Political budget cycles in a fiscal federation : the effect of partisan voluntary transfers

This article first presents an econometric study suggesting that intergovernmental transfers to Brazilian municipalities are strongly partisan motivated. In light of that stylized fact, it develops an extension to Rogoff (1990)’s model to analyze the effect of partisan motivated transfers into sub-national electoral and fiscal equilibria. The main finding is that important partisan transfers may undo the positive selection aspect of political budget cycles. Indeed, partisan transfers may, on one hand, eliminate the political budget cycle, solving a moral hazard problem, but, on the other hand, they may retain an incompetent incumbent in office, bringing about an adverse selection problem.

June Journeys in Brazil: from the networks to the streets

This article seeks to analyse the mass protests that ecloded in the main cities in Brazil in June 2013 - the so-called June Journeys -, event which represented an inflection moment in the country's recent political history and inaugurated a new social mobilization cycle in the country. This analysis will begin with the presupposition that the strong digital inclusion that has been going on over recent years was a main element, but not the only one, responsible for the occurrence of protests. Still, although digital inclusion has been a central tool that allowed these demonstrations to happen in the first place, it was not the only responsible for leading over 1 million people to the streets. Factors such as frustrated expectations over the continuity of the social inclusion process that had been ongoing over the last decade, the rising educational level and a political representation crisis contributed to social mobilization, and were amplified due to widening internet access - and, therefore, access to information - across the population

Rent dissipation, political viability and the strategic adoption of free trade agreements

This paper studies the political viability of free trade agreements (FTAs). The key element of the analysis is the “rent dissipation” that these arrangements induce: by eliminating intra-bloc trade barriers, an FTA reduces the incentives of the local firms to lobby for higher external tariffs, thereby causing a reduction of the rents created in the lobbying process. The prospect of rent dissipation moderates the governments’ willingness to participate in FTAs; they will support only arrangements that are “substantially” welfare improving, and no FTA that reduces welfare. Rent dissipation also implies that the prospects of political turnover may create strategic reasons for the formation of FTAs. Specifically, a government facing a high enough probability of losing power may want to form a trade bloc simply to “tie the hands” of its successor. An FTA can affect the likelihood of political turnover as well. If the incumbent party has a known bias toward special interests, it may want to commit to less distortionary policies in order to reduce its electoral disadvantage; the rent dissipation effect ensures that an FTA can serve as the vehicle for such a commitment. In nascent/unstable democracies, the incumbent government can use a free trade agreement also to reduce the likelihood of a dictatorial takeover and to “consolidate” democracy – a finding that is consistent with the timing of numerous accessions to and formations of preferential arrangements.

Signaling in political budget cycles: How far are you willing to go?

This paper analyzes how heterogeneity in two dimensions, competency and character, a¤ects political budget cycles. Competency is the e¢ciency in running the government. Character is the degree of opportunism. In this expanded space, previous results in the literature on the separating nature of the signaling equilibrium hold if heterogeneity in opportunism is low. With high heterogeneity in opportunism, no separating equilibrium exists. Rather, the equilibrium is partially pooling: only extreme types can be distinguished.

Reelection incentives and political corruption : evidence from Brazil’s municipal audit reports

This paper uses a unique dataset of political corruption, constructed from municipal audit reports obtained from Brazil’s randomized anti-corruption program, to test whether reelection incentives affect the level of rent extraction of incumbent politicians. In order to identify reelection incentives, we use the existence of a term limit in Brazil’s municipal elections. We find that in municipalities where mayors are in their second and final term, there is significantly more corruption compared to similar municipalities where mayors are in their first-term. In particular, in municipalities with second-term mayors there is, on average, R$188,431 more diversion of resources and the incidence of irregularities is 23% higher. We also find more pronounced effects where the costs of rent-extraction are lower (municipalities without media and judicial presence), and the density of pivotal voters is higher (more political competition). Finally, we show that first-term mayors, while less corrupt, have a larger incidence of poor administration suggesting that there may exist a trade-off between corruption and quality in public good provision.

2014 World Cup live blog: political protestor invades field at US vs Belgium

Retirado do Vice News.

Risky business: social media metrics and political risk analysis

A quantificação do risco país – e do risco político em particular – levanta várias dificuldades às empresas, instituições, e investidores. Como os indicadores econômicos são atualizados com muito menos freqüência do que o Facebook, compreender, e mais precisamente, medir – o que está ocorrendo no terreno em tempo real pode constituir um desafio para os analistas de risco político. No entanto, com a crescente disponibilidade de “big data” de ferramentas sociais como o Twitter, agora é o momento oportuno para examinar os tipos de métricas das ferramentas sociais que estão disponíveis e as limitações da sua aplicação para a análise de risco país, especialmente durante episódios de violência política. Utilizando o método qualitativo de pesquisa bibliográfica, este estudo identifica a paisagem atual de dados disponíveis a partir do Twitter, analisa os métodos atuais e potenciais de análise, e discute a sua possível aplicação no campo da análise de risco político. Depois de uma revisão completa do campo até hoje, e tendo em conta os avanços tecnológicos esperados a curto e médio prazo, este estudo conclui que, apesar de obstáculos como o custo de armazenamento de informação, as limitações da análise em tempo real, e o potencial para a manipulação de dados, os benefícios potenciais da aplicação de métricas de ferramentas sociais para o campo da análise de risco político, particularmente para os modelos qualitativos-estruturados e quantitativos, claramente superam os desafios.

International civil society actors in Genetically Modificied Organisms as a field of struggle: a neo-gramscian study in Brazil and the United Kingdom

Since the international financial and food crisis that started in 2008, strong emphasis has been made on the importance of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) (or “transgenics”) under the claim that they could contribute to increase food productivity at a global level, as the world population is predicted to reach 9.1 billion in the year 2050 and food demand is predicted to increase by as much as 50% by 2030. GMOs are now at the forefront of the debates and struggles of different actors. Within civil society actors, it is possible to observe multiple, and sometime, conflicting roles. The role of international social movements and international NGOs in the GMO field of struggle is increasingly relevant. However, while many of these international civil society actors oppose this type of technological developments (alleging, for instance, environmental, health and even social harms), others have been reportedly cooperating with multinational corporations, retailers, and the biotechnology industry to promote GMOs. In this thesis research, I focus on analysing the role of “international civil society” in the GMO field of struggle by asking: “what are the organizing strategies of international civil society actors, such as NGOs and social movements, in GMO governance as a field of struggle?” To do so, I adopt a neo-Gramscian discourse approach based on the studies of Laclau and Mouffe. This theoretical approach affirms that in a particular hegemonic regime there are contingent alliances and forces that overpass the spheres of the state and the economy, while civil society actors can be seen as a “glue” to the way hegemony functions. Civil society is then the site where hegemony is consented, reproduced, sustained, channelled, but also where counter-hegemonic and emancipatory forces can emerge. Considering the importance of civil society actors in the construction of hegemony, I also discuss some important theories around them. The research combines, on the one hand, 36 in-depth interviews with a range of key civil society actors and scientists representing the GMO field of struggle in Brazil (19) and the UK (17), and, on the other hand, direct observations of two events: Rio+20 in Rio de Janeiro in 2012, and the first March Against Monsanto in London in 2013. A brief overview of the GMO field of struggle, from its beginning and especially focusing in the 1990s when the process of hegemonic formation became clearer, serves as the basis to map who are the main actors in this field, how resource mobilization works, how political opportunities (“historical contingencies”) are discovered and exploited, which are the main discourses (“science” and “sustainability” - articulated by “biodiversity preservation”, “food security” and “ecological agriculture”) articulated among the actors to construct a collective identity in order to attract new potential allies around “GMOs” (“nodal point”), and which are the institutions and international regulations within these processes that enable hegemony to emerge in meaningful and durable hegemonic links. This mapping indicates that that the main strategies applied by the international civil society actors are influenced by two central historical contingencies in the GMO field of struggle: 1) First Multi-stakeholder Historical Contingency; and 2) “Supposed” Hegemony Stability. These two types of historical contingency in the GMO field of struggle encompass deeper hegemonic articulations and, because of that, they induce international civil society actors to rethink the way they articulate and position themselves within the field. Therefore, depending on one of those moments, they will apply one specific strategy of discourse articulation, such as: introducing a new discourse in hegemony articulation to capture the attention of the public and of institutions; endorsing new plural demands; increasing collective visibility; facilitating material articulations; sharing a common enemy identity; or spreading new ideological elements among the actors in the field of struggle.

Betting on winner: the effect of local elections on corporate political activity outcomes

How can managers successfully access political rents by way of corporate political strategies (CPA)? Existing research has suggested several endogenous factors that correlate with CPA outcomes. I offer a more robust solution to this problem. Drawing on insights from the perspective of CPA as exchanges between firms and political decision-makers, and from the special interest politics of political economy, I develop and test a causal mechanism that links local elections, legislative bargaining and access to political rents at the national level. I conducted a natural experiment using regression discontinuity design and propensity score matching in municipal elections in Brazil to show that firms enjoy superior access to subsidized financing from the state-owned national development bank (BNDES) when they decide to invest in municipalities whose winning mayoral candidate is coalition-aligned with the national ruler. This effect fades away fades away as the level of competition in the local election decreases. The evidence implies that when managers bet on national coalition-aligned winners in close local elections, they positively affect CPA outcomes. I extend the exchange-based typology of corporate political strategies by offering a novel possibility of targeting voters with financial inducements, which I call a private local development strategy. Finally, these results show that firms exchange their project-execution capabilities for superior access to subsidized financing.

The Limits of political compromise: debt ceilings and political competition

We study the desirability of limits on the public debt and of political competition in an economy where political parties alternate in office. Due to rent-seeking motives, incumbents have an incentive to set public expenditures above the socially optimal level. Parties cannot commit to future policies, but they can forge a political compromise where each party curbs excessive spending when in office if it expects future governments to do the same. In contrast to the received literature, we find that strict limits on government borrowing can exacerbate political-economy distortions by rendering a political compromise unsustainable. This tends to happen when political competition is limited. Conversely, a tight limit on the public debt fosters a compromise that yields the efficient outcome when political competition is vigorous, saving the economy from immiseration. Our analysis thus suggests a legislative tradeoff between restricting political competition and constraining the ability of governments to issue debt.

Supremo interesse: protagonismo político-regulatório e a evolução institucional do processo de seleção dos ministros do STF

Partindo da constatação de que o Brasil acompanha hoje um fenômeno global de protagonismo das cortes supremas nas sociedades complexas contemporâneas, notadamente na criação de políticas-públicas e regulação, o estudo procura mapear a evolução – e progressiva democratização – de uma estrutura de freios e contrapesos prevista na Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988 (“Constituição”), qual seja, o processo de seleção dos ministros do Supremo Tribunal Federal. Ao longo do texto é analisada a arquitetura institucional e constitucional do processo de indicação e aprovação de novos ministros, bem como exemplificadas mudanças no perfil dos atores políticos, no plexo de competências das instituições envolvidas e no contexto social, político, econômico e cultural que forçaram a transformação prática do modelo de seleção institucional, sem alteração, no entanto, da formatação originalmente prevista desde o Século XIX. Mapeando a origem e evolução da fórmula constitucional de colaboração entre o Poder Executivo e o Poder Legislativo para a escolha dos membros da cúpula do Poder Judiciário, o estudo identifica a origem do modelo brasileiro na inspiração da experiência norte-americana, descrevendo esta e os paralelos possíveis com aquele. A partir do marco central da Constituição, o trabalho procura demonstrar uma progressiva mobilização de atores políticos e sociais em relação ao processo de escolha, notadamente em relação ao momento em que os indicados para o Supremo Tribunal Federal são sabatinados pela Comissão de Constituição, Justiça e Cidadania do Senado Federal. Finalmente, são analisadas concretamente as sabatinas e algumas das suas principais discussões, buscando extrair lições que sirvam de norte colaborativo para a evolução da forma de seleção dos ministros do Supremo Tribunal Federal, inclusive como instrumento de controle prévio de seus membros, futuros elaboradores de políticas-públicas.

Foreign support, internal political disputes and mass killings

This paper studies the incentives underlying the relations between foreign countries and rival domestic groups. It models the interaction in a infinitely-repeated game between these three players. The domestic groups bargain for a split of the domestic surplus and may engage in violent dispute for power and in unilateral mass killing processes. The foreign country may choose to support one of these groups in exchange for monetary transfers. The paper characterizes the parametric set in which strategies leading to no violent disputes nor mass killings are Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibra in the presence of foreign support, but not in its absence.