One Un Programme 2010 Annual Report Many Strenghts, One Mission United Nations Cape Verde

This is the second annual report on the One UN Programme in Cape Verde, covering the year 2010. The report high-lights joint efforts and achievements of the UN System, the Government and Civil Society within the framework of the One Programme. It includes both programmatic and financial reporting. It gives concrete examples of the development impact of the “Cape Verde Transition Fund” -- both how those funds were used, and how they complemented additional resources available to the UN system (e.g. core funds plus contributions resulting from other resource mobilization efforts). The report shows how UN system activities have supported national priorities as defined in the Cape Verdean Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (GPRSP II).

The world distribution of income (estimated from individual country distributions)

We estimate the world distribution of income by integrating individualincome distributions for 125 countries between 1970 and 1998. Weestimate poverty rates and headcounts by integrating the density functionbelow the $1/day and $2/day poverty lines. We find that poverty ratesdecline substantially over the last twenty years. We compute povertyheadcounts and find that the number of one-dollar poor declined by 235million between 1976 and 1998. The number of $2/day poor declined by 450million over the same period. We analyze poverty across different regionsand countries. Asia is a great success, especially after 1980. LatinAmerica reduced poverty substantially in the 1970s but progress stoppedin the 1980s and 1990s. The worst performer was Africa, where povertyrates increased substantially over the last thirty years: the number of$1/day poor in Africa increased by 175 million between 1970 and 1998,and the number of $2/day poor increased by 227. Africa hosted 11% ofthe world s poor in 1960. It hosted 66% of them in 1998. We estimatenine indexes of income inequality implied by our world distribution ofincome. All of them show substantial reductions in global incomeinequality during the 1980s and 1990s.

Do you work or do you study? Children's work in a comparative historical perspective

In this paper we compare two historical scenarios very different one to each other bothin institutional and geographical terms. What they have in common is the situation ofrelative poverty of most of the population. On the one side we are dealing withhistorical industrializing Catalonia in the North East of Spain, a country exhibiting pooreconomic yields in the context of European and non European industrializing nations inthe 19th century. We compare children s work patterns in 19th century Catalonia withthose of current developing countries in Latin America, Africa and South and East Asia.This kind of exercise in which the nexus of the comparison are the levels of wealth ofcountries that are unsuccessful to achieve high standards of economic growth allows usto combine the micro historical analysis (in the Catalan case) with the macrocomparative approach in current developing countries. By means of both, the microhistorical analysis and the macro regression analysis we obtain the result that adultwomen s skills and real wages are a key factor when we want to explain the patterns ofchildren work. While female real wages increased a sharp rate in 19th century Cataloniawe obtain very different results in the case of developing countries. This differentgender bias helps to explain why in some cases children continue to work and also whysome parts of the world continue to be poor according to our regression analysis.

Population by Age Group and % of Total Population, 2007

Estimates/projections for age 60+ for the state and for its counties and incorporated places. DEA also provides population estimates on poverty, race and ethnicity, and urban and rural for age 60+. This statistical information is obtained from numerous resources, including the State Data Center of Iowa, US Census Bureau, the Administration on Aging, and Iowa State University Census Services. "The Census Bureau uses the latest available estimates as starting points for population projections. Sometimes the user may see both an estimate and a projection available for the same reference date, which may not agree because they were produced at different times. In such cases, estimates are the preferred data." (Source: State Data Center)

Population by Age Group and Perecnt of Total Popluation by County, 2006

The Department of Elder Affairs maintains and provides population and demographic estimates/projections for age 60+ for the state and for its counties and incorporated places. DEA also provides population estimates on poverty, race and ethnicity, and urban and rural for age 60+. This statistical information is obtained from numerous resources, including the State Data Center of Iowa, US Census Bureau, the Administration on Aging, and Iowa State University Census Services. "The Census Bureau uses the latest available estimates as starting points for population projections. Sometimes the user may see both an estimate and a projection available for the same reference date, which may not agree because they were produced at different times. In such cases, estimates are the preferred data." (Source: State Data Center)

The disturbing 'rise' of global income inequality

We use aggregate GDP data and within-country income shares for theperiod 1970-1998 to assign a level of income to each person in theworld. We then estimate the gaussian kernel density function for theworldwide distribution of income. We compute world poverty rates byintegrating the density function below the poverty lines. The $1/daypoverty rate has fallen from 20% to 5% over the last twenty five years.The $2/day rate has fallen from 44% to 18%. There are between 300 and500 million less poor people in 1998 than there were in the 70s.We estimate global income inequality using seven different popularindexes: the Gini coefficient, the variance of log-income, two ofAtkinson s indexes, the Mean Logarithmic Deviation, the Theil indexand the coefficient of variation. All indexes show a reduction in globalincome inequality between 1980 and 1998. We also find that most globaldisparities can be accounted for by across-country, not within-country,inequalities. Within-country disparities have increased slightly duringthe sample period, but not nearly enough to offset the substantialreduction in across-country disparities. The across-country reductionsin inequality are driven mainly, but not fully, by the large growth rateof the incomes of the 1.2 billion Chinese citizens. Unless Africa startsgrowing in the near future, we project that income inequalities willstart rising again. If Africa does not start growing, then China, India,the OECD and the rest of middle-income and rich countries diverge awayfrom it, and global inequality will rise. Thus, the aggregate GDP growthof the African continent should be the priority of anyone concerned withincreasing global income inequality.

Pertenças identitárias de jovens do Casal da Boba

O trabalho que aqui se apresenta centra-se numa reflexão sobre as pertenças identitárias de jovens descendentes de imigrantes cabo-verdianos. O objectivo principal do estudo é o de contribuir para compreender como é que estes jovens definem e afirmam as suas pertenças identitárias. Os jovens em estudo estabelecem relações com dois códigos culturais, um transmitido no seio familiar e outro pelo contacto com a sociedade portuguesa e nessa medida a sua gestão identitária é complexa. Os descendentes de imigrantes cabo-verdianos ou novos portugueses têm múltiplas referências e pertenças identitárias e representam parte da juventude portuguesa de hoje.

Pertenças identitárias de jovens do Casal da Boba

Resumo - O trabalho que aqui se apresenta centra-se numa reflexão sobre as pertenças identitárias de jovens descendentes de imigrantes cabo-verdianos. O objectivo principal do estudo é o de contribuir para compreender como é que estes jovens definem e afirmam as suas pertenças identitárias. Os jovens em estudo estabelecem relações com dois códigos culturais, um transmitido no seio familiar e outro pelo contacto com a sociedade portuguesa e nessa medida a sua gestão identitária é complexa. Os descendentes de imigrantes cabo-verdianos ou novos portugueses têm múltiplas referências e pertenças identitárias e representam parte da juventude portuguesa de hoje.

Financing local development: Quasi-experimental evidence from municipalities in Brazil, 1980-1991

This paper uses a regression discontinuity design to estimate the impact of additional unrestrictedgrant financing on local public spending, public service provision, schooling, literacy, andincome at the community (municipio) level in Brazil. Additional transfers increased local publicspending per capita by about 20% with no evidence of crowding out own revenue or otherrevenue sources. The additional local spending increased schooling per capita by about 7% andliteracy rates by about 4 percentage points. The implied marginal cost of schooling -accountingfor corruption and other leakages- amounts to about US$ 126, which turns out to be similar tothe average cost of schooling in Brazil in the early 1980s. In line with the effect on human capital,the poverty rate was reduced by about 4 percentage points, while income per capita gains werepositive but not statistically significant. Results also suggest that additional public spending hadstronger effects on schooling and literacy in less developed parts of Brazil, while poverty reductionwas evenly spread across the country.

Managing Social-Business Tensions: A Review and Research Agenda for Social Enterprise

In a world filled with poverty, environmental degradation, and moral injustice, social enterprises offer a ray of hope. These organizations seek to achieve social missions through business ventures. Yet social missions and business ventures are associated with divergent goals, values, norms, and identities. Attending to them simultaneously creates tensions, competing demands, and ethical dilemmas. Effectively understanding social enterprises therefore depends on insight into the nature and management of these tensions. While existing research recognizes tensions between social missions and business ventures, we lack any systematic analysis. Our paper addresses this issue. We first categorize the types of tensions that arise between social missions and business ventures, emphasizing their prevalence and variety. We then explore how four different organizational theories offer insight into these tensions, and we develop an agenda for future research. We end by arguing that a focus on social-business tensions not only expands insight into social enterprises, but also provides an opportunity for research on social enterprises to inform traditional organizational theories. Taken together, our analysis of tensions in social enterprises integrates and seeks to energize research on this expanding phenomenon.

Identidade e Pertença: para além das Dimensões Materiais do Sofrimento Social

Um olhar antropológico sobre as relações sociais em dois microcosmos etnográficos – um bairro e um centro de saúde – revela as limitações de encarar a pobreza material como o único critério para compreender os processos de sofrimento social. De forma a explorar como o sofrimento social pode ser vivenciado através das identificações e das pertenças, a identidade étnica e a identidade profissional são examinadas como exemplos da identidade social em geral. A relação dialética entre a identidade social e a identidade pessoal demonstra como o poder não está depositado nas pessoas, mas depende das suas relações sociais. Dado que o exercício de poder não pode ser garantido pelo simples estatuto de uma determinada categoria social, urge procurar vivências e subjetividades nas fissuras das categorias, distinguindo entre uma categoria de prática e uma categoria de análise, de forma a alargar o horizonte sobre a natureza dos processos de sofrimento social.

A Casa como Centro das Relações de Parentesco e Mobilidade dos Emigrantes Cabo-Verdianos: o Caso dos Cabo-Verdianos em Portugal

Esta dissertação propõe estudar o papel que a casa desempenha na vida dos cabo-verdianos residentes em Portugal, particularmente na região de grande Lisboa, observando-os como um grupo étnico, isto é, como um conjunto de pessoas que tem por referência a sua origem, ou os seus antepassados próximos em Cabo Verde, ou noutras regiões para onde estes tenham emigrado assim como os imigrantes que já regressaram a Cabo Verde. Por “origem” entendese tanto a procedência geográfica de um lugar que ficou distante, quanto a vinculação a determinados referenciais culturais. A imigração em causa é da segunda metade do século XX, cujas motivações ora são de ordem económica (movidos pelo sistema fundiário que não permitia o acesso à terra para a maioria das populações das ilhas, pobreza extrema, etc.), ora de ordem natural (escassez e irregularidade das chuvas, com as consequentes secas prolongadas e fomes, dizimando pessoas e gados), ora de ordem política (perseguição política, fuga à prestação de serviços militares na Guiné, antes e após o 25 de Abril). Assim, será dado uma especial atenção ao papel que a casa, sobretudo a que foi deixada em Cabo Verde, desempenha nas relações de parentesco de pessoas que se encontram espalhadas por diversos países, bem como todo o processo que enrola a construção e a manutenção da mesma.

The economic tragedy of the XXth Century: Growth in Africa

The dismal growth performance of Africa is the worst economic tragedy ofthe XXth century. We document the evolution of per capita GDP for thecontinent as a whole and for subset of countries south of the Saharadesert. We document the worsening of various income inequality indexesand we estimate poverty rates and headcounts. We then analyze some ofthe central robust determinants of economic growth reported bySala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (2003) and project the annual growthrates Africa would have enjoyed if these key determinants had taken OECDrather than African values. Expensive investment goods, low levels ofeducation, poor health, adverse geography, closed economies, too muchpublic expenditure and too many military conflicts are seen as keyexplanations of the economic tragedy.

Human capital distribution, growth and convergence

This paper studies the dynamic relationship between distribution and endogenous growth in an overlapping generations model with accumulation of human and physical capital. It is shown how human capital can determine a relationship between per capita growth rates and inequality in the distribution of income. Family background effects and spillovers in the transmission of human capital generate a dynamics in which aggregate variables depend not only on the stock, but also on the distribution of human capital. The evolution of this distribution over time is then characterized under different assumptions on private returns and the form of the externality in the technology for humancapital. Conditions for existence, uniqueness and stability of a constant growth equilibrium with a stationary distribution are derived. Increasing returns, idiosyncratic abilities and the possibility of poverty traps are explicitely characterized in a closed form solution of the equilibrium dynamics, showing the role played by technology and preferences parameters.

The colonial origins of Civil War

The dominant hypothesis in the literature that studies conflict is that poverty is the main cause of civil wars. We instead analyze the effect of institutions on civil war, controlling for income per capita. In our set up, institutions are endogenous and colonial origins affect civil wars through their legacy on institutions. Our results indicate that institutions, proxied by the protection of property rights, rule of law and the efficiency of the legal system, are a fundamental cause of civil war. In particular, an improvement in institutions from the median value in the sample to the 75th percentile is associated with a 38 percentage points reduction in the incidence of civil wars. Moreover, once institutions are included as explaining civil wars, income does not have any effect on civil war, either directly or indirectly.