for assessing SQOL. The sample comprised 3936 patients with schizophrenia, mood disorders, and neurotic disorders. After controlling for confounding factors, within-subject clustering, and heterogeneity of findings across studies in linear mixed models, patients with schizophrenia had more favourable SQOL scores than those with mood and neurotic disorders. In all diagnostic groups, older patients, those in employment, and those with lower symptom scores had higher SQOL scores. Whilst the strength of the association between age and SQOL did not differ across diagnostic groups, symptom levels were more strongly associated with SQOL in neurotic than in mood disorders and schizophrenia. The association of employment and SQOL was stronger in mood and neurotic disorders than in schizophrenia. The findings may inform the use and interpretation of SQOL data for patients with schizophrenia.

Maternal mental health in the first 3-week postpartum: the impact of caregiver support and the subjective experience of childbirth - a longitudinal path model

Acute stress reactions (ASR) and postpartum depressive symptoms (PDS) are frequent after childbirth. The present study addresses the change and overlap of ASR and PDS from the 1- to 3-week postpartum and examines the interplay of caregiver support and subjective birth experience with regard to the development of ASR/PDS within a longitudinal path model.

Compensation, Incentives and Risk: Economic Theory and Russian Practise

Mr. Pechersky set out to examine a specific feature of the employer-employee relationship in Russian business organisations. He wanted to study to what extent the so-called "moral hazard" is being solved (if it is being solved at all), whether there is a relationship between pay and performance, and whether there is a correlation between economic theory and Russian reality. Finally, he set out to construct a model of the Russian economy that better reflects the way it actually functions than do certain other well-known models (for example models of incentive compensation, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model etc.). His report was presented to the RSS in the form of a series of manuscripts in English and Russian, and on disc, with many tables and graphs. He begins by pointing out the different examples of randomness that exist in the relationship between employee and employer. Firstly, results are frequently affected by circumstances outside the employee's control that have nothing to do with how intelligently, honestly, and diligently the employee has worked. When rewards are based on results, uncontrollable randomness in the employee's output induces randomness in their incomes. A second source of randomness involves the outside events that are beyond the control of the employee that may affect his or her ability to perform as contracted. A third source of randomness arises when the performance itself (rather than the result) is measured, and the performance evaluation procedures include random or subjective elements. Mr. Pechersky's study shows that in Russia the third source of randomness plays an important role. Moreover, he points out that employer-employee relationships in Russia are sometimes opposite to those in the West. Drawing on game theory, he characterises the Western system as follows. The two players are the principal and the agent, who are usually representative individuals. The principal hires an agent to perform a task, and the agent acquires an information advantage concerning his actions or the outside world at some point in the game, i.e. it is assumed that the employee is better informed. In Russia, on the other hand, incentive contracts are typically negotiated in situations in which the employer has the information advantage concerning outcome. Mr. Pechersky schematises it thus. Compensation (the wage) is W and consists of a base amount, plus a portion that varies with the outcome, x. So W = a + bx, where b is used to measure the intensity of the incentives provided to the employee. This means that one contract will be said to provide stronger incentives than another if it specifies a higher value for b. This is the incentive contract as it operates in the West. The key feature distinguishing the Russian example is that x is observed by the employer but is not observed by the employee. So the employer promises to pay in accordance with an incentive scheme, but since the outcome is not observable by the employee the contract cannot be enforced, and the question arises: is there any incentive for the employer to fulfil his or her promises? Mr. Pechersky considers two simple models of employer-employee relationships displaying the above type of information symmetry. In a static framework the obtained result is somewhat surprising: at the Nash equilibrium the employer pays nothing, even though his objective function contains a quadratic term reflecting negative consequences for the employer if the actual level of compensation deviates from the expectations of the employee. This can lead, for example, to labour turnover, or the expenses resulting from a bad reputation. In a dynamic framework, the conclusion can be formulated as follows: the higher the discount factor, the higher the incentive for the employer to be honest in his/her relationships with the employee. If the discount factor is taken to be a parameter reflecting the degree of (un)certainty (the higher the degree of uncertainty is, the lower is the discount factor), we can conclude that the answer to the formulated question depends on the stability of the political, social and economic situation in a country. Mr. Pechersky believes that the strength of a market system with private property lies not just in its providing the information needed to compute an efficient allocation of resources in an efficient manner. At least equally important is the manner in which it accepts individually self-interested behaviour, but then channels this behaviour in desired directions. People do not have to be cajoled, artificially induced, or forced to do their parts in a well-functioning market system. Instead, they are simply left to pursue their own objectives as they see fit. Under the right circumstances, people are led by Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of impersonal market forces to take the actions needed to achieve an efficient, co-ordinated pattern of choices. The problem is that, as Mr. Pechersky sees it, there is no reason to believe that the circumstances in Russia are right, and the invisible hand is doing its work properly. Political instability, social tension and other circumstances prevent it from doing so. Mr. Pechersky believes that the discount factor plays a crucial role in employer-employee relationships. Such relationships can be considered satisfactory from a normative point of view, only in those cases where the discount factor is sufficiently large. Unfortunately, in modern Russia the evidence points to the typical discount factor being relatively small. This fact can be explained as a manifestation of aversion to risk of economic agents. Mr. Pechersky hopes that when political stabilisation occurs, the discount factors of economic agents will increase, and the agent's behaviour will be explicable in terms of more traditional models.