The political economy of global economic disgovernance

A Desgovernança Econômica Global, Mais do que a Governança Caracteriza Hoje a Economia Mundial. Dois Fatos Substanciam Essa Afirmativa: a Crise Recorrente do Balanço de Pagamentos nos Países em Desenvolvimento, e o Enorme Déficit em Conta Corrente dos Estados Unidos. as Crises nos Mercados Emergentes são Essencialmente Resultantes da Estratégia que o Norte Propõe para o Sul: a Estratégia de Crescimento com Poupança Externa. Dado o Fato de que a Entrada de Capital Aumenta a Taxa de Cambio, e que os Paises não Reconheceram as Principais Oportunidades de Investimento nos Anos 1990, Tal Estratégia Levou não ao Aumento das Taxas de Acumulação de Capital e ao Crescimento, Mas ao Aumento do Déficit em Conta Corrente e À Crise do Balanço de Pagamento (Financeiro). por Outro Lado, o Déficit em Conta Corrente dos Estados Unidos é um Problema Sério. Aquele Já é um País Devedor, Mas os Ajustes Continuam a ser Adiados. a Probabilidade de um Soft Landing (Desfecho Satisfatório) é Pequena. as Duas Fontes de Instabilidade Estão Relacionadas Aos Déficits em Conta Corrente e À Moeda Sobrevalorizada. a Política Econômica por Trás tem um Nome: Taxa de Câmbio Populista, uma das Duas Formas de Populismo Econômico (A Outra é o Populismo Fiscal). Isto não é Surpreendente em Países em Desenvolvimento, Mas Pode ser em um País Desenvolvido, como os Estados Unidos. Ainda Assim não é Surpreendente Quando se Considera a Recessão Política e Social que a Sociedade Americana Está Vivendo Desde o Fim da Segunda Guerra

How does corruption hurt growth? Evidences about the effects of corruption on factors productivity and per capita income

Corruption is a phenomenon that plagues many countries and, mostly, walks hand in hand with inefficient institutional structures, which reduce the effectiveness of public and private investment. In countries with widespread corruption, for each monetary unit invested, a sizable share is wasted, implying less investment. Corruption can also be a burden on a nation’s wealth and economic growth, by driving away new investment and creating uncertainties regarding private and social rights. Thus, corruption can affect not only factors productivity, but also their accumulation, with detrimental consequences on a society’s social development. This article aims to analyze and measure the influence of corruption on a country’s wealth. It is implicitly admitted that the degree of institutional development has an adverse effect on the productivity of production factors, which implies in reduced per capita income. It is assumed that the level of wealth and economic growth depends on domestic savings, foster technological progress and a proper educational system. Corruption, within this framework, is not unlike an additional cost, which stifles the “effectiveness” of the investment. This article first discusses the key theories evaluating corruption’s economic consequences. Later, it analyzes the relation between institutional development, factor productivity and per capita income, based on the neoclassical approach to economic growth. Finally, it brings some empirical evidence regarding the effects of corruption on factor productivity, in a sample of 81 countries studied in 1998. The chief conclusion is that corruption negatively affects the wealth of a nation by reducing capital productivity, or its effectiveness.

A economia política da corrupção

The aim of this paper is to show that corruption shoud be an important subject for economic analysis and modern positive political economy. I sustain that one could construct general models of corrupt behavior with the notion of definition of corruption linked with the notion of institutions and incentives. Socondly, I discuss critically the weberian notions of public action to purpose finally, a political economy approach to the problem. The main conclusion of this essay is that economics and modern political economy could be extremely useful tools in the study of this social and economic fact.

Political institutions as substitute for democracy: a political economy analysis of economic growth

This manuscript empirically assesses the effects of political institutions on economic growth. It analyzes how political institutions affect economic growth in different stages of democratization and economic development by means of dynamic panel estimation with interaction terms. The new empirical results obtained show that political institutions work as a substitute for democracy promoting economic growth. In other words, political institutions are important for increasing economic growth, mainly when democracy is not consolidated. Moreover, political institutions are extremely relevant to economic outcomes in periods of transition to democracy and in poor countries with high ethnical fractionalization.

Administração pública federal: propostas para o fortalecimento do controle sobre os atos praticados e o respectivo combate à corrupção

The characteristics of the Brazilian historic context, under which the predominant social relations have developed, have led to a process of income concentration and to the political power of the dominant classes. The slavery abolishment hasn't guaranteed the people the rights secured to privileged citizens in general. Such practices were observed during historic process as the low level literacy shown by the census of 1920, the political domination of oligarchies and the military coup, all as determining factors in process of political power concentration. The social indicators and the corruption are extremely unfavorable to our country, but we wonder if that happens only in underdeveloped societies. It is possible that even the American society, even the most developed societies, under the democratic capitalism, can suffer negative consequences of some corruption in the capitalism system. Our observations have led to the perception that all democratic society must be regulated by the State in order to preserve the stability of the system. It has also been observed that it is necessary more effective popular participation in order to neutralize economic groups¿ pressure. It has also become evident the necessity of reduction of commissioned office in the federal public administration. And, finally, it is fundamental to propose an amendment to the construction that allows the Public Ministry to have access to any bank, fiscal or telephonic information of anyone that is in office: It should be called "The Law of Moral Transparency". Those proposals will only be possible if there is massive popular participation and we hope that they express our people¿s will in order to appose to those who act only to obtain private benefits.

Controle social exercido através da denúncia no âmbito do TCE-RJ

The crisis that affected the capitalist states during the last decade of the 20th century, put an end to the period of greatest expansion of the state, demanding alterations that brought, especially in economic terms, the ideals of the liberal state. The main goal of these changes was to optimize the administration of the public service by introducing into it more efficiency, transparency, and morality because the state had shown to be incapable of attending the demands of the society and its way of doing was inefficient and did not reach out to the public interest. In Brazil, like in other part of the world, recent scandals of corruption and misuse of public funds put in doubt the efficiency of the financial control system. Like any other political system Brazil has a complex set of external and internal control, institutions that work to prevent misuse of public funds and identify responsibilities if bad use occurred. All these elements highlight the mechanisms of control of the public administration, which came to be seen as essential instruments for the improvement of the management of the public resources, targeting the collective interest. Therefore, along with the traditional mechanisms of power suppression, such as the system of checks and balances, social control arises. This, when used together with the monitoring exercised by public inspection agencies, is defined as horizontal accountability activated by civil society, in which citizens and institutions gather efforts in order to promote a more effective charge of responsibility from public agents and politicians in case of misconducts. This study aimed to identify the opportunities and limitations of social control exercised by the complaint under the TCE-RJ. The results point to the need to develop measures to guarantee the anonymity of denouncers, to simplify the forms of access the TCE-RJ and to improve information spread to the citizen.

O Tribunal de Contas do Estado do Espírito Santo e a auditoria de desempenho

A corrupção e a ineficiência estatais são problemas recorrentes da administração pública brasileira, sempre a ocupar espaço na imprensa. Diversas instituições, entre as quais a própria imprensa, se ocupam de buscar a melhoria da gestão dos recursos públicos, pelo combate à corrupção e ao desperdício. Mas há uma instituição, o Tribunal de Contas, que existe exatamente com a missão de garantir o bom uso dos recursos públicos. É uma árdua missão como demonstram as notícias de jornais, e que não vem sendo cumprida a contento. O controle exercido pelo Tribunal de Contas é efetuado quanto aos aspectos da regularidade e do mérito na arrecadação, guarda e aplicação dos recursos públicos. No complexo ambiente em que opera, o Tribunal de Contas só conseguirá exercer com plenitude seu papel se compreender este ambiente, formulando as estratégias adequadas para sua atuação. Isto inclui decidir sobre como exercer o controle e qual aspecto deve ser enfatizado. Este trabalho busca fornecer subsídios para esta compreensão, bem como sugestões para que o Tribunal possa melhor cumprir seu papel, de acordo com a natureza contemporânea de sua missão.

Electoral rules, political competition and fiscal spending: regression discontinuity evidence from brazilian municipalities

We exploit a discontinuity in Brazilian municipal election rules to investigate whether political competition has a causal impact on policy choices. In municipalities with less than 200,000 voters mayors are elected with a plurality of the vote. In municipalities with more than 200,000 voters a run-off election takes place among the top two candidates if neither achieves a majority of the votes. At a first stage, we show that the possibility of runoff increases political competition. At a second stage, we use the discontinuity as a source of exogenous variation to infer causality from political competition to fiscal policy. Our second stage results suggest that political competition induces more investment and less current spending, particularly personnel expenses. Furthermore, the impact of political competition is larger when incumbents can run for reelection, suggesting incentives matter insofar as incumbents can themselves remain in office.

Hybrid political institutions and governability: the budgetary process in Brazil

In this paper we take a close look at some of the particular pathways by which majoritarian and consensual institutions affect governability. We demonstrate that the mix of majoritarian and consensual institutions found within a country can influence these pathways quite dramatically, such that they produce rather different consequences for governability, even when these pathways are relatively similar in nature. Particularly, we focus on the rules governing the relationship between the President and the Legislature, especially the appropriation of amendments proposed by legislators. In some presidential countries, the president possesses a partial veto (or a line-item veto) which allows him/her to approve or strike appropriations, which legislators introduce in amendments. Concentrating on the case of Brazil, we argue and demonstrate that whether or not the president can use this tool to sustain governing majorities (i.e., to increase governability) depends on the kind of amendment introduced by legislators. One kind, individual amendment, is linked to the majoritarian institution of a powerful presidency and therefore helps to increase governability. A second kind, collective amendment, is linked to consensual institutions and actually does not enhance legislative support for the Executive.

The inequality curse: constraints and political discretion

We live in an unjust world characterized by economic inequality. No liberal theory of justice is able to justify it. Inequality is not “solved” with equality of opportunity or meritocracy. Nor by the socialist and republican critique. The poor will have to count with them and with democracy to make social progress reality. In their political struggle, they will face one economic constraint: the expected profit rate must remain attractive to business investors. Yet, giving that technological progress in increasingly capital-saving, this economic constraint does not obstruct that wages grow above the productivity rate and inequality is reduced. What really is an obstacle to social justice in the rich countries is, on one hand, the power that capitalist rentiers retain and financists acquired, and, on the other, the competition originated in low wage countries.