Lessons from the northern hake long-term management plan: Could the economic assessment have accepted it?

An economic expert working group (STECF/SGBRE-07-05) was convened in 2007 for evaluating the potential economic consequences of a Long-Term Management Plan for the northern hake. Analyzing all the scenarios proposed by biological assessment, they found that keeping the F in the status quo level was the best policy in terms of net present values for both yield and profits. This result is counter intuitive because it may indicate that effort costs do no affect the economic reference points. However, it is well accepted that the inclusion of costs affects negatively the economic reference points. In this paper, applying a dynamic agestructured model to the northern hake, we show that the optimal fishing mortality that maximizes the net present value of profits is lower than Fmax.

Strategic Interaction and Conventions

The scope of the paper is the literature that employs coordination games to study social norms and conventions from the viewpoint of game theory and cognitive psychology. We claim that those two alternative approaches are complementary, as they provide different insights to explain how people converge to a unique system of self-fulfilling expectations in presence of multiple, equally viable, conventions. While game theory explains the emergence of conventions relying on efficiency and risk considerations, the psychological view is more concerned with frame and labeling effects. The interaction between these alternative (and, sometimes, competing) effects leads to the result that coordination failures may well occur and, even when coordination takes place, there is no guarantee that the convention eventually established will be the most efficient.

Choice of Flexible Production Technologies Under Strategic Delegation

This work analyzes a managerial delegation model in which firms can choose between a flexible production technology which allows them to produce two different products and a dedicated production technology which limits production to only one product. We analyze whether the incentives to adopt the flexible technology are smaller or greater in a managerial delegation model than under strict profit maximization. We obtain that the asymmetric equilibrium in which only one firm adopts the flexible technology can be sustained under strategic delegation but not under strict profit maximization when products are substitutes. We extend the analysis to consider welfare implications.