Towards a sustainable European economy. EPC Policy Brief, 13 October 2015

Europe is faced with interlinked economic, ecological and climate crises. As identified in the European Environment Agency's The European Environment – state and outlook 2015 report1 , Europe is increasingly affected by global trends that come with positive and negative impacts. Some of these it contributes to, some it can try to manage, while others are beyond its control. Regardless, only by anticipating these trends and making a sustainable economy the overriding policy objective, can it aim to maximise the related opportunities and minimise the threats.

Completing the Banking Union: Deposit Insurance. CEPS Policy Brief No. 335, 3 December 2015

It is generally agreed that a Banking Union should have common or ‘single’ institutions responsible for carrying out three basic functions: supervision, resolution and deposit insurance. So far, however, agreement has been reached in the EU on only the first two of these functions. The Commission has now presented its proposal on how to complete the Banking Union with a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS). It is an innovative and courageous proposal. It is courageous because it will clearly be very controversial in a number of member states (especially Germany) and it is innovative because it proposes a three-stage process, starting with re-insurance, then switching to co-insurance and finally to full direct insurance of deposits via a ‘single’ Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF). This final stage should be reached in 2024, which is also the date at which the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) will become the only source of financing for bank resolution. The Commission’s proposal calls for integrating the decision-making for EDIS into the decision-making entity for the SRF, namely the existing Single Resolution Board (SRB). This makes sense if one views resolution and deposit insurance as two highly interlinked dimensions of dealing with banks in trouble. In this view the two dimensions should be bundled into one institution – and one suspects that over time the two funds (the SRF and the DIF) could be merged into one. This Policy Brief argues that re-insurance should not be considered as a transitory phase, but could also provide a solution for the long run. ‘Experience rating’ could be used to ensure a proper pricing of risk and to protect the interests of the depositors in countries with safer banking systems. Moreover, EDIS should have a decision-making structure separate from and independent of the SRM, since it has mainly a macroeconomic function.

Economic Policy Coordination in the Euro Area under the European Semester. CEPS Special Report No. 123, December 2015

The implementation record of the Country Specific Recommendations (CSRs) has declined over time, as financial turbulence lessened and the economic outlook started to improve. Urgency for reforms seemingly receded to leave room to request member states to move towards more accommodative stances. It is mainly the small countries that implement, at least partially, the recommendations addressed to them. Unfortunately, there is little that the EU can do to change the status quo. Yet, the President of the Eurogroup could be held accountable for the implementation of the recommendations addressed to the euro area. The creation of National Competitiveness Boards risks making the European Semester even more complex and likely to have little impact in the countries that need them most, namely large countries and those with poor governance. To make it effective, a procedure would be needed to make national wage norms consistent at the euro-area level, which may be a very difficult objective to achieve.

European Bank Resolution: Making it work! Interim report of the CEPS Task Force on Implementing Financial Sector Resolution. CEPS Task Force Report, January 2016

From the start of 2016, new rules for bank resolution are in place – as spelled out in the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) – across the EU, and a new authority (the Single Resolution Board, or SRB) is fully operational for resolving all banks in the eurozone. The implementation issues of the new regime are enormous. Banks need to develop recovery plans, and authorities need to create resolution plans as well as set the minimum required amount of own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) for each bank. But given the diversity in bank structures and instruments at EU and global level, this will be a formidable challenge, above all with respect to internationally active banks. In order to explore ways in which the authorities and banks can meet this challenge, CEPS formed a Task Force composed of senior experts on banking sector reform and chaired by Thomas Huertas, Partner and Chair, EY Global Regulatory Network. This report contains its policy recommendations.

Diplomatic parade or last struggle against fatalism? - Making sense of the Paris ministerial meeting on the Middle East Peace Process. EPC Commentary, 16 June 2016

On 3 June, the French government convened an international meeting in Paris, gathering 28 high-level delegations from all around the world, from Norway to Japan, in order to discuss the state of play and future prospects of the enduring Israel-Palestine conflict. The first ministerial meeting of the “Initiative for the Peace in the Middle East”, as it was labelled by the Quai d’Orsay, provided an important political signal, and a potential diplomatic format, to help revive the long-stalled peace process. Yet, its concrete deliverables remain beset by considerable uncertainty.

Dominance, Competition, Compromise or Consensus? Explaining Decision-Making Structures

The previous chapter uncovered important differences between decision-making structures across the 11 processes investigated by this study. As we have noted, both historically and in much contemporary literature, the Swiss political system has been described as highly consensual. And yet, when we focus on differences between decision-making structures across different policy domains, important elements appear that point toward a more conflictual style of decision-making. Both when there is a power balance between coalitions and in the presence of a dominant coalition, coalition interactions are conflictual in the majority of cases. Based on the descriptive account of these differences in Chapter 4, the present chapter studies the conditions under which given decision-making structures emerge. Under which circumstances are actors able to form a dominant coalition, and which conditions lead to a situation where power is more evenly balanced between coalitions? Which conditions lead actors to develop a conflictual rather than a consensual type of interaction? Answering these questions can give us some indication of the factors responsible for different types of decision-making structures.

'Going Public': The Mediatization of Decision-Making Processes

In most Western countries, the media are said to exert an increasing influence on the political game. This development, which has been described variably as a shift towards an 'audience democracy' (Manin 1995) or the 'mediatization of politics' (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999), emphasizes the increasing importance of the media for political actors and political decision-making. In such a context, political actors need to communicate with both the media and the public in order to gain support for their policy plans and to influence decision-making. The media were noticeably absent from Kriesi's (1980) in-depth analysis of political decision-making in Switzerland. This suggests that in the early 1970s, the media did not matter or mattered far less than they do today.

Looking beneath the Surface: Differences in Decision-Making Structures across Processes

The previous chapter presented the overall decision-making structure in Swiss politics at the beginning of the 21st century. This provides us with a general picture and allows for a comparison over time with the decision-making structure in the 1970s. However, the analysis of the overall decision-making structure potentially neglects important differences between policy domains (Atkinson and Coleman 1989; Knoke et al. 1996; Kriesi et al. 2006a; Sabatier 1987). Policy issues vary across policy domains, as do the political actors involved. In addition, actors may hold different policy preferences from one policy domain to the next, and they may also collaborate with other partners depending on the policy domain at stake. Examining differences between policy domains is particularly appropriate in Switzerland. Because no fixed coalitions of government and opposition exist, actors create different coalitions in each policy domain (Linder and Schwarz 2008). Whereas important parts of the institutional setting are similar across policy domains, decision-making structures might still vary. As was the case with the cross-time analysis conducted in the two previous chapters, a stability of 'rules-in-form' might hide important variations in 'rules-in-use' also across different policy domains.

An assessment of sample surveys as feedback mechanisms for guiding local decision making /

Research supported by U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research.

Social decision-making for high consequence, low probability occurences /

Oct. 1978.

ISIS Success in Iraq: A Movement 40 Years in the Making

Thesis (Master's)--University of Washington, 2016-06

A way forward for land-use planning to achieve policy goals by using spatial modelling scenarios

This paper investigates how demographic (socioeconomic) and land-use (physical and environmental) data can be integrated within a decision support framework to formulate and evaluate land-use planning scenarios. A case-study approach is undertaken with land-use planning scenarios for a rapidly growing coastal area in Australia, the Shire of Hervey Bay. The town and surrounding area require careful planning of the future urban growth between competing land uses. Three potential urban growth scenarios are put forth to address this issue. Scenario A ('continued growth') is based on existing socioeconomic trends. Scenario B ('maximising rates base') is derived using optimisation modelling of land-valuation data. Scenario C ('sustainable development') is derived using a number of social, economic, and environmental factors and assigning weightings of importance to each factor using a multiple criteria analysis approach. The land-use planning scenarios are presented through the use of maps and tables within a geographical information system, which delineate future possible land-use allocations up until 2021. The planning scenarios are evaluated by using a goal-achievement matrix approach. The matrix is constructed with a number of criteria derived from key policy objectives outlined in the regional growth management framework and town planning schemes. The authors of this paper examine the final efficiency scores calculated for each of the three planning scenarios and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the three land-use modelling approaches used to formulate the final scenarios.

Occupational therapists' decision making in three therapy settings in Australia

Can a work setting with its organizational, cultural, and practical considerations influence the way occupational therapists make decisions regarding client interventions? There is currently a paucity of evidence available to answer this question. This study aimed to investigate the influence of work setting on therapists’ clinical reasoning in the management of clients with cerebral palsy and upper limb hypertonicity. Specifically the study aimed to examine therapists’ objective and stated policies, and their intervention decisions using Social Judgement Theory methodology. Participants were eighteen occupational therapists with more than five years experience with clients with cerebral palsy who were asked to make intervention decisions for clients represented by 90 case vignettes. They worked in three settings, hospitals (5), schools (6), and community (6). The results indicated that therapy settings did influence therapists’ decisions about intervention choices but not their objective and subjective policy decisions.